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1 ( i i i ) 
A b s t r a c t 
T h i s t h e s i s i s pre s e n t e d as a c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s of K a r l Barth's work 
which attempts to be p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y and t h e o l o g i c a l l y l i t e r a t e . I t 
t r i e s to b r i n g out the p e r v a s i v e i n f l u e n c e of Kant upon K a r l B a r t h , i n 
p a r t i c u l a r upon Fides Quaerens Intellectum, a work which concludes with 
a s t i n g i n g a t t a c k upon Kant's v e r s i o n of the o n t o l o g i c a l argument, and 
y e t which owes so much to a Kantian dualism f o r i t s own c o n c l u s i o n s . 
The work i s a l s o intended as c r i t i c i s m of P r o f e s s o r T.F. Torrance's 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of K a r l B a r t h , which we regard as p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y untenable 
because r e s t i n g upon a f a l s e epistemology. We b e l i e v e t h a t P r o f e s s o r 
Torrance i s one of many i n t e r p r e t e r s of K a r l Barth who have y e t to come 
to terms w i t h the i s s u e s r a i s e d f o r t h e o l o g i c a l r e a l i s m by the epistem-
o l o g i c a l r e v o l u t i o n brought about l a r g e l y through Kant's i n f l u e n c e . 
We a l s o o f f e r a t h e o l o g i c a l c r i t i q u e of Barth. His theology i s , we 
b e l i e v e , based upon a form of C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m which has been c r i t i c i s e d 
as 'Christomonist'. We attempt to develop t h i s c r i t i c i s m w i t h our own 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t i n t h i s t h e s i s . 
F i n a l l y , we conclude with the argument t h a t a p r o p e r l y C h r i s t o c e n t r i c 
theology must always understand the nature of God i n terms of the form of 
His s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e i n C h r i s t . There must be no sense i n which the cry 
'Let God be God! 1 seems r a t h e r t o o v e r r i d e than to c a l l a t t e n t i o n to the 
f a c t t h a t God was i n C h r i s t . We b e l i e v e t h a t Barth does not c o n s i s t e n t l y 
h o l d t o t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n h i s work, and t h a t consequently there i s a 
dimension to God's being i n C h r i s t which i s l a c k i n g i n h i s theology. We 
b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s dimension i s a Kenotic one. 
INTRODUCTION 
Widely regarded as the most important theologian of the twe n t i e t h 
century, K a r l Barth's theology has a t t r a c t e d a v i r t u a l i n d u s t r y of 
secondary l i t e r a t u r e . To provide a c r i t i c a l study of the sum of 
t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n upon Ba r t h i s a l i f e t i m e ' s study, and cannot be 
contained w i t h i n the scope of a d o c t o r a l d i s s e r t a t i o n . T h i s work does 
not attempt such a study. I t has been w r i t t e n because I have been 
s t i m u l a t e d , both by reading B a r t h h i m s e l f and by reading c e r t a i n 
accounts of h i s work, to attempt a c r i t i c a l review of h i s theology. 
I should l i k e i n p a r t i c u l a r to mention the account of Barth's e a r l y 
theology o f f e r e d by P r o f e s s o r T.F. T o r r a n c e , 1 which ig n o r e s , I b e l i e v e , 
profound d i f f i c u l t i e s e n t a i l e d by Barth's t h e o l o g i c a l method, (indeed 
t h i s t h e s i s was c o n s c i o u s l y w r i t t e n i n the l i g h t of the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t 
T o r r a n c e ' s treatment of Barth would not do) and the treatment of Barth 
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by Hans Urs von B a l t h a s a r , which reaches i n my view to the h e a r t of 
the problem r a i s e d by Barth's work. 
W h i l s t I b e l i e v e t h a t the e f f e c t of encountering these works and 
o t h e r s , together w i t h a thorough acquaintance with the thought of Barth 
h i m s e l f , has been to l e a d me i n t o a profound c o n s i d e r a t i o n of c r u c i a l 
i s s u e s i n the attempt of a C h r i s t i a n theology to do j u s t i c e to i t s 
s u b j e c t - m a t t e r , i t has not enabled me to d i g e s t and r e f l e c t upon a l l 
t h a t has been w r i t t e n on Barth. 
T h i s i s not to say t h a t I i n t e n d any apology f o r the form of t h i s 
t h e s i s . I t i s o f f e r e d as a work of s c h o l a r s h i p which must, t h e r e f o r e , 
reach c e r t a i n standards not r e q u i r e d , f o r i n s t a n c e , of the e s s a y i s t . 
But i t i s a work of s c h o l a r s h i p aimed, not a t an aspect of Barth's 
thought or a t a d e f i c i e n c y i n the secondary l i t e r a t u r e , but a t Barth's 
thought taken as a whole, c r i t i c i s e d from the p e r s p e c t i v e of a theologian' 
attempt to a r t i c u l a t e and make sense of the c e n t r a l problems i n theology. 
I t i s not a work t h a t seeks to show how problems of a ge n e r a l nature are 
r a i s e d by the study of a p a r t i c u l a r aspect of Barth's thought, but one 
which seeks to show how problems of a p a r t i c u l a r nature are r a i s e d by 
a g e n e r a l study of K a r l B a r t h . The s c h o l a r s h i p which, i n the former 
ca s e , i s e v i d e n t from a d e t a i l e d acquaintance with a p a r t i c u l a r s u b j e c t -
matter, should here be e v i d e n t from the way i n which any general 
d i s c u s s i o n must be informed by knowledge of p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e s . 
A summary of the arguments contained i n t h i s t h e s i s i s provided i n 
the accompanying a b s t r a c t . Our i n t e n t i o n i s a general approach to 
B a r t h 1 s theology which seeks to uncover an enduring dualism which a f f e c t s , 
not only h i s e a r l y 1 t h e o c e n t r i s m ' , but a l s o h i s l a t e r ' C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m ' . 
Our t h e s i s amounts, indeed, to the c l a i m t h a t Barth's C h r i s t o c e n t r i c 
theology cannot i n f a c t cope with the nature of God re v e a l e d i n C h r i s t . 
There are other g e n e r a l approaches to Barth's thought which follow 
a d i f f e r e n t p a t t e r n to our own. One i n p a r t i c u l a r , which I have not 
sought t o follow up, i s t h a t which sees i n Barth an example of ' t h e o l o g i c a l 
a l i e n a t i o n ' which might be t r e a t e d i n i l l u m i n a t i n g f ashion through a 
M a r x i s t c r i t i q u e . Dr R. H. Roberts has been p a r t i c u l a r l y suggestive to 
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me i n t h i s r e s p e c t . T h i s t h e s i s , however, attempts to follow the 
dualism of Barth's theology through to a flawed C h r i s t o l o g i c a l v i s i o n . 
The two approaches are not, of course, incompatible, s i n c e the ' a l i e n a t i o n ' 
of the theologian from r e a l i t y i s nowhere more evident than i n h i s 
f a i l u r e t o come to terms w i t h the true humanity of Jesus of Nazareth, 
t r u l y God only i n so f a r as He was t r u l y a man. 
I wish to acknowledge the support and encouragement of my super-
v i s o r , P r o f e s s o r S. W. Sykes, i n the p r e p a r a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s , and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r h i s acute suggestions on how I might improve my f i r s t d r a f t . 
I would a l s o l i k e t o acknowledge the help I have r e c e i v e d from Dr R.H. 
Roberts' v a s t e x p e r t i s e on B a r t h , and the r i c h legacy of P r o f e s s o r D.M. 
Mackinnon's attempt to make me to some s m a l l extent capable of 
3. 
understanding problems i n the r e l a t i o n of theology to philosophy 
w h i l s t I was a student a t Cambridge. Because of an acute consciousness 
of how f a r i n what I have w r i t t e n I f a l l s h o r t of the worth of those 
who have helped me, I am very g l a d to be able to say t h a t t h i s t h e s i s 
i s e n t i r e l y my own work, and t h a t i t was very much my own d e c i s i o n t h a t 
I c ould not see any way of improving i t of which I was capable. 
Thanks must a l s o be recorded t o the U n i v e r s i t y of Newcastle upon 
Tyne Research Fund f o r supporting me during a p e r i o d of s a b b a t i c a l leave 
i n Cambridge, to my c o l l e a g u e s and to students i n the Department of 
R e l i g i o u s S t u d i e s f o r t h e i r understanding of the need to r e s e a r c h , and 
to Deborah Middleton f o r her h e l p f u l c r i t i c i s m of my work and much 
a s s i s t a n c e i n the p a i n f u l p r o c e s s of o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
t 
4. 
Notes on I n t r o d u c t i o n 
1. Torrance, T.F., Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology 
1910-1931. 
2. von B a l t h a s a r , Hans U r s , Karl Barth, Darstelluhg und Deutung seiner 
Theologie. 
3. See, f o r example, the suggestion i n 'Barth's Doctrine of Time : I t s 
nature and I m p l i c a t i o n s 1 , from S.W. Sykes, ed., Karl Barth: Studies 
of his Theological Method, p.125, n.30. Roberts d e s c r i b e s Barth's 
work as capable of being seen as "the most profound and s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
c o n s i s t e n t t h e o l o g i c a l a l i e n a t i o n of the n a t u r a l order ever achieved' 
(pp.124-5), and i n h i s footnote comments: 
A c e r t a i n a f f i n i t y e x i s t s here between the l o g i c of Barth's p o s i t i o n 
and t h a t of Hegel as c r i t i c i s e d by Marx i n the ' C r i t i q u e of the 
Hegelian D i a l e c t i c and Philosophy as a Whole' i n The Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. 
5. 
CHAPTER ONE 
The e a r l y Barth and Kantian moral theology 
B a r t h ' s a t t i t u d e towards Kant had not always been c r i t i c a l . The 
l e c t u r e s on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,which contain h i s 
most complete c r i t i c a l examination of K a n t l a were w r i t t e n during the 
1930s, a t a time when B a r t h was a l s o i n the p r o c e s s of developing a 
methodology which came to determine the nature of h i s Church Dogmatics 
- a methodology o u t l i n e d i n Fides Quaerens Intellectum, a study of 
Anselm's Proslogion which concludes w i t h a r e j e c t i o n of Kant's i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of Anselm's o n t o l o g i c a l 'proof of God's e x i s t e n c e . 1 * 3 During 
an e a r l i e r p e r i o d of h i s thought, w h i l s t i t would be o v e r - s i m p l i f y i n g 
to say t h a t Barth was a 'Kantian', h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p to Kant was a much 
c l o s e r one. However, the manner of h i s use of Kant underwent s i g n i f i c a n t 
changes. I n t h i s chapter, we s h a l l study the thought of K a r l Barth up 
2 
to the w r i t i n g of the second e d i t i o n of h i s commentary on Romans, a 
work which demonstrated a very d i f f e r e n t use of Kant from t h a t of h i s 
e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s . 
B a r t h c e r t a i n l y claimed to have read Kant thoroughly a t a very e a r l y 
stage i n h i s academic l i f e . I n a c onversation with Wuppertal students 
i n J u l y . 1968, he d e c l a r e d t h a t during t h r e e semesters a t Marburg, from 
A p r i l 1908 to August 1909, he read both the Critique of Practical Reason 
and the Critique of Pure Reason thoroughly. The l a t t e r , indeed, he 'went 
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twice through .... almost with a toothcomb'. Moreover, Barth claimed 
a l r e a d y to have worked through the whole of Kant 'before I made my 
4 
p i l g r i m a g e to Marburg 1. 
I t i s , perhaps, d i f f i c u l t f o r modern students of theology i n an 
E n g l i s h department of theology or r e l i g i o u s s t u d i e s , to understand the 
importance of Kant f o r modern C h r i s t i a n thought, for t h e i r study of 
S y s t e m a t i c s may w e l l not i n c l u d e a comprehensive reading of something 
o f t e n seen to be more a p p r o p r i a t e l y s t u d i e d w i t h i n the context of 
'philosophy of r e l i g i o n ' . I n Barth's c a s e , however, and whatever h i s 
6. 
views i n l a t e r l i f e , 1 a t t h a t time we thought i t was the way one had to 
begin theology'.^ And so Barth's own t h e o l o g i c a l l i f e began with a 
thorough study of Kant and Schleiermacher. 
T h i s i s not to say t h a t Barth was i n t e r e s t e d i n Kant from a purely 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e r e s t i n q u e s t i o n s of epistemology or e t h i c s . There 
i s some evidence t h a t he was not. He went to l e c t u r e s by the Neo-Kantian 
p h i l o s o p h e r s Hermann Cohen and Paul Natarp, w h i l e a t Marburg, but seems 
to have found them u n p r o f i t a b l e . His r e a l i n t e r e s t l a y i n the t h e o l o g i c a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of Kant, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the thought of William Herrmann, 
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'the t h e o l o g i c a l teacher of my student y e a r s ' . 
We can understand the i n f l u e n c e of Kant's r e l i g i o u s thought upon 
the i d e a s of K a r l Barth i n two ways: f i r s t l y , a metaphysical agnosticism 
concerning the nature, not only of God, but of r e a l i t y as such, and 
secondly, a b e l i e f i n the e x i s t e n c e of God which i s grounded upon man's 
sense of o b l i g a t i o n to the moral law, h i s duty. During the period up to 
and i n c l u d i n g the w r i t i n g of the f i r s t commentary on Romans, the 
i n f l u e n c e of Kant upon Barth followed Herrmann's i n being centred upon 
the second a s p e c t of Kant's thought. I n the y e a r s t h a t intervened 
between then and the p u b l i c a t i o n of the second e d i t i o n of h i s commentary, 
however, a profound concern f o r the f i r s t a s p e c t of Kant's thought, 
supervened, and helped to change the whole nature of Barth's theology 
i n t o what could be termed ' d i a l e c t i c a l ' or the 'theology of c r i s i s ' . 
The Kantian moral i d e a l i s m which remained with Barth f o r a decade 
a f t e r h i s departure from Marburg, i s w e l l e x e m p l i f i e d i n an address given 
i n January 1916 i n the Town Church of Aarau and reproduced i n Das Wort 
Gottes und die Theologie, p u b l i s h e d i n 1924. 
The address i s e n t i t l e d 'The Righteousness of God'. I t begins with 
a quotation from I s a i a h : 
'The v o i c e of him t h a t c r i e t h i n the w i l d e r n e s s , 
Prepare thee the way of the Lord, make s t r a i g h t 
i n the d e s e r t a ^ highway fo r our God ...' 
and B a r t h comments: 
'This i s the v o i c e of our c o n s c i e n c e , t e l l i n g us 
of the r i g h t e o u s n e s s of God'. (9) 
'Conscience remains, f o r Ba r t h , i n p r i n c i p l e beyond the c r i t i c i s m 
of human r e l i g i o n and m o r a l i t y which he makes: ' i t may be l e d a s t r a y ' , 
but ' i t remains f o r ever the p l a c e , the only p l a c e between heaven and 
e a r t h , i n which God's rig h t e o u s n e s s i s manifest'. I t i n t e r r u p t s our 
id e a s of duty and our r e l i g i o u s f e e l i n g s , which themselves are open to 
doubt and may be unrighteous, 'as wi t h a b l a z e of trumpets from another 
w o r l d ' . 1 0 Nor i s i t merely the instrument of s e l f - c r i t i c i s m : the voice 
of c o n s c i e n c e , which t e l l s of an unrighteous w i l l t h a t has produced 
d i s t r e s s i n the world (Barth speaks i n the middle of the F i r s t World War), 
t e l l s us a l s o t h a t there i s another, righteous w i l l , out of which 'a 
new world w i l l a r i s e . ' 1 1 I t was t h i s v o i c e of conscience, moreover, which 
the prophets made a r t i c u l a t e to human beings, and which c o n s t i t u t e s t h e i r 
p r e p a r a t i o n of the way of the Lord. 
However, Barth goes on, the righteous w i l l to which our conscience 
i n t r o d u c e s us, as something separate from the unrighteous one to which 
we n a t u r a l l y a s s e n t , . i s a c a p a c i t y which we l i k e , t o pretend o u r s e l v e s 
capable of a c h i e v i n g from our own r e s o u r c e s , or from some e s t a b l i s h e d 
human i n s t i t u t i o n such as the s t a t e or the law. The 'righteous w i l l ' 
to which we i n c l i n e i n the midst of unrighteousness, we i d e n t i f y with the 
laws of the s t a t e , or the i n t e r e s t s of f a m i l i e s , or the l e g a l code, or 
even our m o r a l i t y . We p r e s e n t the a l t e r n a t i v e , r i g h t e o u s , w i l l to our-
s e l v e s as something human r a t h e r than d i v i n e . I n doing so, however, we 
obtain no guarantee a c t u a l l y of i d e n t i f y i n g the t r u l y righteous w i l l : 
f o r v a l u e s of s t a t e , f a m i l y , law or m o r a l i t y may be used to j u s t i f y 
unrighteous r e a l i t i e s - ' I t h i n k of the c a p i t a l i s t i c order and of the 
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war'. I n s h o r t , 'the d e v i l may a l s o make use of our m o r a l i t y " . Such 
v a l u e s only 'rescue us from the alarm-cry of c o n s c i e n c e 1 , r a t h e r than 
express i t s concern: even ' r e l i g i o n ' and ' C h r i s t i a n i t y ' may have t h i s 
e f f e c t , i n t h e i r o f f e r of a 'wonderful sense of s a f e t y and s e c u r i t y ' f o r 
13 
'the unrighteousness whose might we everywhere f e e l ' . 
Nowhere i n t h i s a n a l y s i s , however, does Barth r e l a t i v i s e conscience 
8. 
i t s e l f , i n the way t h a t s t a t e , law, f a m i l y , m o r a l i t y and r e l i g i o n are 
r e l a t i v i s e d . Conscience remains a d i v i n e l y given v o i c e r e c a l l i n g us 
to r i g h t e o u s n e s s , i f we would only be s t i l l and recognise i t , under-
14 
standing t h a t f a i t h i s a process of ' l e t t i n g God speak w i t h i n ' . I n 
t h i s address Barth remains a 'Kantian' i n s o f a r as he remains committed 
to the absoluteness of conscience, which r e g i s t e r s to the l i s t e n i n g 
h e a r t the r i g h t e o u s w i l l of God, and i s recognised i n t h a t 'inner way 
of simple f a i t h ' which C h r i s t r e v e a l e d . ^ Conscience i t s e l f escapes 
the c r i t i c i s m which other, e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l , sources of a u t h o r i t y 
do not: not everything on e a r t h f a l l s under the ' r e l a t i v i s t axe' as a 
merely human phenomenon which may be as much -the work of 'the d e v i l ' 
as of God. Conscience remains, binding the d i v i n e and human orde r s , t h a t 
were l a t e r to draw a p a r t i n Barth's t h i n k i n g , together: the two are 
bound together by t h i s one, c r u c i a l , Kantian chord. 
I n t h i s same year (1916) Barth and h i s f e l l o w - p a s t o r Eduard 
Thurneysen decided to make a study of Paul's E p i s t l e to the Romans. 
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At the same time, Barth renewed the study of Kant h i m s e l f . At f i r s t 
the work was intended f o r an i n n e r c i r c l e of f r i e n d s only; but i n 1919 
Barth p u b l i s h e d a commentary. I n the course of these three years Barth 
had remained f a i t h f u l to h i s view of the absoluteness of conscience, but 
was i n c r e a s i n g l y under the sway of another p r i n c i p l e , t h a t of 
eschatology. His imagination was caught by the fame of Johann Christoph 
Blumhardt, s t o r i e s of whose miraculous h e a l i n g s were w e l l known, and 
a s s o c i a t e d by Blumhardt h i m s e l f w i t h the imminent coming of God's r e i g n . 
Barth's i n t e r e s t i n Blumhardt was s t i m u l a t e d by h i s son, Christoph 
Blumhardt, whom he came to know through Thurneysen i n 1915. 
The i n f l u e n c e of Blumhardt s a t i n i n c r e a s i n g l y strong t e n s i o n with 
the S a f e n w i l p a s t o r ' s enthusiasm f o r the regeneration of :this world, 
e v i n c e d i n h i s involvement w i t h the R e l i g i o u s S o c i a l i s t s . I n J u l y 1916, 
i t was a review of Blumhardt's Hausandachten (House Pr a y e r s ) t h a t 
i n t r o d u c e d a v i r t u a l breach between Barth and Leonhard Ragaz, one of the 
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17 l e a d e r s of the R e l i g i o u s S o c i a l i s t movement. The tragedy of the F i r s t 
World War, f r e q u e n t l y c i t e d as destr o y i n g f a i t h i n the l i b e r a l theology 
of h i s m a n i f e s t l y w a r l i k e p eers, had something .of a double e f f e c t , s i n c e 
he saw the war as e l i c i t i n g e q u a l l y strong evidence of a n a t i o n a l i s t 
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ideology i n the S o c i a l i s t s . 
The Barth of 1919 h a r d l y thought i n terms of the ' p r o v i d e n t i a l r o l e 
of S o c i a l i s m ' which had appealed to him f i v e y e a r s e a r l i e r . At the same 
time, however, the r e i g n of God, w i t h i t s p u r e l y transcendent o r i g i n 
remained, even i n Barth's i n c r e a s i n g l y e s c h a t o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g , a journey 
of the 'beyond' to the here and now, r e a l i s a b l e i n community through 
obedience to an e t h i c a l i d e a l , an i d e a l couched i n Kantian terms by which 
the w i l l of God and the nature of man were fused i n t o one. 
I n the f i r s t e d i t i o n of Barth's commentary on Romans, (1919), i t i s 
c l e a r t h a t the strong e s c h a t o l o g i c a l t h r u s t of the work does not prevent 
an emphasis upon the moral law as the i d e a l r e a l i s a t i o n of God's w i l l -
even i f man cannot r e a l i s e i t . 
The strong o p p o s i t i o n to a p i e t i s t i c , romantic i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n t h i s 
work, f o r i n s t a n c e , c e r t a i n l y leads Barth to pla y upon the i n c a p a c i t y 
of the i n d i v i d u a l , separated from the corporate Kingdom of God, to 
r e c e i v e God's t r u t h : 
Das L i c h t der Wahrheit f f l l l t i n e i n 1 Auge, das es n i c h t 
zu e r t r a g e n vermag, der g o t t l i c h e I n h a l t e r g i e s s t 
s i c h i n e i n i r d i s c h e s GefSss, das e r s o f o r t sprengen muss. 
Gott kann mit mir n i c h t s anfangen. (19) 
Yet w h i l e the s o l i t a r y i n d i v i d u a l , s e t a p a r t from the Kingdom, i s 
here presented as the being incapable of r e c e i v i n g 'the l i g h t of t r u t h ' 
- f o r h i s eye cannot bear i t , or the 'divine content' - f o r the e a r t h l y 
v e s s e l t h a t r e c e i v e s i t w i l l not be able t o hold i t , and i t w i l l b u r s t 
out a g a i n , n e v e r t h e l e s s these metaphors about the i n d i v i d u a l ' s i n c a p a c i t y 
to r e c e i v e 'divine t r u t h ' do not make t h a t t r u t h u n r e a l i s a b l e i n t h i s 
world, but u n r e a l i s a b l e i n an i n d i v i d u a l s e t a p a r t from the Kingdom of 
God. Ba r t h c o n t i n u e s : 
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Das Individuum i s t n i c h t das Subjekt, das den / 
Imperativen der S i t t i c h k e i t gehorchen kann. (20) 
The e t h i c a l i m p erative cannot be obeyed by man a c t i n g i n 'romantic 
i s o l a t i o n ' as an i n d i v i d u a l . But t h a t imperative remains the i d e a l 
r e a l i s a t i o n of God's w i l l , i n p r i n c i p l e r e a l i s a b l e on e a r t h : 
An d i e s e n Menschen t r i t t nun das ewige 'Du s o l l s t ' heran, 
e r muss dazu S t e l l u n g nehmen: der ' I c h ' s o i l Gott 
gerecht werden. (21) 
Faced by the ' e t e r n a l thou s h o u l d s t ' , man remains s u b j e c t to God's 
demand t h a t he r e a l i s e i n h i m s e l f a moral i d e a l which he c o n s t a n t l y 
f a i l s to r e a l i s e . He remains bound to s t r i v e f o r a union of the e t e r n a l 
and the temporal i n a pure moral a c t i o n of which he i s , as a s i n n e r , 
i n c a p a b l e . 
I n t h i s , f i r s t e d i t i o n of h i s commentary, Barth never r e l a t i v i s e s 
the moral law as such as an imperfect human attempt to understand God's 
w i l l . P a u l has r e j e c t e d the i d e a (Romans 7:7) t h a t the law i s e v i l , and 
Barth ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Paul takes the opportunity of denying t h a t the 
moral law can be t r e a t e d as other than an absolute demand upon man's 
obedience: 
Nein Gott, und d i e G e r e c h t i g k e i t , d i e das Gesetz 
f o r d e r t , s i n d e i n s . N i cht der i r r e n d e , a b g e f a l l e n e , 
Mensch i s t e s , der den kategorischen Imperativ der 
P f l i c h t , der i n ihm i s t , ersonnen hat, sowenig e r 
der Erbauer des g e s t i r n t e n Himmels tlber ihm i s t . (22) 
Man no more de v i s e d the moral law, then, than b u i l t the s t a r r y 
heavens! I s i t not p o s s i b l e t h a t Barth has i n mind here the concluding 
remarks of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, t h a t two t h i n g s f i l l e d 
h i s mind w i t h ever new amazement, 'the s t a r r y heavens above me, and the 
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moral law w i t h i n me'? The i d e a t h a t the c a t e g o r i c a l imperative i s a 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of human e t h i c a l theory i s r u l e d out completely: i t i s a 
d i v i n e l y given i d e a l . Barth goes on to w r i t e : 
H i n t e r den Erscheinungen der R e l i g i o n und Moral 
v e r b i r g t s i c h d ie ewige O b j e k t i v i t a t des Wahren 
und Guten, und d i e F u l l e der Ideen w e i s t zuruck 
auf i h r e n Ursprung und I n b e g r i f f i n Gott. (24) 
Behind the 'appearances' of man's a c t u a l moral behaviour and 
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r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e , i s concealed the ' e t e r n a l o b j e c t i v i t y ' of the true 
and the good, whose o r i g i n and p r i n c i p l e l i e i n God. I n the P l a t o n i c 
language o f the quo t a t i o n , the ' f u l l n e s s of the i d e a s ' may be only 
i m p e r f e c t l y expressed - indeed more a c c u r a t e l y concealed - i n the 
ex p e r i e n c e s of m o r a l i t y and r e l i g i o n i n t h i s world: y e t these 'ideas' 
may n e v e r t h e l e s s be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the c a t e g o r i c a l imperative, which 
remains i t s e l f beyond reproach, and i s not i t s e l f an 'appearance' of 
m o r a l i t y i n which i d e a l goodness i s 'concealed'. 
Hence the f i r s t e d i t i o n of t h i s commentary i s prepared to argue, 
t h a t by grace man may become attached to the moral law and God's w i l l 
become a law of nature i n him: 
I h r s e i d unter der Gnade. Euch i s t gegeben, was von 
euch gefordet w i r d . I h r s e i d im B e s i t z der Macht, 
di e das Gute t u t , w e i l s i e s e l b e r das Gute i s t . (25) 
The u n r e a l i s a b l e good, i n so f a r as man remains an i n d i v i d u a l s i n n e r , 
becomes by grace the good t h a t i s i n him and i s him. He does not merely 
p o i n t away from h i m s e l f , i n a l l forms of moral and r e l i g i o u s behaviour, 
to a r e a l i t y which can only appear i n him by way of a p a r a d o x i c a l 
concealment. For the moral law i s not i t s e l f an example of such 
behaviour, open to r e l a t i v i s a t i o n as a 'merely human' i d e a l : i t i s a 
d i v i n e r e a l i t y , given to man not de v i s e d by him. By God's grace i t may 
be r e a l i s e d i n him as h i s true being, and God and man u n i t e d thereby as 
the w i l l of one becomes the nature of the other. 
D e s p i t e the s t r e s s on f a i t h f a i l i n g to j u s t i f y man i n terms of any 
h i s t o r i c a l or p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y i n t h i s world, the moral law i t s e l f 
remains immune t o c a t e g o r i s a t i o n as such a r e a l i t y : thereby i t remains 
a l s o as an i d e a l i n whose r e a l i s a t i o n , by God's grace, the temporal and 
the e t e r n a l , human and d i v i n e , f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e are not separated 
a b s o l u t e l y but r a t h e r are h e l d together i n 'den Kategorischen Imperativ 
der P f l i c h t , der i n ihm i s t ' . I n t h i s , f i r s t commentary on Romans, i n a 
way perhaps r e m i n i s c e n t of Hegel's thought i n The Positivity of the 
Christian Religion before The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, 
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the hold of Kant's moral theology r e s t r a i n s Barth from a more daring 
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approach, which y e t must needs e v e n t u a l l y break the f r a y i n g ropes t h a t 
bind i t . 
Between the f i r s t and second e d i t i o n s of Barth's commentary, a number 
of important i n f l u e n c e s worked upon Barth's thought. Two of the most 
important were Overbeck (and through him, Neitzsche) and Dostoevsky. 
Both men a t t a c k e d the very thread t h a t kept the human and d i v i n e worlds 
i n a l e s s than t o t a l estrangement, t h a t of conscience. The ' s i n n e r s ' i n 
Dostoevsky's novels do not r e a l i s e an i d e a l l i f e - they hope f o r i t . 
T h e i r hope i s p a r a d o x i c a l l y i n the consciousness of t h e i r own wo r t h l e s s n e s s , 
r a t h e r than i n the s t r i v i n g to overcome i t i n obedience to the moral law. 
They a r e , i n the world of the novel, a r e a l i s a t i o n to Barth of the 
Lutheran p r i n c i p l e , 'simul j u s t u s e t p e c c a t o r 1 . T a l k i n g to Raskolnikov 
i n a pub of h i s f a i l i n g s , Marmeladov's hope l i e s i n God's acceptance of 
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the s i n f u l , not i n the power of h i s own conscience to make him b e t t e r . 
He has no hope of t h a t . He w i l l continue to squander h i s money on d r i n k , 
l o s e h i s c i v i l s e r v i c e p ost, beggar h i s fa m i l y and leave h i s daughter 
Sonia condemned to p r o s t i t u t i o n , as the only means of earning a l i v i n g 
f o r her f a m i l y . I n f l u e n c e d by h i s c o l l a b o r a t o r and f e l l o w - p a s t o r 
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Thurneysen, who p u b l i s h e d a s i g n i f i c a n t work on Dostoevsky i n 1921, 
Bar t h experienced a world i n which human beings d i d not progress towards 
m a t u r i t y i n obedience to the d i c t a t e s of conscience: r a t h e r , conscience 
exposed to them the hopeless nature of t h e i r own s i n , and, p a r a d o x i c a l l y , 
awoke i n them a t the same time a humble confidence i n t h e i r f u t u r e 
d e l i v e r a n c e . Conscience d i d not r e a l i s e the u n i t y of the w i l l of God 
wi t h the nature of man, but r e i n f o r c e d t h e i r separateness: i t e s t a b l i s h e d 
the nature of man's confidence and v a l u a t i o n of hims e l f i n terms of hope 
fo r a f u t u r e i n which h i s s a l v a t i o n would be i n s p i t e of h i m s e l f , and 
h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n imputed because only e s c h a t o l o g i c a l l y imparted. Rather 
than l e a d i n g man to a u n i t y w i t h God centred upon h i s moral i d e a l i s m , 
conscience l e d man to an awareness of h i s otherness from God, h i s nature 
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as an i r r e d e e m a b l e s i n n e r , and h i s hope f o r s a l v a t i o n i n s p i t e o f h i s 
s i n f u l n a t u r e . 
The i n f l u e n c e o f Overbeck upon B a r t h , m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h t h e p u b l i c -
a t i o n i n 1919 o f a c o l l e c t i o n o f h i s work, Christentum und Kultur, 
was t o r e i n f o r c e t h e e s c h a t o l o g i c a l s t r a i n i n B a r t h ' s t h o u g h t , and t h e 
c o n v i c t i o n t h a t as such C h r i s t i a n i t y must be a t v a r i a n c e w i t h t h e norms 
o f r e l i g i o n , c u l t u r e and m o r a l i t y . For Overbeck, t h e e s c h a t o l o g i c a l 
c o n t e x t o f t r u e C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f was a ' c a l l t o t h e d e s e r t ' , away from 
t h e 'decadence' o f compromise w i t h c i v i l i s a t i o n . T h i s i n f l u e n c e , however, 
i t s e l f an a c c e n t u a t i o n a l r e a d y n o t i c e a b l e i n B a r t h ' s f i r s t commentary, 
may be l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a n t h a t o f N i e t z s c h e ; Overbeck's c o l l e a g u e and 
c l o s e a s s o c i a t e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B a s l e . I t was N i e t z s c h e who 
perhaps m e d i a t e d t o B a r t h something o f t h e f e r v e n t , Olympian s t y l e he 
d i s p l a y s i n t h e second e d i t i o n o f h i s commentary. More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
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B o u i l l a r d s u g g e s t s , t h e r e may be a c o n n e c t i o n between N i e t z s c h e ' s 
' t r a n s v a l u a t i o n o f v a l u e s ' and B a r t h ' s a t t a c k on t h e v a l u e s of m o r a l i t y , 
c u l t u r e and r e l i g i o n i n t h e name o f C h r i s t i a n i t y : he connects N i e t z s c h e ' s 
r e j e c t i o n o f ' C h r i s t i a n v a l u e s ' i n f a v o u r o f t h e w i l l t o power, w i t h 
B a r t h ' s r e j e c t i o n o f f a i t h i n t h i s - w o r l d l y v a l u e s o f man's m o r a l and 
r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e i n f a v o u r o f an e s c h a t o l o g i c a l hope. Paul's 
remark (Romans 15:1) t h a t 'we who are s t r o n g ' s h o u l d "bear t h e i n f i r m -
i t i e s o f t h e weak', i s connected t o N i e t z s c h e ' s view o f those few who 
a r e p r e p a r e d t o r e j e c t ' C h r i s t i a n ' v a l u e s . C e r t a i n l y t h e n a t u r e o f t h e 
' s t r e n g t h ' i s d i f f e r e n t i n B a r t h and N i e t z s c h e : b u t t h e v a l u e s w h i c h come 
under w h o l e s a l e r e j e c t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f b o t h men c o u l d n o t 
e a s i l y f a i l t o i n c l u d e t h e v e r y m o r a l i d e a l i s m which l a y i n B a r t h ' s 
i n h e r i t a n c e f r o m Kant and Herrmann. 
Through Dostoevsky and N i e t z s c h e i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e i d e a o f 
c o n s c i e n c e as an a b s o l u t e p r i n c i p l e by w h i c h God's w i l l was u n i t e d t o 
man's n a t u r e , and t h e Kingdom advanced, was undermined i n B a r t h ' s 
t h o u g h t . Conscience was n o t t h e i n s t r u m e n t o f u n i t y between man and God 
14. 
b u t a means by w h i c h man l e a r n t t o address h i m s e l f t o h i s o t h e r n e s s f r o m 
God; i t t u r n e d h i s e x p e c t a t i o n o f s a l v a t i o n i n t o a hope f o r acceptance 
i n s p i t e o f h i s s i n f u l n a t u r e . S a l v a t i o n was a p a r a d o x i c a l r e a l i t y , i n 
w h i c h t h e s e p a r a t i o n between man and God was a c c e p t e d , r a t h e r t h a n 
m e l t i n g away i n a m o r a l l y a c h i e v e d f u s i o n . Conscience l a y on the s i d e 
o f man's weakness r a t h e r t h a n h i s s t r e n g t h , as a v a l u e w h i c h , l i k e t h o s e 
o f r e l i g i o n and c u l t u r e , reminded him e s s e n t i a l l y o f h i s d i s u n i t y w i t h 
God. I t d i d n o t h e a l t h e d i v i d e between them, b u t awakened man t o a 
c o nsciousness o f i t , and encouraged him t o l o o k f o r a s t r e n g t h f o u n d 
o n l y i n acceptance t h a t t h i s d i v i d e c o u l d n o t be, i n h i s human under-
s t a n d i n g , overcome. 
B a r t h ' s t h o u g h t was d r i v e n by these r e f l e c t i o n s towards a r a d i c a l 
e s c h a t o l o g y i n w h i c h t h e s e p a r a t i o n between man and God was a b s o l u t e . 
I n K i e r k e g a a r d he had an example o f p a s s i o n a t e acceptance o f t h e 
paradox w h i c h t h i s c r e a t e d f o r C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f . I n Kant, however, he 
had t h e semblance o f i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
\ Throughout h i s academic l i f e , B a r t h ' s s t u d y o f Kant (as w e l l as 
t h a t o f P l a t o ) was i n f l u e n c e d by t h a t o f h i s b r o t h e r , H e i n r i c h : 
Mein P h i l o s o p h i s c h e Bruder s o r g t e d a f u r , dass 
m i r auch d i e W e i s h e i t P l a t o s w i e d e r e r n s t l i c h 
v o r Augen g e f f l h r t wurde. Und V a t e r K a n t , der m i r e i n s t d i e 
\ I n i t i a l z f l n d u n g v e r m i t t e l t h a t , h a t auch i n j e n e n Jahren 
( B a r t h i s r e f e r r i n g t o t h e 1910s) merkwurdigerweise a u f s 
Neue d i r e k t zu m i r g e r e d e t . (30) 
I n 1921 H e i n r i c h B a r t h p u b l i s h e d two s t u d i e s o f P l a t o n i c t h o u g h t . ^ 
A r g u a b l y , he produced something o f a ' K a n t i a n ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f P l a t o . 
I n h i s book on t h e s o u l i n P l a t o ' s p h i l o s o p h y , he argued t h a t t h e s o u l 
c o u l d n o t be f o u n d i n t h e r e g i o n o f b e i n g , b u t must be t r e a t e d as an a 
priori i d e a , an argument w h i c h i l l u s t r a t e d H e i n r i c h B a r t h ' s tendency, as 
a n e o - K a n t i a n , t o i n t e r p r e t P l a t o ' s Ideas as i f t h e y were ' f o r m a l a. 
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prioris'. A t t h e same t i m e , H e i n r i c h B a r t h sought t o r e d r e s s an 
i mbalance which he f e l t b e l o n g e d t o t h e 'Marburg School'. T h e i r 
c r i t i c a l i d e a l i s m r a d i c a l i s e d Kant's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a n a l y t i c and 
e l i m i n a t e d t h e ' t h i n g i n i t s e l f . H e i n r i c h B a r t h sought t o r e s t o r e 
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t h e r e l a t i o n o f a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r o b l e m a t i c t o t h e problem o f r e a l i t y , . 
and t h u s t o m a i n t a i n t h e e s s e n t i a l d u a l i s m o f Kant's t h o u g h t , n o t 
a l l o w i n g t h e i d e a l i s m o f Kant's i n t e r p r e t e r s t o bypass t h e q u e s t i o n o f 
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r e a l i t y as i t e x i s t e d a p a r t f r o m t h e human u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 
What i s p r o f o u n d l y i m p o r t a n t , i n t h e t h o u g h t o f b o t h P l a t o and Kant, 
i s t h e o u t l i n e o f a d u a l i s m . I n t h e f o r m e r , t h e d u a l i s m l i e s between t h e 
s e n s i b l e w o r l d o f becoming and t h e i n t e l l i g i b l e w o r l d o f b e i n g : i n t h e 
l a t t e r , i t l i e s between t h i n g s as t h e y a r e p e r c e i v e d and u n d e r s t o o d , and 
t h i n g s as t h e y a r e ' i n t h e m s e l v e s ' , a p a r t f r o m such p e r c e i v i n g and 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n o f t h e work we c o n c e n t r a t e upon t h e i n f l u e n c e o f 
Kant, whose p h i l o s o p h y does n o t r e s t upon an u n r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n between 
t h e scope o f t h e senses and t h a t o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , u n l i k e P l a t o ' s , 
and w h i c h t h e r e f o r e approaches t h e problem o f t h e r e l a t i o n between 
knowledge and r e a l i t y w i t h an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l m a t u r i t y l a c k i n g i n P l a t o 
(as i t was a l s o l a c k i n g i n t h e p r e - K a n t i a n e m p i r i c i s t s ' d i s t i n c t i o n 
between ' i m p r e s s i o n s ' and ' i d e a s ' ) . 
I n many t r e a t m e n t s o f t h e i n f l u e n c e o f Kant's p h i l o s o p h y upon 
C h r i s t i a n t h o u g h t i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s , t h a t 
i n f l u e n c e i s c o n f i n e d t o t h e d i s p r o o f o f t r a d i t i o n a l p r o o f s o f t h e 
e x i s t e n c e o f God, fou n d i n t h e second h a l f o f t h e Critique of Pure 
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Reason, But Kant's i n f l u e n c e upon modern t h e o l o g y was much b r o a d e r 
t h a n t h a t . I n h i s t r e a t m e n t o f 'The I m p o s s i b i l i t y o f a C o s m o l o g i c a l 
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P r o o f o f t h e E x i s t e n c e o f God' , Kant remarks t h a t t h e p r o o f i n v o l v e s 
t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e ' a p p l i c a b l e o n l y i n t h e s e n s i b l e w o r l d ' 
t o a r e a l i t y beyond i t . The p r o o f a t t e m p t s t o i n f e r , f r o m t h e 
c o n t i n g e n t n a t u r e o f t h e w o r l d , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a necessary b e i n g as 
i t s cause. Kant's o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s i s t h a t 'the p r i n c i p l e o f 
c a u s a l i t y has no meaning and no c r i t e r i o n f o r i t s a p p l i c a t i o n save o n l y 
i n t h e s e n s i b l e w o r l d . But i n t h e c o s m o l o g i c a l p r o o f i t i s p r e c i s e l y 
i n o r d e r t o e n a b l e us t o advance beyond t h e s e n s i b l e w o r l d t h a t i t i s 
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36 employed'. The p o i n t seems t o be t h a t an i d e a whose raison d'etre 
l i e s i n i t s b e i n g a concept w h i c h t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g b r i n g s t o 
e x p e r i e n c e cannot be a p p l i e d beyond e x p e r i e n c e ; t h e p l a c e o f a concept 
o f c a u s a l i t y i s t o a l l o w t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o have e x p e r i e n c e , n o t t o 
enable i t t o s p e c u l a t e upon what l i e s o u t s i d e e x p e r i e n c e a l t o g e t h e r . 
The p o i n t h e r e i s much b r o a d e r i n scope t h a n a mere r e j e c t i o n o f 
s p e c u l a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g God. Kant's p h i l o s o p h y must s u r e l y e x c l u d e a l l 
s p e c u l a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y as such, as i t e x i s t s 
i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e o b s e r v e r , and n o t merely c o n c e r n i n g t h e n a t u r e o f 
God. The c o s m o l o g i c a l argument must s u r e l y be wrong, on Kant's 
p r i n c i p l e s , n o t o n l y i n t h e way i n w h i c h i t a t t e m p t s t o reason from t h e 
w o r l d t o God, b u t i n t h e way i n w h i c h i t a t t e m p t s t o reason about 
r e a l i t y as such. F o r i f t h e concept o f c a u s a t i o n i s n o t d e r i v e d f r o m 
n a t u r e , b u t r a t h e r b r o u g h t t o i t by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i c h demands 
t h a t i n o r d e r t h a t r e a l i t y s h o u l d be made i n t e l l i g i b l e t o i t i t s h o u l d 
have such a concept imposed upon i t , t h e n t o argue t h a t r e a l i t y as such 
e x h i b i t s a c h a r a c t e r o f c a u s a l i t y i s i t s e l f t o t a k e p h i l o s o p h y 'where 
i t c a n n o t go'. There i s a tendency t o suppose t h a t Kant i s making t h e 
' s e n s i b l e ' remark t h a t w h i l s t we may c o n f i d e n t l y d i s c e r n t h e t r u e 
n a t u r e o f t h e e m p i r i c a l w o r l d , we cannot know what may l i e 'beyond' i t . 
Kant i s f a r more r a d i c a l and i n t e r e s t i n g i n h i s remarks t h a n t h a t . He 
i s n o t so much, i n these remarks on t h e C o s m o l o g i c a l Argument, a t t a c k i n g 
a v i e w w h i c h reasons f r o m t h e known t o t h e unknown, as one w h i c h reasons 
f r o m one unknown t o a n o t h e r . The d i s t i n c t i o n between phenomena and 
noumena w h i c h a r i s e s f r o m h i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t 'the w o r l d ' o r ' n a t u r e ' 
must be u n d e r s t o o d as r e a l i t y o n l y i n s o f a r as i t i s d e t e r m i n e d 
a c c o r d i n g t o a priori concepts o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and w h i c h i s 
t h e r e f o r e d i s t i n c t f r o m r e a l i t y as i t e x i s t s a p a r t from such determ-
i n a t i o n , e f f e c t i v e l y removes f r o m t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g n o t m e r e l y God b u t 
t h i n g s - i n - t h e m s e l v e s , a l l t h a t i s i n s o f a r as i t l i e s o u t s i d e t h e 
i n e v i t a b l y d i s t o r t i n g mind o f man, w h i c h t r a n s f o r m s what e x i s t s i n t o 
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what may be o r d e r e d by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and t h e r e f o r e can o n l y presume 
i g n o r a n c e o f t h e r e a l n a t u r e o f what e x i s t s . The t r o u b l e w i t h t h e 
' c o s m o l o g i c a l p r o o f i s n o t s i m p l y i t s a m b i t i o n t o d i s c e r n i n t h e f i n i t e 
n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y t h e ground f o r b e l i e v i n g i n an i n f i n i t e -- God; b u t i t s 
a m b i t i o n s i m p l y t o d i s c e r n t h e f i n i t e n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y . For what 
r e a l i t y i s i t d i s c e r n i n g ? Only t h e 'phenomenal w o r l d ' , t h e w o r l d as i t 
appears t o man. I s i t s f a u l t t o b e l i e v e t h a t f r o m t h e n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y 
e x t e r n a l t o t h e o b s e r v e r i t can de t e r m i n e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f God? But i t s 
f a u l t l i e s f i r s t l y i n b e l i e v i n g t h a t i t can determine t h e n a t u r e o f 
r e a l i t y e x t e r n a l t o t h e o b s e r v e r . The r e a l e f f e c t o f Kant's p h i l o s o p h y 
i s n o t s i m p l y t o e x c l u d e t h e employment o f t h e s p e c u l a t i v e reason i n 
a t t e m p t i n g t o p r o v e God's e x i s t e n c e , b u t t o produce a fundamental s h i f t 
i n t h e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g as such. 
T h i s s h i f t may l e a d t h e t h e o l o g i a n t o see God's r e v e l a t i o n l o c a t e d 
n o t i n t h e n a t u r e o f a r e a l i t y e x t e r n a l t o t h e o b s e r v e r , b u t i n t h e 
o b s e r v e r ' s own e x p e r i e n c e , w h i c h i s t h e o n l y r e a l i t y known t o him. I t 
may encourage a development o f t h e o l o g y i n w h i c h evidence f o r t h e 
e x i s t e n c e o f God i s made t o l i e i n t h e n a t u r e o f main's m o r a l o r 
r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e r a t h e r t h a n i n t h e n a t u r e o f t h e w o r l d e x t e r n a l 
t o h i m , w h i c h becomes an unknown r e a l i t y i n t o w h i c h h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g • 
cannot go. I t was i n t h i s s h i f t i n t h e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g , i n f l u e n c e d 
by Kant's p h i l o s o p h y , t h a t B a r t h came t o d i s c e r n an unwelcome a n t h r o p o -
c e n t r i c t r e n d i n n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h e o l o g y ( n o t t o be confused w i t h 
s u b j e c t i v i s m ) , a t r e n d w h i c h he was f i n a l l y t o b e l i e v e c o u l d o n l y be 
b r o k e n by a t h e o c e n t r i c o n t o l o g y based on t h e pri m a c y o f r e v e l a t i o n . 
I n t h e second e d i t i o n o f B a r t h ' s commentary on Romans , we f i n d no 
e v i d e n c e y e t o f such an o n t o l o g y . B ut t h e r e i s , a l r e a d y , a c l e a r 
r e j e c t i o n o f t h e move fr o m an e x t e r n a l t o an i n t e r n a l r e a l i t y as t h e 
l o c u s o f God's r e v e l a t i o n . B a r t h d e n i e s h i m s e l f t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r 
t h e o l o g y i n t h e l i g h t o f c r i t i c a l i d e a l i s m which Kant h i m s e l f , and 
S c h l e i e r m a c h e r , d e v e l o p , i n w h i c h t h e e x c l u s i o n o f man's knowledge f r o m 
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r e a l i t y as such i s a c c e p t e d , and h i s knowledge o f God l o c a t e d i n 
human m o r a l and r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . For such a move i s p r e c i s e l y 
what, i n B a r t h ' s v i e w , leads t o an u n a c c e p t a b l e 1 r e l a t i v i s i n g 1 o f 
f a i t h , w h i c h i s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r s e t o f m o r a l , r e l i g i o u s 
o r c u l t u r a l v a l u e s , i n c l u d i n g t h a t o f co n s c i e n c e . The r e s u l t i s a 
' m o r a l i s i n g ' and ' p s y c h o l o g i s i n g ' o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f a s s e s s i n g C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f i n terms o f e x t r a - t h e o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s 
drawn f r o m e t h i c s and p s y c h o l o g y . B a r t h has, t h e r e f o r e , no l o c u s o f 
r e v e l a t i o n i n t h e w o r l d as we e x p e r i e n c e i t a t a l l : r e a l i t y as we 
know i t i s i t s e l f r e l a t i v i s e d i n t o an e x i s t e n c e under 'judgment', i n 
which f a i t h i s an e s c h a t o l o g i c a l hope w h i c h can i n no way b i n d t h e 
Word t o come t o t h i s w o r l d . As B o u i l l a r d p o i n t s o u t , under t h e 
p e r s p e c t i v e r e c e i v e d f r o m Kant's c r i t i c a l i d e a l i s m , B a r t h ' s t h o u g h t 
e x p r e s s e d i n t h e second commentary shows t h a t : 
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e s c h a t o l o g i e d e v i e n t synomyme de transcendence. 
Man's e s c h a t o l o g i c a l hope i s no l o n g e r f o r a f u t u r e i n whic h t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f t h i s w o r l d a r e r e a l i s e d , b u t f o r a 'Wholly Other' 
t r a n s c e n d e n t r e a l i t y i n w h i c h t h i s w o r l d i s negated. 
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" I f I have a system', B a r t h remarks i n t h e p r e f a c e t o h i s second 
e d i t i o n o f h i s commentary (which I a l s o d e l i b e r a t e l y r e f e r t o as a 
'second commentary', g i v e n i t s r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s from t h e f i r s t , 
acknowledged by B a r t h h i m s e l f i n terms o f an o r i g i n a l w h i c h 'has been 
so c o m p l e t e l y r e w r i t t e n t h a t i t may be c l a i m e d t h a t no s t o n e remains 
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i n i t s o l d p l a c e 1 ) ' i t i s l i m i t e d t o a r e c o g n i t i o n o f what 
K i e r k e g a a r d c a l l e d t h e " i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n " between t i m e 
and e t e r n i t y , and t o my r e g a r d i n g t h i s as p o s s e s s i n g n e g a t i v e as w e l l 
as p o s i t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e : "God i s i n heaven, and t h o u a r t on e a r t h " . 
B a r t h goes on: 
The r e l a t i o n between such a God and such a man, and t h e 
r e l a t i o n between such a man and such a Gcd, i s f o r me 
t h e theme o f t h e B i b l e and t h e essence o f p h i l o s o p h y . 
Note t h e words, 'and t h e essence o f p h i l o s o p h y ' . B a r t h ' s system i s n o t 
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so much K i e r k e g a a r d i a n i n i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l base, as K a n t i a n , a p p l y i n g 
t h e f i r m d ichotomy between appearance and r e a l i t y i n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l 
i d e a l i s m t o t h e t h e o l o g i c a l scheme o f an a b s o l u t e s e p a r a t i o n between 
God and man. I t b u i l d s upon a K a n t i a n p e r c e p t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e 
i n e v i t a b l e s e l f - i m p o s e d l i m i t s p l a c e d by t h e mind upon i t s knowledge o f 
r e a l i t y , and w i t h a N i e t z s c h e a n grandeur p r o c l a i m s t h e acceptance o f 
t h i s i s o l a t i o n o f man i n t h e pa£hos of an e s c h a t o l o g i c a l hope. Man's 
c a p a c i t y i s undoubted - i n d e e d e s t a b l i s h e d - by Kant, b u t t h e l i m i t s o f 
t h a t c a p a c i t y are a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d , i n a f i r m o b j e c t i v e s e p a r a t i o n 
between t h e r e a l i t y w i t h w h i c h man d e a l s and t h e r e a l i t y he must presume, 
b u t c a n n o t know, beyond such d e a l i n g . . He i s l i b e r a t e d f r o m a Humean 
s c e p t i c i s m c o n c e r n i n g t h e use o f concepts such as t h a t o f c a u s a t i o n , 
o n l y i n t h e acceptance t h a t t h e y a r e forms o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g r a t h e r t h a n 
c o n s t i t u e n t s o f r e a l i t y i n i t s e l f : such a l i b e r a t i o n e x i s t s o n l y i n t h e 
c o n t e x t o f an i m p r i s o n m e n t w i t h i n w h i c h he cannot even ask t h e q u e s t i o n 
w h i c h Hume asked, c o n c e r n i n g t h e c a p a c i t y o f r e a l i t y i t s e l f t o bear such 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t o o l s . He i s l o c k e d i n t o h i s own p e r c e p t i o n and under-
s t a n d i n g o f r e a l i t y w i t h i n w h i c h , i n a memorable phrase o f P r o f e s s o r 
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Donald Mackinnon's , he can o p e r a t e f r e e l y o n l y m th e consciousness 
t h a t he can never 'jump o u t o f h i s c o g n i t i v e s k i n ' . 
Under Kant's c r i t i c a l i d e a l i s m , man i s bound, even i n h i s v e r y 
s c i e n t i f i c s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e , t o a m e t a p h y s i c a l a g n o s t i c i s m w h i c h he cannot 
deny. H i s o p t i m i s m about h i m s e l f and h i s p r o g r e s s i n d i s c e r n i n g and 
m a n i p u l a t i n g r e a l i t y i s j u s t i f i e d , o n l y a t t h e moment when r e a l i t y i s 
i t s e l f t a k e n f r o m under h i s f e e t and he i s condemned t o i s o l a t i o n f r o m 
i t . I t i s w i t h i n t h i s framework o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i d e a l i s m t h a t B a r t h ' s 
t h e o l o g y i n h i s second commentary on Romans f i t s : a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l 
e s c h a t o l o g y , w h i c h c a r r i e s w i t h i t a l l t h e v i t a l d o c t r i n e s o f t h e 
C h r i s t i a n f a i t h , t h o s e o f C r e a t i o n , f a l l , r e s u r r e c t i o n and s a l v a t i o n , 
ensures t h a t none may c r o s s t h e i m p e n e t r a b l e d i v i d e between t i m e and 
e t e r n i t y , and e s t a b l i s h e s a s e p a r a t i o n between man and God w h i c h 
, 2o. 
p r o v i d e s t h e p a r a d o x i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n o f a K a n t i a n d u a l i s m . 
The p o s s i b i l i t y o f freedom w h i c h such d u a l i s m made p o s s i b l e , and 
t h e consequent j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e r e a l i t y o f m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n , i n t h e 
t h o u g h t o f Kant h i m s e l f , i s e x c l u d e d f r o m account i n t h i s commentary. 
I t i s r e g a r d e d as an unnecessary appendage t o t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i d e a l i s m 
i t s e l f . PB we s h a l l see i n d e t a i l i n t h e n e x t c h a p t e r , the second e d i t i o n 
o f B a r t h ' s commentary f i n d s t h e u l t i m a t e s t a t e m e n t o f man's r e l a t i o n t o 
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God i n a ' d e n i a l .of knowledge' w h i c h makes room, n o t f o r a m o r a l , b u t 
f o r an e s c h a t o l o g i c a l , f a i t h . 
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T r a n s c e n d e n t a l I d e a l i s m and T r a n s c e n d e n t a l E s c h a t o l o g y 
Among t h e v a r i o u s i n f l u e n c e s upon the second e d i t i o n o f B a r t h ' s 
Epistle to the Romans, one t h a t i s e a s i l y missed i s t h a t o f P a u l 
h i m s e l f , i n a work t h a t i s , a f t e r a l l , p r e s e n t e d i n t h e form o f a 
commentary on a t e x t . I n e x a m i n i n g B a r t h ' s book, we s h a l l t a k e care 
t o show t h e use he makes o f P a u l i n e c o n c e p t s , w i t h o u t presuming t o be 
a b l e t o j u d g e t h e work as a p i e c e o f New Testament s c h o l a r s h i p (upon 
success i n w h i c h endeavour t h e v a l u e o f t h e work does n o t , i n our 
v i e w l i e ) . 
B a r t h ' s commentary i s an e x p l o r a t i o n o f P a u l i n e t h o u g h t i n t h e 
l i g h t o f t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' 
( ' u n e n d l i c h e n q u a l i t a t i v e n U n t e r s c h i e d ' ) between t i m e and e t e r n i t y , and 
i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h e r e l a t i o n between God and man, was something 
w h i c h t h e A p o s t l e h i m s e l f a f f i r m e d . He understands ' f a i t h ' . (*XLOTLS) 
i n P a u l ' s t h o u g h t t o be an a t t i t u d e towards God which sees Him i n 
complete a n t i t h e s i s t o t h e w o r l d . A key p o i n t i n B a r t h ' s a n a l y s i s i s 
t h a t any d e n i a l o f t h i s a n t i t h e s i s w o u ld i n d i c a t e a b e l i e f t h a t man 
m i g h t 'possess' t h e d i v i n e , m i g h t c o n t r o l i t and d i r e c t i t t o a human 
p u r p o s e . Through some human i n s t i t u t i o n , o r c i r c u m s t a n c e , o r p r i v i l e g e , 
man w o u l d b e l i e v e h i m s e l f a b l e t o 'take h o l d o f God: b u t f o r B a r t h , 
P a u l ' s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t f a i t h i s e q u a l l y p o s s i b l e f o r a l l d e r i v e s from 
h i s p e r c e p t i o n t h a t t h e b a r r i e r between man and God e x c l u d e s any such 
human a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f t h e d i v i n e . There i s an e q u a l i t y o f a l l men 
b e f o r e God i n t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f t h e d i v i n e absence: God i s 'no 
r e s p e c t e r o f p e r s o n s ' (Romans 2:11), and ' t h e r e i s no d i s t i n c t i o n ' 
(Romans 3:22b). I n t h i s c o n t e x t ' f a i t h ' i s n o t t o be u n d e r s t o o d as a 
'pos s e s s i o n ' o f man, as some d i v i n e power w h i c h c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s l a y 
h o l d o f , and w h i c h overcomes i n themselves t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between man 
and God. B a r t h f r e q u e n t l y t r a n s l a t e s 'ituaTts •' 'the f a i t h f u l n e s s o f God 1 
r a t h e r t h a n ' f a i t h ' as a q u a l i t y o f man, i n o r d e r t o emphasise t h a t 
25. 
f a i t h does n o t overcome t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . I n t r a n s l a t i n g Romans 3:22a, 
B a r t h r e f e r s t o t h e r i g h t e o u s n e s s o f God n o t 'thro u g h f a i t h i n Jesus 
C h r i s t f o r a l l who b e l i e v e " , b u t 'thro u g h h i s f a i t h f u l n e s s i n C h r i s t 
u n t o a l l them t h a t b e l i e v e ' . ^ " B a r t h ' s i n t e n t i o n i s t o c l a i m t h a t Paul 
i s n o t a r g u i n g t h a t God's r i g h t e o u s n e s s i s m a n i f e s t e d t o those who have 
t h e q u a l i t y o f f a i t h i n C h r i s t , and who t h e r e b y u n i t e themselves w i t h 
t h e d i v i n e , b u t t h a t God's r i g h t e o u s n e s s i s m a n i f e s t e d t h r o u g h H i s own, 
d i v i n e , f a i t h f u l n e s s , w h i c h a l l o w s no one t o push f o r w a r d t h e i r own 
c a p a c i t i e s , p r i v i l e g e s - o r f a i t h ! - i n o r d e r t o make a c l a i m upon Him 
and u n i t e themselves t o Him. 
I t i s i n t h i s sense t h a t B a r t h understands Paul's r e j e c t i o n o f any 
gro u n d f o r ' b o a s t i n g ' (Kotuxnya) i n man. The power o f g r e a t f i g u r e s such 
as Abraham i s God's, n o t t h e i r s . 'Abraham never "possessed" God: God 
2 
possessed him'. The ' r i g h t e o u s n e s s ' o f Abraham - ' t o Abraham h i s 
f a i t h was reckoned f o r r i g h t e o u s n e s s ' (Romans 4:9b) - i s n o t a 
3 
' p e c u l i a r i t y o f Abraham's d i r e c t l y v i s i b l e s t a t u s ' . B a r t h i n s i s t s 
4 
t h a t ' h i s r i g h t e o u s n e s s i s c l e a r l y d i s t i n c t f r o m h i s c i r c u m c i s i o n ' , 
f o r i t i s n o t an aspe c t o f some e a r t h l y p r i v i l e g e or o f h i s b e l o n g i n g 
t o a p a r t i c u l a r r a c e . I n d e e d , B a r t h i n s i s t s t h a t t h e emphasis upon 
Abraham, i n Paul's a c c o u n t , i s an emphasis upon Abraham as a 'pagan' 
r a t h e r t h a n a 'Jew', as one t h e r e f o r e who had p r e c i s e l y no e a r t h l y 
p r i v i l e g e or s t a t u s t o c l a i m f o r h i m s e l f b e f o r e God. Abraham has 
n o t h i n g t o b o a s t about b e f o r e God, save h i s f a i t h , w hich h i s c i r c u m -
c i s i o n s i g n i f i e s b u t i n no way e s t a b l i s h e s . Moreover t h e f a i t h o f 
Abraham, as we have a l r e a d y o b s e r v e d , i s n o t an a c t i v e q u a l i t y o f man 
w h i c h u n i t e s him w i t h God, b u t t h e f a i t h f u l n e s s o f God w h i c h remains 
s e p a r a t e f r o m t h e b e i n g o f man. I t i s t h u s t h a t P a u l , B a r t h a r g u e s , 
speaks o f Abraham's f a i t h as 'reckoned', t h a t i s t o say, i t i s n o t a 
q u a l i t y o f Abraham w h i c h God p e r c e i v e s , b u t a q u a l i t y o f God i n whi c h 
Abraham i s a c c e p t e d i n s p i t e o f h i s ' u n g o d l i n e s s ' and s e p a r a t i o n f r o m 
h i s C r e a t o r - a d i v i n e ' n e v e r t h e l e s s ' r a t h e r t h a n a d i v i n e ' t h e r e f o r e ' , 
26. 
f o r g i v e n e s s r a t h e r t h a n a d i v i n e i m p r i m a t u r upon what men a r e . ^ 
Every ground o f b o a s t i n g i s l o s t , e xcept hope, f o r any c o n f i d e n c e 
man has cannot l i e i n what he i s or possesses now b e f o r e God, b u t i n 
what he b e l i e v e s o f God i n s p i t e o f t h e s e p a r a t i o n between them. I n 
o t h e r w o r d s , h i s ground o f b o a s t i n g i s a hope o f s a l v a t i o n i n which man 
i s e s t a b l i s h e d beyond d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h i s w o r l d - o r d e r , o f w h i c h he can 
6 
i n p r i n c i p l e have no u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n t h i s l i f e , n o r i n any way grasp. 
7 
The o n l y g r o u n d o f b o a s t i n g , t h e n , i s r e p e n t a n c e , (Romans 2:4) i n 
w h i c h man a c c e p t s t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f u n i t i n g h i m s e l f w i t h God i n t h e 
c o n t e x t o f h i s w o r t h l e s s n a t u r e on e a r t h . The o n l y t r u e o b j e c t o f 
g 
b o a s t i n g i s t h e r i g h t e o u s n e s s ' m a n i f e s t e d by t h e b l o o d o f Jesus', f o r 
t h e c r o s s , i n B a r t h ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n , stands between man and God as t h e 
v e r y c o r n e r s t o n e o f h i s d i a l e c t i c a l argument t h a t man's ' e s t a b l i s h m e n t ' 
comes t h r o u g h ' d i s s o l u t i o n 1 , t h a t h i s s a l v a t i o n i s by way of 'cross and 
r e s u r r e c t i o n ' , though t h e d e n i a l o f t h i s w o r l d i n i t s s e p a r a t i o n f r o m 
God and i t s r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t beyond t h a t d i s s o l u t i o n i n a form w h i c h 
cannot now be p e r c e i v e d . B o a s t i n g i n t h e r i g h t e o u s n e s s ' m a n i f e s t e d by 
t h e b l o o d o f Jesus', focusses upon t h e c r o s s as 'the b r i d g e w h i c h 
9 
c r e a t e s a chasm and t h e p r o m i s e w h i c h sounds a w a r n i n g ' . 
The c r o s s c r e a t e s a d i s t a n c e between o u r s e l v e s and God even as i t 
u n i t e s us t o Him. I t j o i n s man t o God i n a f f i r m i n g t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n , 
as C h r i s t h i m s e l f o n l y l i v e s i n t h e r e s u r r e c t i o n t h r o u g h h i s death on 
t h e c r o s s . Man and God r emain a p a r t , and t h e 'boast' o f t h e f o r m e r i n 
t h e r i g h t e o u s n e s s o f God does n o t deny t h a t s e p a r a t i o n : i t a f f i r m s t h a t 
t h e r e i s an e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f man beyond i t i n an e s c h a t o l o g i c a l t r a n s -
f o r m a t i o n o f w h i c h he can have, i n t h i s l i f e , no knowledge, and i n t h i s 
10 
l i f e possess p r o l e p t i c a l l y no p a r t and e n j o y no f o r e t a s t e . 
I n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h i s B a r t h i a n scheme, 'grace' cannot i m p l y any 
' s p i r i t u a l power r e s i d i n g i n t h e man o f t h i s w o r l d ' , any acceptance o f 
a 'cosmic power i n t h i s e a r t h ' . ^ Grace i s a promise o f t h e Kingdom 
o f God u n r e a l i s e d , an assurance t h a t t h e s e p a r a t i o n between man and God 
27. 
i s n o t t h e u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y . I t i s always h i d d e n and i n v i s i b l e - f o r 
i t can never become a ' p a r t ' o f t h i s w o r l d : t h e mark of i t s o p e r a t i o n 
i s a d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e p a s s i n g o f t h i s w o r l d . I n g i v i n g us g r a c e , God 
t r e a t s us as t h a t w h i c h we are p r e s e n t l y n o t . He t r e a t s us as those t o 
be e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e p r e s e n t o r d e r i n whic h 
we s t i l l e x i s t i n a b s o l u t e o t h e r n e s s t o H i m s e l f . Grace t r a n s f o r m s t h e 
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' p r i s o n e r ' i n t o a 'watchman', who l e a r n s t o see t h e c o n f i n e s o f t h e 
p r e s e n t o r d e r , n o t as any l e s s s e p a r a t e d f r o m i t s d i v i n e o r i g i n , b u t 
as a p l a c e f r o m w h i c h he may e x p e c t and hope f o r t h e e s c h a t o l o g i c a l 
coming o f God. Grace does n o t i n f u s e a d i v i n e presence i n t o t h e w o r l d : 
i t r e l a t i v i s e s t h e w o r l d , and makes i t aware o f i t s l i m i t a t i o n s , w h i l s t 
d e n y i n g i t t h e power t o overcome t h o s e l i m i t a t i o n s . I t g i v e s i t a n o t e 
o f e x p e c t a n c y , o f hope - t h e h a r d w a l l s o f i t s confinement r e m a i n , be 
t h e y o f a c e l l o r a w a t c h t o w e r . 
T h i s s i t u a t i o n o f man b e f o r e God i s r e p r e s e n t e d , B a r t h argues, i n 
t h e c l a s s i c P a u l i n e concepts o f t h e law, o f s i n , o f death and o f t h e 
F a l l . These p r o v i d e t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f a d i a l e c t i c a l s t a t e m e n t o f t h e 
human c o n d i t i o n , w h i c h i s w h o l l y s e t a p a r t f r o m God - robbed o f l i f e , 
f a l l e n f r o m P a r a d i s e - and a b l e t o be r e s t o r e d o n l y by t h e d i s s o l u t i o n 
o f t h e p r e s e n t o r d e r , r a t h e r t h a n i t s g r a d u a l p e n e t r a t i o n by t h e 
presence o f God. The i d e a t h a t t h e p r e s e n t o r d e r may be u n i t e d t o God 
i s r i g o r o u s l y e x c l u d e d by B a r t h ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n o f Paul's t r e a t m e n t o f 
t h e l aw, whic h s t a n d s f o r human b e i n g , h a v i n g and d o i n g i n s o f a r as t h e y 
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p r e s e n t man s t r i v i n g t o r e a l i s e a divine-human harmony w h i c h i n 
p r i n c i p l e cannot be a c h i e v e d . The law awakens i n man a d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , 
a sense o f d e p r i v a t i o n , a v o i d and a l o n g i n g , a P l a t o n i c 'anamnesis' of 
a r e a l i t y i n c o n g r u e n t w i t h t h e p r e s e n t w o r l d o r d e r . Indeed t h e r e i s a 
sense i n w h i c h t h e s t o r y o f t h e F a l l i s used by B a r t h t o g i v e grounds 
f o r such an 'anamnesis', as i f t h e Garden'of Eden were a t r a n s c e n d e n t 
o r d e r o f e x i s t e n c e o f w h i c h man i n h i s f a l l e n and s i n f u l c o n d i t i o n 
r e t a i n e d somehow a d i s t a n t memory, exp r e s s e d however o n l y i n t h e n e g a t i v e 
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f o r m o f t h e sense o f f u n d a m e n t a l mismatch w i t h h i s p r e s e n t o r d e r . As 
the s l a v e i n P l a t o ' s Meno i s encouraged by q u e s t i o n i n g t o f i n d i n h i s 
g e o m e t r i c a l prowess e v i d e n c e o f a f o r m e r knowledge, so t h e r e a l i t y o f 
t h e law encourages man t o r e c o g n i s e , i n h i s f a l l e n c o n d i t i o n , a 
, s u g g e s t i o n o f h i s estrangement f r o m a r e a l i t y w h i c h he cannot, however, 
d i r e c t l y c o n c e i v e . ^ 
I t w o u l d t h e r e f o r e be a g r e a t m i s t a k e t o suppose t h a t t h e d i a l e c t -
i c a l n a t u r e o f B a r t h ' s argument e x c l u d e s any r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f those passages i n Romans w h i c h have suggested t o l a t e r 
t h e o l o g i a n s a b e l i e f t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f God c o u l d be d i s c e r n e d f r o m 
t h e n a t u r e o f t h e p h y s i c a l u n i v e r s e , or t h a t t h e r e was some analogy 
between t h e b e i n g o f t h e w o r l d , o r t h e b e i n g o f man, and t h e b e i n g o f 
God h i m s e l f . B a r t h has a p e r f e c t l y c l e a r r o l e f o r passages such as 
Romans 1:19-20 i n P a u l i n e thought 7: 
Because t h a t w h i c h may be known o f God i s m a n i f e s t t o them; 
f o r God m a n i f e s t e d i t u n t o them. For t h e i n v i s i b l e t h i n g s 
o f h i m s i n c e t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d a r e c l e a r l y seen, 
b e i n g p e r c e i v e d t h r o u g h t h e t h i n g s t h a t a r e made, even h i s 
e v e r l a s t i n g power and d i g n i t y ; . . . 
The argument o f K a r l B a r t h i s t h a t t h e l a t e r d o c t r i n e o f t h e 
' a n a l o g i a e n t i s ' can o n l y be expressed i n terms o f t h e s e l f - c r i t i c i s m 
o f t h e f i n i t e o r d e r , i n w h i c h s e l f - c r i t i c i s m t h e i n f i n i t e and w h o l l y 
o t h e r may be i n d i r e c t l y a f f i r m e d . I n o t h e r words, t h e r e i s no p o s i t i v e 
c omparison t o be made between t h e b e i n g o f t h e w o r l d and t h e b e i n g o f 
God, even t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e y b o t h , a t d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s , possess 'being' 
i t s e l f . But t h e r e i s a n e g a t i v e i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e i n h e r e n t l i m i t a t i o n s 
i n i t s own n a t u r e w h i c h t h e p r e s e n t o r d e r r e v e a l s o f i t s e l f , o f an 
i n f i n i t e o r d e r o f b e i n g . F or t h e r e i s 'no r e l a t i v i t y t h a t does n o t 
r e f l e c t "a v a n i s h e d a b s o l u t e " w h i c h can never be w h o l l y o b l i t e r a t e d 
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because i t i s t h e a b s o l u t e w h i c h makes r e l a t i v i t y r e l a t i v e ' . I f we 
were t o u n d e r s t a n d B a r t h p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , we s h o u l d t h i n k n o t o f t h e 
' a n a l o g i a e n t i s ' b u t o f t h e i d e a s o f reason i n Kant's f i r s t critique."'"'' 
I n t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f ' i n v i s i b l e t h i n g s ... t h r o u g h t h e t h i n g s t h a t a r e 
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made' (Romans 1:20), we should recognise not the presence of a d i v i n e 
r e a l i t y w i t h i n the world order, nor some suggestion of d i v i n e immanence 
or q u a l i f i e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the being of the world i n the being of 
God, but the i n h e r e n t suggestion, i n the s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n of the 
r e a l i t y we know, of an absolute order i n which such c o n t r a d i c t i o n s are 
r e s o l v e d . Kant's suggestions, i n the Critique of Pure Reason, . that 
i n s o f a r as we remain committed to an i n t e l l e c t u a l i d e a l of reason, and 
f e e l convinced t h a t the u n i t y and t o t a l i t y of our understanding which 
i t suggests must be r e a l i s e d , then we must be committed to b e l i e f i n 
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the e x i s t e n c e of God, i s a t l e a s t comparable to Barth's suggestion of 
a 'vanished a b s o l u t e ' i n a humanity condemned by the F a l l t o i n h a b i t a 
world of ' r e l a t i v i t y ' cut o f f from i t s o r i g i n . The Barthian d i a l e c t i c , 
i 
l i k e the Kantian, i s committed i n p r i n c i p l e to a P l a t o n i c s e p a r a t i o n 
between r e a l i t y as we experience i t and a r e a l i t y which, although wholly 
other than t h a t w i t h which we are a t present i n v o l v e d , i s n e v e r t h e l e s s 
suggested by the form of t h a t involvement. 
B a r t h ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n of Paul's Romans a s s i m i l a t e s r e l i g i o n t o the 
law. R e l i g i o n , l i k e the law, i s a conscious and c r e a t i v e human 
a c t i v i t y . The Church, s i m i l a r l y , r e p r e s e n t s a form of human s e l f -
a s s e r t i o n , which i s presented by Barth both as necessary and u l t i m a t e l y 
f a l s e . The Church i s e s s e n t i a l 'for the b e n e f i t of those who cannot l i v e 
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w i t h the l i v i n g God and y e t cannot l i v e without God'. I t attempts to 
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humanise the d i v i n e and b r i n g i t w i t h i n the sphere of the world of 
time and t h i n g s , f o r there are those who cannot l i v e with the absolute 
dichotomy between time and e t e r n i t y . Yet 'the Church confronts the 
Gospel as the l a s t human p o s s i b i l i t y confronts the impossible p o s s i b i l i t y 
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of God'. The Church r e p r e s e n t s the culmination of man's attempts to 
humanise the d i v i n e , and i s t h e r e f o r e , as the f r u i t i o n of a v a i n e f f o r t , 
the o c c a s i o n of h i s r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t God and man cannot, i n f a c t , meet. 
I n t h a t sense the Church i s e s s e n t i a l t o C h r i s t i a n i t y ( i n s i m i l a r v e i n 
B a r t h j u s t i f i e s Paul's upholding of the l a w ) . I t i s even p o s s i b l e to 
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say t h a t the Church i s e s s e n t i a l to s a l v a t i o n - t h a t there i s no 
s a l v a t i o n outside i t . F o r the Church, as the apotheosis of man's 
attempt to overcome the d i s t i n c t i o n between h i m s e l f and God, a l s o 
p r o v i d e s the oc c a s i o n of h i s acceptance of t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n , and 
t h e r e f o r e the p o s s i b i l i t y of f a i t h . 
The 1 t r i h u l a t i o n 1 of the Church, i t s f a i l u r e to "humanise the 
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d i v i n e ' , i s the oc c a s i o n of i t s coming to hope, because where the 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y of such 'humanisation' i s p e r c e i v e d f a i t h i n God which 
ac c e p t s the r e l a t i v i t y of the pr e s e n t order and i t s s e p a r a t i o n from God 
becomes p o s s i b l e . Barth j o i n s h i s understanding of the Church to Paul's 
treatment of the r e j e c t i o n of I s r a e l i n Romans 9-11. I s r a e l ' s 
r e j e c t i o n p r ovides the p o s s i b i l i t y of s a l v a t i o n f o r the G e n t i l e s , 
p r e c i s e l y i n the sense t h a t her f a i l u r e to u n i t e man and God provides 
the opportunity of accepting t h e i r absolute s e p a r a t i o n : but such an 
example given to the G e n t i l e s a l s o provides the opportunity f o r I s r a e l 
h e r s e l f to be accepted, f o r she too can see her r e j e c t i o n as an 
opportunity f o r f a i t h . She too can see i n her r e j e c t i o n the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of e l e c t i o n , i n the l o s s of God the p o s s i b i l i t y of f a i t h i n God who i s 
unknown. 
Within the Church, Barth argues, i t i s e n t i r e l y appropriate t h a t 
b e l i e v e r s a r e b a p t i s e d 'into the death and r e s u r r e c t i o n of C h r i s t ' 
(Romans 6:3-5). I n baptism, the i l l u s i o n of the l i k e n e s s of man to God 
i s s t r i p p e d away. B a p t i s e d i n t o the death and r e s u r r e c t i o n of C h r i s t , 
the b e l i e v e r a c c e p t s h i s otherness from God and h i s 'establishment' 
only beyond the d i s s o l u t i o n of the pr e s e n t order: i t i s i n t h i s sense 
t h a t 'united to him i n the l i k e n e s s of h i s death, we s h a l l be a l s o i n 
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the l i k e n e s s of h i s r e s u r r e c t i o n * . B aptised we 'walk a f t e r the 
S p i r i t ' , not i n the sense of p o s s e s s i n g any d i v i n e q u a l i t y now ( c f . 
B a r t h ' s treatment of grace, above p.26) but i n the sense of r e c o g n i s i n g 
the 'impossible p o s s i b i l i t y ' of our 'establishment through d i s s o l u t i o n ' , 
of an e x i s t e n c e i n another order of which our knowledge now i s l i m i t e d 
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to the consciousness of l i m i t a t i o n i n the order i n which we a t present 
l i v e . 
B a r t h ' s second commentary on The Epistle to the Romans i s a 
d i a l e c t i c a l c r i t i q u e , i n t h a t i t has as i t s fundamental p r i n c i p l e an 
' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' between God and man which can only 
be overcome e s c h a t o l o g i c a l l y : there i s no p r e s e n t overcoming of the 
2 3a 
d i s t i n c t i o n , and P a u l i n e terms such as 'grace', ' f a i t h ' , ' s p i r i t ' 
and ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' are i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h i n t h a t o v e r r i d i n g p r i n c i p l e . 
The u l t i m a t e 'establishment' of man must be beyond the d i s s o l u t i o n of 
t h i s world-order: i t i s thus an 'establishment through d i s s o l u t i o n ' , 
a ' l i f e through death' (to be seen i n the context of C h r i s t ' s own l i f e 
through death i n h i s c r u c i f i x i o n and r e s u r r e c t i o n ) . Indeed the man who 
i s ' e s t a b l i s h e d ' through God's c r e a t i v e word i s the negation of man as 
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he i s now, the 'not I 1 , the 'non-existence of our non-existence'. 
Such e s t a b l i s h m e n t only through the negation of what we are i n t h i s 
world, r a t h e r than through the a d d i t i o n of 'grace' i n the sense of 
s p i r i t u a l power to our l i v e s as we l i v e them now i n a u n i t y of man and 
God on e a r t h , i s the e s s e n t i a l c o n v i c t i o n of ' d i a l e c t i c a l theology' -
t h a t God's Yes i s u t t e r e d only i n His No, His mercy i n His judgment, 
because the s a l v a t i o n which He proclaims f o r man i n v o l v e s the d i s s o l u t i o n 
of h i s p r e s e n t being i n u l t i m a t e s e p a r a t i o n from h i s Creator. 
To say t h a t t h i s d i a l e c t i c a l theology can make no sense of the 
i d e a of the world as God's c r e a t i o n , r e f l e c t i n g His gl o r y even i n i t s 
f a l l e n c o n d i t i o n , would be u n f a i r on Barth. He c e r t a i n l y does t r y to 
make sense, although i n a negative r a t h e r than p o s i t i v e manner as we 
have suggested, of the' world as a r e a l i t y through which the d i v i n e 
being i s d i s c l o s e d to man. But the g l o r y of God i s d i s c l o s e d , not 
through the world or man's p o s i t i v e l i k e n e s s t o Himself, but i n i t s 
exposing i n i t s own l i m i t a t i o n s a s e l f - c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e towards i t s e l f 
as f i n a l . Barth's argument i s comparable i n t h i s r e s p e c t to both P l a t o 
and Kant: h i s sense of God i n the world i s a P l a t o n i c amamnesis 
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expressed i n terms of the longing f o r unity and completeness t h a t 
j u s t i f i e s the Kantian 'idea of reason". Commenting on Romans 5:13 
('for u n t i l the law s i n was i n the world: but s i n i s not imputed when 
ther e i s no l a w ' ) , Barth does indeed use language which, once t r a n s -
l a t e d from i t s p o e t i c c o l o u r to a prose meaning, concedes a form of 
r e v e l a t i o n of God i n the world: 
The law i s the l i g h t of the r e v e l a t i o n and of the 
presence of God, broken i n t o beams of d i f f e r e n t colours 
i n the prism of the sequence and v a r i e t y of human events. (25) 
Moreover, any reading of Barth's commentary r e v e a l s t h a t he 
b e l i e v e s t h e r e to be, i n t h i s world, an ' i n d i c a t i o n ' or ' l i k e n e s s ' 
(Hinweis, G l e i c h n i s ) of the d i v i n e r e a l i t y which i s , however, wholly 
s e p a r a t e from t h i s f i n i t e order of being. We s h a l l c onsider three 
examples to i l l u s t r a t e t h i s : 
The f i r s t comes i n h i s comment on Romans 3:1-4; i n p a r t i c u l a r the 
passage: 
What advantage then hath the Jew? Or what i s the p r o f i t 
of c i r c u m c i s i o n ? Much i n every way: f i r s t of a l l , t h a t 
they were e n t r u s t e d w i t h the o r a c l e s of God. 
This passage may seem to c o n t r a d i c t Barth's c l a i m t h a t no person 
or human i n s t i t u t i o n has a p r i v i l e g e of 'possessing' God, s i n c e a l l are 
condemned by him, and e x i s t w i t h i n the context of t h e i r own ult i m a t e 
d i s s o l u t i o n . Barth comments: 
F o r when we have c l e a r l y p e r c e i v e d t h a t , i f d i v i n i t y be so 
concreted and humanised i n a p a r t i c u l a r department of h i s t o r y 
- the h i s t o r y of r e l i g i o n or the h i s t o r y of s a l v a t i o n - God 
has ceased to be God, and there can be no r e l a t i o n with him, 
then we are abl e to see t h a t the whole occurrence of the known 
world r e c e i v e s i t s content and s i g n i f i c a n c e from the unknown 
God; then too, we are able to see i n every impress of 
r e v e l a t i o n a s i g n - p o s t to R e v e l a t i o n (dass a l l e r Offenbarungs-
eindruck e i n Hinweis i s t auf Offenbarung s e l b s t ) ; then, too, 
we are able to rec o g n i s e t h a t a l l experience bears w i t h i n i t 
an understanding by which i t i s i t s e l f condemned, and t h a t a l l 
time bears w i t h i n i t that- e t e r n i t y by which i t i s d i s s o l v e d . (26) 
How does the known world provide i n s i g h t i n t o an 'unknown God' i n 
i n f i n i t e , q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n from i t s e l f ? How can i t bear w i t h i n 
i t s e l f an 'impress of r e v e l a t i o n ' (Offenbarungseindruck) t h a t i s an 
i n d i c a t i o n (Hinweis) of r e v e l a t i o n i t s e l f ? Barth's answer i s th a t the 
i n s i g h t i s a negative one: where, i n the world, the absence of God 
from p a r t i c u l a r ' c o n cretions' and human beings has been recognised, 
where i t has been understood t h a t were God to overcome the d i v i d e 
between Himself and man and be 'contained' w i t h i n the world then God 
would 'cease to be God', t h e r e a p a r t i c u l a r understanding has been 
achieved i n the world concerning the nature of i t s Creator. I t has 
been understood t h a t , s i n c e God i s God, He cannot be found i n p a r t i c u l a r 
human beings or p l a c e s on e a r t h . The advantage of the Jew, i n t h i s 
sense, i s not a p o s i t i v e p o s s e s s i o n of the d i v i n e , but a negative 
understanding of why, i n t h i s world, God cannot be present to be 
p o s s e s s e d . That i s the ' i n d i c a t i o n ' or 'sign-post' of the 'unknown 
God' to be found w i t h i n the known world. 
The second example comments on Romans 2:14, where Paul speaks of 
the G e n t i l e s , 'which have not the law', but n e v e r t h e l e s s 'do the t h i n g s 
of the law'. How i s i t t h a t the G e n t i l e s 'by nature and i n the n a t u r a l 
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order do the law'? T h e i r l i v e s , Barth t e l l s us, are a 'parable' ( e i n 
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G l e i c h n i s ) , but a p a r a b l e i n the negative sense t h a t the 'Gentile 
world l i e s i n wickedness', t h a t i t i s a world ' d i s i n t e g r a t e d , d i s o r g a n i s e d 
and undermined', but t h a t p r e c i s e l y because of t h a t the mercy of God 
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'seems c l o s e r and more c r e d i b l e ' among them. 
I t i s c l e a r from t h i s example t h a t the G e n t i l e s 'do the law' and 
are c l o s e r t o the mercy of God p r e c i s e l y by t h e i r f a i l u r e s r a t h e r than 
t h e i r s u c c e s s e s . As the n a t u r a l world suggests, i n the t r a c e of what 
i t has l o s t , the r e a l i t y of a God who cannot make hi m s e l f known to i t , 
so the moral, c u l t u r a l and r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t i e s of man are 'parables' 
or ' l i k e n e s s e s ' ( G l e i c h n i s s e ) i n s o f a r as they manifest, i n human 
behaviour and s o c i e t y , the absence of the Kingdom of God. Once again 
the i n d i c a t i o n of God i s a negative one: 
Disturbance of s o u l , r e s t l e s s murmuring, c a v i l and p r o t e s t : 
such may be s i g n - p o s t s (Hinweis) to the peace of God which 
p a s s e t h a l l understanding. (30) 
Human f a i l u r e i n d i c a t e s God's peace and presence, as the world 
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i n d i c a t e s by i t s r e c o g n i t i o n of His absence the r e a l i t y of the unknown 
God. Both, i n the r e a l i t y of t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n from God, bear witness 
to him: i n the u n r e a l i t y of the world, and the f a i l u r e of man,lies the 
parable of the r e a l i t y of God. 
The t h i r d example p r e s e n t s Barth's treatment of the I n c a r n a t i o n i n 
h i s commentary. Commenting on Romans 1:3-4, Barth remarks concerning 
J e s u s 'born of the seed of David according to the f l e s h ' : 
The y e a r s AD 1-30 are the e r a of r e v e l a t i o n and 
d i s c l o s u r e . (Offenbarungszeit und E n t d e c k u n g s z e i t ) . (31) 
Given the ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' between time and 
e t e r n i t y , and between God and man, presupposed i n Barth's 'system', 
i t would be h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t to know i n what sense these years of 
J e s u s ' h i s t o r i c a l e x i s t e n c e formed a 'time of r e v e l a t i o n ' and 'a time 
of d i s c o v e r y ' . Barth t e l l s us t h a t the e r a i s one which 'sets f o r t h 
the new and strange and d i v i n e d e f i n i t i o n of a l l time' (die neue, 
a n d e r s a r t i g e , gdJttliche Bestimmung a l l e r Z e i t ) . This d i v i n e d e f i n i t i o n 
d i s s o l v e s the p a r t i c u l a r i t y of these y e a r s , by making every epoch 'a 
p o t e n t i a l f i e l d of r e v e l a t i o n and d i s c l o s u r e ' . And then Barth introduces 
another c o l o u r f u l metaphor: 
The e f f u l g e n c e , or rather,, the c r a t e r made a t the p e r c u s s i o n 
p o i n t of an exploding s h e l l ; the v o i d by which the p o i n t on 
the l i n e of i n t e r s e c t i o n makes i t s e l f known i n the concrete 
world of h i s t o r y i s not - even though i t be named the l i f e 
of J e s u s - t h a t other world which touches our world i n Him. 
The German reads: 
Jener Punkt der S c h n i t t l i n i e s e l b s t aber h a t wie 
d i e ganze unbekannte Ebene, deren Vorhandensein er 
anktlndigt, gar keine Ausdehnung auf der uns bekannten 
Ebene. Die Austrahlungen oder vielmehr d i e e r s t a u n l i c h e n 
E i n s c h l a g s t r i c h t e r und Hohlraume, durch d i e e r s i c h i n n e r h a l b 
der h i s t o r i s c h e n A n s c h a u l i c h k e i t bemerkbar macht, und, auch 
wenn s i e "Leben J e s u " h e i s s e n , n i c h t die andre Welt, die s i c h 
i n J e s u mit u n s r e r Welt be r u h r t . (32) 
T h i s passage i s extremely i n t e r e s t i n g . For one obvious concern 
about Bart h ' s d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i s t h a t an absolute s e p a r a t i o n 
between God and man would make d i f f i c u l t the i d e a of t h e i r u n i t y i n 
C h r i s t i n His i n c a r n a t e e x i s t e n c e . The ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e ' 
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between time and e t e r n i t y , between God ' i n heaven' and man 'on e a r t h ' , 
would not only exclude the p r e t e n t i o u s c l a i m of man to humanise the 
d i v i n e , but a l s o the s e l f - g i v i n g of God i n t a k i n g the human to Himself 
i n J e s u s C h r i s t . The ' s e p a r a t i o n ' which cannot be overcome 'from the 
s i d e of man' i n 'possessing' God, would a l s o exclude an a c t i o n to over-
come i t 'from the s i d e of God' i n His i n i t i a t i v e to make Himself p r e s e n t 
as a man among men. Divine s e l f - g i v i n g i s excluded along with human 
s e l f - a s s e r t i o n ; the I n c a r n a t i o n disappears with the r e j e c t i o n of an 
i d o l a t r o u s 'having' of God by man. I f Barth i s committed to the u n i t y 
only i n terms of an e s c h a t o l o g i c a l r e a l i s a t i o n beyond the p r e s e n t world 
order, what sense can he make of t h e i r u n i t y i n the I n c a r n a t e Word 
w i t h i n t h a t order? 
B a r t h ' s procedure i s to p r e s e n t the I n c a r n a t i o n i n p r e c i s e l y the 
imagery we have seen i n the l a s t two examples, namely t h a t which allows 
only f o r a negative r e v e l a t i o n of God to man i n the world. The 
d e s c r i p t i o n of C h r i s t as making h i m s e l f known w i t h i n h i s t o r i c a l 
p e r c e p t i o n (er s i c h i n n e r h a l b der h i s t o r i s c h e n A n s c h a u l i c h k e i t bemerkbar 
macht) through 'bomb-craters' and ' c a v i t i e s ' ( E i n s c h l a g s t r i c h t e n und 
Hohlraume), t r i e s to d e s c r i b e the impact of one whose r e a l i t y i s made 
known through His e x p l o s i v e i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y w i t h t h i s world, through 
His d e s t r o y i n g r a t h e r than s a n c t i f y i n g i t . B arth has a number of 
metaphors i n t h i s v e i n : another i s t h a t of the 'empty c a n a l ' whose 
corroded banks p o i n t to the l o s t r e a l i t y of waters t h a t have long s i n c e 
l e f t i t : again, the suggestion i s t h a t God i s known ' i n ' the world 
only i n the sense t h a t the world's f i n i t e order suggests a l o s t 
i n f i n i t y which i s no longer j o i n e d to i t . The I n c a r n a t i o n appears to 
be seen by Barth as a confirmation of t h i s s e p a r a t i o n , expressed 
through the d e s t r u c t i v e consequences of an attempted u n i t y : the two 
worlds can touch now only i n the manner of a s h e l l touching the ground, 
and l e a v i n g i n the c r a t e r i t c r e a t e s the i n d i c a t o r of i t s i n a b i l i t y to 
become a p a r t of the e a r t h . 
36. 
Y e t not a l l of the quotation i n t h i s example i s the language of 
metaphor. The most s i g n i f i c a n t s e c t i o n i s p l a i n l y expressed: 
Jener Punkt der S c h n i t t l i n i e s e l b s t aber hat 
wie das ganze unbekannte Ebene, deren Vorhandensein 
er ankundigt, gar keine Ausdehnung auf der uns 
bekannten Ebene. 
The ' l i n e of i n t e r s e c t i o n ' ( S c h n i t t l i n i e ) marked by the I n c a r n a t i o n 
does not r e s u l t i n an ex t e n s i o n (Ausdehnung) of the h i s t o r i c a l plane 
known to us (der uns bekannten Ebene). I t s presence (Vorhandensein) -
l i t e r a l l y i t s 'being a t hand' - does not r e s u l t i n any f u s i o n w i t h the 
known, h i s t o r i c a l plane of t h i s world. I t remains i t s e l f unknown 
(unbekannte). The question i s i n e v i t a b l e : i f the I n c a r n a t i o n r e s u l t s 
i n no j o i n i n g of the 'divine plane' to the human, i f the I n c a r n a t i o n 
i s not a 'making known' of the d i v i n e among men but a remaining 'unknown' 
among men (and what sense can be made of 'among' when, even as 'present' 
(Vorhandensein), t h i s l i n e of i n t e r s e c t i o n has no extension on the 
h i s t o r i c a l p l a n e ? ) , then i s there a r e a l I n c a r n a t i o n i n Barth's 
p r e s e n t a t i o n a t a l l ? The same could be argued of Barth's metaphor of 
the R e s u r r e c t i o n : 
I n the R e s u r r e c t i o n the new world of the Holy S p i r i t 
touches the o l d world of the f l e s h , but touches i t as 
a tangent touches a c i r c l e , t h a t i s , without touching i t . 
(Ober s i e b e r i l h r t s i e wie d i e Tangente einen K r e i s , 
ohne s i e zu beruhren ...) (33) 
Again one may ask: i s the u n i t y of God and man suggested by a 
g l o r i f i e d humanity of the r i s e n C h r i s t any more affirmed i n Barth's 
p r e s e n t a t i o n of the R e s u r r e c t i o n , than the u n i t y of God and man i n the 
humbled d i v i n i t y of the I n c a r n a t e C h r i s t ? 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to avoid the conclusion t h a t i n r e f e r e n c e to the 
I n c a r n a t i o n and R e s u r r e c t i o n , Barth does not avoid the model of a 
'negative p r e s e n c e 1 of God among men; t h a t humanity bears w i t h i n i t s e l f , 
i n i t s own f i n i t e n ature, an i n h e r e n t s e l f - c r i t i c i s m which suggests a 
r e a l i t y o u t s i d e i t s e l f , which i t can never d i r e c t l y p e r c e i v e or under-
stand. I f the Jew has an advantage, i t i s h i s perception t h a t God 
could not be possessed by him without c e a s i n g to be God. He has the 
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awe of God which r e c o g n i s e s the grounds of the d i v i n e absence. I f the 
' G e n t i l e s do the thin g s of the law', i t i s because they a r r i v e a t a 
s e l f - c r i t i c i s m , by way of t h e i r moral f a i l u r e , which p o i n t s to a wholly 
other r e a l i t y which they have l o s t . I f , f i n a l l y , Jesus C h r i s t i s born 
of the f l e s h , of the seed of David, he does not u n i t e God and man w i t h i n 
Himself, but makes known to man t h e i r i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y . 
I n these t h r e e examples we see Barth's c o n s i s t e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the world, and man i n the image of h i s 
C r e a t o r , on the one hand, and God on the other, i n terms of a 'negative 
analogy', by which man and nature e x i s t locked i n t o t h e i r own s e l f -
c r i t i c a l f i n i t u d e , which n e v e r t h e l e s s l e a v e s them with echoes of an 
i n f i n i t e order of being which they have l o s t . ^ a Arguably, Barth i s 
more of an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t h i s approach than he would l i k e to admit! 
i 
But what i s most i n t e r e s t i n g , i n h i s account, i s h i s a s s i m i l a t i o n of 
the presence of God i n C h r i s t to the same order of explanation. No 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s made between 'nature' and ' r e v e l a t i o n * here - indeed 
B a r t h has, i n t h i s commentary, no s p e c i f i c a l l y C h r i s t o c e n t r i c theology 
of r e v e l a t i o n a t a l l , but r a t h e r a'negative n a t u r a l theology' which 
operates throughout h i s commentary. The problems t h i s r a i s e s i n 
r e c o n c i l i n g Barth's understanding with t r a d i t i o n a l views of the 
I n c a r n a t i o n are immense. I n a s u c c i n c t statement, Barth d e c l a r e s : 
. I n Jesus God i s known to be the unknown God. (34) 
The unknownness of God which had been recognised i n the case of 
nature and h i s t o r y i n g e n e r a l , i n the awe of the Jews and the moral 
f a i l u r e of the G e n t i l e s , i n the l o s t g l o r y of God revea l e d i n the d r i e d -
up c a n a l s of time and h i s t o r y , i s a l s o made known i n C h r i s t . The old 
c a n a l s become new and sudden c r a t e r s and c a v i t i e s i n the e a r t h . The 
echo of an unknown God becomes the shout of an unknown God. The 
s e p a r a t i o n of the worlds of God and man i s proclaimed d i r e c t l y - but 
not overcome. The l o s t g l o r y of the Creator i s r e v e a l e d i n a p o i n t of 
h i s t o r y and time - but s t i l l as l o s t . There i s no u n i t y of God and man 
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i n the I n c a r n a t i o n , but a r e v e l a t i o n , i n one concentrated span, of 
t h e i r i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y . That Barth i s here committed to a complete 
paradox, namely t h a t he has to overcome t h a t i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y i n order 
to p r o c l a i m i t . ' - does not f o r e s t a l l him. The tangent touches the 
c i r c l e , even though i t does not touch i t : the Word takes f l e s h i n 
order to r e v e a l i t s i n a b i l i t y to j o i n i t s e l f to human h i s t o r y . 
B a r t h i s i n danger here of wanting to have h i s i n c a r n a t i o n a l cake 
and e a t i t . On the one hand, the otherworld 'touches' (beruhrt) our 
world i n the R e s u r r e c t i o n , and i n t h a t s i n g l e word 'touches' i s 
contained a l l t h a t C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e a f f i r m s concerning the e x a l t a t i o n 
of a human l i f e to g l o r y through the r a i s i n g of C h r i s t . On the other 
hand, B a r t h wants to say t h a t t h i s other world i s not observable 
(bemerkbar) w i t h i n t h i s one; the ' c r a t e r s ' and ' c a v i t i e s ' formed by 
the encounter of worlds i s i n f a c t only a p o i n t a t which t h e i r 
s e p a r a t i o n i s af f i r m e d . The negative t h r u s t of Barth's d i a l e c t i c 
remains - no containment of the other world (durch d i e e r s i c h i n n e r h a l b 
der h i s t o r i s c h e n A n s s c h a u l i c h k e i t bemerkbar macht), can be admitted. 
The ' c r a t e r s ' and ' c a v i t i e s ' formed, i n the p e o t i c d e s c r i p t i o n of i 
B a r t h ' s , by the I n c a r n a t i o n , l i k e the r e l i g i o u s reverence of the Jews 
and the consciousness of a ki n d of c r i t i c a l moral and c u l t u r a l f a i l u r e 
among the G e n t i l e s , i s an occasion of r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t a dualism between 
man and God cannot be denied, a dualism t h a t brooks no C h r i s t o l o g i c a l 
i n t e r f e r e n c e . Yet committed to a d i a l e c t i c of t h i s kind, i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to see what s o r t of C h r i s t o c e n t i s m Barth could admit to i n t h i s work, 
or to r e j e c t the c r i t i c i s m of Adolf S c h l a t t e r t h a t , where t h i s commentary 
I 
i s concerned: 
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... f o r Barth f a i t h remains 'a leap i n t o the voi d ' , and i n t h i s 
a deep gap between h i s e x p o s i t i o n and the Letter to the Romans 
opens up. (35) 
Moreover, the e x c l u s i o n of Kant's moral theology from account i n 
Barth' s second commentary, and h i s f a s t e n i n g e x c l u s i v e l y upon Kant's 
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i d e a l i s m i n order to shore up the d i a l e c t i c of ' i n f i n i t e , 
q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' between God and man which has a merely 
e s c h a t o l o g i c a l r e s o l u t i o n , makes i t doubly d i f f i c u l t to make sense of 
the notion of I n c a r n a t i o n i n Barth's scheme. For Kant's p r e s e n t a t i o n 
of Jesus as a supreme exemplar of the moral law is _ a way of making 
sense of the C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m of a C h r i s t i a n theology, and does o f f e r 
a way of us i n g concepts such as ' I n c a r n a t i o n ' even w i t h i n the 
c o n s t r a i n t s of a Kantian d u a l i s m : " ^ a but h i s way depends p r e c i s e l y 
upon the supreme importance of the moral law i n Kant's theology, an 
option which Barth r u l e s out i n h i s second commentary. 
I f we compare the passages c i t e d from Barth's f i r s t commentary as 
evidence of h i s b e l i e f t h a t a u n i t y of the d i v i n e and human orders can 
be r e a l i s e d i n the commitment of conscience to the moral law, with the 
same passages from h i s second commentary, then we see t h a t the moral 
law has l o s t i t s p o s i t i o n as an 'absolute' which cannot be r e l a t i v i s e d 
along w i t h the other moral, c u l t u r a l and r e l i g i o u s v alues of mankind. 
Commenting on Romans 7:11 ('and the commandment t h a t was unto l i f e , 
t h i s I found to be unto d e a t h ' ) , i n which context Barth i n h i s f i r s t 
commentary spoke of the ' e t e r n a l thou ought' (ewige du s o l l s t ) which 
man should r e a l i s e i n h i m s e l f , Barth t a l k s i n h i s second commentary of 
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a 'vast c r i t i c a l negation' from which no human q u a l i t y or c a p a c i t y 
i s excepted. By the 'commandment1, he argues, men are 'thrown i n t o 
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c o n t r a s t between r e l a t i v e and ab s o l u t e , and there imprisoned 1. They 
have i n themselves no 'absolute' which can j o i n them to God, but must 
remain i n the p r i s o n of t h e i r own r e l a t i v i t y u n t i l ' e s t a b l i s h e d ' a t 
the eschaton through the death of a l l t h a t they now a r e . 
Again, i n h i s f i r s t commentary on Rowans' Barth comments on Romans 
7:7a (What s h a l l we say then? The law i s s i n ? God for b i d . ) by 
r e f e r r i n g to the c a t e g o r i c a l imperative which man i s obliged to obey, 
but cannot obey as an i n d i v i d u a l i n i s o l a t i o n ( i n opposition to 
' r o m a n t i c i s t ' n o t i o n s ) , and no more devised than b u i l t the s t a r r y 




Kant's Critique of Practical Reason). I n h i s second commentary, 
however, Barth s p e c i f i c a l l y disowns the view i n h i s e a r l i e r work: 
Why should we not r e t u r n to the main theme of the f i r s t 
e d i t i o n of t h i s commentary, and, j o i n i n g with Beck and 
wit h the n a t u r a l i s m of the l e a d e r s of the o l d school of 
Wurttemberg, s e t over a g a i n s t an empty i d e a l i s m the p i c t u r e 
of humanity as a growing d i v i n e organism? ... The answer 
i s simply - God f o r b i d ! ... Law brings a l l human p o s s i b -
i l i t y i n t o the c l e a r l i g h t of an all-em b r a c i n g KRISIS. (38) 
Once again, Barth excludes a l l forms of 'human p o s s i b i l i t y ' which 
might provide f o r an encounter between the d i v i n e and human worlds, 
and i n c l u d e s w i t h i n h i s e x c l u s i o n the moral law which had e a r l i e r 
escaped i t , together w i t h the b e l i e f i n humanity as a 'growing d i v i n e 
organism' , which might r e a l i s e an e t h i c a l imperative i n s o c i e t y . 
F i n a l l y , whereas i n h i s f i r s t commentary Barth remarks, 
( i n t e r p r e t i n g Paul's words i n Romans 6:14b, 'ye are not under the law 
but under grace') t h a t by grace an u n r e a l i s a b l e good becomes the good 
t h a t i s i n man and i s man, i n the second he d e c l a r e s : 
Ye a r e , however, not under law, but under grace. That i s 
to say, ye stand beyond the l a s t and n o b l e s t human achievement, 
where only f o r g i v e n e s s matters, and where forgi v e n e s s becomes 
a matter of f a c t . (39) 
.1 
Where i n the f i r s t commentary man stands by grace in_ the noblest 
human achievement, i n the second he stands 'beyond' ( j e n s e i t s ) i t i n 
the f o r g i v e n e s s t h a t negates a l l p r e s e n t human ' p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' or 
c a p a c i t i e s . Among these negated p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n the second commentary 
stands conscience i t s e l f : obedience to the moral . law i s ' r e l a t i v i s e d ' 
along w i t h other moral, r e l i g i o u s and c u l t u r a l i d e a l s , as products of 
t h i s - w o r l d l y ambitions t h a t a r e condemned by the d i v i n e judgment which 
' d i s s o l v e s ' , and s e p a r a t e s i t s e l f from, and a f f i r m s i t s e l f i n 
sep a r a t e n e s s from, t h i s world. 
I n h i s second commentary, Barth's theology reaches a c r i t i c a l 
impasse. Enclosed w i t h i n the p u r i t y of i t s e s c h a t o l o g i c a l d i a l e c t i c , 
i t i s unable to move towards any s o r t of r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t C h r i s t i a n i t y 
i s only t h e o c e n t r i e i n s o f a r as i t i s C h r i s t o c e n t r i c . I t cannot confess 
to a u n i t y , even w i t h i n one s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l i n h i s t o r y , of r e a l i t i e s 
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which i t has d e l i b e r a t e l y s e t i n a f i n a l opposition to one another. 
I t has j e t t i s o n e d the option of e x p l o r i n g Kant's understanding of the 
moral law as a means by which the d o c t r i n e of the I n c a r n a t i o n could 
make sense. With a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l eschatology t h a t represents a 
p a r a d o x i c a l formulation of the Kantian i d e a l i s m whose deep i n f l u e n c e 
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on the work cannot be doubted, Barth i s l e f t p a r a d o x i c a l l y 
a f f i r m i n g what h i s 'system' cannot, i n f a c t , allow, t h a t between 1 and 
30. A.D. two worlds encountered one another, touched - and y e t d i d not 
j o i n . 
J esus i s l e f t to j o i n the ranks of those who sought to make man 
conscious of a n e c e s s a r y s e p a r a t i o n between h i m s e l f .and God. Indeed 
the c o n v i c t i o n i s unavoidable t h a t C h r i s t i s no more than the supreme 
exemplar, or t e a c h e r , of a negative theology t h a t could have been 
l e a r n e d from elsewhere i n h i s t o r y , or from nature i t s e l f . F a r from 
r u l i n g out a n a t u r a l theology, Barth's second commentary is_ a n a t u r a l 
theology: the ' r e v e l a t i o n ' of God i n Jesus i s merely h i s reinforcement 
of the negative d i a l e c t i c which i s ' n a t u r a l l y ' r e v e a l e d i n the p h y s i c a l 
u n i v e r s e and p e r c e i v e d i n h i s t o r y . The 'paradox' of the C h r i s t i s t h a t 
He r e v e a l s t h a t there i s to be no r e v e l a t i o n , but t h i s could have 
a l r e a d y been understood e x i s t e n t i a l l y by o t h e r s , f o r i n s t a n c e , Abraham. 
I n the a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t man could not u n i t e h i m s e l f with God by 
r e a l i s i n g i n h i m s e l f d i v i n e p o s s i b i l i t i e s , Barth e f f e c t i v e l y excludes, 
i n h i s commentary, the p o s s i b i l i t y of God's u n i t i n g Himself with man 
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by r e a l i s i n g i n Himself human p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Barth f a l l s v i c t i m , i n 
f a c t , to a c r i t i c i s m which P r o f e s s o r H.R. Mackintosh makes of 
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K i e r k e g a a r d , whose 'system' Barth claimed f o r h i m s e l f i n h i s commentary 
i 
Committed to a ' p a r a d o x i c a l ' nature of h i s subject-matter, Kierkegaard 
i 
sees only one h a l f of the paradox, clai m s Mackintosh, namely t h a t the 
transcendent God a f f i r m s Himself i n H i s otherness to man. The other 
h a l f , t h a t t h i s transcendent God i s n e v e r t h e l e s s , even as wholly other, 
a man among men l i v i n g and b r e a t h i n g (and capable of h i s t o r i c a l 
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r e c o g n i t i o n ) during a p e r i o d of time, i s unaffirmed. What both 
Ki e r k e g a a r d and B a r t h f a i l to see i s t h i s : t h a t the 'paradox' of 
C h r i s t i a n i t y i s not t h a t J e s u s proclaims the unknown God, but t h a t he 
p r o c l a i m s the knownness of the unknown God. Barth's second commentary 
i s not, i n t h i s sense, a ' p a r a d o x i c a l ' work: i t eschews paradox i n 
favour of a r i g i d adherence to a 'system', i t s negative d i a l e c t i c . 
Rather than a 'theology of r e v e l a t i o n ' , i n which the unknown God 
n e v e r t h e l e s s r e v e a l s Himself as known, i t i s a negative n a t u r a l theology 
i n t o which the C h r i s t i a n r e v e l a t i o n i s unhappily f i t t e d . 
An important c a s u a l t y of Barth's approach i s the l a c k of moral 
and p o l i t i c a l s e r i o u s n e s s t h a t i t e n t a i l s , which can be o u t l i n e d i n 
terms of h i s treatment of Romans 12-15. Barth a p p l i e s the argument he 
used concerning God as the one who 'reckoned w i t h no man', to judgments 
between p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l and moral p r i n c i p l e s . As no man may 
p o s s e s s the p r i v i l e g e of the d i v i n e presence, as no human i n s t i t u t i o n 
can c l a i m to take hold of the d i v i n e and c o n t r o l i t w i t h i n i t s e l f , so 
no p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l order or moral p r i n c i p l e can c l a i m to possess 
a d i v i n e s a n c t i o n or to express the d i v i n e w i l l . Both ' L e g i t i m i s t s ' 
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and ' R e v o l u t i o n a r i e s ' , B a r t h i n s i s t s , seek by d e f i n i t i o n to t r e a t a 
p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l order as ' d i v i n e ' : they l o s e s i g h t of the 
e s s e n t i a l s e l f - c r i t i c i s m by which any p o l i t i c a l order must judge i t s e l f . 
Both the ' r e a c t i o n a r y ' and the ' r e v o l u t i o n a r y ' are attacked by B a r t h : 
the former because he a b s o l u t i s e s the p r e s e n t order, the l a t t e r because, 
although he r e l a t i v i s e s the p r e s e n t , he a b s o l u t i s e s some order with 
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which he could r e p l a c e i t . One weakness i n Barth's a n a l y s i s c l e a r l y 
e xpressed by t h i s c r u c i a l (but r e l a t i v e l y short) passage i n the 
commentary, i s t h a t he sees Paul as p r o v i d i n g no p r i n c i p l e s by which 
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to d i s c r i m i n a t e between the v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l systems. 
I n h i s treatment of e t h i c s , Barth's fundamental p r i n c i p l e i s the 
f o r g i v e n e s s of s i n s , r a t h e r than p a r t i c u l a r moral i d e a l s r e a l i s a b l e i n 
t h i s world. I n passages i n Barth's work one d i s c e r n s c l e a r l y an almost 
4 3 . 
'Olympian' a t t i t u d e towards humanity. Human beings are not capable 
< 4 4 
of goodness, but God ignores t h i s i n f o r g i v i n g them. S i m i l a r l y , the 
i 
love which the C h r i s t i a n should show towards h i s fellow-men, i s not 
t h a t of ' e r o s 1 , which loves them as they a r e , but 'agape', which 
'accepts and r e j e c t s ' them. I t accepts what others are not ( t h e i r 
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goodness) , and r e j e c t s what i n t h e i r t o t a l i t y they are ( e v i l ) . The 
C h r i s t i a n i s here i n danger of looking p a s t the faces of h i s f e l l o w -
c r e a t u r e s , p a s t the concrete r e a l i t y of t h e i r l i v e s , to a mythologised 
I 
i d e a of t h e i r e s c h a t o l o g i c a l being. The danger, i n Barth's view of 
' C h r i s t i a n l o v e ' , i s t h a t the l i v e s which our neighbours a c t u a l l y l e a d 
are c o n s i d e r e d u n r e a l , and we are asked i n s t e a d to love them i n an 
e x i s t e n c e which they do not have. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to avoid the 
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a c r u c i a l weakness i n Barth's | work l i e s here: the 
sense t h a t the p o l i t i c a l and moral choices made by people do not r e a l l y 
matter, f o r they take p l a c e i n the context of an order of r e a l i t y 
i t s e l f condemned by God. 
B a r t h ' s f a i l u r e to see the e x p r e s s i o n of d i v i n e s a n c t i o n or w i l l 
i n any p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l order or moral p r i n c i p l e , may be connected 
with h i s f a i l u r e t o g i v e v a l u e to the 'other h a l f of the paradox, 
namely the knownness of the unknown God i n an h i s t o r i c a l l i f e . ' A l l 
Reformers are P h a r i s e e s ' , f o r B a r t h , because they make ' P h a r i s a i c ' 
c l a i m s to have determined the d i v i n e w i l l , to be changing s o c i e t y to 
correspond w i t h the s p e c i f i c form of l i f e which God s a n c t i o n s . Yet 
C h r i s t i a n s may w e l l want to say t h a t such correspondence i s based upon 
what God r e v e a l s of Himself i n the concrete h i s t o r i c a l e x i s t e n c e of 
i 
His son. F o r B a r t h , however, t h i s 'concrete h i s t o r i c a l e x i s t e n c e ' may 
not occur: the 'other' d i v i n e world which 'touches' t h i s world i n 
C h r i s t does not extend i t s e l f along i t . For t h a t reason, C h r i s t trod 
no p a r t i c u l a r path of p o l i t i c a l and moral commitment i n t h i s world, 
and His f o l l o w e r s have no a u t h o r i t y to c l a i m to i m i t a t e t h a t commitment 
i n t h e i r own e f f o r t s to reform. They have no example of a commitment 
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which, by v i r t u e of the I n c a r n a t i o n , might have had a more than human 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n . From the i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y of the d i v i n e and human 
worlds manifested by C h r i s t ' s ' I n c a r n a t i o n ' i n Barth's p r e s e n t a t i o n , 
f o l l o w s the 'Olympian' r e j e c t i o n of a l l p a r t i c u l a r reforms and 
improvements i n s o f a r as they c l a i m to r e a l i s e the Kingdom of God. The 
' c r a t e r ' marking the impact of the d i v i n e world upon t h i s , becomes the 
v o i d o f p o l i t i c a l and moral commitment suggested by Barth's commentary. 
He argues t h a t the r a d i c a l d i s c o n t i n u i t y between man and God i n h i s 
d i a l e c t i c i s i n a n t i t h e s i s to a 'bourgeois' s e a r c h for a 'secure' God 
i n t h i s world: and i t i s true t h a t the commentary provides no s a n c t i o n 
f o r a bourgeois s o c i a l order. But nor does i t encourage any a l t e r n a t i v e 
to the bourgeois s t a t u s quo: f o r i t evacuates the s i g n i f i c a n c e of 
p o l i t i c a l options by undermining the h i s t o r i c a l order w i t h i n which they 
are made. Any suggestion of a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l and moral content 
i n C h r i s t i a n teaching i s cut o f f a t source, s i n c e i t presupposes a 
s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the h i s t o r i c a l order which Barth has e f f e c t i v e l y 
r e f u t e d . 
I t i s not as i f Barth 'takes s i d e s ' i n any debate over such content: 
he merely denies the debate. But i n t h i s l i g h t , i t i s s u r e l y r i g h t t o 
conclude t h a t s i n c e he a s p i r e d to a viewpoint too Olympian f o r p o l i t i c s , 
t h i s must make him a t t r a c t i v e to c o n s e r v a t i v e s . 
Whereas the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i d e a l i s m of Kant o f f e r e d a 'd e n i a l of 
knowledge' which made p o s s i b l e a moral theology i n which the teaching 
of J e s u s was of supreme importance, t h a t of Barth e f f e c t i v e l y r u l e s out 
the C h r i s t o c e n t r i c p a r t i c u l a r i t y which g i v e s to s p e c i f i c moral and s o c i a l 
v a l u e s a d i v i n e s a n c t i o n . I n t h i s resounding second commentary on Paul's 
Epistle to the Romans one may d i s c e r n a d i a l e c t i c a l system, a n a t u r a l 
theology, an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t awareness of man's f i n i t u d e , a paradox muted 
by the demands of a ' p h i l o s o p h i c a l ' system - of the c e n t r a l i t y of C h r i s t 
to C h r i s t i a n i t y , the 'primacy of r e v e l a t i o n ' , the independence of 
theology as a d i s c i p l i n e and the work of grace i n overcoming the l a c k of 
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r e s o u r c e s i n man f o r understanding God, there i s no convincing evidence 
The problem of g r e a t e s t urgency f o r Barth's thought i n 1922, was t h a t 
of how to introduce the concept of r e v e l a t i o n i n t o theology: f o r the 
overcoming of t h a t i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e between man and God, 
which as a human undertaking must be an a c t of h u b r i s , was as a d i v i n e 
undertaking the essence of the gospel, the good news of Gcd's coming to 
man. 
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Notes on Chapter Two 
1. ... namlich d i e G e r e c h t i g k e i t Gottes durch s e i n e Treue i n Jesus 
C h r i s t u s ftir a l l e , d i e glauben. (Barth, Der Rbmerbrief, p.66. 
ET, t r . . E.C. Hoskyns, The Epistle to the Romans, pp. 91 f f . ) 
2. 'Das i s t Abrahams G o t t e s g e r e c h t i g k e l t . Ob Abraham "Gott h a t ? " 
Nein niemals, aber Gott h a t i n n ' . (Barth, Rbmerbrief, p.99: 
ET, p.123.) , 
i 
3. ET, op. cit., p.127. 
4. Ibid. 
5. ... a l s o g d t t l i c h e s Trotzdem (nie a l s Darum!), a l s Vergebung (nie 
a l s Best&tigung!) dessen, was e r i s t . (Barth, Rbmerbrief, p.99: 
ET, p.123.) 
6. Abraham's (or the man of f a i t h ' s ) r e a l i s a t i o n of t h i s 'establishment 
through d i s s o l u t i o n ' i s expressed through Barth's use of the Pauline 
word X P L O L S , which means both 'judgment' and 'separation'. Man 
understands God's judgment to e n t a i l a s e p a r a t i o n of h i m s e l f from 
the world-order i n which he l i v e s , and d i r e c t s h i s f a i t h to be 
e s c h a t o l o g i c a l . I f ' k r i s i s ' r e p r e s e n t s the judgment under which 
man i s separated from God, 'das Moment' (the moment) r e p r e s e n t s h i s 
e s c h a t o l o g i c a l establishment: t h i s 'moment', however, i s not a 
p e r i o d of time-however s h o r t - f o r i t i s not r e a l i s e d w i t h i n the 
parameters of a t h i s - w o r l d l y spatio-temporal e x i s t e n c e : 
The moment of the movement of men by God i s beyond men, 
i t cannot be enclosed i n a system or a method or a 'way' 
(ET, op. cit., p.110) 
(Und d i e s e r Moment der Bewegung des Menschen durch Gott 
i s t s e l b s t j e n s e i t s des Menschen, kann i n keinem Sinn 
zum Weg, zur Methode, zum System werden) 
(Barth, K., Rbmerbrief, p.85) 
The concepts of ' k r i s i s ' and 'moment1 f u n c t i o n as key terms i n the 
d i a l e c t i c a l theology of Barth's 'Romans', ensuring t h a t no un i t y 
of God and man w i l l be r e a l i s e d w i t h i n the present world-order. 
7. ET, op. cit., p.119. 
8. Ibid., p.112. 
9. Ibid. Hoskyns t r a n s l a t e s somewhat l o o s e l y . The German reads (p.87) 
Zwischen uns und Gott s t e h t und wird stehen b i s ans 
Ende der Tage das Kreuz, einigend, aber auch Distanz 
schaffend, v e r h e i s s u n g s v o l l , aber auch warnend. 
10. Hence i n being j u s t i f i e d man i s decl a r e d righteous (gerecht e r k l a r t 
werden) r a t h e r than 'becoming' r i g h t e o u s , which would imply t h a t 
through f a i t h the s e p a r a t i o n between man and God could be overcome 
i n the p r e s e n t world-order. Rather, f a i t h e x i s t s as a promise and 
a hope. (See Rbmerbrief, p. 76, ET, p.101.) 
11. ET, op. cit., p.103. 
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12. Whereas under the wrath of God (Romans 1:18), "the p r i s o n e r 
remains a p r i s o n e r and does not become a watchman 1, (ET, p.43). 
The German words are 'Gefangene' and 'wMchter' (Barth, 
R&merbrief, p.19). 
13. Note these words (ROmerbrief, p.151, ET, p.173) concerning the law: 
Es i s t d i e im Menschen und unter den Menschen s i c h ereignende 
Erinnerung an d i e - v e r l o r e n e - U n m i t t e l b a r k e i t zu Gott. 
B a r t h ' s r e f e r e n c e here to a ' l o s t immediacy' with God which the 
law b r i n g s to human ' r e c o l l e c t i o n ' i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s P l a t o n i c 
tendency of h i s thought. 
14. ET, op. cit., p.45. 
15. Those who see i n Barth an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the world as c r e a t e d 
w i t h the world as s i n f u l , and who see i n t h i s commentary a 
confounding of the two (e.g., E.L. M a s c a l l , Nature and Supernature, 
p.92: ' I t hink t h a t one of the most, unfortunate things i n some 
P r o t e s t a n t t h e o l o g i a n s , i n T i l l i c h as w e l l as i n Barth, i s a 
tendency to confuse the f a l l w ith c r e a t i o n , ... ') seem to us to 
f o r g e t t h a t Barth does take account of the d i s t i n c t i o n , but i n a 
n e g a t i v e sense. That i s to say, he argues t h a t : 
Nur i n dem, was d i e Dinge i n i h r e r S e l b s t f l n d i g k e i t und 
G f l l t i g k e i t beschrSnkt, nur i n ihrem k r i t i s c h zu gewinnenden 
B e g r i f f d.h. aber nur i n i h r e r Frag-W(irdigkeit, i n der 
M o g l i c h k e i t und Notwendigkeit i h r e r Aufhebung, i h r e r Negation, 
i n i h r e r FMhigkeit, a l s das, was s i e s i n d , hinzuweisen auf 
das, was s i e n i c h t s i n d ... (my u n d e r l i n i n g ) . 
(Barth, Rdmerbrief, p.147). 
The s e l f - c r i t i c a l f i n i t u d e of the things of t h i s world i s the 
n e g a t i v e means by which (through i t s v i s i b l e absence) they r e f l e c t 
t h e i r i n v i s i b l e o r i g i n . I t i s i n t h i s , negative sense that t h i s 
world d i s p l a y s i t s 'createdness' by God, even i n i t s f a l l e n , 
s i n f u l c o n d i t i o n . 
ET, p.170, B a r t h , p.148. The German, l o o s e l y t r a n s l a t e d , reads: 
Keine R e l a t i v i t a t , d i e n i c h t i n i h r e r v e r l o r e n - u n v e r l i e b a r e n 
Beziehung zuriickwiese auf das Absolute, von dem s i e e i g e n t l i c h 
l e b t , ... 
More l i t e r a l l y than Hoskyns, 'there i s no r e l a t i v i t y , which does 
not r e f e r back, i n i t s l o s t and y e t immortal r e l a t i o n to the 
Absolute, from which i t e s s e n t i a l l y l i v e s ... 
17. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, t r . N. Kemp Smith, pp.532-549. 
The i d e a s of reason are concepts which, w h i l s t a source of 
i l l u s i o n i f taken as r e l a t i n g to o b j e c t s of p o s s i b l e knowledge, 
perform a n e c e s s a r y f u n c t i o n i n the extension of our under-
standing when employed i n a ' r e g u l a t i v e ' manner. The concepts 
of 'God', 's o u l ' and 'immortality' do not imply t h a t we may form 
a d e f i n i t e i d e a of o b j e c t s corresponding to them; but advances 
i n psychology and s c i e n c e a r e , Kant argues, dependent upon our 
t h i n k i n g of i n n e r s t a t e s 'as i f they were s t a t e s of a s i n g l e 
i n c o r p o r e a l substance, and t h i n k i n g of the u n i v e r s e 'as i f i t 
were the product of a d i v i n e i n t e l l i g e n c e . The ideas of reason 
are used, not as ' c o n s t i t u t i v e ' of an o b j e c t of experience, but 
as ' r e g u l a t i v e ' i d e a s which give u n i t y to the understanding i n 





T h i s , then, i s how matters stand: i f we assume a d i v i n e being, 
we have indeed no concept whatsoever e i t h e r of the i n n e r 
p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s supreme p e r f e c t i o n or of the n e c e s s i t y of i t s 
e x i s t e n c e ; but, on the other hand, we are i n a p o s i t i o n to give 
a s a t i s f a c t o r y answer to a l l those questions which r e l a t e to the 
contingent, and to a f f o r d reason the most complete s a t i s f a c t i o n 
i n r e s p e c t to the h i g h e s t u n i t y a f t e r which i t i s seeking i n i t s 
e m p i r i c a l employment. The f a c t , however, t h a t we are unable to 
s a t i s f y reason i n r e s p e c t to the assumption i t s e l f , shows t h a t 
i t i s the s p e c u l a t i v e i n t e r e s t of reason, not any i n s i g h t , which 
j u s t i f i e s . i t i n thus s t a r t i n g from a point that l i e s so f a r above 
i t s sphere; and i n endeavouring, by t h i s d e v i c e , to survey i t s 
o b j e c t s as c o n s t i t u t i n g a complete whole. 
The p a r a d o x i c a l dilemma of human reason, with which Kant's f i r s t 
c r i t i q u e begins: 
Human reason has t h i s p e c u l i a r f a t e t h a t i n one s p e c i e s of i t s 
knowledge i t i s burdened by questions which, as p r e s c r i b e d by 
the v e r y nature of reason i t s e l f , i t i s not able to ignore, but 
which as transcending a l l i t s powers i t i s a l s o not able to 
answer. 
(Kemp Smith, p.7) 
may be compared to the p a r a d o x i c a l sense of God from the n a t u r a l 
world as presented by Barth i n h i s commentary on:Romans, as the 
' i n v i s i b l e absolute' which makes i t s e l f known only i n d i r e c t l y 
through the s e l f - c r i t i c a l r e c o g n i t i o n by the f i n i t e order of i t s 
r e l a t i v i t y . 
A f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n might be whether t h i s o u t l i n e of a 
' n a t u r a l theology' i n Romans might not accord more c l o s e l y 
w i t h some C a t h o l i c theology than the l a t e r theology of Barth 
which s e t s up a s e l f - e n c l o s e d c i r c l e of r e v e l a t i o n . There are 
echoes of t h i s B a r t h i a n ' n a t u r a l theology' i n both Anglican and 
c o n t i n e n t a l Neo-Thomist theology. The c l a i m t h a t i t i s the l a t e r 
r a t h e r than the e a r l i e r B a r t h , w i t h a more ' p o s i t i v e ' view of the 
c r e a t e d world and of humanity, which corresponds more c l o s e l y with 
C a t h o l i c theology, f o r g e t s t h a t t h i s ' p o s i t i v e ' view i s f i r m l y 
e s t a b l i s h e d on the b a s i s of a 'primacy of r e v e l a t i o n ' which gives 
to t h i s c r e a t e d order a freedom and an independence which i s more 
apparent than r e a l . I t would probably be more appropriate to 
concur w i t h Barth h i m s e l f t h a t i t was not u n t i l ten years a f t e r 
the f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n of Romans t h a t he f i n a l l y managed to purge 
h i s theology of ' e x i s t e n t i a l i s t ' ideas and of any suggestion of a 
n a t u r a l theology. 
1 8 . I t i s the f a t e of reason, i n Kant's view, to be forced beyond the 
l i m i t of i t s powers by. the nature of the challenge which i t f a c e s 
i n the employment of those powers. T h i s i s the sense i n which a 
f i n i t e order of being c o n t a i n s a p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - c r i t i c i s m t h a t 
d r i v e s i t to presume what i t cannot conceive - an i n f i n i t e order. 
See note 17. 
19.ET, op. cit., p.332. Immediately a f t e r t h i s remark Barth d e c l a r e s : 
The Grand I n q u i s i t o r ! 
He r e f e r s to the f i g u r e i n Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov 
who j u s t i f i e s , to the r e t u r n i n g C h r i s t , h i s a c t i o n s i n e n s l a v i n g 
man to an e c c l e s i a s t i c a l a u t h o r i t y . He r e c e i v e s , f o r h i s endeavours, 
a k i s s on h i s b l o o d l e s s l i p s . F o r g i v e n e s s ? Approval? Both have 
been argued. Most l i k e l y f o r g i v e n e s s of the weakness of man i n 
f i n d i n g such a u t h o r i t y n e c e s s a r y - f o r being unable t o face 'the 
i m p o s s i b l e p o s s i b i l i t y ' of f a i t h . (See The Brothers Karamazov, 
pp.288-311.) 
49. 
20. Ibid. (.Rdmerbrief, p.316 - das G o t t l i c h e zu vermensclichen). 
21. ET, p.332, Rdmerbrief, p.316: 
Dem Evangelium s t e h t d i e Ki r c h e gegen ilber a l s d i e Verkorperung 
der l e t z t e n menschlichen Mtiglichkeit d i e s s e i t s der unmflglichen 
M o g l i c h k e i t G o t t e s . 
22. Ibid., p.345. 
23. Ibid., p.191. Barth adds a f t e r the remark 'united with him i n the 
l i k e n e s s of h i s death' the words 'by our death' (nMmlich i n unsern 
Tode) i n order to make Paul emphasise t h a t t h i s u nity i s es c h a t -
o l o g i c a l , not p r e s e n t . (Rdmerbrief, p.171) 
2 3a. T h i s i s not to say t h a t Barth's eschatology i s f u t u r i s t i c ; r a t h e r , 
the e s c h a t o l o g i c a l 'Moment' r e p r e s e n t s the e t e r n a l and transcendent 
which i s the boundary of every event w i t h i n time. 
24. Ibid., p.148. Rdmerbrief, p.124. 
... das N i c h t - S e i n s . 
25. ET, op. cit., p.173. Rdmerbrief, p.151: 
Es i s t (das Gesetz) das l i c h t g f l t t l i c h e r Gegenwart und Offenbarung, 
gebrochen und g e f a r b t im Prisma jenes z e i t l i c h e n Nacheinander und 
d i n g l i c h e n Nebeneinander, das f u r d i e Welt des Menschen bezeichnend 
i s t . 
26. ET, op. cit., p.79: Rdmerbrief, p.53 
27. ET, p.66. 
28. Ibid., Rdmerbrief, p.41. 
29. Ibid., p.67. 
30. Ibid. Rdmerbxief, p.42. 
31. Ibid., p.29. Rdmerbrief, p.5. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ibid., p.30. Rdmerbrief, p.6. See chapter 8 f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of 
Bar t h ' s treatment of the r e s u r r e c t i o n i n h i s theology as a whole. 
In the commentary on Romans the r e s u r r e c t i o n f u nctions v i r t u a l l y 
as a synonym f o r r e v e l a t i o n , being t h a t which r e l a t e s the h i s t o r i c a l 
l i f e of Jesus to the realm of the n o n - h i s t o r i c a l and i n v i s i b l e . 
I t i s the demonstration of a realm which d e l i m i t s t h i s f i n i t e realm, 
the f r o n t i e r of h i s t o r y r a t h e r than an event i n h i s t o r y . 
33a. ' I t i s remarkable how often and how s t r o n g l y the Commentary on 
Romans emphasises the p o s i t i v e i n n e g a t i v i t y and th a t which p o i n t s 
to r e v e l a t i o n or which p a r a b o l i c a l l y r e f l e c t s i t i n the world'. 
(Regin P r e n t e r , ' D i e t r i c h Bonhoeffer and K a r l Barth's P o s i t i v i s m 
of R e v e l a t i o n ' , i n , World Come of Age : A Symposium on Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, ed., R. Gregor Smith, p.113) 
34. Ibid., p.114. Rdmerbrief, p.88. 
A l s der unbekannte Gott w i r d Gott i n Jesus erkannt. 
50. 
34a. Such a negative c o n c l u s i o n concerning h i s t o r y as a locus of 
r e v e l a t i o n p a r t l y r e f l e c t s the i n f l u e n c e upon Barth of Kahler's 
d i s j u n c t i o n between the 'Jesus of h i s t o r y ' and the ' C h r i s t of 
f a i t h ' (see Der sogenannte historische Jesus und der biblische, 
geschichtliche Jesus.) At the root of such h i s t o r i c a l 
s c e p t i c i s m was the p h i l o s o p h i c a l problem of 'Lessing's d i t c h ' , 
t h a t i s to say the apparently unbridgeable d i v i d e between 
' a c c i d e n t a l t r u t h s of h i s t o r y ' and 'necessary t r u t h s of reason', 
i n c l u d i n g t r u t h s of f a i t h , such t h a t the l a t t e r seemed incapable 
of being dependent upon the former, and such that the former, 
once admitted as the locus of r e v e l a t i o n , seemed to provide too 
u n c e r t a i n a foundation f o r those t r u t h s of dogma i n which the 
C h r i s t i a n r e v e l a t i o n found the means of ex p r e s s i o n . 
35. See J.M. Robinson, ed., The Beginnings of Dialectical Theology, 
p.125; t r a n s l a t e d from J . Moltmann, ed., Anf&nge der 
dialektischen Theologie, p.146. Note t h a t the Robinson s e l e c t i o n 
omits c e r t a i n works from the Moltmann s e l e c t i o n . 
S c h l a t t e r ' s quotation continues: 
Paul d i d not leap i n t o the v o i d , but j o i n e d h i m s e l f to J e s u s . 
One might c i t e i n support of S c h l a t t e r the sense given by Barth 
to being ' i n C h r i s t J e s u s ' . When S c h l a t t e r t a l k s of Paul as 
having 'joined h i m s e l f t o J e s u s ' , he i s questioning Barth's 
e s c h a t o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of passages such as Romans 8:1 
('There i s t h e r e f o r e no condemnation f o r those who are i n C h r i s t 
J e s u s ' ) . Barth comments upon t h i s passage (ET, p.272): 
Comprehended i n the d i s s o l u t i o n of the man of t h i s world, which 
i s r e v e a l e d i n Jesus as the C h r i s t , we are e s t a b l i s h e d as new 
men and pass from death to l i f e . T his i s the meaning of the 
words - i n C h r i s t J e s u s . 
S c h l a t t e r r e j e c t s the i d e a t h a t 'those who are i n C h r i s t J e s u s ' 
merely recognise t h e i r ' d i s s o l u t i o n ' as men of t h i s world r e v e a l e d 
i n C h r i s t and t h e i r e s c h a t o l o g i c a l establishment as 'new men'. 
The sense of the P a u l i n e passage i s of a present union with C h r i s t 
which Barth's 'system' of ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' 
r e n ders i m p o s s i b l e . 
However, i t seems to us to be a merit of Barth's commentary t h a t 
he does not t a l k of Paul having 'joined h i m s e l f t o J e s u s ' , a phrase 
which r e p r e s e n t s the s o r t of nonsense to which C h r i s t i a n p i e t y i s 
c o n s t a n t l y tempted. The f a i l i n g of Barth l i e s , r a t h e r , i n h i s 
i n a b i l i t y to g i v e o n t o l o g i c a l value to those c e n t r a l C h r i s t i a n 
m y s t e r i e s of the I n c a r n a t i o n and R e s u r r e c t i o n which do, as our 
chapter t r i e s to argue, undermine h i s 'system', w h i l s t remaining 
for, B a r t h h i m s e l f the very foundation of C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f . 
35a. See Mackinnon, D.M.y 'Kant's Philosophy of R e l i g i o n ' , i n Philosophy 
(1975) and Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Book 
Two, S e c t i o n One. 
36. ET, p.251. Rbmerbrief, p.234. The German r e f e r s to 'der V o l l z u g 
der k r i t i s c h e n Negation', l i t e r a l l y 'the f u l f i l m e n t of c r i t i c a l 
negation'. 
37. ET, p.252. Rbmerbrief, p.235: 
... Mensch q u a l i f i z i e r t , duch d i e er i n den Kontrast des 
R e l a t i v e n zum Absoluten g e s t i i r z t und v e r k e t t e t w i r d ... 
i 
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38. ET, pp.2.41-2. Rbmerbrief, pp.223-4. 
39. ET, p.213. Rbmerbrief, p.194. 
39a. L e a s t of a l l by Barth h i m s e l f . However, l a t e r he was to f e e l l e s s 
happy with the p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n f l u e n c e s upon h i s commentary, which 
i n the pref a c e t o h i s second e d i t i o n he had merely noted. In 1935 
Ba r t h commented t h a t h i s d e s i r e 'to e l u c i d a t e Paul's E p i s t l e to 
the Romans' was 'done p a r t l y by means of a strange i n c r u s t a t i o n of 
K a n t i a n - P l a t o n i c conceptions'. He goes on: 
I was a t l i b e r t y then to use these conceptions, but i f I were 
to be t o l d to-day t h a t I had to use them, I should say with 
d e c i s i o n , No. 
(Barth, Credo, ET, p.185). 
In f a c t , as we attempt t o show i n the course of t h i s t h e s i s , Barth 
could never i n h i s theology s i t so l i g h t l y towards p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
i d e a s as he was f r e q u e n t l y to make out. He suggests here t h a t he 
might almost p i c k them up or put them down at w i l l , whereas our 
c l a i m i s to be t h a t they r e p r e s e n t a f a r more p e r v a s i v e i n f l u e n c e 
upon h i s theology, which could not indeed have been a r t i c u l a t e d 
without them. 
39b. T h i s i s the c o n c l u s i o n reached by R.W.A. McKinney i n The Role of 
the Historical Jesus in the Theology of Karl Barth. He says of 
K a r l Barth's commentary: 
E f f e c t i v e l y , he has no d o c t r i n e of the I n c a r n a t i o n , (p.146) 
And he goes on: 
What we have i n s t e a d , i s a type of n a t u r a l theology, (p.146) 
K a r l Barth h i m s e l f remarked of h i s e a r l i e r commentary i n h i s 
Church Dogmatics: 
Readers of i t to-day w i l l not f a i l to appreciate t h a t i n i t 
Jn. l : 1 4 does not have j u s t i c e done to i t . (Volume 1, Part 2, 
p.50.) 
40. H.R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, pp. 218-262. 
41. ET, pp.480 f f . 
42. Ibid., pp. 480 f f . 
43. Compare the e x t r a o r d i n a r y remark: 
A H e Ref ormmenschen s i n d P h a r i s a e r . (.Rbmerbrief, p. 493, 
ET, p.509.) 
See a l s o the d i s c u s s i o n of Harnack below p. 58 . 
44. T h i s c h a r a t e r i s t i c of Barth's treatment of e t h i c s may i n p a r t l i e 
behind h i n t s of u n i v e r s a l i s m i n h i s commentary. I t i s as i f human 
beings are u l t i m a t e l y so unimportant t h a t God can ignore t h e i r s i n s 
a t no c o s t to h i m s e l f . 
45. ET, pp.454 f f . 
52. 
CHAPTER THREE 
A Question of Hermeneutics 
1. B a r t h ' s e a r l y thought 
I n a passage from Barth's Romans concerning the 'Incarnation 1''' 
we have quoted the remark: 
The e f f u l g e n c e , or r a t h e r , the c r a t e r made a t the p e r c u s s i o n 
p o i n t of an exploding s h e l l , the v o i d by which the p o i n t on 
the l i n e of i n t e r s e c t i o n makes i t s e l f known i n the concrete 
world of h i s t o r y i s not - even though i t be named the l i f e 
of J e s u s (auch wenn s i e "Leben J e s u " h e i s s e n ) - t h a t other 
world which touches our world i n Him. ( l a ) 
B a r t h ' s commentary was bound to have i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the attempt 
to w r i t e a ' L i f e of J e s u s ' , indeed f o r the whole hermeneutical question 
of how S c r i p t u r e was to be i n t e r p r e t e d . I n the quotation given above 
the i m p l i c a t i o n i s contained, t h a t the attempt to w r i t e an h i s t o r i c a l 
account of J e s u s i s a methodologically unsound one. Such an attempt 
would presume what has not i n f a c t been given - namely an extension of 
the 'ganze unbekannte Ebene 1 t o the 'uns bekannte Ebene', enabling t h e r e 
to be a r e a l h i s t o r i c a l dimension to the Word of God i n i t s s t a t e of 
2 
i n c a r n a t e s e l f - g i v i n g . The s u s p i c i o n of 'Gnostic o c c u l t i s m ' (gnostische 
Okkultismus) i n Barth u n s u r p r i s i n g l y followed p u b l i c a t i o n of h i s second 
commentary, and focussed on a debate w i t h Adolph von Harnack s e t o f f i n 
a s e r i e s of f i f t e e n q u e s t i o n s i n the j o u r n a l Christliche Welt. Barth 
3 
r a p i d l y p u b l i s h e d f i f t e e n answers. The debate was something of an 
e x e r c i s e i n mutual incomprehension, but i s i n t e r e s t i n g evidence of the 
methodological c r i s i s to which Barth's d i a l e c t i c a l procedure was 
s u b j e c t i n g him. An ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e ' between God and 
man i n e v i t a b l y r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n of how f a r S c r i p t u r e i t s e l f can c l a i m 
to b r idge t h a t gap, and of how f a r the 1 r e l a t i v i s i n g 1 of a l l human 
v a l u e s , i n s t i t u t i o n s and i d e a s under the p r e s s u r e of ' k r i s i s ' (the 
judgment t h a t i s by way of s e p a r a t i o n ) can avoid a 1 r e l a t i v i s i n g ' of the 
B i b l e i t s e l f . B a r t h seems to be f o r c e d e i t h e r to deny the a u t h o r i t y of 
the e p i s t l e - as he has denied the a u t h o r i t y of the moral law and a l l 
'human' v a l u e s - or to make s c r i p t u r e an exception to h i s 'system', 
i n which case he would have r e p l a c e d a Kantian moral theology with a 
b i b l i c a l theology. 
In f a c t , Barth a f f i r m s the a u t h o r i t y of S c r i p t u r e , but not by 
suggesting t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r 'human' q u a l i t y or a c t i o n has thereby been 
given an absolute s t a t u s . Rather, he denies t h a t i n e l e v a t i n g the 
Epistle to the Rowans,' he i s e f f e c t i v e l y e l e v a t i n g the human c a p a c i t y 
t h a t engineered i t : 
Regarded as a "point of view" (Standpunkt), the point of view of 
The Epistle to the Romans i s God's p o i n t of view. (4) 
Bart h c l a i m s t h a t the a u t h o r i t y of the e p i s t l e d e r i v e s from God, 
not from man. I t s s t a t u s does not deny the ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e 
d i s t i n c t i o n ' between God and man, and i m p l i e s no 'divine' power i n man, 
c 
f o r i t o r i g i n a t e s only i n the d i v i n e power of God. As we s h a l l see, 
Barth' s p o s i t i o n b r i n g s d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
The P r e f a c e s to Barth's commentaries on Romans ( c e r t a i n l y the f i r s t 
t h r e e e d i t i o n s ) have been seen as a watershed i n b i b l i c a l hermeneutics, 
although an important and l u c i d e a r l i e r essay e n t i t l e d 'The Strange New 
World Within the B i b l e ' ^ , o u t l i n e s aspects of Barth's hermeneutics based 
upon an address given i n the church a t L e u t w i l i n the autumn of 1916, 
three y e a r s before the f i r s t commentary was pub l i s h e d . Hermeneutics 
occupied B a r t h , then, as soon as he began to prepare a commentary on 
P a u l , or even to d i s c u s s P a u l i n e themes i n f o r m a l l y with Thurneysen. 
I n the Preface to the second commentary, Barth draws a t t e n t i o n to 
6 
Wernle's claimed l i s t of 'uncomfortable p o i n t s ' m Paul's theology, 
i n c l u d i n g h i s d e p r e c i a t i o n of the e a r t h l y l i f e of J e s u s , redemption by 
the blood of C h r i s t , Paul's use of the Old Testament, h i s a t t i t u d e 
towards s e c u l a r a u t h o r i t y and the i d e a of double p r e d e s t i n a t i o n . Barth 
c l a i m s t h a t Wemle di s m i s s e d or overlooked these 'uncomfortable p o i n t s ' , 
w h i l e he h i m s e l f w r e s t l e d w i t h them, r e f u s i n g to allow t h a t they be 
co n v e n i e n t l y f o r g o t t e n . How, then, d i d Barth come to terms w i t h them? 
54. 
I t would be w e l l here to remember the essay w r i t t e n i n 1916, 
'The Strange New World Within the B i b l e ' . For a s i m i l a r discomfort 
awaits the reader of S c r i p t u r e i n g e n e r a l , according to Barth's 
argument here. He d e s c r i b e s the 'shock' which the B i b l e gives to those 
who imagine t h a t what i t says w i l l conform to t h e i r human notions of 
h i s t o r y or m o r a l i t y : 
The B i b l e i s f u l l of h i s t o r y ; r e l i g i o u s h i s t o r y , l i t e r a r y 
h i s t o r y , c u l t u r a l h i s t o r y , world h i s t o r y and human h i s t o r y 
of every s o r t ... But the p l e a s u r e i s s h o r t - l i v e d ; the 
p i c t u r e , on c l o s e r i n s p e c t i o n , proves q u i t e incomprehensible 
and f l a t , i f i t i s meant only f o r h i s t o r y . (7) 
Again, 
At c e r t a i n c r u c i a l p o i n t s the B i b l e amazes us by i t s 
remarkable i n d i f f e r e n c e t o our conception of good 
and e v i l . (8) 
The consequence of our f i n d i n g a discomforting h i s t o r i c a l incompre-
h e n s i b i l i t y and moral i n d i f f e r e n c e i n the B i b l e , Barth i s suggesting, 
i s to f o r c e us to ask the question: are we using the c o r r e c t method i n 
t r y i n g to understand the t e x t 1 We would, a f t e r a l l , r e a c t to a mathem-
a t i c a l p u z z l e which we found i n s o l u b l e by attempting a new method i n 
s o l v i n g i t . I n a s i m i l a r way (although more r a d i c a l i n i t s change of 
method) the B i b l e should shock us out of an all-embracing h i s t o r i c a l -
c r i t i c a l methodology, when the consequence of applying t h a t method alone 
to the t e x t i s , i n Barth's view, a f a i l u r e to u n r a v e l i t s meaning. We 
should not t r y to make the t e x t y i e l d more comprehensible r e s u l t s when 
i n t e r p r e t e d according to our h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l approach, but should 
a l t e r the approach i t s e l f . To shore up the h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l method 
by supposing i t to have e x p l a i n e d what i n f a c t remains unsolved by i t 
would be d i s h o n e s t : y e t t h i s , by i m p l i c a t i o n , i s the f a i l u r e of which 
Ba r t h would accuse those who, l i k e Wernle i n Barth's view, conceal the 
'ungemtltliche Punkte' emanating from the use of what they w i l l not admit, 
to be an i n a p p r o p r i a t e methodology. 
A s i m i l a r argument i s to be found i n the preface to the t h i r d 
i i . . . e d i t i o n of Barth's Romans. Here Barth confronts Bultmann's c r i t i c i s m 
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t h a t h i s method of e x e g e s i s takes no account of the f a c t t h a t 'other 
9 . 
s p i r i t s make themselves heard, as w e l l as the S p i r i t of C h r i s t ' i n 
the t e x t of the e p i s t l e . Barth's r e p l y i s an apparently modest one on 
b e h a l f of P a u l , namely t h a t the 'other s p i r i t s ' make themselves heard 
i n every p a r t of the t e x t , and not merely i n the p a r t s which the 
i n t e r p r e t e r has l e s s enthusiasm f o r than o t h e r s : 
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The whole i s p l a c e d under the k r i s i s of the S p i r i t of C h r i s t . 
Yet from t h i s 'modest' premise Barth draws the conclusion t h a t 
Paul i s beyond c r i t i c i s m ! He comments: 
Anything s h o r t of u t t e r l o y a l t y means a commentary 
ON Paul's E p i s t l e to the Romans, not a commentary 
so f a r as i s p o s s i b l e WITH him - even to h i s l a s t word. 
The grounds upon which Barth makes t h i s remark are r e v e a l e d i n h i s 
subsequent comment: 
I cannot, f o r my p a r t , t h i n k i t p o s s i b l e f o r an i n t e r p r e t e r 
h o n e s t l y to reproduce the meaning of any author unless he 
dares to accept the c o n d i t i o n of u t t e r l o y a l t y . (12) 
T h i s p o i n t i s hard to f o l l o w . Obviously i f l o y a l t y means 
' d e s c r i b i n g what the author a c t u a l l y meant i n context', then l o y a l t y i s 
a c o n d i t i o n of any approach to the t e x t which attempts to do j u s t i c e 
to what i s being s a i d . This seems to be the meaning Barth has i n mind 
when he c o n t i n u e s , a g a i n s t Bultmann: 
He a s k s me to t h i n k and w r i t e WITH Paul, to follow him i n t o 
the v a s t u n f a m i l i a r i t y of h i s Jewish P o p u l a r - C h r i s t i a n , 
H e l l e n i s t i c conceptions; and then suddenly, when the whole 
becomes too h o p e l e s s l y b i z a r r e , I am to t u r n round and 
w r i t e ' c r i t i c a l l y ' ABOUT him - as though, when a l l i s 
s t r a n g e , t h i s or t h a t i s to be regarded as e s p e c i a l l y 
outrageous. (13) 
One would have thought t h a t there was nothing odd or unreasonable 
about Bultmann's p o s i t i o n . L o y a l t y to an author means seeing h i s p o i n t , 
but not n e c e s s a r i l y accepting i t . I t means a f a i r c o n t e x t u a l p r e s e n t -
a t i o n , which i s a c o n d i t i o n as much of agreement as disagreement. Barth 
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d e s c r i b e s Bultmann's view as an 'error i n l i t e r a r y t a s t e ' , thereby 
seeming to confuse ' l o y a l t y ' i n the sense of being true to what someone 
i s s a y i n g with ' l o y a l t y ' i n the sense of agreeing with him. The p o i n t 
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of Bultmann's remarks concerning the danger of confusing the ' S p i r i t 
of C h r i s t ' with 'other s p i r i t s ' , i s not to suggest t h a t Paul should 
not be r e a d i n context, but to suggest t h a t having been read i n 
c o n t e x t he should be c r i t i c i s e d . 
However, what we may understand Barth to mean by h i s remark 
concerning Bultmann's ' e r r o r i n l i t e r a r y t a s t e ' , i s not t h a t Bultmann 
reads Paul c r i t i c a l l y , but t h a t he reads him i n the wrong way. Barth 
f e e l s t h a t Bultmann does not see what s o r t .of a work the e p i s t l e i s -
hence h i s t r e a t i n g i t as a document deserving c r i t i c i s m on the b a s i s 
of c o n t e x t u a l h i s t o r i c o - c r i t i c a l methods. His seeing 'other s p i r i t s ' 
b e s i d e s the ' S p i r i t of C h r i s t ' a t work i n the author's words, i s a 
symptom of h i s viewing the t e x t as an h i s t o r i c a l document, and t h i s 
a t t i t u d e , i n Barth's view, doesn't do j u s t i c e to the nature of the work 
Thus the 'error i n l i t e r a r y t a s t e ' , namely to t r e a t a s c r i p t u r a l t e x t 
as an h i s t o r i c a l document. The problem, then, i s to determine what 
ki n d of work Barth h i m s e l f understands a s c r i p t u r a l t e x t to be, and 
why he demands ' u t t e r l o y a l t y ' to a t e x t he admits to be i n f e c t e d i n 
a l l i t s p a r t s by ' s p i r i t s ' other than t h a t of C h r i s t . 
I n each of these examples of Barth's hermeneutics, from the essay 
of 1916 and the p r e f a c e s to the commentaries on Romans., E a r t h ' s 
fundamental concern i s not t h a t b i b l i c a l e x egesis should be improving 
i t s a c c u r a c y but t h a t i t should be changing i t s method. His b a s i c 
c l a i m i s t h a t a s c r i p t u r a l t e x t i s not - or not simply - an h i s t o r i c a l 
document, and t h e r e f o r e t h a t i t cannot be s t u d i e d by c r i t i c a l 
h i s t o r i c a l methods alone. I f i t i s so s t u d i e d , i t proves p e r p l e x i n g , 
although purveyors of an e x c l u s i v e l y h i s t o r i c a l method might deny t h i s , 
or f i n d i n i t merely evidence of the complexity of t h e i r t a s k . However 
f o r Barth such p e r p l e x i t y should l e a d us to question our method of 
a n a l y s i n g the t e x t , and to ask whether t h i s method i s appropriate to 
the p a r t i c u l a r s u b j e c t - m a t t e r , namely S c r i p t u r e . The p o i n t i s c l e a r l y 
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s t a t e d i n the p r e f a c e to B a r t h 1 s f i r s t commentary: 
The h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l method of B i b l i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n has i t s 
r i g h t f u l p l a c e : i t i s concerned with the p r e p a r a t i o n of the 
i n t e l l i g e n c e - and i t can never be s u p e r f l u o u s . But, were I 
d r i v e n to choose between i t and the venerable d o c t r i n e of 
I n s p i r a t i o n , I should without h e s i t a t i o n adopt the l a t t e r , which 
has a broader, deeper, and more important j u s t i f i c a t i o n . (15) 
B a r t h i s c l a i m i n g t h a t a methodology of ' i n s p i r a t i o n ' i s more 
ap p r o p r i a t e than one of ' h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l ' methods. The l a t t e r have 
a r o l e i n 'preparing' the i n t e l l i g e n c e , but t h i s i s merely p r e l i m i n a r y : 
and from Barth's d e s c r i p t i o n of the a p p l i c a t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l methods to 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f S c r i p t u r e i n 'The Strange New World Within the 
B i b l e ' , t h i s p r e l i m i n a r y r o l e appears s i m i l a r t o t h a t of the law and 
r e l i g i o n i n Barth's second commentary, namely a form of 'witness by 
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f a i l u r e ' . Because of the 'uncomfortable p o i n t s ' t h a t i n e v i t a b l y a r i s e 
when the t e x t i s i n t e r p r e t e d according to h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l methods, 
those methods are seen to be inadequate: a consciousness of such inadequacy 
'prepares the i n t e l l i g e n c e ' to embrace a d i f f e r e n t method of e l u c i d a t i n g 
the meaning of the t e x t , which B a r t h here a s s o c i a t e s with 'the venerable 
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d o c t r i n e of i n s p i r a t i o n ' . I n the way t h a t r e l i g i o n and the law provided 
important means by which man d i s c o v e r e d t h a t he could not 'humanise the 
d i v i n e ' , h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l methods are important means by which man 
r e a l i s e s t h a t he cannot 'capture the d i v i n e meaning' by means of i n s t r u -
ments of human reason. The gospel i s proclaimed i n a n t i t h e s i s to r e l i g i o n 
and the law, i n the second commentary on Romans, and i t e n t a i l s a p o s i t i v e 
r e c o g n i t i o n ( f u l f i l l i n g t h e i r negative r e c o g n i t i o n ) of the s e p a r a t i o n 
between God and man; s i m i l a r l y the 'doctrine of I n s p i r a t i o n ' , i n Barth's 
view, e n t a i l s p o s i t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n of the g u l f between human understanding 
and the d i v i n e l y - c o n t r o l l e d meaning of the t e x t . 
Two quotations from 'The Strange New World Within the B i b l e ' make 
c l e a r B a r t h ' s view: 
I t i s not the r i g h t human thoughts about God which form the content 
of the B i b l e , but the r i g h t d i v i n e thoughts about man. (18) 
I n other words: 
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The B i b l e t e l l s us not how we should t a l k with God but what He 
says to us; not how we f i n d the way to Him, but how He has 
sought and found the way to us; .... (19) 
The argument i s t h a t the h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l method t r e a t s the 
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S c r i p t u r a l t e x t as capable of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as a c o l l e c t i o n of 'human 
thoughts, about God': human thoughts may be i n t e r p r e t e d according to a 
human understanding. I n f a c t , however, Barth c l a i m s , the B i b l e contains 
' d i v i n e thoughts about man1 r a t h e r than 'human thoughts about God 1, and 
these may not be comprehended by man, s i n c e man and God are s e t i n 
' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' . They may be comprehended only by 
a p a r t i c u l a r a c t of God's grace - by i n s p i r a t i o n . 
These hermeneutical forays by Bar t h provide the background by 
which we may judge h i s debate w i t h Adolf von Harnack i n 1923. 
Harnack's Fifteen Questions to the Despisers of Scientific 
Theology, r e c a l l s S c h l e iermacher's Speeches on Religion to its 
Cultured Despisers. He c l e a r l y f e a r s t h a t any theologian arguing i n 
a B a r t h i a n manner w i l l r e v e r s e a t r e n d of accommodation w i t h 
i n t e l l e c t u a l and c u l t u r a l v a l u e s which Schleiermacher encouraged, and 
thereby p r o p e l theology i n t o i s o l a t i o n - an i s o l a t i o n i n which i t w i l l 
not be able to judge w i t h d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between v a r i o u s c u l t u r a l , 
i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral a t t i t u d e s , although i t may s t i l l judge upon them. 
To the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n h i s t o r y i s e s s e n t i a l , f o r the 
h i s t o r i c a l method r e v e a l s f i n Harnack's view, the f i n a l importance of 
lo v e , j o y , peace and goodness as o u t l i n e d i n the l i f e of J e s u s . The 
f e a r t h a t C h r i s t i a n i t y w i l l l o s e the power to pronounce with a d i s c r i m -
i n a t i n g concern upon the importance of these v a l u e s i n s o c i e t y i s indeed 
the main concern of Harnack's q u e s t i o n s : : h i s concern i s not merely f o r 
the r e c o v e r y of the ' h i s t o r i c a l J e s u s ' as such. Thus: 
(11) Whatever i s t r u e , honourable, j u s t , g r a c i o u s , i f there i s 
any e x c e l l e n c e , anything worthy of p r a i s e , t h i n k on these 
th i n g s - i f t h i s l i b e r a t i n g admonition s t i l l s tands, how 
can one expect b a r r i e r s between the experience of God and 
the good, the t r u e and the b e a u t i f u l , i n s t e a d of r e l a t i n g 
them w i t h the experience of God by means of h i s t o r i c a l 
knowledge and c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n ? (21) 
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I t i s the e x t o l l i n g and support of c e r t a i n moral values through 
'the experience of God' ( G o t t e s e r l e b n i s ) t h a t i s c r u c i a l f o r Harnack, 
and e x p l a i n s the f e a r he has of Barth's approach. But t h i s 'experience 
of God' i s h i s t o r i c a l l y - m e d i a t e d , f o r i t comes by way of the example 
of C h r i s t h i s t o r i c a l l y known: 
(14) I f the person of Jesus C h r i s t stands a t the centre of 
the gospel, how e l s e can the b a s i s f o r r e l i a b l e and 
communal knowledge of t h i s person be gained but through 
c r i t i c a l - h i s t o r i c a l study so t h a t an imagined C h r i s t 
i s not put i n p l a c e of the r e a l one ? What e l s e besides 
s c i e n t i f i c theology i s able to undertake t h i s study? (22) 
Harnack's f e a r , which a reading of the l a s t s e c t i o n s of Barth's 
second commentary on Romans might seem to j u s t i f y , i s t h a t without 
c r i t i c a l - h i s t o r i c a l study the l i f e and teaching of C h r i s t w i l l not 
be recovered, and the moral, r e l i g i o u s and c u l t u r a l v alues which he 
embraced w i l l not be advanced as e x p r e s s i o n s of the d i v i n e w i l l . 
Rather, good and bad a l i k e w i l l be lumped together as aspects of a 
' f i n i t e ' and ' s i n f u l ' r e a l i t y r e q u i r i n g equal condemnation, and 
C h r i s t i a n i t y w i l l ' surrender i t s power to d i s c r i m i n a t e between such 
v a l u e s by taking an 'Olympian 1 p o s i t i o n above and apart from them. 
Such an a c t i o n would be, Harnack suggests, an 'Herostratean' deed, 
f o l l o w i n g the Ephesian H e r o s t r a t e s who s e t f i r e to the temple of 
Artemis i n an attempt - which Harnack i m p l i e s provides a precedent 
f o r B a r t h - to gain n o t o r i e t y through barbarism. The tenor of Harnack's 
q u e s t i o n s i s not then simply t h a t of an academic concerned with h i s 
d i s c i p l i n e , but of a C h r i s t i a n f e a r i n g t h a t the e t h i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t 
and c i v i l i s i n g nature of h i s f a i t h w i l l be l o s t . 
B arth's i n i t i a l r e p l y to the f i f t e e n questions could be s a i d to 
g i v e substance to Harnack's f e a r s : 
(4) The f a i t h awakened by God w i l l never be able to avoid 
completely the n e c e s s i t y of a more or l e s s r a d i c a l 
p r o t e s t a g a i n s t t h i s world as s u r e l y as i t i s a hope 
f o r the promised but i n v i s i b l e g i f t ... For the 
' u t t e r c o n t r a s t 1 of God and the world, the c r o s s , i s 
the only way i n which we as human beings can c o n s i d e r 
the o r i g i n a l and f i n a l u n i t y of Creator and c r e a t u r e . (2 3) 
The r a d i c a l c r i t i c i s m of t h i s world, the d i a l e c t i c a l subsumption 
of a l l i t s v a l u e s under the ' K r i s i s ' of God's judgment, and t h e i r 
merely e s c h a t o l o g i c a l r e s o l u t i o n , removes the p o s s i b i l i t y of d i s c r i m -
i n a t i n g between those v a l u e s . This i s perhaps the i m p l i c a t i o n of 
Barth's merely r e p l y i n g to Harnack's question 6: ' I f God and the world 
are complete opp o s i t e s , how does education i n g o d l i n e s s , t h a t i s 
goodness, become p o s s i b l e ? 'by quoting John 6:44?: 'No one can come 
to me u n l e s s the F a t h e r who s e n t me draws him and I w i l l r a i s e him up 
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a t the l a s t day 1. More e x p l i c i t l y , Barth suggests t h a t 'the gospel 
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has as much and as l i t t l e t o do w i t h "barbarism" as with c u l t u r e ' , 
a view which u n s u r p r i s i n g l y a l e r t s Harnack to the e x c l u s i o n of 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between human val u e s under the comprehensive d i v i n e 
' K r i s i s ' of Barth's 'system' .: 
For your sentence 'the gospel has as much and as l i t t l e to 
do w i t h barbarism as with c u l t u r e " can be only understood 
as a r a d i c a l d e n i a l of every r a d i c a l understanding of God 
w i t h i n the h i s t o r y of man's thought and e t h i c s . (26) 
S i n c e , Harnack goes on to e x p l a i n , Barth argues f o r a r a d i c a l 
d i s j u n c t i o n between 'God's t r u t h and our t r u t h 1 , no ' t r u t h ' of human 
c u l t u r e or m o r a l i t y w i l l more a p p r o p r i a t e l y suggest or 'capture' the 
27 
d i v i n e t r u t h than any other. A l l are condemned to s e p a r a t i o n from 
t h a t t r u t h and none may c l a i m to possess God. 
C r i t i c a l - h i s t o r i c a l study of the B i b l e , Barth suggests i n answer 
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to Harnack's fo u r t e e n t h q u e s t i o n , should remind us that we 'no longer 
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know C h r i s t according to tie f l e s h ' . The Pauline quotation i s 
i n t e r p r e t e d to mean t h a t no h i s t o r i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d 'Leben J e s u ' , or 
l i f e of J e s u s , may be w r i t t e n : t o suppose such a work p o s s i b l e would 
be a k i n t o b e l i e v i n g i n the continued p h y s i c a l presence of C h r i s t . 
The b e l i e f t h a t the h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l method alone should be a p p l i e d 
to S c r i p t u r e , r a t h e r than the use of i t as a p r e l i m i n a r y method 
which i l l u m i n a t e s , through i t s i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s to i t s s u b j e c t -
matter, t h a t the t e x t must be conceived ' a f t e r the S p i r i t ' , 
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expressed the mistaken view t h a t C h r i s t i s s t i l l a v a i l a b l e ' i n the 
f l e s h 1 t o man, not through the d i r e c t view of a contemporary but 
through an equally ' f l e s h l y ' i n d i r e c t n e s s by means of h i s t o r i c a l 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
I t i s i n answer t o Harnack's subsequent l e t t e r t o Barth, t h a t the 
l a t t e r ' s own methodology i s made c l e a r e r . Barth sees i n Harnack's 
commitment t o the h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l method the view t h a t t h i s i s the 
only way of grasping the o b j e c t of study e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y . Barth's 
own view, however, i s t h a t t h i s methodology must be employed only as a 
p r e l i m i n a r y exercise i n order t o demonstrate i t s fundamental inapprop-
r i a t e n e s s t o i t s subject-matter. More appropriate would be the 
'venerable d o c t r i n e of I n s p i r a t i o n 1 . I t becomes clearer i n Barth's 
answer t o Harnack's l e t t e r what he means by t h i s methodology of 
' i n s p i r a t i o n ' . He w r i t e s : 
You had asked i n question 1 how one might come t o f i n d out 
what the content of the gospel i s without h i s t o r i c a l 
knowledge and c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n . I answered i n the f i r s t 
instance t h a t t h i s understanding occurs e x c l u s i v e l y through 
an a c t i o n (through deed and word) of t h i s very 'content' 
( I n h a l t ) (of God or C h r i s t or the S p i r i t ) ... I n the 
second instance I s a i d concerning c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n t h a t 
i t cannot be good t o reverse the order and t u r n 'Thus says 
the Lord' i n t o 'Thus hears man'. I f there i s a way t o t h i s 
the speaking voice must be the l i s t e n i n g ear (Gibt es 
einen Weg zu diesem " I n h a l t " , so muss der I n h a l t s e l b s t der 
Weg, die redende Stimme auch das horende Ohr s e i n ) . 
This argument must be seen i n the context of the accusation t h a t 
i f Barth deserts the h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l method of exegesis, then he 
w i l l encourage a s u b j e c t i v i s m t h a t i n t e r p r e t s the s c r i p t u r e s i n any 
way i t l i k e s . Uncontrolled by the demands of what i s h i s t o r i c a l l y 
accurate, i t w i l l be f r e e t o impose any desired meaning of i t s own. 
Barth denies t h a t he i s encouraging ' s u b j e c t i v i s m ' : ^ 1 indeed h i s view 
i s t h a t t h i s methodology i s more 'o b j e c t i v e ' than t h a t of c r i t i c a l 
h i s t o r y , since i t respects the nature of the 'object' i n question, the 
'content' ( I n h a l t ) of-! the s c r i p t u r a l corpus i t s e l f , which i s not 
p r i m a r i l y a c o l l e c t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l documents. Thus Barth's method-
ology claims t o be more ' o b j e c t i v e ' than Harnack's. Recognising the 
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p a r t i c u l a r nature of t h i s 'object' or 'content', i t accepts t h a t ' i f 
there i s a way t o t h i s "content", then the content i t s e l f must be the 
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way'. I n other words, the content of the s c r i p t u r a l t e x t determines 
the way i n which i t i s t o be understood, r e v e a l i n g i t s e l f t o be of a 
d i f f e r e n t nature from h i s t o r i c a l documents l i k e Thucydides' The 
Peloponnesian Wars, a n d thus r e q u i r i n g a d i f f e r e n t methodology i n 
order t o e l i c i t i t s meaning. This methodology, Barth argues, i s 
determined by the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t S c r i p t u r e supplies not only the 
content which i s t o be apprehended,but the manner of i t s apprehension. 
I t i s p r e c i s e l y when man f o r g e t s t h a t he i s not only provided w i t h the 
'content' ( I n h a l t ) t o be understood, but also w i t h the manner by which 
he i s t o understand i t , and r a t h e r supposes t h a t man must supply t h a t 
methodology h i m s e l f , t h a t he becomes a 'speaking voice' ra t h e r than a 
' l i s t e n i n g ear': more p r e c i s e l y , man makes t h i s e r r o r when he t r i e s 
t o hear and understand what God i s saying w i t h h i s own ears r a t h e r than 
through a capacity supplied by God himself. I n t h i s way Barth claims 
t o have a pu r e l y o b j e c t i v e approach t o S c r i p t u r e , one which recognises 
t h a t i t s meaning must be perceived i n the manner appropriate t o i t , 
which i s by means of an a c t i v i t y of the 'content' of Scripture i t s e l f . 
Hence Barth remarks, i n the preface t o the second commentary on 
Romans, t h a t the h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l method has a merely preparatory 
r o l e i n the understanding of S c r i p t u r e , because t h i s method i s an 
expression of the human understanding attempting to make sense of the 
t e x t from i t s own resources, r a t h e r than from 'an act of the content 
i t s e l f - Barth's understanding of ' i n s p i r a t i o n ' . Hence the emphasis, 
i n 'The Strange New World Within the B i b l e ' , upon the f a c t t h a t Scripture 
t e l l s us, 'not how we f i n d the way t o him, but how he has sought and 
found the way t o us'. Hence the 'error i n l i t e r a r y t a s t e ' of Bultmann, 
which l i e s not i n a lack of ' o b j e c t i v i t y ' measured by the standards of 
h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l s c h o l a r s h i p , but i n a lack of understanding t h a t 
the a p propriate methodology w i t h respect t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 'object' i s 
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one which recognises t h a t the understanding i t s e l f i s given by God, 
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not by man. That i s why Barth demands ' u t t e r l o y a l t y ' t o the author 
- not because such l o y a l t y would be appropriate t o h i s t o r i c a l documents 
which must be understood by man's c r i t i c a l s c r u t i n y , but because i t i s 
appro p r i a t e t o s c r i p t u r a l documents which are t o be understood through 
'an a c t of the content i t s e l f - the work of God rath e r than of man. 
We can glimpse here on what grounds Barth would seek t o deny the 
i n d i s c r i m i n a t e r e j e c t i o n of a l l human values and judgments, i n the l i g h t 
of an absolute separation between man and God, which Harnack fears must 
r e s u l t from r e j e c t i o n of t h a t c r i t i c a l , h i s t o r i c a l method which brings 
t o l i g h t the d i v i n e s i g n i f i c a n c e of c e r t a i n of these values. He would 
argue t h a t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n remains, but t h a t i t i s God's, not man's. 
God hi m s e l f ensures t h a t the t e x t i s understood i n such a way t h a t i t 
bears a p a r t i c u l a r meaning f o r man; indeed, f a r from 'subjectivism' 
t h i s i s the highest ' o b j e c t i v i s i m ' , f o r w h i l s t man's attempt t o reason 
o b j e c t i v e l y using c r i t e r i a o f human understanding may be e r r a n t , God's 
understanding does not e r r . =Ged's S p i r i t leads man i n t o a l l t r u t h , 
human s p i r i t s do not. Indeed, important disagreements between ' c r i t i c a l 
h i s t o r i a n s ' could be pointed t o . Their ' s c i e n t i f i c theology' had 
produced a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t assessments of the ' h i s t o r i c a l Jesus' 
i n the previous century. Their accounts had culminated i n Schweitzer's 
Von Reimarus zu Wrede which suggested t h a t Jesus' es c h a t o l o g i c a l concern 
was of more importance than h i s moral teaching - indeed t h a t Jesus was 
an a p o c a l y p t i c v i s i o n a r y determined by h i s own c u l t u r e , not the purveyor 
of ' e t e r n a l t r u t h ' . Arguably i t was the h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l method 
i t s e l f which was seen t o be encouraging 'subjectivism'and Barth could 
clai m t o be presenting a f u l l y ' o b j e c t i v i s t ' methodology, which removed 
the burden of understanding C h r i s t i a n o r i g i n s from the whims of human 
c r i t i c i s m and es t a b l i s h e d i t as an i n f a l l i b l e d i v i n e a c t i o n t h a t man 
should simply 'hear'. I n s p i r a t i o n (of the reader and i n t e r p r e t e r , not 
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simply of the author and the t e x t ) had a consistency - an o b j e c t i v i t y 
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i t could be claimed - which the h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l method lacked, 
dependent as i t was on the p r e v a i l i n g c u r r e n t s of c u l t u r a l and moral 
a s s o c i a t i o n by which the h i s t o r i a n h i m s e l f was determined by h i s time. 
Y e t Barth's hermeneutic f a l l s under the same c r i t i c i s m as h i s 
second commentary. S c r i p t u r e i n general i s s u b j e c t e d to the same 
'system' of ' i n f i n i t e , q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' a s the Pauline t e x t i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , not only with r e s p e c t to what i t s a y s , but with r e s p e c t to 
i t s s t a t u s i n saying i t . The problem, we found, w i t h r e s p e c t to the 
I n c a r n a t i o n and R e s u r r e c t i o n i n the second commentary, was t h a t they 
were presented i n the ambiguous form of a meeting between two worlds 
t h a t cannot meet. The tangent touches the c i r c l e - t h a t i s to say 
'without' touching i t . The v e r t i c a l l i n e i n t e r s e c t s the h o r i z o n t a l 
without forming a p a r t of i t . One plane f a i l s to merge with another. 
Such mathematical metaphors do not e x p l a i n - they only make confusion 
p o e t i c . Our c l a i m w i t h r e s p e c t to Barth's commentary was t h a t i n the 
I n c a r n a t i o n God and man do not become one i n i t s p r e s e n t a t i o n , but 
r a t h e r t h a t the I n c a r n a t i o n i s an occasion of a f f i r m i n g - i n a concrete 
event - the absolute s e p a r a t i o n of God and man. 'In Jesus God i s known 
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as the unknown God'. The knowledge of God i s not C h r i s t o l o g i c a l , by 
way of a theology of r e v e l a t i o n c e n t r e d on C h r i s t , but i s achieved by 
way of an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t n a t u r a l theology founded on P l a t o n i c - K a n t i a n 
d u a l i s m . God i s the Other i n d i r e c t l y known through the e x i s t e n t i a l l y -
r e a l i s e d f a i l u r e s of t h i s l i f e and incompleteness of t h i s f i n i t e world. 
I n the correspondence with Harnack, a s i m i l a r p a t t e r n emerges. 
The h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l method,like the law and r e l i g i o n , w i t n e s s e s by 
f a i l u r e ; i t too c o n t r i b u t e s to the merely negative information -
anamnesis - of a 'vanished a b s o l u t e ' . I t l e a d s man to d e s p a i r of h i s 
understanding, as the law l e a d s him to d e s p a i r of h i s moral and c u l t u r a l 
v a l u e s , and as r e l i g i o n leads him to d e s p a i r of h i s r e l i g i o u s v a l u e s 
and f i n a l l y of h i m s e l f . I n t h i s sense, the more negative the conclusions 
a r r i v e d a t by the h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l method the b e t t e r . Thus, Barth's 
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hermeneutic i s one of r e s i g n a t i o n before an understanding which only 
God can b r i n g about, i n the context of a r e j e c t i o n of human h i s t o r i c a l 
methods, prone as they are to f a i l u r e - and s u b j e c t i v i s m ! Here, 
however, Barth's hermeneutic f a c e s the d i f f i c u l t y of s e t t i n g i t s e l f 
w i t h i n an e s c h a t o l o g i c a l framework: and as i n the commentary on 
Romans, i n c a r n a t i o n and I n s u r r e c t i o n seemed s e t to challenge the idea 
of a s e p a r a t i o n overcome only a t the eschaton, so the presence of a 
s c r i p t u r a l corpus i n t h i s p r e s e n t world-order provides a challenge to 
t h a t s e p a r a t i o n . The words of S c r i p t u r e , l i k e the humanity of C h r i s t , 
tug a t the ropes by which two worlds are h e l d a p a r t i n Barth's 'system'. 
The worlds are allowed to touch - 'but not to touch'. S c r i p t u r e i s 
allowed to be the Word of God - and y e t i t i s merely the words of man. 
On the one hand, Bultmann i s not c r i t i c a l enough of Paul, Barth claims 
- f o r 'other s p i r i t s make themselves heard i n every p a r t of the t e x t , 
and not merely i n p a r t s ...'. On the other hand, Bultmann does not 
r e s p e c t the f a c t t h a t u t t e r l o y a l t y to the commentary i s r e q u i r e d , 
w r i t i n g 'with' Paul r a t h e r than 'about' him, basing h i m s e l f upon a 
c o n v i c t i o n of the I n s p i r a t i o n of S c r i p t u r e . I n s p i r e d and y e t wholly 
c o r r u p t , the Word of God and y e t the word of man, the same d i a l e c t i c 
r e c u r s as Barth s t r a i n s to make compatible what h i s system of " i n f i n i t e 
q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' renders a priori incompatible. 
The d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h e r e n t i n Barth's argument may be seen i n the 
f o l l o w i n g remark from the pr e f a c e to the t h i r d commentary, i n Barth's 
c r i t i c i s m of Bultmann. He w r i t e s : 
No human word, no word of Paul, i s absolute t r u t h ... But 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , we must l e a r n to see beyond Paul. This can 
only be done, however, i f with u t t e r l o y a l t y and with a 
desperate e a r n e s t n e s s , we endeavour to penetrate h i s meaning. (36) 
I t i s c l e a r from t h i s remark t h a t Barth does not uphold an i d e a of 
v e r b a l i n s p i r a t i o n . No 'word of Paul' i s absolute t r u t h . I f i t were, 
then the 'humanisation' of the d i v i n e would have been r e a l i s e d i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r t e x t , and the ' d i a s t a s i s ' of the Barthian 'system' r e j e c t e d . 
But how, then, can Barth take such a c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e towards the t e x t 
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i t s e l f and yet maintain i t s ' i n s p i r a t i o n ' ? The answer i s t h a t Barth 
very c a r e f u l l y draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between the words of Scripture them-
selves, which are not 'absolute t r u t h ' , and the Word of God, t o which 
they bear witness. We need t o recognise t h a t the words of Scripture 
do not 'absolutise' themselves, but r a t h e r bear witness t o an 'absolute' 
t h a t i s not themselves, but i s indeed t h e i r 'content'. What we see here 
i s a p a r a l l e l t o the cry of 'Romans' — 'In Jesus God i s known as the 
unknown God' - namely, ' I n S c r i p t u r e the Word of God i s known as the 
unknown Word'. The Word of God i s 'no human word, no word of Paul'; 
but those words of Paul 'point t o ' , 'witness t o ' , 'reveal' t h a t Word, 
which cannot however merge w i t h the f a l l i b l e words of S c r i p t u r e . 
Thus we have t o be very c a r e f u l w i t h Barth's language when he t a l k s 
about the 'content' ( I n h a l t ) , of the s c r i p t u r a l corpus, or about under-
standing i t through 'an act of the content i t s e l f . One would normally 
understand 'content' t o mean 'the words themselves, the t e x t ' , but t o 
make sense of Barth's language concerning 'an act of the content i t s e l f 
i t must r a t h e r r e f e r t o the Word of God which 'appropriates' these words, 
t h a t i s , t o the ' d i v i n e ' content of the work. Indeed the success of 
Barth's argument must r e l y upon the ambiguity of h i s phraseology: 
unless he i s i n f a c t r e f e r r i n g t o the s c r i p t u r a l corpus, then the whole 
p o i n t of h i s commentaries and a t t e n t i o n t o S c r i p t u r e i s undermined. 
But unless he i s r e f e r r i n g t o something other than the words of s c r i p t u r e 
themselves, then these must f a l l under the c r i t i c i s m , l e v e l l e d by Barth 
h i m s e l f , t h a t 'no human words, no word of Paul, i s absolute t r u t h ' . He thus 
t a l k s of the 'content' ( I n h a l t ) , which i s something other than the words 
themselves, ( f o r they, u n l i k e i t , are f a l l i b l e ) , w h i l s t i n some sense 
'belonging' t o those words ( f o r otherwise t o say t h a t i t i s t h e i r 
'content' has no meaning). The tangent which touches the c i r c l e w i t h o u t 
touching i t , the plane from above which i n t e r s e c t s , but does not extend 
i t s e l f along, the h o r i z o n t a l plane" below, has become the content which 
i s not the words themselves, the Word t h a t i s i n - but i s not - the words. 
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The ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e ' between man and God i s maintained, 
i n t h i s case, by making what i s 'd i v i n e ' i n S c r i p t u r e something t h a t i s 
d i s t i n c t from the human words which form the t e x t and are open t o 
c r i t i c i s m - w h i l s t a t the same time the d i v i n e Word i s s u f f i c i e n t l y 
c l o s e l y associated w i t h those words t o b r i n g the a u t h o r i t y of Scripture 
i n by the back door. 
I f we are t o understand S c r i p t u r e by 'an a c t i o n of t h i s very 
"content",' then how can we define 'content'? I t cannot be the t e x t 
i t s e l f , f o r t h a t i s human and f a l l i b l e . Barth t e l l s us i n the preface 
to the t h i r d commentary t h a t no word of Paul i s absolute t r u t h , and t h a t 
we penetrate h i s meaning by 'seeing beyond Paul' (tiber Paulus hinaus). 
But i n what sense, i n t h a t case, are we t r y i n g t o comment on Paul, and 
i n what sense then are the human words of the Pauline t e x t i n any sense 
a v e h i c l e f o r the "Word of God? We f i n d ourselves confronted by the 
'content' of the words as a 'pseudo-reality' which, while claiming t o 
be a separate r e a l i t y from the words themselves, i s i n f a c t e n t i r e l y 
p a r a s i t i c upon the view t h a t i t i s t h e i r content, bound up w i t h any 
r e l a t i v e human value which they may have, f o r any sense t h a t may be 
made of i t . 
Barth's 'conversations' w i t h Harnack revealed i n one important 
respect an advance upon h i s thought i n Romans', namely i n t h e i r 
assuming a r o l e f o r the Holy S p i r i t . I n answer t o Harnack's open l e t t e r , 
Barth commented t h a t i t was c r u c i a l 'to speak of the Holy S p i r i t i f a l l 
the o b j e c t i o n s Herrmann rammed i n t o our heads against a "mere credence" 
i n h i s t o r i c a l f a c t s apart from t h i s basis of c o g n i t i o n are not t o hold 
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good'. 1 
The r o l e of the Holy S p i r i t Barth saw as being an epistemological 
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one. I t i s by means of the S p i r i t t h a t we understand S c r i p t u r e , 
despite the f a l l i b l e nature of our human organs of comprehension: f o r 
these are bypassed i n the understanding t h a t i s brought about ' i n ' man 
by the Holy S p i r i t : 
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Therefore I d i s t i n g u i s h f a i t h as God's working on us ( f o r only 
he can say t o us, i n such a way t h a t we w i l l hear i t , what we 
cannot hear, 1 Corinthians 2:9) from a l l known and unknown 
human f u n c t i o n s , even our s o - c a l l e d 'experiences of God'. (39) 
L a t e r i n the same answer Barth t a l k s of God speaking 'the Word of 
C h r i s t ' through 'the witness of the Scriptures empowered through the 
testimonium S p i r i t u s Sancti internum, so t h a t I hear i t and by hearing 
i t believe'.^° 
The appropriate methodology f o r comprehending the content of a 
s c r i p t u r a l t e x t , then, i s one which allows the reader t o make sense 
of i t not through h i s resources of an h i s t o r i c a l understanding, but 
God's resources given t o man through the Holy S p i r i t . The f a l l i b l e 
human words of S c r i p t u r e witness t o the Word of God as i t i s i n t e r p r e t e d 
t o man through the Holy S p i r i t . 
The i n t r o d u c t i o n of the Holy S p i r i t i n t h i s epistemological r o l e 
gives Barth the o p p o r t u n i t y t o claim t h a t a p o s i t i v e exegesis of 
S c r i p t u r e can be made, and t h a t the exegete i s not condemned t o silence 
by h i s r e c o g n i t i o n not only of the f a l l i b i l i t y of the t e x t but also the 
f a l l i b i l i t y of h i s understanding. He can cease t o be an h i s t o r i a n 
burdened by the d i f f i c u l t task of i n t e r p r e t i n g the meaning of documents 
w r i t t e n i n a very d i f f e r e n t time t o h i s own, i n order t o understand, 
through the i n n e r working of the Holy S p i r i t , the Word of God t o which 
the words of S c r i p t u r e bear an uncomfortable witness. 
Barth i s moving, at t h i s stage, towards the methodology t h a t w i l l 
enable him t o present a 'theology of r e v e l a t i o n 1 . He i s beginning t o 
understand t h a t the r a d i c a l separation between man and God must be 
a f f i r m e d on an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r a t h e r than an o n t o l o g i c a l plane. P o s i t i v e 
knowledge of God is_ given t o man, he w i l l claim, but the sources and 
process of r e v e l a t i o n by which t h i s g i f t i s made are d i v i n e r a t h e r than 
human, and i n v o l v e i n v e s t i n g no human i n s t i t u t i o n , q u a l i t y or capacity 
w i t h the power t o 'receive' or 'possess' God. I n a manner t h a t i s only 
f u l l y accomplished i n h i s work on Anselm, Barth w i l l i n e f f e c t f i n d h i s 
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way out of a n a t u r a l theology i n t o a theology of r e v e l a t i o n . We s h a l l 
examine t h i s t r a n s i t i o n i n d e t a i l i n the next chapter. 
Barth's treatment of hermeneutics leaves any c r i t i c a l reader i n 
considerable d i f f i c u l t y . On the one hand, he f i n d s t h a t Barth, by 
t a l k i n g of the words of S c r i p t u r e as a 'witness' t o the Word of God, 
and of the Word of God known through the ' i n t e r n a l testimony of the 
Holy S p i r i t ' , must be r e f e r r i n g t o a deeper and d i v i n e l y assisted 
understanding of the words themselves than mere c r i t i c a l l i t e r a r y and 
h i s t o r i c a l r e f l e c t i o n upon t h e i r 'meaning1 could give. On the other 
hand, he f i n d s i t d i f f i c u l t t o see how t h i s deeper understanding, which 
f i n d s the 'content' ( I n h a l t ) of S c r i p t u r e i n the Word r a t h e r than the 
words themselves, could remain i n any sense the meaning of the t e x t . 
I t i s t h i s d i f f i c u l t y which renders Barth's hermeneutics problematic, 
where t h a t of Luther, f o r instance, who t a l k s of a 'two-fold c l a r i t y ' 
and 'two-fold o b s c u r i t y ' i n the t e x t , i s not. For Luther c i t e s the 
example of a person who knows the words of the Scriptures by h e a r t , and 
y e t does not understand t h e i r r e a l meaning, which he may only know through 
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the enlightenment of the Holy S p i r i t . I n t h i s presentation i t i s i n t o 
a deeper understanding of the t e x t t h a t the Holy S p i r i t leads man. But 
i n Barth's p r e s e n t a t i o n , i t appears t o be i n t o a 'content' which l i e s 
beyond the t e x t a l t o g e t h e r t h a t man i s l e d by the Holy S p i r i t . The 
suspicion then a r i s e s , t h a t the reader i s being encouraged, by a Barthian 
hermeneutics, t o bypass the words of S c r i p t u r e f o r mythological r e a l i t i e s 
c a l l e d 'Word' and ' S p i r i t ' , and t h a t the words of the s c r i p t u r a l t e x t s , 
l i k e the l i f e of Jesus as presented i n Romans , excuse themselves from 
analysis as inadequate v e h i c l e s of t h a t 'Other' which they nevertheless 
'bear witness t o ' . The reader, i n such a s i t u a t i o n , f e e l s f r u s t r a t e d 
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by B a r t h , and although we have concentrated upon Barth's e a r l y thought 
i n t h i s chapter an o u t l i n e of h i s l a t e r thought does not d i s p e l the 
f r u s t r a t i o n . 
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A Review of Barth's Later Thought 
An i l l u m i n a t i n g i n s i g h t i n t o Barth's l a t e r hermeneutical t h i n k i n g 
may be gleaned through reading John D. Godsey's e d i t i o n of Karl Barth's 
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Table Talk , a s e l e c t i o n of conversations between Barth and students 
a t an English-speaking colloquium i n Basel between 1953 and 1956. Asked: 
What gives the present canon of S c r i p t u r e i t s a u t h o r i t y ? 
Barth r e p l i e d : 
There i s no explanation f o r a u t h o r i t y . The canon i s the 
canon j u s t because i t i s so. (44) 
The c l a i m t h a t the B i b l e 'becomes' the Word of God through the Holy 
S p i r i t provides no humanly graspable explanation of why i t i s these books 
r a t h e r than others, which are so 'exalted'. I n t h i s sense Barth's 
hermeneutics remains always i n p r a c t i c a l terms Fundamentalist, f o r 
although i t i s not the 'words' but the 'Word' which i s regarded as 
'absolute' by him, nevertheless the 'words' are admitted t o , or 'become', 
the Word of God f o r reasons which Barth cannot e x p l a i n , and thereby 
e f f e c t i v e l y obtain an unquestioned a u t h o r i t y as i n Fundamentalist 
hermeneutics. Even i f , w i t h Luther, Barth were t o say t h a t the a u t h o r i t y 
of the words of S c r i p t u r e comes from t h e i r speaking of C h r i s t , being as 
i t were the casket i n which t h a t precious jewel were contained, s t i l l 
Barth w i l l not concede, as Luther w i l l , t h a t man may examine and judge 
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how f a r they speak of C h r i s t , or whether they speak of him c o r r e c t l y . 
Nor has Barth any a f f i n i t y w i t h a p r i n c i p l e of Catholic hermeneutics 
t h a t the B i b l e represents a s e l e c t i o n made by the church, a view which 
may concur, i f the word 'church' i s c a r e f u l l y defined, w i t h a form-
c r i t i c a l approach t o the t e x t s . Barth i n s i s t s , on the c o n t r a r y , t h a t : 
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The Books of the B i b l e have forced themselves upon the Church. 
But why these p a r t i c u l a r texts? Barth can only say t h a t these and these 
alone have been 'assumed' i n t o the Word of God by the Holy S p i r i t , and 
moreover t h a t t o ask the question 'why these t e x t s ? ' i s t o show a 
mistaken commitment t o the capacity of man t o make sense of God's 
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r e v e l a t i o n i n terms of the 'human' resources of reason and t r a d i t i o n . 
Barth grants t h a t the Holy S p i r i t might lead the Church t o accept a 
new gospel. This i s intended t o make the p o i n t t h a t the Holy S p i r i t i s 
sovereign over man, who cannot claim t o have 'determined' i t s ways. 
But then the question a r i s e s , of how t h i s new gospel might be i n p r a c t i c e 
e s t a b l i s h e d as canonical. Barth concedes a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t a general 
synod or c o u n c i l of the Church would have t o decide upon the i n c l u s i o n 
of the new gospel i n the canon. However, we have seen already t h a t 
Barth does not derive the canon from the a u t h o r i t y of the church - indeed 
he presents i t as somehow 'forced upon' the church. I t i s cle a r t h a t 
were Barth t o concede a u t h o r i t y t o a human ' i n s t i t u t i o n ' - or indeed t o 
human reason - i n determining the canon, then he would have also t o 
concede t h a t S c r i p t u r e might i n p r i n c i p l e be assessed i n terms of i t s 
'innate' v a l u e , e i t h e r as u s e f u l t o the church or as appealing t o human 
reason. S c r i p t u r e would i n e f f e c t be subordinate as an a u t h o r i t y t o 
reason or the church. Therefore having conceded t h a t a general synod 
or c o u n c i l of the church must i n p r a c t i c e decide upon an extension of the 
canon, Barth a t once r e t r e a t s t o the view t h a t only the Holy S p i r i t 
provides the means of assessment by which such a decision may be made, 
a means which transcends human reason and i n s t i t u t i o n s , whose p r i o r 
'decision' the 'decision' of a general synod merely a f f i r m s . 
Barth's hermeneutics i s an attempt t o obtain the advantages of a 
Fundamentalist p o s i t i o n w i t h o u t i n c u r r i n g any of the disadvantages. 
His hermeneutics p a r a l l e l s h i s treatment of the Resurrection, which has 
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been cha r a c t e r i s e d by van Harvey i n the same way. 
Barth o f f e r s an extended discussion of 'Scripture as the Word of 
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God' i n the Church Dogmatics . I n an important piece of Barthian 'small 
p r i n t j " ^ , he describes a reduc t i o n of the d o c t r i n e of I n s p i r a t i o n t o a 
view which would transform the idea t h a t the Bible i s the Word of God 
'from a statement about the f r e e grace of God i n t o a statement about 
the B i b l e as exposed t o human i n q u i r y and brought under human c o n t r o l . 
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The B i b l e as the Word of God s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y became a p a r t of n a t u r a l 
knowledge of God, i . e . , of t h a t knowledge of God which man can have 
wi t h o u t the f r e e grace of God, by h i s own power, and w i t h d i r e c t i n s i g h t 
and assurance'^ 1 I n s p i r a t i o n , i n other words, became a q u a l i t y of the 
Bi b l e ' i n i t s e l f r a t h e r than of God i n h i s gracious a c t i o n : a human 
product was 'absolutised' i n the seventeenth century d o c t r i n e of 
i n s p i r a t i o n , and became a 'paper Pope', i n a way t h a t , Barth c l e v e r l y 
suggests, allowed the t h i n k e r s of the secular Enlightenment i n the 
f o l l o w i n g century t o t r e a t the Bi b l e as a purely h i s t o r i c a l document, 
which they found t o be u n r e l i a b l e or even f r a u d u l e n t . Freed by the 
seventeenth century from i t s constant dependence upon God's gracious 
a c t i v i t y f o r i t s a u t h o r i t y , Barth i s arguing, the Bible f e l l v i c t i m t o 
the r e d u c t i v e h i s t o r i a n s of the eighteenth century, p r e c i s e l y because 
they too could t r e a t i t as an independent, ' s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t ' document. 
But w h i l s t Barth thereby seeks t o l i f t the Bible out of the 
sphere of c r i t i c i s m as an ' h i s t o r i c a l document', he yet assumes, and 
takes advantage o f , the h i s t o r i c a l f a c t t h a t i t i s these t e x t s - and 
these alone - which have come t o form the 'witness t o r e v e l a t i o n ' as 
Holy S c r i p t u r e . C e r t a i n l y : 
The statement t h a t the Bi b l e i s the Word of God cannot 
t h e r e f o r e say t h a t the Word of God i s t i e d t o the B i b l e , 
On the c o n t r a r y , what i t must say i s t h a t the Bible i s 
t i e d t o the Word of God. (52) 
But on what grounds i s i t the B i b l e t h a t i s t i e d t o the Word of God? 
Why t h i s c o l l e c t i o n of t e x t s and not another? Not because the church 
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selected them: but because of a 'free decision of-God' t o make these 
t e x t s 'become' the Word of God r a t h e r than any other. To ask: 'why 
these?', then, i s t o presume t o understand the Word of God 'apart from' 
the Holy S p i r i t , through resources located i n 'human' a u t h o r i t i e s . The 
question cannot be asked. God through h i s Word determines the canon: 
the 'decision' of the church merely confirms t h i s d i v i n e decree. 
The idea of the words of S c r i p t u r e 'becoming' the Word of God 
through His 'free d e c i s i o n ' provides the basis f o r the idea of a 
' b i b l i c a l Chalcedonianism' i n Barth. This i s the view t h a t , as the 
Word of God i n the I n c a r n a t i o n condescends t o take upon i t s e l f the 
form of man, so i t condescends t o take upon i t s e l f the form of 
Sc r i p t u r e t h a t i t might 'become' the Word of God. The c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n 
i s , however, a p r e c i s e l y opposite one i n the case of S c r i p t u r e . For 
w h i l s t the Word 'becomes' f l e s h i n the I n c a r n a t i o n , the words of 
S c r i p t u r e 'become' the Word of God. The associa t i o n of Barth w i t h 
t h i s phrase i s nevertheless i n t e r e s t i n g , since arguably the f a i l i n g 
of Barth's hermeneutics l i e s p r e c i s e l y i n h i s t r e a t i n g the Bible as i f 
i t might more a p p r o p r i a t e l y be described i n terms of a movement 'from 
God t o man' than i n terms of a movement 'from man t o God'. 
Barth, then, e f f e c t i v e l y makes use of the advantages of a Funda-
m e n t a l i s t hermeneutics, namely i n the claim t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r set of 
t e x t s are de facto a u t h o r i t a t i v e , w h i l s t t r y i n g t o claim t h a t he has a 
methodology 'above' a Fundamentalist one and immune from the c r i t i c a l 
opprobrium which such an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n might i n c u r . The c r u c i a l p o i n t 
l i e s i n Barth's r e f u s a l t o o f f e r any 'human' explanation of why i t i s 
the p a r t i c u l a r t e x t s of the B i b l e which have, as a matter of h i s t o r i c a l 
f a c t , been regarded as canonical and thereby a u t h o r i t a t i v e f o r the 
C h r i s t i a n : t h a t these t e x t s have "become',through God's free d e c i s i o n , 
the Word of God, i s a r e a l i t y which Barth cannot ex p l a i n but only 
confirms, as indeed the church i n 'deciding' upon the canon merely 
confirms a p r i o r d e c i s i o n of the free grace of God. He can only 
pronounced ' I t i s so', adding t h a t we misunderstand how i t i s so i f we 
seek t o have explained t o us on what grounds the canon of Scr i p t u r e has 
become a u t h o r i t a t i v e f o r the C h r i s t i a n . 
I n adopting t h i s v i e wpoint, however, does not Barth i m p l i c i t l y 
r e l y upon the a u t h o r i t y of a t r a d i t i o n which he p u b l i c l y denies as 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e ? I n a b e a u t i f u l metaphor Barth w r i t e s : 
A genuine, f a l l i b l e human word i s at t h i s centre the Word of 
God: not i n v i r t u e of i t s own s u p e r i o r i t y , of i t s replacement 
by a Word of God v e i l e d as the word of man, s t i l l less of any 
k i n d o f miraculous t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , but, of course, i n v i r t u e 
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of the p r i v i l e g e t h a t here and now i t i s taken and used 
by God h i m s e l f , l i k e the water i n the Pool of Bethesda. (54) 
The water i n the pool of Bethesda.1 Sometimes one has t o be 
r u t h l e s s , and wonder j u s t what l i e s beneath the ' p o e t r y 1 , or whether 
the music of t h i s Mozartian a r i a i s l e t down by the l i b r e t t o . The words 
of S c r i p t u r e are an i n n a t e l y unassuming and unnoteworthy c o l l e c t i o n of 
t e x t s which not only lack inherent a u t h o r i t y but even, i f t h i s metaphor 
- even as metaphor! - i s t o be respected, lack any c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which 
might d e t r a c t from t h e i r o r d i n a r i n e s s . Only by a miracle of God's grace 
may they 'become' noteworthy - the Word of God: as the water i n the 
pool of Bethesda i s remembered only f o r what by God's grace took place 
t h e r e , and not f o r any p r o p e r t i e s of healing which i t contained w i t h i n 
i t s e l f : 
I f God was not ashamed of the f a l l i b i l i t y of a l l the human 
words of the B i b l e , of t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c 
i n a c c u r a c i e s , t h e i r t h e o l o g i c a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , the 
u n c e r t a i n t y of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n , and, above a l l , t h e i r 
Judaism, but adopted and made use of these expressions 
i n a l l t h e i r f a l l i b i l i t y ... (55) 
(my emphasis) 
And made use of .'them not only i n t h e i r f a l l i b i l i t y , but i n t h e i r 
e s s e n t i a l o r d i n a r i n e s s , t h e i r almost nondescript character, as blank 
and common as the water i n a pool. I may take a metaphor too s e r i o u s l y , 
and y e t so much of Barth's theology i s couched i n metaphorical language. 
That God chose t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c o l l e c t i o n of ' f a l l i b l e ' t e x t s t o become 
the Word of God i s a l l the more a question which t h r u s t s i t s e l f upon the 
t h e o l o g i a n , when he i s encouraged t o believe t h a t these words of 
S c r i p t u r e possess no a r r e s t i n g and compelling p r o p e r t i e s which mark 
them out as e x t r a o r d i n a r y from t h e i r innate character, whatever the 
manner of t h e i r l a t e r use. Barth's concession t o an almost impossible 
scepticism i s q u i t e amazing here. 
2 
Elsewhere m 1 , Barth i n s i s t s : 
I n and w i t h the church we obey the judgment which was already 
pronounced, before the church could pronounce i t s judgment and 
which the church's judgment could only confirm ... when we 
adopt the canon of the church we do not say t h a t the church 
i t s e l f , but t h a t the r e v e l a t i o n which underlies and c o n t r o l s 
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the church, a t t e s t s these witnesses and not others as the 
witnesses of r e v e l a t i o n and the r e f o r e as c r u c i a l f o r the 
church. (56) 
The a u t h o r i t y of the canon, then, derives not from the church but 
from r e v e l a t i o n i t s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n 'recognised' from i t s e l f . The Word 
declares the canon f o r the church, which 'confirms' t h i s decision. That 
t h i s c o l l e c t i o n and no other can be recognised as the canon or ' r u l e ' 
f o r the church i s grounded not on the decision of the church (which we 
see t o be l a c k i n g t o the p o i n t of denying any p a r t i c u l a r q u a l i t y to the 
documents considered i n themselves), but i n the free decision of God's 
Word. I n r e a l i t y , however, i t could be argued t h a t Barth would not have 
recognised these p a r t i c u l a r t e x t s as becoming the Word of God (e s p e c i a l l y 
i n view of t h e i r i n t r i n s i c lack of v a l u e ! ) , save through the t r a d i t i o n 
of the church; but i n theory he claims t h a t t h i s ' t r a d i t i o n ' merely 
acknowledges a p r i o r 'decision' by the Word. Furthermore, Barth faces 
the problem of how t h i s d e c i s i o n i s t o be recognised, and by whom. By 
i n d i v i d u a l s ? By the Church ? By a general synod? C e r t a i n l y the tenor 
of Barth's remarks bears a Fundamentalist r i n g - the Bible i s 'given 
t o 1 the church r a t h e r than 'coming from' i t , and i s authorised d i r e c t l y 
by God himself as a necessary adjunct t o His s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n i n C h r i s t . 
I t makes . i t s e l f known through the Holy S p i r i t not so much as a work of 
man which 'becomes' the Word of God, but as a work of God which 'becomes' 
the word of man when the church 'confirms' a d i v i n e f a i t accompli. The 
h i s t o r i c a l context of the emergence of the canon i s e f f e c t i v e l y bypassed. 
The 'pseudo-reality' of the B i b l e as having 'become' the Word of 
God renders i t immune from c r i t i c i s m i n i t s ' r e a l i t y ' as the h i s t o r i c a l l y -
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mediated work of f a l l i b l e human beings. We have here the hallmark of a 
Barthian d i a l e c t i c which w i l l be c l o s e l y examined i n l a t e r chapters i n 
other contexts from Barth's works. By i t s adoption of the words of 
S c r i p t u r e the Word of God not only receives content, but renders t h a t 
content immune t o the, s o r t of c r i t i c i s m w i t h which ' l i b e r a l s ' and 
Funadmentalists a l i k e agree t h a t they must engage. "Meanwhile i t i s not 
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seen how Barth i s i n f a c t presenting a r e a l i t y , whose substance l i e s 
embedded i n i t s temporal, h i s t o r i c a l emergence i n t o being through a 
human response t o the l i f e of C h r i s t , as i f i t were a r e a l i t y d e l i v e r e d 
by God t o man apart from any such response. Barth's theology i s no less 
a movement 'from God t o man' f o r h i s f i l l i n g out the d i v i n e content from 
the resources of human experience! Nor i s h i s theology any less a 
'theology of a l i e n a t i o n ' , g i v i n g content t o .the d i v i n e by removing the 
human from o r d i n a r y human experience. His view of Scripture i s 
'Fundamentalist' i n t h a t he shares w i t h the Fundamentalist the 'alienated' 
b e l i e f t h a t S c r i p t u r e o r i g i n a t e d w i t h God r a t h e r than man, loosening the 
•Bible from the temporal, h i s t o r i c a l moorings of i t s gradual composition. 
Yet i t i s an attempt t o avoid the c r i t i c i s m s which may e a s i l y be l e v e l l e d 
a t the Fundamentalist, i n i t s r e f u s a l t o deny any of the 'human' 
q u a l i t i e s of t h a t work. I t i s beyond c r i t i c i s m not f o r what i t i s , but 
f o r what i t has, through the Word of God, 'become'. 
In Kerygma and Myth, K a r l Barth wrote an essay e n t i t l e d : 'Rudolf 
Bultmann: An Attempt t o Understand him'. I n i t he declared: 
For genuine understanding between man and man, however incomplete, 
the d i s c i p l i n e of the Holy S p i r i t w i l l undoubtedly be necessary. 
For i t i s only through the Holy S p i r i t t h a t the Old and New 
Testaments can be appreciated as a testimony t o the Word of God. 
Not even myths or persons l i k e Goethe can be understood w i t h o u t 
t h i s i n i t i a l sympathy, t h a t i s , without something of the d i s c i p l i n e 
of the Holy S p i r i t . (58) 
Barth echoes, once more, the suggestion of a Bultmannian 
'Geschmacksverirrung'. Yet no reading of Goethe t h a t i s 'sympathetic' 
eschews dependence upon the l i t e r a r y and c r i t i c a l t o o l s of analysis 
r e q u i r e d i n order t o understand a poet i n h i s time. Appreciation of 
meaning i s dependent upon them. A pure openness t o the t e x t of S c r i p t u r e , 
however, which i n Barth's view i n t h i s essay means approaching i t without 
'presuppositions' (and among such 'presuppositions' he f i n d s Bultmann's 
emphasis upon an e x i s t e n t i a l l y s e n s i t i s e d 'VorverstSndnis'), e f f e c t i v e l y 
bypasses such dependence. S c r i p t u r e i s not of such a k i n d - i t i s not 
an h i s t o r i c a l document but 'becomes' the Word of God, i n t e r p r e t e d t o i t s 
readers through the Holy S p i r i t . What i t has become, however, i s a 
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mythologised human r e a l i t y rendered immune t o c r i t i c i s m , a work t h a t 
has proceeded on earth presented by Barth as declared t o man from 
heaven. 
The ambiguity of a 'content' beyond the contents of S c r i p t u r e , w i t h 
which the previous s e c t i o n of t h i s chapter ended, a Word 'within'- the 
words of the B i b l e , i s not diminished i n the l a t e r thought of Barth. 
A t t a c k i n g Bultmann's 'demythologisation' of S c r i p t u r e , Barth e f f e c t i v e l y 
mythologises S c r i p t u r e . To the Fundamentalist Barth believes i n the 
f a l l i b i l i t y of the words of S c r i p t u r e , w h i l s t t o the c r i t i c a l h i s t o r i a n 
he b e l i e v e s i n the i n f a l l i b i l i t y of the 'Word', the 'content', the 
'other' which admits w i t h i n i t s e l f words whose meaning i t does not 
change or make redundant but preserves from c r i t i c i s m . I n u n r e m i t t i n g 
commitment t o a fundamental dualism between the Word of God and the word 
of man, Barth attempts t o ward o f f both forms of c r i t i c i s m : yet he 
remains e f f e c t i v e l y caught w i t h i n the c r o s s f i r e of both. The c r i t i c a l 
h i s t o r i a n remains convinced t h a t Barth's a f f i r m a t i o n of the f a l l i b i l i t y 
of the t e x t e n t i t l e s him t o c r i t i c i s e S c r i p t u r e w i t h o u t an 'error i n 
l i t e r a r y t a s t e ' . The Fundamentalist remains convinced t h a t the 
i n f a l l i b i l i t y of the Word i n Barth's hermeneutics e n t i t l e s him (the 
Fundamentalist) t o claim t h a t Barth believes i n the absolute a u t h o r i t y 
of the B i b l e . I n the end i t i s the Fundamentalist who has more r i g h t 
t o i d e n t i f y himself w i t h Barth,- f o r i n the absolute a u t h o r i t y of the 
Word of God Barth a f f i r m s the supremacy of a r e a l i t y whose only content 
i s the f a l l i b l e words of S c r i p t u r e , and whose only purpose i s t o s a n c t i f y 
as d i v i n e a borrowed human plumage. 
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Notes on Chapter Three 
1. See chapter 2, p.7. 
l a . See chapter 2, note 32. 
2. A remark of von Harnack t o Barth, i n the 'Fifteen Questions t o the 
Despisers of S c i e n t i f i c Theology', o r i g i n a l l y published i n 
Christliche Welt i n 1923, and t r a n s l a t e d and reproduced w i t h 
Barth's r e p l y and f u r t h e r correspondence between himself and Harnack, 
i n Revelation and Theology, An Analysis of the Barth-Harnack 
Correspondence of 1923, ed. H.M. Rumscheidt. Harnack asked 
r h e t o r i c a l l y i n h i s t h i r t e e n t h question. 
And what has one t o o f f e r once t h i s Herostratean deed i s done? 
I s not even gno s t i c occultism r i s i n g up now out of the rubble? 
(p.31) 
3. The German may be found i n K a r l Barth, Theologische Fragen und 
Antworten, pp. 7-31. 
4. ET, op. cit., p.516: Barth, R&merbrief , p.499. 
5. The t e x t of t h i s address given i n 1916 i s t r a n s l a t e d and reproduced 
i n Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, t r . D. Horton, ch.2, 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Fides Quaerens I n t e l l e c t u m 
1. The Background t o Barth's Work on Anselm 
Barth's work on Anselm i s the methodological manifesto of h i s l a t e r 
thought: but the methodology arose only out of an experiment i n theology 
t 
which ' f a i l e d ' Die Christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf published i n 1927. 
2 
Before concentrating upon Fides Quaerens Intellectum something should 
be s a i d about t h i s e a r l i e r work. 
'Du ROmberbrief a L'Esquisse', B o u i l l a r d remarks, 'l'aspect 
1 -
p l a t o n i c i e n e t Kantien de sa (Barth's) pensee s'est estompe'. The 
dualism of these two p h i l o s o p h i c a l systems was t o be l e f t behind by 
Barth i n the 1920s, culminating i n the work on Anselm which concluded 
w i t h a f i r m r e j e c t i o n of what Kant viewed as insurmountable objections 
4 
t o the Proslogion. But i t was not t o be replaced w i t h any form of 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l monism, or of pa n e n t h e i s t i c Hegelian d i a l e c t i c . Rather, 
Barth was t o set out t o l i b e r a t e theology from dependence upon any s o r t 
of p h i l o s o p h i c a l system:^ 3 the i n s i g h t s of human reason would be shown 
up as an impossible c o n s t r a i n t upon the Word of God as i t revealed 
i t s e l f , should they seek t o determine how t h a t Word might be known. 
This might not have been an argument from which Barth would e a r l i e r 
have dissented: y e t i n p r a c t i c e the n o t i o n of an unbridgeable 
separation between man and God, between time and e t e r n i t y , does 
determine the p o s s i b i l i t y o f human knowledge of God i n Barth's 
commentary on Romans. C h r i s t i a n s a l v a t i o n - h i s t o r y i s there t o r n apart 
and summarily made t o accord w i t h the demands of a negative n a t u r a l 
theology. I n 1922, when Barth t a l k s about the 'paradox' of r e v e l a t i o n , 
he only means t h a t i t cannot be squared w i t h h i s system. I n 1932, when 
he t a l k s about the same paradox, he means t h a t i t has i t s system w i t h i n 
i t s e l f . P a r t l y f o r t h i s reason, no l a t e r work of Barth's i s as e x c i t i n g 
as h i s commentary, f o r i t does not give the impression of an attempt t o 
f i n d echoes, i n an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t sense of the absence of God and the 
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p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e v o l u t i o n of Kantianism, of Paul's discovery of the 
gospel of C h r i s t . The impression given t o t h i s w r i t e r a t l e a s t , by 
the Church Dogmatics, i s t h a t of a prophet who has l e f t the society 
i n which he once spoke w i t h c r i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , and r e t r e a t e d i n t o an 
i s o l a t i o n , where he pursues an endless dialogue w i t h himself. N a t u r a l l y , 
such an argument about Barth requires defence, which we hope t o give t o 
i t : p a r t i c u l a r l y since the b e l i e f t h a t Barth, i n h i s l a t e r work, 
r e s t o r e d the emphasis upon God's humanity"* and the ' p o s i t i v e ' nature 
of the created w p r l d ^ b e l i e v e d t o have been lacking i n h i s commentary 
on Romans, has encouraged the view t h a t the 'prophet' somehow came t o 
look more favourably upon the 'society' he once condemned. Quite the 
opposite: he l e f t i t t o form h i s own world, i n which, c e r t a i n l y , there 
were ' p o s i t i v e ' aspects, but these were never t o be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h 
the w orld he l e f t behind, however much he borrowed from h i s former 
h a b i t a t i o n , and however much he claimed t o have found the 'prototype' 
of h i s former h a b i t a t i o n . Barth was a prophet who l e f t the world, not 
one who gave h i m s e l f t o i t . 
I n Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes, Barth t r i e d t o take account of some 
of the c r i t i c i s m s which arose out of h i s commentary on Romans. His 
'new approach' i s s i g n a l l e d i n a reworking of the I n c a r n a t i o n , 
p r e v i o u s l y i r r e c o n c i l a b l e w i t h Barth's d u a l i s t i c , e s chatological scheme. 
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W r i t i n g on 'Der Sinn der C h r i s t o l o g i e ' , Barth comments: 
I n -der W i r k l i c h k e i t dieses Menschen (Jesus) i s t d i e o b j e k t i v e 
Mtiglichke'it der Offenbarung gegeben, s i e i s t das i n seinem Wie? 
u n b e g r e i f l i c h e Dass der Offenbarung ... (8) 
I t has been argued t h a t here i s the c r u c i a l methodological s h i f t which 
was t o characterise Barth's l a t e r theology?: i n Romans the nature of 
C h r i s t i s t o be understood according t o the d i c t a t e s of Barth's ' i n f i n i t e 
q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' between man and God. Now any conception of 
man's r e l a t i o n t o God i s t o be understood according t o the d i c t a t e s of 
the concrete r e a l i t y of Jesus C h r i s t . The 'how' of the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
r e v e l a t i o n i s a question subsequent t o the f a c t of Chr i s t ' s being as 
the 'given' of r e v e l a t i o n . 
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The f a c t of C h r i s t as the 'given' of r e v e l a t i o n ('given' i s ray 
t r a n s l a t i o n of 'das dass') provides Barth w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
o u t l i n i n g the t r u e n a t u r e , as he sees i t , of dogmatics, i n a way t h a t 
i s not t o change i n h i s l a t e r theology. Whilst dogmatics needs t o be 
aware o f other d i s c i p l i n e s such as sociology, psychology and h i s t o r y , 
- indeed '... er d a r f , nein er s o i l die Moglichkeiten a l l e r dieser 
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Denkarten lebendig i n s i c h tragen' - at the same time the theologian 
must recognise the 'appropriate form of thought' (angemessene Denkart) 
of h i s subject-matter (Sache), Dogmatics: 
£r i s t der wahre dogmatische D i l e t t a n t , wenn er n i c h t merkt, 
-dass die Besinnung, die h i e r zu uben i s t , i h r e n eigenen 
Richtpunkt h a t , der nun einmal n i c h t von der H i s t o r i k , 
n i c h t von der Psychologie, n i c h t von der Soziologie und 
auch n i c h t von ein e r allgemeinen K u l t u r p h i l o s o p h i e oder 
Geisteswissenschaft i h r gesetzt werden kann, sondern der 
i h r a l s Dogmatik so gut gesetzt i s t , wie jeder anderen 
Wissenschaft i h r e Richtpunkte. (11) 
The given f a c t of C h r i s t e s t a b l i s h e s , f o r Barth, the autonomy of 
dogmatics as a d i s c i p l i n e , w i t h i t s own appropriate 'aiming-point' 
( R i c h t p u n k t ) . I t i s not dependent on h i s t o r y or sociology or philosophy 
f o r the establishment o f i t s claims: these are b u i l t upon the r e a l i t y 
o f C h r i s t as the Word of God which alone establishes the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
r e v e l a t i o n . Where i n Romans t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y depended upon the 
determining system o f the ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' between 
man and God, i n the Christian Dogmatics in Outline, Barth's argument 
appears t o be t h a t t h i s 'system' - and a l l other 'systems' of explanation 
- cannot determine the p o s s i b i l i t y o f God's s e l f - g i v i n g t o man, which 
derives from the concrete r e a l i t y of God's a c t i o n alone. Theology i s 
concentrated upon a C h r i s t o l o g i c a l datum:' from the f a c t of Jesus 
C h r i s t as i t s d e l i m i t i n g 'Richtpunkt' (and 1Ausgangspunkt') t h e o l o g i c a l 
r e f l e c t i o n (die Besinning, die h i e r zu uben i s t ) derives and i s 
determined, w i t h o u t any requirement t o e s t a b l i s h i t s reasoning on the 
basis of what other d i s c i p l i n e s claim about r e a l i t y . The Kantian system 
which p r e v i o u s l y forced Barth t o t a l k o f the tangent which touched a 
c i r c l e w i t h o u t touching i t , i s now apparently removed from d i r e c t i nfluence 
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upon the form of t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n . 
There appears, c e r t a i n l y , t o be a l o g i c about Barth's argument. 
Having i n the second commentary on Romans r e l a t i v i s e d a l l human values 
and made absolute the separation between man and God, he now appears 
t o r e l a t i v i s e the d i s t i n c t i o n also. Man may assume nothing concerning 
h i s r e l a t i o n t o God - not even t h a t they both e x i s t i n i n f i n i t e 
q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n from one another. His understanding of t h a t 
r e l a t i o n must be l e a r n t from God, and i n terms t h a t God alone may give , 
not from any system of human r e f l e c t i o n . From God's Word i n the 
concrete r e a l i t y o f Jesus C h r i s t man-learns of h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o God, 
of h i s being as a creature before h i s Creator, of h i s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
and o f h i s hope f o r redemption. I n so arguing, Barth could claim t o 
be completing a process, begun i n the commentary on Romans, of 
excluding a l l human 'claims' upon God, even the 'negative' claim of a 
f i x e d g u l f between himself and God, w h i l s t a t the same time focussing 
theology upon a concrete f a c t ( t h a t of Jesus C h r i s t i n h i s humanity 
the Word of God) r a t h e r than upon an abstr a c t system, a C h r i s t o c e n t r i c 
theology of r e v e l a t i o n r a t h e r than a t h e o c e n t r i c n a t u r a l theology. 
Das U r b e i s p i e l , von dem a l l e anderen l e t z l i c h herkommen, 
das die ganze Dogmatik zwangslaufig d i a l e k t i s c h macht, 
i s t k e i n anderes a l s : Gott und Mensch i n der Person des 
Versohners: Jesus C h r i s t u s . (12) 
I t i s not the d i a l e c t i c of d i s t i n c t i o n and esch a t o l o g i c a l 
r e u n i f i c a t i o n between God and man which determines the nature of C h r i s t , 
as i n Romans, but the 'prime example' of Jesus C h r i s t which makes 
dogmatics o b l i g a t o r i l y d i a l e c t i c a l . 
The question a r i s e s as t o why, i n view of the f a c t t h a t the work 
s u b - t i t l e d Prolegomena zur christlichen Dogmatik was intended as the 
f i r s t volume of an o u t l i n e of C h r i s t i a n Dogmatics t o be completed i n 
another few volumes, Barth abandoned h i s e n t e r p r i s e and published 
another i n t r o d u c t o r y volume t o a Church Dogmatics f i v e years l a t e r 
(1932). I t was not t h a t he had y e t t o discover the methodology of the 
Church Dogmatics, even i f i t had s t i l l t o be f u l l y a r t i c u l a t e d i n 
I 
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Fides Quaerens Intellectum. That methodology i s already i m p l i c i t i n 
h i s e a r l i e r work o f 1927. Did the reason l i e , r a t h e r , i n the f a c t t h a t 
the Prolegomena zur christlichen Dogmatik does not do j u s t i c e i n i t s 
d e t a i l s t o the autonomy of theology as a d i s c i p l i n e which i t recognises 
i n p r i n c i p l e , a t l e a s t i n s o f a r as too many of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
resonances t h a t f i l l e d the commentary on Romans remain i n the Prolegomena 
This seems t o be the claim of T.F. Torrance i n a study of Barth between 
13 14 1910 and 1931, a view r e j e c t e d by J.D. Smart, who i n a study of 
Barth and Bultmann during the same pe r i o d (Smart's study i s i n f a c t 
from 1908 t o 1933) claims t h a t the o u t l i n e of a divergence between Barth 
and Bultmann was already apparent i n 1926, and t h a t Barth was never 
' s e r i o u s l y tempted' by any form of the 'analogia e n t i s ' , even ' i n i t s 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t f o r m 1 , i n h i s Prolegomena. I t would, however, seem t h a t 
Barth h i m s e l f took the view t h a t the 1927 work might be construed as 
g i v i n g support f o r a ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n of theology by e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
philosophy', judging from remarks he made i n the foreword t o h i s f i r s t 
volume o f the Church Dogmatics i n 19 3 2 . N e v e r t h e l e s s , there i s no 
reason t o f i n d these remarks of Barth's incompatible w i t h a view t h a t 
h i s purpose i n making a 'new beginning' i n the Church Dogmatics was a 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n r a t h e r than an a l t e r a t i o n of h i s opinions. Busch indeed 
makes t h i s p o i n t i n h i s biography of B a r t h , ^ p o i n t i n g t o the f a c t t h a t 
i n the Christliche Dogmatik Barth could deal w i t h the whole of the 
prolegomena i n 463 pages, whereas the f i r s t h a l f of the f i r s t volume 
of the Kirchliche Dogmatik, which would deal w i t h the same range of 
study, i s i t s e l f 514 pages. The l e n g t h , he i m p l i e s , suggests a reworking 
expansion and c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f an e a r l i e r work, not a disavowal of i t . 
Moreover, he quotes Barth's remark from the foreword t o the Church 
Dogmatics, Volume 1, Part 1, t h a t he sought i n i t 'to make my e x p o s i t i o n 
much more e x p l i c i t ... During the past f i v e years I have found every 
problem very much r i c h e r , more f l u i d and more d i f f i c u l t . I have had t o 
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make more extensive soundings and t o lay broader foundations'. 
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Indeed i t i s not c l e a r t o us t h a t there i s a s h i f t i n Barth's 
opinions between the [Christliche Dogmatik and the Kirchliche Dogmatik. 
What i s evide n t i s an a m p l i f i c a t i o n of the former i n the l a t t e r , and 
the separate and very important p u b l i c a t i o n , i n 1930, of a 'methodo-
l o g i c a l manifesto' i n which Barth made cle a r t o himself and t o others 
the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of theology as an autonomous d i s c i p l i n e , not i n the 
sense of the theologian having no regard t o other d i s c i p l i n e s , but i n 
the sense of h i s bearing no o b l i g a t i o n t o d i r e c t h i s t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c -
t i o n s t o any other purpose than the e x p l i c a t i o n of a datum given q u i t e 
independently of what those d i s c i p l i n e s might say about i t , namely, the 
17a 
r e a l i t y of Jesus C h r i s t , the Word of God. We s h a l l not, then, 
present Fides Quaerens Intellectum as a 'break' w i t h the past, nor the 
Church Dogmatics as a theology based upon such a r i f t w i t h the t h i n k i n g 
of the e a r l i e r Christliche Dogmatik. We s h a l l concentrate upon these 
works as the mature r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a t h e o l o g i c a l development already 
o u t l i n e d i n 1927 as the 'system' of i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n 
seemed t o give way t o a purely t h e o l o g i c a l 'system', before which even 
the s t r a n g e l y t h r i l l i n g sound of a humanity prepared t o s u f f e r s e l f -
immolation before God, appeared t o contain echoes of an i n v e r t e d h u b r i s . 
At the same time we s h a l l attempt t o show t h a t i n an important sense 
the system of ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' i n f a c t remains as a 
pres u p p o s i t i o n of Barth's l a t e r work, but i n an epistemological, 
r a t h e r than o n t o l o g i c a l sense. 
« 
2. The Argument of Fides Quaerens Intellectum 
The argument of Barth's Fides Quaerens Intellectum i s not easy t o 
f o l l o w . An e s s e n t i a l p r e c o n d i t i o n of understanding i t i s the'thought 
of Anselm h i m s e l f , i n p a r t i c u l a r the argument of h i s Proslogion, 
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a m p l i f i e d by the discussion of Gaunilo's r e p l y . 
The f i r s t p o i n t t o recognise i s t h a t Anselm's o r i g i n a l argument 
applies only t o God. His argument i s t h a t God i s 'something than which 
88. 
nothing g r e a t e r can be thought' ( a l i q u i d quo n i h i l maius c o g i t a r i 
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p o t e s t ) . Now i t i s greater f o r something t o e x i s t i n r e a l i t y than 
f o r i t t o e x i s t i n the mind alone. Therefore, t o t h i n k of t h a t than 
which nothing greater can be thought i s t o t h i n k of what must e x i s t , 
not only i n the mind, but i n r e a l i t y . Furthermore, on the same l i n e 
of argument, t h a t which cannot be thought not t o e x i s t i s greater than 
t h a t which can be thought not t o e x i s t . Wherefrom i t f o l l o w s t h a t God 
cannot be thought not t o e x i s t , by the same reasoning. God, Anselm 
concludes, 'necessarily' e x i s t s , a conclusion which has been derived 
merely from r e f l e c t i o n upon what i t means f o r something t o be God 
( t h a t than which a greater cannot be thought). 
Now Anselm i n s i s t s t h a t t h i s argument may only apply t o the 
existence of God: 
Et quidem quidquid est a l i u d praeter te solum, po t e s t c o g i t a r i 
non esse (And indeed everything else there i s , except you alone, 
can be thought not t o be.) (20) 
This must be c l e a r from the f a c t t h a t Anselm's argument not only 
est a b l i s h e s t h a t God e x i s t s , but t h a t He 'necessarily' e x i s t s , i n the 
sense t h a t He cannot be thought not t o e x i s t . 
.Gaunilo, however, i n h i s 'Reply on behalf of the f o o l ' , misses 
t h i s e s s e n t i a l p a r t of Anselm's argument. He introduces the idea of 
an i s l a n d somewhere i n the ocean which, because of the d i f f i c u l t y of 
f i n d i n g i t , i s c a l l e d the 'Lost I s l a n d ' . Tales of i t s magnificence 
and the d e l i g h t s of l i f e upon i t abound - i t i s c e r t a i n l y the most 
e x c e l l e n t of lands, 'than which none greater could be thought'. Would 
Anselm l i k e t o apply h i s argument concerning God's existence t o t h i s 
i s l a n d , on the grounds t h a t since i t would be more e x c e l l e n t f o r t h i s 
i s l a n d t o e x i s t i n r e a l i t y than i n thought alone i t must t h e r e f o r e , 
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as the most e x c e l l e n t of places, e x i s t beyond doubt i n r e a l i t y ? 
Anselm's r e p l y t o Gaunilo makes i t c l e a r t h a t Gaunilo has, i n h i s 
view, a p p l i e d the argument beyond i t s proper range : 
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Now, I t r u l y promise t h a t i f anyone should discover f o r me 
something e x i s t i n g e i t h e r i n r e a l i t y or the mind alone -
except 'that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought' - t o 
which the l o g i c of my argument would apply, then I s h a l l f i n d 
t h a t Lost I s l a n d and give i t , never more t o be l o s t , t o t h a t 
person. (23) 
For i n the t h i r d s e c t i o n of the Proslogion, Anselm has claimed t o 
e s t a b l i s h not only t h a t God e x i s t s , but t h a t He cannot be thought not 
to e x i s t . This 'necessary existence' of God cannot apply t o anything 
else. A Lost I s l a n d or any other r e a l i t y , apart from God, can be 
thought not t o exist.The second p a r t of the argument i s therefore 
c r u c i a l t o Anselm's case, since by e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t God not only e x i s t s 
but cannot be thought not t o e x i s t , Anselm makes i t c l e a r t h a t h i s 
argument applies only t o God. Immediately a f t e r the section quoted 
above, t h e r e f o r e , Anselm goes on: 
I t has already been c l e a r l y seen, however, t h a t 1that-than-which 
-a-greater-cannot-be-thought' cannot be thought not t o e x i s t , because 
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i t e x i s t s as a matter of such c e r t a i n t r u t h . 
Anselm i s reminding Gaunilo t h a t since he has used h i s argument, 
not only t o e s t a b l i s h God's existence but His 'necessary' existence, 
i t i s an argument c l e a r l y l i m i t e d t o the establishment of God's 
. " 25 existence. 
Hick r i g h t l y s t a t e s : 
Anselm 1s.reply, emphasising the uniqueness of the idea of God 
t o show t h a t the o n t o l o g i c a l reasoning applies only t o i t , i s 
based upon h i s second form of the argument. The element i n the 
idea of God which i s l a c k i n g i n the not i o n of the most p e r f e c t 
i s l a n d i s necessary existence. (26) 
We may t h e r e f o r e conclude t h a t Anselm's argument applies only t o 
God. He alone cannot be thought not t o e x i s t . His existence alone i s 
es t a b l i s h e d merely by r e f l e c t i o n upon what we mean by 'God'. 
Rene" Descartes i s associated w i t h a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of Anselm's 
.1 
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argument i n h i s Meditations. Here he argues, i n s i m i l a r vein t o the 
Proslogion of Anselm, t h a t since God i s supremely p e r f e c t , t h a t i s t o 
say contains a l l p e r f e c t i o n s , and since existence i s i t s e l f a p e r f e c t i o n , 
then God must e x i s t . Once again, a way i s apparently found from mere 
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c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the meaning of 'God' t o the existence of God. 
Descartes w r i t e s : 
But nevertheless, when I t h i n k of i t w i t h more a t t e n t i o n , I 
c l e a r l y see t h a t existence can no more be separated from the 
essence of God than can i t s having three angles equal t o two 
r i g h t angles be separated from the essence of a ( r e c t i l i n e a r ) 
t r i a n g l e ... (28) 
However, there i s a f u r t h e r discussion of God's existence else-
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where i n the Meditations (Meditation III), which i s of more i n t e r e s t 
t o us i n the context of Barth's discussion. Here Descartes' ' p r o o f of 
God's existence proceeds on d i f f e r e n t l i n e s : 
Hence there remains only the idea of God, concerning which we 
must consider whether i t i s something which cannot have proceeded 
from me myself. By the name God I understand a substance t h a t i s 
i n f i n i t e ( e t e r n a l , immutable), independent, all-knowing, a l l -
p o w e r f u l , and by which I myself and everything e l s e , i f anything 
else does e x i s t , have been created. Now a l l these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
are such t h a t the more d i l i g e n t l y I attend t o them the less do 
they seem capable of proceeding from me alone; hence, from what 
has been already s a i d , we must conclude t h a t God necessarily 
e x i s t s . (30) 
The argument i s t h a t since the idea of God could not be b u i l t up 
out of the resources of the human mind, i t must be d i r e c t l y placed i n 
the mind by God Himself. Therefore, since we could not have an idea 
of God w i t h o u t God's existence t o give us i t , we may conclude, from the 
very existence of an idea of God the existence of God i n r e a l i t y : 
... Descartes proceeds t o enquire i n t o the causes of h i s various 
ideas. As f o r h i s ideas of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , various animals and 
so on, he sees no evident reason why these should not proceed from 
h i m s e l f ; h i s own degree of r e a l i t y as a t h i n k i n g substance may 
w e l l be adequate t o produce such ideas. But now he makes the 
c r u c i a l r e f l e c t i o n t h a t there i s another idea t h a t he has, f o r 
which t h i s can scarcely be so. This i s the idea of a Being 
'sovereign, e t e r n a l , i n f i n i t e , unchangeable, omniscient, omnipotent, 
and u n i v e r s a l creator of everything t h a t i s outside' himself: 
t h a t i s t o say, the idea of God... Hence there must be a p e r f e c t 
Being independent of Descartes himself who i s the cause of Descartes' 
idea of God, and t h i s p e r f e c t Being i s of course God himself. 
Hence God r e a l l y e x i s t s . (31) 
From our examination of Descartes, we may conclude: 
Although the argument from the F i f t h Meditation reminds us most c l e a r l y 
of Anselm's ' p r o o f of God's existence, i t i s the argument i n the T h i r d 
M e d i t a t i o n which w i l l be of most relevance t o our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Karl 
Barth. This argument proceeds along the l i n e s t h a t no other source 
f o r our idea of God i s conceivable, save God Himself, and t h a t there-
f o r e from the no t i o n of God which we possess we may v a l i d l y i n f e r the 
existence of God t o provide us w i t h the n o t i o n . A c l e a r presupposition 
of t h i s argument i s t h a t we do indeed have an idea of God - t h a t we can 
understand what we mean by 'God'. I t i s claimed t h a t t h i s idea i s a • 
g i f t from an i n f i n i t e God t o c e r t a i n of His f i n i t e creatures. This 
g i f t , f o r both Descartes and Barth, serves t o remind us t h a t we can 
lea r n of God only from God Himself, as He w i l l s t o be revealed. Descartesi • 
however, i n s i s t s t h a t the knowledge our f i n i t e minds may have of an 
i n f i n i t e God i s l i m i t e d , t o an extent which, i n Professor Williams's 
view, compromises h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t we nevertheless have a 'clear and 
d i s t i n c t ' idea of God, and which, furthermore, compromises Descartes 
a s s e r t i o n t h a t the idea which we have of God must necessarily be God-
given. The question arises as t o whether t h i s ambiguity e x i s t s i n 
Barth's t h i n k i n g a l s o , or whether between Descartes and Barth an 
epi s t e m o l o g i c a l b a r r i e r has been overcome, the b a r r i e r between man and 
h i s knowledge, even God-given knowledge, of God. We s h a l l r e t u r n t o 
t h i s c r u c i a l p o i n t a t the end of the chapter. 
In the Preface t o the second e d i t i o n of h i s book on Anselm, Barth 
remarks t h a t few of those who have w r i t t e n about h i s work (he s p e c i f i c a l l y 
exempts Hans Urs von Balthasar from c r i t i c i s m i n t h i s respect) have 
understood how Fides Quaerens Intellectum contains 'a v i t a l key, i f 
not the key, t o an understanding of t h a t whole process of thought t h a t 
has impressed me more and more i n my Church Dogmatics a s ^he o n i y proper 
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one t o theology'. What was t h a t key? 
To understand Barth's argument two p o i n t s about Anselm's Proslogion 
as presented by Barth must be recognised. The f i r s t i s h i s co n v i c t i o n 
t h a t prayer i s the most d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e of Anselm's t h e o l o g i s i n g . 
The Proslogion i s cast i n the form of an address to-God r a t h e r than a 
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p h i l o s o p h i c a l dialogue or monologue. I t i s , indeed, the f r u i t of an 
encounter w i t h God. I t i s t h i s which enables Barth t o argue t h a t the 
92. 
understanding of f a i t h does not belong t o human reason, but i s 
bestowed by God as a donum gratiae, a g i f t of grace, which forms the 
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basis of p r a y e r f u l communication between the b e l i e v e r and-God. 
The second p o i n t concerns the words Fides Quaerens Intellectum, 
the t i t l e of Barth's book, as being the ' v i t a l key' t o understanding 
i t . Intelligere, the L a t i n word meaning t o understand comes from two 
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L a t i n words, intus and legere, which l i t e r a l l y mean 'to read w i t h i n ' . 
The understanding of f a i t h i s a process whereby f a i t h 'reads w i t h i n 
i t s e l f , understanding something already i m p l i c i t l y given but not yet 
e x p l i c i t l y a f f i r m e d and comprehended. F a i t h seeking understanding does 
not seek beyond i t s e l f but w i t h i n i t s e l f : i t i s always working upon a 
'given' r a t h e r than out towards an unknown. I t i s as i f the seeking 
of understanding by f a i t h was l i k e the decoding of a message whose 
a u t h e n t i c i t y could not be doubted because i t was the g i f t of God himself. 
As the idea of God, i n Descartes' T h i r d M e d i t a t i o n , i s d i r e c t l y placed 
i n the mind by God h i m s e l f , so the understanding of f a i t h , i n Barth's 
p r e s e n t a t i o n , i s an e f f o r t t o comprehend what i s given by God's grace -
by a God who 'comes w i t h i n h i s (man's) system as the object of h i s 
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t h i n k i n g ... ' This methodology allows theology t o proceed along 
the l i n e s of developing and a r t i c u l a t i n g what is'by d e f i n i t i o n a true 
r e v e l a t i o n , so t h a t both the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Scripture and the 
e x p l i c a t i o n of the f a i t h of the Church i n the a r t i c l e s of the creed 
take the form of 'reading w i t h i n ' a given and unquestioned f a i t h . 
Theology, the speech of God, becomes by^God's grace the speech of man 
a r t i c u l a t i n g the t r u t h of God given by r e v e l a t i o n : Scr i p t u r e or the 
dogmas of the Church work upon t h i s given datum as t h e i r p o i n t of 
departure (Ausgangspunkt) and p o i n t of d i r e c t i o n (Richtpunkt). They 
have a b s o l u t e l y no need t o match t h e i r ' s c i e n t i f i c ' p u r s u i t w i t h the 
determinations of other d i s c i p l i n e s , but only t o remain f a i t h f u l t o a 
t h e o l o g i c a l given. 
Let us t u r n t o Barth's consideration of Anselm's d e s c r i p t i o n of 
God as 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought'. T h i s 
d e s c r i p t i o n , Barth i n s i s t s , does not show t h a t one can decide upon the 
nature or e x i s t e n c e of God through the resources of the human mind. 
The formula 'does not say th a t God i s , nor what He i s , but r a t h e r , i n 
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the form of a p r o h i b i t i o n t h a t man can understand, who He i s ' . 
The p r o h i b i t i o n i s a p r o h i b i t i o n upon what Barth c a l l s 'an o n t i c 
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conception of God', a conception which man forms f o r hims e l f by 
usi n g h i s n a t u r a l powers of reason to r e f l e c t upon the nature and 
e x i s t e n c e of God. Anselm's i d e a of God, f o r Barth, i s one which 
e x p r e s s e s 'who' r a t h e r than 'that' or 'what' God i s : i t i s based upon 
the encounter of r e v e l a t i o n i n which God r e v e a l s His Name. What Anselm 
i s t r y i n g to do, Barth c l a i m s , i s to argue t h a t what we c a l l a 
' t h e o l o g i c a l methodology of grace' must be a p p l i e d i n the realm of 
r e f l e c t i o n upon God's e x i s t e n c e and nature. I t i s t h i s 'methodology 
of g r a c e ' which Barth seeks to d e s c r i b e i n the f i r s t h a l f of Fides 
Quaerens Intellectum, ("The T h e o l o g i c a l Scheme'), before showing i t s 
a p p l i c a t i o n to the proofs of God's e x i s t e n c e i n the second h a l f ('The 
Proof of the E x i s t e n c e of God'). 
By 'methodology of grace', I mean the view t h a t grace, i n Barth's 
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words, i s an ' a c t u a l i s a t i o n of t h a t power to know' i n man. Right 
knowledge i s conditioned by the preveni e n t and co-operating grace of 
God: theology i s not a d i s c i p l i n e which can make sense of i t s o b j e c t 
through the n a t u r a l powers of human reason: ' ... the ult i m a t e and 
d e c i s i v e c a p a c i t y f o r the intellectus fidei does not belong to human 
reason a c t i n g on i t s own but has always to be bestowed on human 
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reason ... 
Bart h r e f e r s i n a footnote to a passage of the Proslogion: 
Ergo Domine, qui das fidei intellectum, da mihi, ut ... intelligam 
I n t h i s passage Anselm asks God to grant as much understanding of 
Him 'as You see f i t ' (quantum s c i s e x p e d i r e ) . To Barth, t h i s request 
f o r i l l u m i n a t i o n from-God i n d i c a t e s that: man's knowledge of God i s 
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God-given, determined by God's w i l l to r e v e a l Himself. I t i s t h i s 
t h e o l o g i c a l methodology which Barth claims to f i n d i n Anselm. There 
can be no understanding of God without the 'encounter' with Him t h a t 
e x i s t s i n the ' f u l n e s s of grace': 
I n t h i s a t t i t u d e he (man) stands i n encounter with God f o r he 
knows t h a t God must stand i n encounter with him i f h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e 
i s not to be d e l u s i o n and i f he h i m s e l f i s not to be a mere 
i n s i p i e n s . The Proof, Proslogion 2-4, i s a l s o w r i t t e n i n t h i s 
a t t i t u d e and i n t h i s knowledge. We cannot be i n d i f f e r e n t to t h i s 
i f we are to understand and i n t e r p r e t him. (42) 
B a r t h makes c l e a r what he t h i n k s Anselm did say i n a r h e t o r i c a l 
passage d e s c r i b i n g what he t h i n k s he didn't say: 
Or should Anselm have thought of i t a l l q u i t e d i f f e r e n t l y - at 
l e a s t p a r t s of i t o c c a s i o n a l l y ? Should he r e a l l y have sought 
the law of the e x i s t e n c e and p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n c e of the o b j e c t 
of f a i t h i n the human c a p a c i t y to form concepts and judgments 
(as i d e n t i c a l with i t s laws) and t h e r e f o r e have assumed as 
p o s s i b l e and n e c e s s a r y an independent knowledge alongside t h a t 
of f a i t h , able to draw from i t s own sources? Should he t h e r e -
f o r e have begun quaerens i n t e l l e c t u m with nothing, t h a t i s 
w i t h i n the r u l e s of an autonomous human reason and with the 
data of g e n e r a l human experience, and t h e r e f o r e of h i s own 
accord as i n v e n i e n s i n t e l l e c t u m ....? (43) 
Anselm's understanding of the knowledge of God i s not of an 
autonomous e x e r c i s e of the human reason 'quaerens i n t e l l e c t u m ' (seeking 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) , Barth argues, f o r 'fundamentally, the quaerere 
i n t e l l e c t u m i s r e a l l y immanent i n the f i d e s ' . I n h i s commentary on 
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Anselm's Proslogion, M.J. Charlesworth claims t h a t Barth's i n t e r p r e t -
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a t i o n of Anselm makes him 'into a f i d e i s t of a very rigorous k i n d ' , 
but i f by t h i s remark Charlesworth means to i d e n t i f y Barth w i t h a 
s e p a r a t i o n of ' f a i t h ' and 'reason', and the view t h a t knowledge of God 
depends on the former alone, then t h i s must be a m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
B a r t h ' s view. I t i s not, i n t h i s sense, f i d e i s t ; r a t h e r , as C h a r l e s -
worth h i m s e l f remarks e a r l i e r of Barth's view, 'reason operates w i t h i n 
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the context of f a i t h and always presupposes f a i t h ' . 
What does Barth mean by the argument t h a t the search f o r under-
s t a n d i n g i s 'immanent' i n f a i t h ? To follow h i s argument i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
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47 d i f f i c u l t here, but h i s p o i n t would seem to be t h a t conformity of 
thought w i t h i t s o b j e c t i n t h e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g can only be achieved 
through the s e l f - r e v e a l i n g power of God. Conformity of thought with 
i t s o b j e c t i s the aim of human reason i n i t s s e a r c h f o r t r u t h , but 
when reason i s engaged i n making t h e o l o g i c a l statements such conformity 
can only be achieved i n f a i t h , t h a t i s to say by means of the 
i l l u m i n a t i o n brought about by God Himself i n His r e v e l a t i o n , which i s 
the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of any correspondence of t h e o l o g i c a l thought to i t s 
o b j e c t , and t h e r e f o r e of t h e o l o g i c a l t r u t h : 
The conformity of r a t i o to t r u t h depends n e i t h e r upon the 
o b j e c t nor the s u b j e c t but on t h a t same r e v e a l i n g power of 
God which i l l u m i n e s f a i t h and which f a i t h encounters as 
a u t h o r i t y . (48) 
The 'quaerere i n t e l l e c t u m ' i s immanent i n the ' f i d e s ' , i n the sense 
t h a t any t h e o l o g i c a l statement which ' d e s c r i b e s ' God, for i n s t a n c e the 
statement t h a t He i s 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', 
i 
i s not v e r i f i e d through man's autonomously operating n a t u r a l powers of 
reason but through the S e l f - r e v e a l i n g a c t i v i t y of God made known to 
f a i t h w i t h i n the Church. Indeed Barth argues t h a t the phrase i s one 
of the ' r e v e a l i n g Names' of God: 
Quo maius c o g i t a r i nequit only appears to be a concept t h a t he 
(Barth r e f e r s to Anselm) formed f o r h i m s e l f ; i t i s i n f a c t as 
f a r as he i s concerned a r e v e a l e d Name of God. (49) 
For K a r l B a r t h , Anselm's i n t e n t i o n i n the Proslogion i s to apply 
what we c a l l a ' t h e o l o g i c a l methodology of grace' to the question of 
the e x i s t e n c e and nature of God. respite any appearance to the co n t r a r y , 
the e a r l y s e c t i o n s of the Proslogion s e t the problem of e s t a b l i s h i n g 
God's e x i s t e n c e f i r m l y w i t h i n t h i s methodology. The 'Proof of God's 
e x i s t e n c e o f f e r e d by Anselm i s a seeking of understanding w i t h i n f a i t h , 
t h a t i s to say on the b a s i s of God's r e v e l a t i o n of Himself. I t may 
seem t h a t to 'prove' the e x i s t e n c e of God i s to seek to operate with 
the autonomous powers of the n a t u r a l reason; i n f a c t i t r e p r e s e n t s 
the e f f o r t to hear the Name by which God l e t s Himself be known. 'Quo 
maius c o g i t a r i nequit' i s not the conc l u s i o n of an argument (or i t s 
96. 
premise) reached by a powerful mind employing i t s n a t u r a l i n t e l l e c t u a l 
s k i l l s : i t i s the t r a c i n g out of the d i v i n e Wisdom given to man i n 
f a i t h . 
The outlook of B a r t h ' i s r e v e a l e d i n a passage of h i s book where 
he i s c o n s i d e r i n g the ' s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y ' of God.^° I t i s here t h a t we 
may s e t h i s view of Gaunilds misunderstanding of Anselm's d e s c r i p t i o n 
of God as 'maius omnibus' (gre a t e r than a l l things) i n context: 
The i n v a l i d i t y f o r proof which Anselm h i m s e l f a s s e r t e d of the 
Quod e s t maius omnibus stood i n very c l o s e connection with a 
second c o n s i d e r a t i o n , namely t h a t as a Name of God i t did not 
p o s s e s s t h a t s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y t h a t belongs to and b e f i t s the 
nature of i t s s u b j e c t . (51) 
The ' s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y ' of God, to which Barth r e f e r s , excludes 
the view t h a t God may be known by means of knowledge of other beings: 
i t denies the way of reasoning about God i n terms of reasoning about 
l e s s e r beings which 'point beyond themselves' to the Supreme Being. 
Very c l e a r l y - w e see here echoes of Barth's fundamental and s t a t e d 
o p p o s i t i o n to the 'analogia e n t i s ' or analogy of being which he i d e n t i f i e s 
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as the c a r d i n a l e r r o r of C a t h o l i c i s m . Although o b j e c t i o n may be made 
to a n a l o g i c a l reasoning about God on p u r e l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l grounds, 
Bart h ' s o b j e c t i o n i s t h e o l o g i c a l , namely t h a t any reasoning about the 
C r e a t o r by way of reasoning about His c r e a t u r e s must make knowledge 
of. Him dependent upon knowledge of C r e a t i o n (hence the compromising 
of God's ' s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y ' ) , and thereby, i n denying t h a t man may know 
God only by way of God Himself i n His r e v e l a t i o n , i n e v i t a b l y have a 
f a l s e i d e a of God. Barth's p o i n t i s t h a t a f a l s e i d e a of God i s betrayed 
by a f a l s e methodology i n determining how we may a r r i v e a t such an 
l 
i d e a . Barth w r i t e s : 
F o r the quod e s t maius omnibus to become admissible as proof, 
i t r e q u i r e d c e r t a i n p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s not contained w i t h i n i t s e l f . 
That i s , i n order to be the h i g h e s t i t must f i r s t presuppose the 
e x i s t e n c e and nature of omnia, t h a t i s of o b j e c t s which i n t h e i r 
e x i s t e n c e and nature p o i n t beyond themselves to the 'highest' 
which forms t h e i r peak. Without the r e s t of the pyramid the peak 
could not be a peak. (54) 
The a d d i t i o n to 'maius omnibus' of 'quo maius c o g i t a r i n e q u i t 1 , the 
n e c e s s i t y of which a d d i t i o n Gaunilo had f a i l e d to see, i s e s s e n t i a l i n 
order t o e s t a b l i s h the ' s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y ' of God i n the sense d e s c r i b e d : 
T h i s s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y does, however, belong t o the Name 
of God d i s c o v e r e d i n the Proslogion. (55) 
What Gaunilo fundamentally has f a i l e d to see i s t h a t the proof of 
God's e x i s t e n c e must be subsumed w i t h i n the 'methodology of grace', 
t h a t i s t o say i t may be c a r r i e d out on the b a s i s of God's s e l f - r e v e a l i n g 
a c t i v i t y alone. Gaunilo has p r e f e r r e d to understand the Proslogion i n 
terms of ' o n t i c conceptions of God' which attempt to make sense of Him 
from the r e s o u r c e s of an autonomous human reason, employing comparisons 
w i t h o t h e r beings i n order to ascend by analogy t o the Supreme Being. 
Thereby the understanding of God's e x i s t e n c e becomes dependent upon 
the understanding of other beings. Such dependence i l l u s t r a t e s a 
f a i l u r e t o understand t h a t the theologian l e a r n s of God from God, and 
not from other beings which, when he r i g h t l y understands them, themselves 
p o i n t t o God. By i n s i s t i n g upon the e r r o r of Gaunilo's d e s c r i p t i o n of 
h i s i d e a of God, Anselm not only emphasises t h a t 'proof of God i s 
independent of ' p r o o f of anything e l s e ; he i m p l i e s by t h i s t h a t the 
understanding of God's e x i s t e n c e may be approached only through the 
'methodology of grace' which i t i s the theologian's t a s k to pursue, i n 
h i s a p parently most p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y r i g o r o u s operations attempting only 
to respond to God's address to Him, to hear the name of God spoken to 
him by God Himself, and not to operate with the f a l s e methodology of an 
autonomous human reason. 
The ' s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y ' (Selbstgenugsamkeit) of God i n Barth's 
p r e s e n t a t i o n of Anselm, may be l i n k e d to t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l approach 
t o the s o - c a l l e d ' o n t o l o g i c a l p r o o f of the e x i s t e n c e of God, which 
sees i n the argument a merely a priori p r o o f . I t i s pointed out t h a t 
w h i l s t . t h e other t r a d i t i o n a l proofs of God's e x i s t e n c e , the cosmological 
and t e l e o l o g i c a l , reason from the nature of the world (as contingent 
or designed) t o the e x i s t e n c e of God, the o n t o l o g i c a l argument i s based 
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upon no such e m p i r i c a l c l a i m . I t reasons simply from the meaning of 
the word 'God', and i s based merely upon a d i s c u s s i o n of d e f i n i t i o n s . 
Now i n B a r t h 1 s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between an 
argument based upon mere d e f i n i t i o n s of meaning, and one based upon 
ob s e r v a t i o n of the r e a l i t y to which words r e f e r , becomes a qu i t e 
d i f f e r e n t t h e o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n , namely t h a t between knowledge based 
upon r e v e l a t i o n , a n d on the other hand, ' n a t u r a l theology', theology 
based upon n a t u r a l reasoning. The'argument from words', the 'proof 
from d e f i n i t i o n ' , becomes an argument from r e v e l a t i o n , from a 'donum 
g r a t i a ' or g i f t of God's grace. The argument from the nature of the 
e x t e r n a l world becomes an argument based upon the resources of n a t u r a l 
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reason. Anselm's Proslogion becomes not a pure p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n , 
but an argument which r e f u s e s to proceed from i t s opponents' b a s i s of 
argument, which i s n a t u r a l reason, and Gaunilo's misunderstanding of 
Anselm i s presented as p r e c i s e l y h i s f a i l i n g to r e a l i s e t h i s p o i n t : 
... t o whom are Anselm's w r i t i n g s addressed? F i r s t and foremost 
to the Benedictine theologians of h i s day. They are w i t n e s s to 
a d i s c u s s i o n being c a r r i e d on between one of t h e i r own i l k and 
u n b e l i e f ... That discussion,however, i s not allowed to take 
p l a c e on u n b e l i e f ' s ground. Rather, i t proceeds as an e x e r c i s e 
i n f a i t h seeking understanding. (57) 
And Barth i n s i s t s t h a t Anselm, u n l i k e the s c h o l a s t i c s of the t h i r t e e n t h 
century, i s not arguing from h i s opponents' b a s i s of argument, but basing 
h i s d i s c u s s i o n on the d e f i n i t i o n of a 'Name of God' as an a r t i c l e of 
f a i t h or r e v e l a t i o n : 
Anselm could not have begun l e s s p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y . He has 
a b s o l u t e l y no thought whatsoever of reaching an agreement 
w i t h h i s opponent i n the debate (or with h i m s e l f i n h i s 
c a p a c i t y as a philosopher) over a u n i v e r s a l minimum knowledge 
of God, s t i l l l e s s of becoming in v o l v e d i n a movement towards 
h i s opponent's b a s i s of argument. (58) 
The ' s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y ' of a proof which proceeds from words alone, 
becomes i n Barth's p r e s e n t a t i o n the ' s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y ' of a proof based 
on the knowledge-God g i v e s as he mani f e s t s him s e l f to the b e l i e v e r . 
Theology i s t h e r e f o r e e f f e c t i v e l y i n s u l a t e d from p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i c i s m , 
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having a d i f f e r e n t b a s i s of argument from the philosopher who uses h i s 
n a t u r a l reason. F or whereas n a t u r a l reason may examine arguments from 
d e f i n i t i o n s of God to h i s e x i s t e n c e , or from observation of the e x t e r n a l 
world to h i s e x i s t e n c e , i t cannot hope to examine an argument which 
proceeds from a resource of d i v i n e s e l f - g i v i n g which e n t i r e l y bypasses 
i t s ( n a t u r a l reason's) workings. E f f e c t i v e l y Barth has i n t e r p r e t e d the 
Proslogion not i n terms of a d i s t i n c t i o n between two forms of p h i l o s o -
p h i c a l r e a s o n i n g , but a d i s t i n c t i o n between p h i l o s o p h i c a l and t h e o l o g i c a l 
r e a s o n i n g , forms of argument which proceed from q u i t e d i f f e r e n t bases. 
E a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter, we drew out the ' l o g i c ' of Barth's 
development i n the 1920s. Having made absolute the sep a r a t i o n between 
man and God i n h i s commentary on Romans, K a r l Barth now sees t h a t t h i s 
too i s a 'human' assumption which must i t s e l f be questioned. Man must 
know God on the b a s i s of r e v e l a t i o n alone, without presuming that t h i s 
r e v e l a t i o n w i l l d i s c l o s e an ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' between 
h i m s e l f and h i s C r e a t o r . 
We may now q u a l i f y t h i s view. We now have the evidence to suggest 
t h a t B a r t h ' s 'system' of ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' operates 
even more s t r o n g l y to determine h i s theology, s i n c e i t has now become 
the b a s i s of h i s t h e o l o g i c a l methodology. I n other words, Barth has 
now presupposed an ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' between the use 
of n a t u r a l reason and the understanding of f a i t h . 
F o r w h i l s t we may wholeheartedly agree with Barth concerning the 
nature of the Proslogion as an'address to God', concerning 'that-than-
which ...' as a 'revealed Name' of God manifested to those who b e l i e v e 
as a 'donum g r a t i a ' ; and w h i l s t we may even agree f u l l y w ith the i d e a 
t h a t '"Quo maius c o g i t a r i n e q u i t " only appears to be a concept t h a t he 
(Anselm) formed f o r h i m s e l f ; i t i s i n f a c t as f a r as he i s concerned 
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a r e v e a l e d Name of God'/ we do not see how Barth can move on to 
conclude t h a t an absolute dichotomy e x i s t s between what i s a concept 
'r e v e a l e d by God' and what i s formed from the resources of human reason. 
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T h i s dichotomy i s a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of Barth's system: the i n t r u s i o n 
of the ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' has r e s u r f a c e d , and theology 
i s again being s u b j e c t e d t o u n j u s t i f i a b l e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s from outside 
i t s e l f . 
The problem i s t h i s . Given t h a t one can r e f e r both to what i s 
le a r n e d as a g i f t of God's grace by r e v e l a t i o n , and what i s l e a r n t by 
the e x e r c i s e of the n a t u r a l reason, upon what grounds does one i n s i s t 
upon an absolute d i s t i n c t i o n between the two? On what grounds does 
one r e s i s t the view t h a t r a t i o n a l i t y i s i t s e l f a g i f t of God, and t h a t 
the e x e r c i s e of the n a t u r a l reason, f a r from being 'autonomous', i s 
i t s e l f a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of God to man? On what grounds does 6ne conclude, 
from the obs e r v a t i o n t h a t Anselm p r e s e n t s h i s work as a p r a y e r f u l , 
address, t h a t i t i s q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t from a p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e a t i s e ? 
We suggest t h a t there are no grounds f o r doing so save the enduring power 
of t h a t ' i n f i n i t i v e n q u a l i t a t i v e n Unterschied' t h a t Barth viewed as a 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i n the face of any t h e o l o g i c a l evidence. The s c h o l a s t i c s , 
a f t e r a l l , d i d not cease to t a l k of r e v e l a t i o n : but they would have 
f a i l e d t o see the grounds f o r an absolute d i s t i n c t i o n between 'the 
reason of f a i t h ' and ' n a t u r a l reason' such as Barth i n s i s t s upon. And 
Gaunilo would not have f a i l e d t o a p p r e c i a t e t h a t Anselm wrote p i o u s l y 
f o r b e l i e v e r s to whom he d e s c r i b e d the experience of God's r e v e l a t i o n 
to him in. f a i t h : but might w e l l have f a i l e d t o see how t h i s presumed 
t h a t such experience must be d i s t i n c t from the workings of n a t u r a l reason. 
I n d i s c u s s i n g Barth's commentary on Romans, we found t h a t h i s 
'system' made c e r t a i n C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e s very d i f f i c u l t f o r him to 
e x p r e s s . Recourse to unhappily ambiguous language has been discovered 
i n B a r t h , as he s t r o v e to make sense of a u n i t y i n C h r i s t of q u a l i t a t i v e 
d i s t i n c t r e a l i t i e s : a k i n d of t h e o l o g i c a l dualism was forced upon him. 
I n h i s work on Anselm a s i m i l a r ambiguity a r i s e s i n the attempt to make 
sense of a methodology which s e p a r a t e s theology from other forms of 
d i s c o u r s e . They 'touch' and y e t 'do not touch', to r e c a l l the f a m i l i a r 
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B a r t h i a n metaphor of the r e s u r r e c t i o n , i n p r e c i s e l y the p a r a d o x i c a l 
manner of the second commentary. 
We have a l r e a d y quoted B a r t h as saying t h a t God 'comes w i t h i n h i s 
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(man's) system as the o b j e c t of h i s t h i n k i n g ' , t h a t he '"shows" 
h i m s e l f ' ^ to the t h i n k e r and 'modifies " c o r r e c t " t h i n k i n g to an 
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i n t e l l i g e r e esse i n r e 1 . Such language suggests t h a t God's grace 
a l l o w s Anselm to conceive of Him - the obvious sense of 'comes w i t h i n 
h i s system as the o b j e c t of h i s thinking'.. By His grace, i n a way t h a t 
man's powers of n a t u r a l reason could not achieve, God g i v e s man an i d e a 
of His d i v i n e being. However, i t i s c l e a r from other p a r t s of Fides 
Quaerens Intellectum t h a t Barth does not allow f o r any d e n i a l of the 
i n c o n c e i v a b i l i t y of God: 
Knowledge of the i n c o n c e i v a b i l i t y of God cannot be played o f f 
a g a i n s t knowledge of h i s (intramental) e x i s t e n c e because as 
knowledge of God and t h e r e f o r e knowledge of f a i t h i t r a t h e r 
presupposes t h i s l a t t e r . (63) 
The knowledge of God granted t o f a i t h , then, does not exclude but 
presupposes h i s i n c o n c e i v a b i l i t y - B a r t h f i n d s support f o r t h i s p o i n t 
of view i n an argument of the Proslogion i t s e l f : 
Ergo Domine, non solum es quo maius c o g i t a r i nequit, 
sed es quiddam maius quam c o g i t a r i p o s s i t . (64) 
God, then, i s not only 1that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought 1 
but indeed 'something g r e a t e r than can be thought'. Barth i n s i s t s t h a t 
t h i s remark i l l u s t r a t e s , together w i t h other passages of Anselm, 'the 
t o t a l hiddenness of God even f o r those who know Him i n f a i t h 1 . The 
statement of the ' i n c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y ' of God i s 'not i n any sense 
denied by the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of the Name of God'. ^ 
I n t h i s l i g h t , we can understand the e a r l i e r remark of Barth t h a t : 
S t r i c t l y speaking i t i s only God h i m s e l f who has a conception 
of God. A l l t h a t we have are conceptions of o b j e c t s , none of 
which i s i d e n t i c a l with God. (66) 
The formula of 1that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought', then, 
i s not p r o p e r l y d e s c r i b e d as a concept of God. I t i s , Barth argues, a 
'designation of God', which 'expresses nothing about the nature of God 
but r a t h e r l a y s down a r u l e o f t h o u g h t which, i f we follow i t , enables 
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us to endorse the statements about the Nature of God accepted i n f a i t h 
(example, the statement of h i s i n c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y ) as our own necessary 
thoughts'. 
U n s u r p r i s i n g l y , i t i s not c l e a r what s t a t u s Barth g i v e s , i n t h a t 
c a s e , t o the Anselmic formula. What does i t mean to c a l l i t a 
'de s i g n a t i o n ' of God, when a t the same time i t i m p l i e s His incomprehen-
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s i b i l i t y ? Charlesworth, reviewing Anselm, f e e l s t h a t the answer to 
the problem of using o r d i n a r y language to d e s c r i b e God w i l l be found 
i n the i d e a of a n a l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t i o n l a t e r developed by Aquinas, and 
t h i s i s h i n t e d at by Barth to some measure: 
I t i s p o s s i b l e f o r exp r e s s i o n s which are r e a l l y appropriate only 
to o b j e c t s t h a t are not i d e n t i c a l with God, to be true e x p r e s s i o n s , 
per aliquam s i m i l i t u d i n e m aut imaginem ... even when these 
e x p r e s s i o n s are a p p l i e d to the God who can never' be expressed. (69) 
However, any theory of analogy must s u r e l y t h r e a t e n Barth with a 
n a t u r a l theology such as he e x p r e s s l y f o r b i d s . A f u l l d i s c u s s i o n of 
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B a r t h ' s use of analogy w i l l not be attempted here, but we must 
examine how he attempts to r e t r i e v e h i s p o s i t i o n from compromise with 
a n a t u r a l theology. 
B a r t h does not deny the use of a concept of analogy i n theology. 
He q u i t e c l e a r l y has s t a t e d i n the quotation above t h a t human conceptions, 
'by a c e r t a i n s i m i l i t u d e or image 1 express what i s otherwise (that i s 
to say d i r e c t l y ) i n e x p r e s s i b l e . At the same time, the d e s c r i p t i o n of 
God which employs a n a l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g cannot be one based on n a t u r a l 
powers of human reason, f o r t h a t would be concede ground to a n a t u r a l 
theology, but upon the m a n i f e s t a t i o n of r e v e l a t i o n from God which giv e s 
understanding of f a i t h . Hence Barth's use of analogy came to be 
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designated as an 'analogy of f a i t h ' r a t h e r than an 'analogy of being', 
t h a t i s to say a use of a n a l o g i c a l language based on what God re v e a l e d 
r a t h e r than what man by h i s n a t u r a l reason alone might determine. I t 
i s important to recognise t h a t Barth seeks to maintain an ' i n f i n i t e 
q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' h e re, between what God r e v e a l s and what man 
understands through h i s n a t u r a l reason, even when r e f e r r i n g to the use 
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of a n a l o g i c a l language which concedes that any i d e a of God must be one 
contained w i t h i n the l i m i t a t i o n s of the human mind. I n theory, i f the 
i d e a s of God given to man are q u i t e independent of h i s n a t u r a l c a p a c i t y 
to t h i n k and understand, t h e r e i s no need f o r any concept of analogy a t 
a l l ? : God could p e r f e c t l y w e l l enable man to understand him d i r e c t l y . 
But Barth seems to wish to avoid some of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of h i s 
a l i e n a t i o n of the 'understanding of f a i t h ' from n a t u r a l reason. He 
t h e r e f o r e shares w i t h n a t u r a l theology, which does not wish to separate 
the two, an apparent enthusiasm f o r a concept of analogy which he does 
not i n f a c t need. 
B a r t h t h e r e f o r e d e s c r i b e s God as 'coming w i t h i n ' man's system when 
i n f a c t he q u i t e c l e a r l y wants to suggest t h a t God b u i l d s h i s own 
system w i t h i n man, a system i n p r i n c i p l e a b s o l u t e l y d i s t i n c t from man's 
own. I n t h i s way he to some extent obscures the f a c t that n a t u r a l 
reason has been e f f e c t i v e l y i s o l a t e d from man's knowledge of-God i n 
Fides Quaerens Intellectum, j u s t as humanity i t s e l f has been e f f e c t i v e l y 
i s o l a t e d from God i n the commentary on Romans. 
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Schofner d e s c r i b e s t h i s work of Barth as f o l l o w s : " 
With the Fides Quaerens Intellectum book Barth succeeded in-
a r t i c u l a t i n g a monumental scheme fo r the development of a 
c o n s i s t e n t t h e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n . A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l l y o r i e n t a t e d 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the dogmatic e n t e r p r i s e no longer had a hold 
on him. C a r t e s i a n i s m i n theology was now a defeated opponent. 
Henceforth the Denkform of h i s t e c h n i c a l , proposals would be 
'the o b j e c t i v i t y of r e v e l a t i o n ' . 
The ' t h e o l o g i c a l C a r t e s i a n i s m ' which Schofner d e s c r i b e s , i s the 
' r e l i g i o u s antropocentrism' which appears to d e r i v e the knowledge of 
God from man's self-knowledge. But no exponent of ' r e l i g i o u s anthrop-
ocentrism' would q u i t e put the p o i n t i n t h a t way. He would, r a t h e r , 
argue t h a t man's self-knowledge i s the locus of h i s understanding of 
what i s r e v e a l e d to him by God, t h a t the channel of r e v e l a t i o n cannot 
be s e t a p a r t from the channels of n a t u r a l reason. I t i s the s e p a r a t i o n 
between man's self-knowledge and h i s knowledge of God, r a t h e r than any 
attempt to ' d e r i v e ' one from the other, which most c l e a r l y c h a r a c t e r i s e s 
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B a r t h ' s theology. Fides Quaerens Intellectum i s the o u t l i n e of a 
methodology based upon such a s e p a r a t i o n . I t i s n e i t h e r p r i m a r i l y 
' t h e o c e n t r i c 1 as i f i t d e r i v e d man's self-knowledge from h i s knowledge 
of God, nor a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c ' , d e r i v i n g the knowledge of-God from man's 
self-knowledge. I t i s , r a t h e r , an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l dualism s e p a r a t i n g 
the two forms of knowledge, not i n terms of ' f a i t h ' and 'reason', but 
i n terms of reason a c t i n g w i t h i n the laws of r e v e l a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d by 
God, and reason a c t i n g from i t s own autonomous powers. This i s the 
proper d e s i g n a t i o n of Barth's methodology as ' t h e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m ' 
r a t h e r than ' f i d e i s m 1 . 
However, such.a dualism c r e a t e s extreme d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r Barth's 
p o s i t i o n . I t presumes a dichotomy which, l i k e t h a t between God and 
man i n Romans,cannot e a s i l y be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e . 
•More e s p e c i a l l y the reason which 'understands f a i t h ' appears to borrow, 
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and even i n a sense to ' r e b a p t i s e ' the terminology of n a t u r a l reason: 
the a p p r o p r i a t i o n of analogy i n t o a scheme of ' t h e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m ' , 
l i k e the a p p r o p r i a t i o n of humanity i n t o the C h r i s t o l o g y of Romans, i s a 
p a r a d o x i c a l d e n i a l of the presupposed system of ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e 
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d i s t i n c t i o n ' which remains fundamental to Barth's p o s i t i o n . 
I t might appear t h a t Kant's i n f l u e n c e upon Barth has now 
disappeared. On the p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , i l l u s t r a t e d i n h i s growing 
a s s o c i a t i o n with Henrich Scholz among ot h e r s , t h i s i s an u n l i k e l y 
c o n c l u s i o n to reach. Yet the c o n c l u s i o n of Fides Quaerens Intellectum 
does c o n t a i n a f i r m r e j e c t i o n of Kant's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Anselm as 
making a p h i l o s o p h i c a l e r r o r i n confusing words which provide p a r t of 
a d e f i n i t i o n w i t h those which c l a i m t h a t what i s defined e x i s t s not i n 
i d e a alone but i n r e a l i t y - the sharp Kantian reminder t h a t 'existence 
i s not a p r e d i c a t e ' . Barth's work concludes: 
That Anselm's Proof of the e x i s t e n c e of God has repeatedly been 
c a l l e d the ' O n t c l c g i c a l ' Proof of God, t h a t commentators have 
r e f u s e d to see t h a t i t i s i n a d i f f e r e n t book al t o g e t h e r from 
the well-known teaching of Descartes and L e i b n i z , t h a t anyone 
could s e r i o u s l y think t h a t i t i s even remotely a f f e c t e d by what 
Kant put forward a g a i n s t these d o c t r i n e s - a l l t h a t i s so much 
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73 nonsense on which no more words ought to be wasted. 
Yet B a r t h remained committed to h i s P l a t o n i c - K a n t i a n i n h e r i t a n c e 
i n t h i s sense - t h a t he remained a d u a l i s t . However, whereas Kant's 
dualism remained t h a t between phenomena and noumena, between things as 
they n e c e s s a r i l y p r e s e n t themselves t o , and are determined by, the 
understanding, and t h i n g s as they are i n themselves, Barth's i s a 
d i f f e r e n t dualism. Kant had, a f t e r a l l , i n s i s t e d that a l l knowledge, 
i n c l u d i n g 'metaphysical' knowledge, must be c o n s t r a i n e d by the conditions 
of human understanding. Barth c o n s i s t e n t l y opposes t h i s approach - i t 
i s behind h i s constant s t r e s s upon the almost ' i d o l a t r o u s ' b e l i e f t h a t 
God can be 'possessed', 'contained' by the concepts of human reason: 
the i d e a t h a t man's understanding must pl a y a p a r t i n r e c e i v i n g x e v e l a t i o n 
i s p r e s e n t e d by Barth as p r e c i s e l y as 'anthropocentric' as the b e l i e f 
t h a t he may f a s h i o n a God i n h i s image, or see God a s an 'extension', 
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i n some sense, of h i m s e l f . For B a r t h , the road from Kant and 
Schleiermacher to Marx and Feuerback i s a d i r e c t one and the whole of 
the n i n e t e e n t h century l a y under the sway of t h i s 'anthropocentric' 
b l i g h t . By the time of w r i t i n g h i s book Protestant Thought in the 
Nineteenth Century, the echoes i n Romans of Kane's "own awareness of a 
dualism overcome through the 'ideas of reason' which i n t u i t the nature 
of the world as a l i m i t e d whole r e q u i r i n g an u l t i m a t e ground, are l o s t , 
a l o n g s i d e the P l a t o n i c 'anamnesis' of a world of 'being' i n a world of 
f l u x . Kant's dualism now appears a complete one, and as such an 
unacceptable d i v o r c e between the r e a l i t y of God and human knowledge, 
which i n Kant's view touches nothing t h a t i t does not d i s t o r t , and i n 
Ba r t h ' s does so i n p u r s u i t of an ' i d o l a t r o u s ' d e s i r e to 'possess' God 
a n d ' l i m i t ' Him to the framework of the human mind. 
But Barth does not eschew a dualism as such. I n s t e a d he d i v i d e s 
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the n a t u r a l reason, i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms of the c o n s t r a i n t s upon 
understanding r e a l i t y as such i n d i c a t e d by Kant, from the reason which v 
i s d i r e c t e d by the Holy S p i r i t to the understanding of f a i t h , whose 
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power and whose c a p a c i t y come not from the human understanding but from 
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the d i r e c t g i f t of God's grace. The noumenal world does not cease 
to be a r e a l i t y beyond the embrace of the human understanding, but i t 
does cease to be i n a c c e s s i b l e to man, simply because i t may be made 
a c c e s s i b l e t o him by God's r e v e a l i n g g i f t of grace, which cannot be 
c o n s t r a i n e d by the l i m i t a t i o n s of man's n a t u r a l a b i l i t y to r e c e i v e i t . 
Rather than c h a l l e n g e Kant, Barth e f f e c t i v e l y bypasses him: r a t h e r 
than q u e s t i o n the nature of h i s dualism, he adopts i t i n terms of a 
d i v i s i o n between what man l e a r n s for. h i m s e l f and what he l e a r n s from 
God. I n s t e a d of a d i v i s i o n between noumena and phenomena, Barth i n 
e f f e c t i n t r o d u c e s a d i v i s i o n between the ' t h e o l o g i c a l ' and the ' s e c u l a r ' , 
t h a t which reason d i s c o v e r s from r e v e l a t i o n , and t h a t which i t l e a r n s 
from i t s own autonomous working. Hence the c o n c l u s i o n of Fides 
Quaerens Intellectum does not i n e f f e c t r e j e c t Kant a t a l l - i t 
d i s m i s s e s him as not germane to the i s s u e - 'that anyone could 
s e r i o u s l y t h i n k t h a t i t i s even remotely a f f e c t e d by what Kant put 
forward a g a i n s t these d o c t r i n e s - a l l t h a t i s so much nonsense on which 
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no more words ought to be wasted'. Yet from Kant Barth d e r i v e s h i s 
most important p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , namely that beyond the world which we 
order according to the form of our understanding, i s another, a 
noumenal world, the nature of whose i n f l u e n c e , upon th a t which we know, 
i t i s beyond our powers to t r a c e . Beyond our powers, Barth wants to 
say, but not beyond the power of "God. 
L e t us r e t u r n to an e a r l i e r comparison between the problem of 
Barth's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Anselm and t h a t of D e s c a r t e s ' argument i n the 
T h i r d M e d i t a t i o n . D e s c a r t e s ' argument, P r o f e s s o r Williams comments, 
presupposes: 
an i d e a of God a g r e a t d e a l more determinate and a r t i c u l a t e d 
than D e s c a r t e s ' f i n i t e mind can be expected to have. 
On the one hand, Descartes must c l a i m t h a t h i s i d e a of God i s p e r f e c t l y 
c l e a r , i n order to avoid the c r i t i c i s m t h a t i t i s a hazy notion cobbled 
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together from h i s i d e a s of f i n i t e beings: on the'otftej; hand, 'both 
h i s r e l i g i o u s f a i t h and the e x i g e n c i e s of h i s argument r e q u i r e t h a t 
he cannot r e a l l y conceive of God's i n f i n i t y , s i n c e t h i s must be 
i n a c c e s s i b l e to a mind which i s , as the argument i t s e l f i n s i s t s , 
f i n i t e . 
T h i s r e f l e c t i o n of Williams i s very p e r t i n e n t . For the form of 
argument i n the T h i r d Meditation i s a k i n to that of Barth's and the 
i d e a of a 'primacy of r e v e l a t i o n ' a s s o c i a t e d with the B a r t h i a n theology, 
namely the i n s i s t e n c e t h a t our i d e a of God, which may not be constructed 
out of our own reso u r c e s of i n t e l l e c t or emotion, may a r i s e only through 
the s e l f - r e v e a l i n g a c t i v i t y of God Himself. The c r i t i c i s m P r o f e s s o r 
Williams l e v e l s a t D e s c a r t e s ' argument i s r e l e v a n t to the problems of 
Barth's arguments too. For Barth seeks an understanding of r e v e l a t i o n 
t h a t i s a b l e to argue t h a t f i n i t e minds, through t h e i r r e c e p t i o n of 
God's Word, are provided with a knowledge of the i n f i n i t e God, which 
i t i s beyond the r e s o u r c e s of the f i n i t e mind as such to achieve. 
Now P r o f e s s o r Williams i d e n t i f i e s D e s c a r t e s ' weakest f l a n k i n h i s 
assumption t h a t man may have a c l e a r i d e a of God. This i s e s p e c i a l l y 
so i n t h a t the argument t h a t man cannot have fashioned the i d e a of God 
out of h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l r e s o u r c e s r e q u i r e s Descartes to emphasise the 
i m p e r f e c t i o n of f i n i t e beings and t h e i r d i s t a n c e from a p e r f e c t God. 
They a r e , however, apparently able to have a c l e a r and d i s t i n c t i d e a 
of God! Williams quotes other passages of Descartes which seem'rather 
to suggest t h a t a man cannot expect to have a c l e a r idea of God, f o r 
i n s t a n c e , a l e t t e r to Mersenne of 15 A p r i l 1630 where Descartes s a y s : 
We cannot understand the greatness of God, even though we know 
him. But the v e r y f a c t t h a t we recognise i t to be incomprehensible 
makes us th i n k a l l the more h i g h l y of i t ; j u s t as a king has more 
majesty when he i s l e s s f a m i l i a r l y known to h i s s u b j e c t s , provided 
they do not then t h i n k t h a t they have no king, and t h a t they know 
him enough not to be able to doubt i t . (78) 
Th i s e x t r a c t suggests t h a t we may perhaps know a s u f f i c i e n t amount to 
c l a i m t h a t God e x i s t s , without knowing His nature, j u s t as s u b j e c t s may 
know t h a t they have a k i n g , w h i l s t h i s majesty precludes them from any 
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f a m i l i a r knowledge of him. 
A more s p e c i f i c d i s c u s s i o n may be found i n the ' F i r s t Objections 
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urged a g a i n s t the Meditations' together with Descartes r e p l y . The 
o b j e c t i o n i s made, t h a t . s i n c e Descartes d e c l a r e s : 
I apprehend c l e a r l y and d i s t i n c t l y an i n f i n i t e being, 
someone w i l l respond: 
Do you apprehend c l e a r l y and d i s t i n c t l y an i n f i n i t e being? 
For what then, the o b j e c t i o n continues, i s meant by t h a t well-known 
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maxim known to a l l - The i n f i n i t e qua i n f i n i t e i s unknown ? 
D e s c a r t e s ' r e p l y i s to agree 'that the i n f i n i t e qua i n f i n i t e i s 
i n no wise comprehended', but t h a t n e v e r t h e l e s s i t i s 'understood', a 
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confusing remark which, however, he goes on to say enables us c l e a r l y 
to understand t h a t God i s ' i n f i n i t e ' (as opposed to ' i n d e f i n i t e ' , an 
i d e a which we could form merely from f i n i t e o b j e c t s ) . He continues 
t h a t we know the i n f i n i t e ' p o s i t i v e l y ... though not adequately, i . e . , 
we do not comprehend the whole of what i s i n t e l l i g i b l e i n i t ' . He 
suggests t h a t we may b e s t understand God by c o n s i d e r i n g His p e r f e c t i o n s 
s i n g l y i n t u r n , r a t h e r than t r y to comprehend Him i n His t o t a l i t y at 
once. Yet s u r e l y d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e when Descartes remarks: 
Wherever I have s a i d t h a t God can be c l e a r l y and d i s t i n c t l y 
known, I have understood t h i s to apply only to t h i s f i n i t e 
c o g n i t i o n of ours, which i s proportionate to the diminutive 
c a p a c i t y of our minds. (81) 
We say t h a t d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e , f o r i f the only God we can recognise 
i s a God planed down, as i t were, to the s i z e of our i n t e l l i g e n c e , then 
do we any longer p o s s e s s the terms i n which to c l a i m t h a t God's e x i s t e n c e 
i s demonstrated from the presence i n our minds of the i d e a of Him, an 
i d e a which we could not p o s s i b l y have fashioned from our own r e s o u r c e s ? 
For what may be comprehended only by being reduced to the l i m i t a t i o n s 
of our understanding, must s u r e l y be i n p r i n c i p l e capable of being b u i l t 
up from r e f l e c t i o n on the f i n i t e world upon which t h a t understanding 
o p e r a t e s . But then Descartes can no longer argue t h a t our idea of God 
can have come only from God h i m s e l f , whose e x i s t e n c e as the author of 
, 109. 
man's i d e a of him i s thereby proved. 
There i s , c l e a r l y , a sense i n which i t can be agreed t h a t an idea 
of an o b j e c t could not have e x i s t e d without the o b j e c t i t s e l f to cause 
i t . T h i s i s true of most of our ideas of o b j e c t s : they a r i s e from a 
form of encounter w i t h the o b j e c t s themselves. But what Descartes i s 
r e f e r r i n g to i s an i d e a of an o b j e c t which could not p o s s i b l y have 
a r i s e n by any other means than through the o b j e c t i t s e l f . The mind 
i s capable of imagining a fabulous monster without observing one> 
because a fabulous monster possesses no q u a l i t i e s which are not possessed 
by c r e a t u r e s which i t has observed, a l b e i t the monster possesses them 
i n d i f f e r e n t combinations and to a d i f f e r e n t degree. God, however, 
i t seems to be s a i d , i s so q u a l i t a t i v e l y other than observable beings 
t h a t i f we have an i d e a of Him i t i s not conceivably an imaginary 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of our minds. Yet i f Descartes i s bound to admit t h a t 
the c l e a r i d e a of God which we have i s 'proportionate to the diminutive 
c a p a c i t y of our minds', then he seems to be admitting t h a t there i s 
nothing i n our i d e a of God which has i n t e r r u p t e d or exceeded t h a t 
c a p a c i t y . But s u r e l y t h i s i s j u s t what he must say. For u n l e s s we 
have an i d e a of God 'which exceeds the c a p a c i t y ' of our f i n i t e minds, 
then how can we have an i d e a of God which our f i n i t e minds could not 
i n p r i n c i p l e have c r e a t e d ? 
T h i s problem i n Descartes i s s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r to the problem 
which we f i n d i n Fides Quaerens Intellectum. For we can c e r t a i n l y 
imagine the c r i t i c i s m l e v e l l e d by P r o f e s s o r Williams a t Descartes being 
l e v e l l e d a t Anselm as i n t e r p r e t e d by K a r l Barth. As we observe i n 
D e s c a r t e s the attempt a t once to p o r t r a y the idea of God i n our minds 
as p o s s e s s i n g no other p o s s i b l e source save God h i m s e l f , and y e t as 
' p r o p o r t i o n a l to the diminutive c a p a c i t y of our minds', so we have i n 
Barth the a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t our knowledge of God proceeds from God alone, 
and y e t t h a t our concept of God i s an ' a n a l o g i c a l one'. Both w r i t e r s 
wish to take account of the l i m i t a t i o n s of human understanding w h i l s t 
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p o i n t i n g t o God alone as the source of our i d e a of Him. Both seem to 
be s a y i n g 'where e l s e could the. i d e a of God have o r i g i n a t e d from save 
from God H i m s e l f ? ' w h i l s t a l s o s a y i n g : 'Of course man's i d e a of God 
must be the s o r t of i d e a of which h i s conceptual reasoning i s capable -
"proportionate to the diminutive c a p a c i t y of our minds" ( D e s c a r t e s ) , or 
"per aliquam s i m i l i t u d i n e m aut imaginem" 1 ( B a r t h ) . Both thereby r a i s e 
i n the r e a d e r ' s mind the s u s p i c i o n , t h a t what must be proportioned to 
the c a p a c i t y of our minds to r e c e i v e must be w i t h i n the power of our 
minds to c r e a t e , and the ' r e a l i s t - i d e a l i s t ' controversy over what i s 
i n f a c t being d i s c o v e r e d , and what invented, r e a s s e r t s i t s e l f . 
I n D e s c a r t e s , the c o n f l i c t appears unresolved. I n Barth, however, 
the r e i s an ' e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s h i f t ' to t r y to s o l v e the problem. Rather 
than an 'idea' which comes d i r e c t l y from God, Barth suggests a form of 
knowledge which comes d i r e c t l y from God. Yet i s t h i s to do anything 
d i f f e r e n t than repeat the argument of Descartes i n the l i g h t of the 
'Copernican Revolution' of Kant? The mind i s not, as Descartes tends 
to p r e s e n t i t , a p a s s i v e l y e x i s t i n g 'land' i n which i d e a s d w e l l , i n c l u d i n g 
the r e c o g n i s a b l y ' a l i e n ' i d e a of God which comes 'from abroad', a form 
of t h i n k i n g which r e c a l l s the n a t i o n of the mind as a blank s l a t e upon 
which the world attempts t o t r a c e out i t s meaning. I t i s not simply, 
as Kant has shown, our i d e a of God, but our i d e a of anything which i s 
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'proportionate to the diminutive c a p a c i t y of our minds', s i n c e the 
mind i t s e l f demands t h a t i t s i d e a s of 'objects should be determined by 
the form of understanding w i t h which i t n e c e s s a r i l y operates. I t i s 
because D e s c a r t e s operates with a pre-Kantian assumption of the mind's 
p a s s i v i t y i n r e l a t i o n to i t s i d e a s , t h a t he b e l i e v e s he can give sense 
to the notion of the mind 'having an i d e a forced upon i t ' , which i t 
cannot p o s s i b l y have been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t s e l f . I n the l i g h t of 
Kant, the remark t h a t the mind p o s s e s s e s no i d e a t h a t exceeds i t s 
'diminutive c a p a c i t y ' , i s only s a y i n g t h a t i t cannot possess an i d e a 
which cannot be thought! A l l i d e a s must be proportioned to the mind's 
c a p a c i t y t o understand - otherwise they are unthinkable. 
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Thus when Barth t a l k s about the idea of God, he cannot be t a l k i n g 
about a p a r t i c u l a r i d e a which appears somehow 'unlike the r e s t 1 , and 
which cannot have been b u i l t up, u n l i k e i t s f e l l o w - n o t i o n s , by the mind 
i t s e l f , s i n c e such an i d e a could not even be e n t e r t a i n e d by the mind. 
He has, t h e r e f o r e , to argue t h a t a c e r t a i n form of thought operates 
q u i t e independently of the human understanding whose s t r u c t u r e , as Kant 
.1 
has shown, e f f e c t i v e l y determines the nature of human t h i n k i n g . Barth 
i n t r o d u c e s the i d e a of a form of thought based upon r e v e l a t i o n , which 
i s e f f e c t i v e l y separated from a n a t u r a l reason t h a t must be contained 
by the nature of the human mind a c t i n g as a kind of s i e v e determining 
what i t i s prepared to admit to human comprehension. I n Barth, then, 
i n s t e a d of the p a r t i c u l a r notion which has a d i r e c t d i v i n e o r i g i n a t i o n , 
we have the p a r t i c u l a r form of thought which has a d i r e c t d i v i n e 
o r i g i n a t i o n . Where i n De s c a r t e s the i d e a of God i s a stranger to the 
mind, i n Barth the form of knowledge based upon r e v e l a t i o n i s a str a n g e r 
to the mind; i n s t e a d of an i d e a i n the mind which cannot have come 
'from i t ' , B arth p r e s e n t s a whole process of reasoning 'outside' the 
mind a l t o g e t h e r . 
Does, then, the same c r i t i c i s m p e r t a i n to Barth as p e r t a i n s to 
De s c a r t e s ? Williams i s puz z l e d by Descartes a t once pre s e n t i n g God 
as i n c o n c e i v a b l e and y e t the i d e a of God as a 'recognisable s t r a n g e r ' 
i n the mind. We may be e q u a l l y puzzled by Barth a t once p r e s e n t i n g 
God as i n c o n c e i v a b l e and y e t the i d e a of God as a recognisable g i f t of 
r e v e l a t i o n . Williams notes t h a t Descartes s t i l l t a l k s of an i d e a 
' p r o p o r t i o n a t e ' t o the diminutive c a p a c i t y o f our minds', and we note 
t h a t B a r t h s t i l l t a l k s i n terms of analogy. Williams notes t h a t 
D e s c a r t e s t a l k s of an a l i e n a t e d i d e a i n the mind which betrays a 
transcendent o r i g i n , w h i l s t s t i l l somehow proportioned to the c a p a c i t y 
of human understanding; and we, s i m i l a r l y , note t h a t Barth t a l k s of an 
a l i e n a t e d form of thought, the understanding of f a i t h proceeding as a 
g i f t of grace from God, which a l s o has a transcendent o r i g i n and y e t 
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which a l s o r e q u i r e s to be understood 'per aliquam s i m i l i t u d i n e m aut 
imaginem'. Descartes seeks an ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n 1 
between h i s i d e a of God and other i d e a s i n h i s mind: y e t at the same 
time he r e c o g n i s e s the paradox of h i s p o s i t i o n i n the requirement t h a t 
even the former i d e a be prop o r t i o n a t e to the mind's c a p a c i t i e s . Barth 
seeks an ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' between the 'understanding 
of f a i t h ' , reason a m p l i f y i n g f a i t h given i n r e v e l a t i o n , and the n a t u r a l 
reason determined according to Kantian r u l e s of thought: y e t he 
re c o g n i s e s the paradox of h i s p o s i t i o n i n the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the 
'understanding of f a i t h ' cannot a l t o g e t h e r separate i t s e l f from the 
c o n s t r a i n t s of the human n a t u r a l reason whose concepts of God are only 
a n a l o g i c a l . Both face the problem t h a t i n order t o give substance to 
t h e i r i d e a s of God, they must deny the methodological ground of t h e i r 
e n u n c i a t i o n . D e s c a r t e s ' i d e a of God ceases to be a b s o l u t e l y d i s t i n c t 
from o t h e r i d e a s : B a r t h ' s form of thought based upon God's g i f t of 
grace c e a s e s to be a b s o l u t e l y d i s t i n c t from forms of thought based upon 
n a t u r a l reason. N e i t h e r can maintain the dualism they wish to presuppose. 
I t w i l l be c l e a r t h a t the argument of t h i s chapter poses a 
chal l e n g e to P r o f e s s o r T.F. Torrance's reasoning i n defence of Barth 
i n h i s e a r l y work Karl Barth : An Introduction To His Early Theology. 
We attempt to c r i t i c i s e Torrance's theology s p e c i f i c a l l y i n chapter 
seven of t h i s work, but i n our c r i t i c i s m of Barth's development i n the 
l i g h t of h i s work of Anselm we are conscious of opposing Torrance's 
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own r a t i o n a l e of Bart h . Torrance w r i t e s : 
I t belongs to the r a t i o n a l i t y of theology t h a t the reason 
should operate only with o b j e c t s of f a i t h , f o r f a i t h i s 
the s p e c i f i c mode of r a t i o n a l i t y which i s demanded of 
theology when i t i s d i r e c t e d to the knowledge of God. (85) 
I t seems to us t h a t Torrance i n h i s apology f o r Barth repeats h i s 
unmaintainable dualism. On- the one hand t h e o l o g i c a l knowledge possesses 
i t s own 'mode of r a t i o n a l i t y ' , i t s own form of thought p r e s c r i b e d by 
the nature of the o b j e c t w i t h which i t d e a l s . On the other hand, the 
very term 'mode of . r a t i o n a l i t y ' i n d i c a t e s a necessary recourse to a 
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common concept of ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' shared by a l l forms of thought i n 
order t h a t Torrance may t a l k i n t e l l i g i b l y of the ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' of 
theology, and indeed of the ' i r r a t i o n a l i t y ' of any t h e o l o g i c a l 
r e f l e c t i o n which operates i n 'detachment' from i t s o b j e c t . The 
nature of the s p e c i f i c , and y e t i n i t s own way l i k e other forms of 
thought ' r a t i o n a l ' , mode of t h i n k i n g which i s appropriate to theology 
p o s s e s s e s p r e c i s e l y the ambiguity which we f i n d i n Barth; namely an 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l dualism which denies i t s e l f as soon as i t reaches f o r 
s u i t a b l e means of e x p r e s s i o n . 
3. Conclusion 
Hence we must conclude by doubting the claims t h a t Barth's thought 
between 1922 and 1930 profoundly changes. I t changes more i n key than 
i n substance. We began by p o i n t i n g out the evidence f o r profound 
development i n Barth's i d e a s during t h i s p e r i o d : the ' r e l ' a t i v i s a t i o n * 
of a l l human va l u e s and ideas i n Romans i s extended to the c r u c i a l 
'system' of ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' between man. and God, so 
t h a t , i t i s s a i d , even t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n must not be presupposed but 
r a t h e r a l l notions of God's r e l a t i o n to man de r i v e d from the concrete 
r e a l i t y of Jesus C h r i s t . I f t h i s were t r u e , however, Barth would have 
had no a priori grounds f o r i n s i s t i n g , as he does, t h a t the 'under-
standing of f a i t h ' , reason working w i t h i n the nature of r e v e l a t i o n given 
by God's grace, i s i t s e l f i n ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' from 
the 'autonomous' workings of n a t u r a l reason. That he does make t h i s 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t e s , r a t h e r , t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n i t s e l f has been 
found to operate elsewhere, i n the sphere of epistemology (between what 
we know by ' f a i t h ' through r e v e l a t i o n and what we know n a t u r a l l y ) r a t h e r 
than t h a t of ontology (between man and -God). I n an important r e s p e c t 
B a r t h does t r y to draw the workings of n a t u r a l reason 'in t o ' the 
knowledge based upon r e v e l a t i o n , as the ' r e b a p t i s i n g ' of a d o c t r i n e 
of analogy i n terms of the i d e a of an 'anology of f a i t h ' i l l u s t r a t e s . 
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F o r t h i s reason, as we s h a l l see i n chapter f i v e , Barth s e t s h i m s e l f 
a g a i n s t the i d e a of other d i s c i p l i n e s presuming independence of theology, 
d e s p i t e h i s commitment to an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l dualism between knowledge 
of God and other forms of human understanding. He i s not content merely 
to make theology immune to e x t r a - t h e o l o g i c a l c r i t i c i s m . This process 
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of a s s i m i l a t i o n w i l l be given c a r e f u l s c r u t i n y i n l a t e r chapters. 
But there can be no d i s g u i s i n g the nature of the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l g u l f 
which Barth e s t a b l i s h e s , or the e s s e n t i a l a l i e n a t i o n i n Barth's thought 
of theology-knowledge of God based upon God's own s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n under-
stood by reason w i t h i n f a i t h - from those d i s c i p l i n e s which c u l t i v a t e 
the workings of the n a t u r a l reason. I t cannot be s t a t e d too often t h a t 
whatever the apparent h u m i l i t y of Barth's c a l l that we understand'God 
simply from the Word which He speaks to us, i t i s h i s own methodological 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n which determines t h a t t h a t Word should be spoken by a 
channel of r e v e l a t i o n e n t i r e l y d i vorced from the autonomous workings 
of the human mind. Arguably, Barth has been f r i g h t e n e d by Kant i n t o 
the b e l i e f t h a t any knowledge of God i n which the human mind operated 
from i t s own 'autonomous' powers would r e q u i r e i t to 'jump out of i t s 
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c o g n i t i v e s k i n ' i n t o an imp o s s i b l e d i r e c t i n t u i t i o n of what i t could 
not, i n p r i n c i p l e , understand. I f so, i t would perhaps have been b e t t e r 
Had B a r t h p a i d c l o s e r a t t e n t i o n to the kinds of p h i l o s o p h i c a l development 
which had i n f a c t d r i v e n him i n the d i r e c t i o n of an ' a l i e n a t e d theology'.* 
I n s t e a d , h i s l a t e r thought appears to p r e s e n t i t s e l f as the humble 
conformity of theology to i t s o b j e c t of study,. w h i l s t i n f a c t p r e -
determining t h a t o b j e c t to be known independently of the n a t u r a l 
r e s o u r c e s of human reason. 
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I t i s n o t i c e a b l e how f a r theologians w i l l go i n order to deny 
t h i s a l i e n a t i o n . I n h i s complex book, The Doctrine of God in 
Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth, C o l i n Gunton remarks (p.121) 
of the 'theologian's t a s k ' as e l u c i d a t e d by a study of Barth's 
work on Anselm, t h a t i t i s : 
... not to e s t a b l i s h the o b j e c t of h i s r e f l e c t i o n , for i t s 
nature i s such t h a t i t can be e s t a b l i s h e d only by i t s e l f , 
but to r e f l e c t upon t h a t o b j e c t , and thus to make i n t e l l i g i b l e 
i t s n a ture, and hence i t s r a t i o n a l i t y and n e c e s s i t y . The aim 
of theology i s undoubtedly proof, not i n the sense t h a t i t i s 
u s u a l l y understood i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l theology, but as something 
t h a t can perhaps be c a l l e d i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n v i c t i o n . 
Having i s o l a t e d the 'understanding of f a i t h ' from the autonomously 
working powers of human reason on the b a s i s of a merely presupposed 
s e p a r a t i o n between the two, Barth's approach i s here j u s t i f i e d i n 
terms of 'mythologisations' such as ' e s t a b l i s h ' and ' i n t e l l e c t u a l 
c o n v i c t i o n ' . The process of God's r e v e l a t i o n to the 'understanding 
of f a i t h ' e f f e c t i v e l y i s o l a t e d from h i s n a t u r a l reason becomes the 
p r o c e s s of God's ' e s t a b l i s h i n g h i m s e l f . The aim of a theology 
t h a t i s unable to speak of proof as a philosopher speaks of i t , 
because e f f e c t i v e l y denied the use of n a t u r a l reason i n determining 
the e x i s t e n c e of God, i s l e f t w ith the obscure p o s s i b i l i t y of 
' i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n v i c t i o n ' . These hollow phrases d i s g u i s e the r e a l i t y 
of the theologian's a l i e n a t i o n , and make i t appear t h a t he i s , i n . 
f a c t , l e f t w i t h something to work with w i t h i n a Bar'thian method-
ology. Against t h i s one has to ask: 'What i s i t to be able to 
r e f l e c t upon something t h a t " e s t a b l i s h e s i t s e l f ' " ? I s that to make 
r e a l r e f l e c t i o n p o s s i b l e , or i s i t not i n f a c t to demand t h a t the 
whole p o i n t of r e f l e c t i o n - to e s t a b l i s h what i s the case - i s 
denied? And secondly, 'what s o r t of " i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n v i c t i o n " i s 
i t , t h a t cannot employ the means of proof o f f e r e d w i t h i n the ambit 
x of a p h i l o s o p h i c theology?' I f t h i s form of debate i s denied, what 
s o r t of ' i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n v i c t i o n ' p o s s i b l y remains? How f a r i s 
Gunton's p r a c t i c e t o suggest ' p s e u d o - r e a l i t i e s ' which appear to 
o f f e r the theologian r e a l scope f o r c r i t i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l endeavour, 
when i n f a c t the d i s t i n c t i o n drawn by Barth between 'the under-
stan d i n g of f a i t h ' and the autonomous workings of human reason make 
t h i s i m p o s s i b l e ? 
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CHAPTER F I V E 
The ' R e l i g i o u s ' and the 'Secular ' 
Ba r t h ' s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l duaiism, o u t l i n e d i n the previous chapter, . 
e n t a i l s a d i s t i n c t i o n between theology and other d i s c i p l i n e s . Reason 
as the i n n e r s e l f - e x p l i c a t i o n of f a i t h , " the operation of ' f i d e s quaerens 
i n t e l l e c t u m ' , i s c o n t r a s t e d to reason as the n a t u r a l form of human 
r e f l e c t i o n upon r e a l i t y . We c r i t i c i s e d the v a l i d i t y of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
i n chapter four, and we t r i e d to suggest d i f f i c u l t i e s which bore 
comparison to those undergone by Barth's e a r l i e r , o n t o l o g i c a l , dualism. 
We noted Barth's attachment to the independence of theology as a 
d i s c i p l i n e whose mode of r a t i o n a l i t y i s determined by the nature of 
i t s p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t of study. At the same time we may note t h a t the 
c l a i m of theology to be a form of r a t i o n a l i t y d r i v e s i t i n the d i r e c t i o n 
of language whose meaning depends upon i t s usage i n non-theological 
c o n t e x t s . We t r i e d i n the l a s t chapter to argue t h a t the ' o n t o l o g i c a l ' 
dilemma of Romans, i n which Barth i s f o r c e d to compromise an ' i n f i n i t e 
q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' between God and man i n order to do j u s t i c e to 
t h e i r u n i t y i n C h r i s t , i s transposed i n the works of the 1920s i n t o an 
' e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l ' dilemma, i n which Barth i s f o r c e d to compromise the 
q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n between theology and other forms of d i s c o u r s e . 
Barth's much-heralded C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m i n the Church Dogmatics i s the 
overcoming of one dualism through the use of another, and r e p r e s e n t s a 
p e r v a s i v e Kantian i n f l u e n c e i n t h i s r e s p e c t , d e s p i t e the concluding 
words of Barth's work on Anselm. We s h a l l pursue t h i s argument i n 
d e t a i l i n subsequent c h a p t e r s . I n t h i s chapter we propose to analyse 
the s e r i e s of l e c t u r e s o r i g i n a l l y given by Barth a t the U n i v e r s i t y of 
Bonn i n the e a r l y 1930s, and subsequently published as a survey of 
P r o t e s t a n t theology i n the nineteenth century.''" From t h i s study, and 
i n p a r t i c u l a r from the long p r e f a t o r y s e c t i o n on the thought of the 
Enlightenment which i t c o n t a i n s , we propose to d e f i n e the nature of 
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the c h a l l e n g e which the Enlightenment presented to Barth's under-
standing o f theology, and to compare i t with Barth's own c r i t i c i s m s 
of the thought of t h i s p e r i o d . 
Although e n t i t l e d Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 
(Die Protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert), K a r l Barth's survey 
of i d e a s i n the century preceding h i s own devotes a t l e a s t h a l f of i t s 
s i x hundred pages to the eigh t e e n t h century background. The book i n 
f a c t i n c l u d e s a prolonged d i s c i s s i o n of the Enlightenment. 
T h i s p e r i o d of h i s t o r y , Barth comments, was described by Walter 
Goetz as 'The Age of Absolutism' ('Das Z e i t a l t e r des Absolutismus'). 
I t i s a d e s c r i p t i o n , Barth suggests, t h a t 'probably r e f e r s to the w e l l -
known s t r u c t u r e of the p o l i t i c a l order of t h a t p e r i o d ' . However, he 
continues, p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e i s no more than 'an experiment of the 
order of l i f e , the i d e a l of l i f e i n g e n e r a l ' ('Ein Exponent der 
Lebensordnung bzw. des Lebens i d e a l s tlberhaupt 1) and he goes on to 
give h i s own d e f i n i t i o n of 'Absolutism': 
Absolutism i n general can obviously mean a system of l i f e based 
upon the b e l i e f i n the omnipotence of human powers (... e i n 
Lebenssystem, das gegrdndet i s t auf d i e glaubige Voraussetzung 
der Allmacht des menschlichen Vermogens). Man, who d i s c o v e r s 
h i s own power and a b i l i t y , the p o t e n t i a l i t y dormant i n h i s 
humanity, t h a t i s , h i s human being as such, and looks upon i t as 
the f i n a l , the r e a l , and absolute ( L e t z t e s , E i g e n t l i c h e s , A b s o l u t e s ) , 
I mean, as something detached ( e i n G e l o s t e s ) , s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g , with 
i t s own a u t h o r i t y and power, which he can t h e r e f o r e s e t i n motion 
i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s and without any r e s t r a i n t - t h i s man i s absolute 
man. ( l a ) 
The 'absolutism' which B a r t h d i s c e r n s i n eighteenth century European 
l i f e i s f a r wider than a narrow p o l i t i c a l d e f i n i t i o n would permit; 
t h e ' E n l i g h t e n e d Despots' are f o r him but one asp e c t of a deeper 
a b s o l u t i s m than t h a t of a r u l e r over h i s s u b j e c t s . The absolutism 
which B a r t h d e s c r i b e s i s an absolutism of man as such when, 'loosened 
from' (as ' e i n Ge l o s t e s ' ) h i s dependence upon God, he s e t s out to be 
a s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g being. 
E i g h t e e n t h century man, as Barth p o r t r a y s him, has won independence 
from the world and frdm the Church: from the world, because i n l e a r n i n g 
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to experiment upon i t he has begun to develop the c a p a c i t y to c o n t r o l 
i t , and from the Church, because i n the l i g h t of the Reformation she 
has not been able to r e s t r a i n the i n d i v i d u a l s o u l from seeing i t s e l f 
as the r e a l locus of r e v e l a t i o n . Man has become by t h i s time, both i n 
s p i r i t u a l and i n w o r l d l y terms, 'the measure of a l l t h i n g s ' . 
2 
The i d e a t h a t 'the proper study of Mankind i s Man1 , which i n 
Barth's view expressed 'the conscious or unconscious i d e a of the whole 
3 
century i n i t s p u r s u i t of s c i e n c e ' , i m p l i e d not so much the egotism 
of a humankind bent only on the study of i t s e l f , as the absolutism of 
a humankind convinced t h a t nothing a t a l l might be s t u d i e d save 
through the medium of human understanding. I t was man who determined 
how the world might be changed, how God must r e v e a l himself,and how. 
h i s own nature might be improved. The e g o t i s t sees h i m s e l f as the 
u n i v e r s e ; the a b s o l u t i s t sees h i m s e l f as the centre of the u n i v e r s e . 
I t was the l a t t e r f a i l i n g t h a t c h a r a c t e r i s e d the eighteenth century, 
and the f a c t t h a t two-thirds of h i s book on P r o t e s t a n t theology i n the 
n i n e t e e n t h century i s concerned w i t h t h i s view of the eighteenth may 
be taken to i l l u s t r a t e t h a t f o r Barth t h i s f a i l i n g i s d e c i s i v e f o r the 
whole course of modern theology. 
B a r t h p a i n t s a comprehensive p i c t u r e of the eighteenth century 
under t h i s s p e l l of 'absolutism', of a b e l i e f i n the power of man to 
determine h i s r e l a t i o n to nature, s o c i e t y and God. The n a t u r a l world 
i n the age of Enlightenment i s not only seen to be capable of being 
understood, but of being organised and even c r e a t e d . The tame 
c o n s t r u c t i o n s of the landscape gardener, with planned gardens cu t 
according to human design, r e p r e s e n t i n t h e i r own way the sense of 
power not only to c o n t r o l , but to c r e a t e , a n a t u r a l environment, which 
followed from g i a n t s t r i d e s i n the d i r e c t i o n of understanding i t . The 
p o p u l a r i t y of t r a v e l books and a t l a s e s show not merely a chance fad 
but a new sense of man's power to s e a r c h out and conquer the world 
around him. The esteemed f i g u r e of popular imagination i s Robinson 
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Crusoe, the man who can be thrown onto h i s own resources i n the face 
of n a t u r e , and not only s u r v i v e but compel nature to be h i s s e r v a n t . 
The same confidence which p r e v a i l e d with r e s p e c t to the n a t u r a l 
world, p r e v a i l e d with r e s p e c t to the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l world. Here 
too man must l e a r n t h a t he i s master of h i s own d e s t i n y . He i s not 
bound to take h i s p l a c e i n an e x i s t i n g s o c i a l order determined by 
t r a d i t i o n and s a n c t i f i e d by the D i v i n e Right of Kings; h i s reason may 
order a r a t i o n a l s o c i e t y as i t may order the n a t u r a l world around him. 
Barth i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s a t both the 'micro' and the 'macro' l e v e l . At 
the former, he i d e n t i f i e s the development of g u i l d s , freemasons' 
s o c i e t i e s , and even the p o p u l a r i t y of the coffee-houses i n which 
p o l i t i c a l questions were d i s c u s s e d and leading f i g u r e s s a t i r i s e d , as 
evidence of the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t human community, l i k e i t s n a t u r a l 
c o u n t e r p a r t , could be ordered by man, who d i d not merely i n h e r i t the 
'given' order of f a m i l y or n a t i o n i n t o which he was born, but could 
a c t u a l l y c r e a t e a s o c i e t y f o r h i m s e l f , a l b e i t a t the r e l a t i v e l y 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l of a c l u b . On the 'macro' l e v e l were the p o l i t i c a l 
t h e o r i s t s , i m patient of the i n f l u e n c e of t r a d i t i o n and s u p e r s t i t i o n 
upon the s t a t e , who sought to order s o c i e t y on a ground of r a t i o n a l 
order r a t h e r than i n h e r i t e d t r a d i t i o n , and whose e f f o r t s culminated 
i n the French Revolution of 1789. T h e i r s was not p r i m a r i l y the 
motivation of compassion or concern f o r the poor; nor d i d they b e l i e v e 
i n any u n d e r l y i n g s o c i a l and economic f o r c e s beyond the c o n t r o l of man 
which u l t i m a t e l y decided h i s p o l i t i c a l d e s t i n y , as i n the l a t e r 
philosophy a s s o c i a t e d w i t h Marx. F i r e d more by impatience with an 
order bound by t r a d i t i o n , than by anger a t a s o c i e t y designed to 
b e n e f i t i t s c a p i t a l i s t e l i t e , they had no sense of an underlying 
m a t e r i a l i s t dynamic which might remove human reason from i t s p o s i t i o n 
as the p o t e n t i a l d i s p o s e r of the s o c i a l order. They s e t reason a g a i n s t 
s u p e r s t i t i o n r a t h e r than p r o l e t a r i a n a g a i n s t c a p i t a l i s t . They d i d not 
sense s o c i a l f o r c e s beyond human c o n t r o l a t work i n r e s o l v i n g an 
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i n e v i t a b l e d i a l e c t i c , but only s o c i a l f o r c e s b o l s t e r e d by ignorance 
which must f a l l as soon as human reason became the instrument of man's 
power to determine h i s own s o c i a l d e s t i n y . With t h i s went a. confidence 
i n t h e i r a b i l i t y to understand man; a p h y s i c a l nature ordered according 
to laws of mathematics and s c i e n c e was the f i r s t s tep; a moral nature 
of man s i m i l a r l y ordered and contained w i t h i n a s o c i a l arrangement i n 
which i t would be designed to f u n c t i o n harmoniously, was the second. 
B a r t h extends h i s t h e s i s even to the a r t s . A r t i n the enlightenment 
p e r i o d , Barth f e e l s , i s designed more to prove human mastery and 
p r o f i c i e n c y than to l e a d man i n t o awareness of f o r c e s over which he has 
no power, and t h a t remind him of the mystery of l i f e . The musicians 
of the p e r i o d ' s u b j e c t sound to laws', although Barth cannot allow h i s 
f a v o u r i t e Mozart not to transcend t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n . So do the s c u l p t o r s , 
who r e v e a l i n the ' p l i a b i l i t y ' of p l a s t e r i t s e s s e n t i a l manoeuvrability 
by man. The p a i n t e r s d e s c r i b e what man has fashioned, r a t h e r than the 
depths of a nature he can only wonder a t ; landscapes take preference 
over n a t u r a l s e t t i n g s . Gardens are painted r a t h e r than w a t e r f a l l s . 
The a r t i s t s of the p e r i o d are craftsmen r a t h e r than c r e a t o r s . They do 
not r e s p e c t the m a t e r i a l they hew i n t o shape; they only want to 
demonstrate t h e i r power over i t . S i m i l a r l y , the philosophy of the period 
i s not a metaphysical d i s c u s s i o n of the l i m i t s to man's knowledge or 
understanding; i t i s more a ' p r a c t i c a l teaching on l i f e ' , i n s t r u c t i o n 
on how to be s u c c e s s f u l men of the world. 
There i s an obvious s i m p l i f i c a t i o n i n the broad, g e n e r a l i s i n g sweep 
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of Barth's survey, although i t i s immediately apparent from the scope 
of the work t h a t those who regard Barth as a 'narrow theologian' have 
not read him comprehensively. Yet h i s survey succeeds very w e l l i n 
b r i n g i n g together a number of a r t i s t i c , i n t e l l e c t u a l and r e l i g i o u s 
developments of the p e r i o d , and i n suggesting t h a t they a l l i n t h e i r 
v a r i o u s ways express t h a t p r i n c i p l e of an 'absolutism of man' which was 
to determine the course of n i n e t e e n t h century theology as w e l l as i t s 
own, and which l a y behind what Barth regards as many of the ' h e r e s i e s ' 
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of the modern age. I t i s Barth's argument t h a t the Enlightenment 
s t u d i e d a l l things from the p e r s p e c t i v e of man's power to order and 
d i r e c t them;man demonstrated h i s power over nature, h i s power over the 
instruments of a r t i s t i c accomplishment, h i s power over h i s s o c i a l 
environment, and f i n a l l y h i s power over God. He d i d not, of course, 
b e l i e v e t h a t he could d i r e c t God i n the way t h a t he might b e l i e v e 
h i m s e l f capable of d i r e c t i n g nature. But he b e l i e v e d t h a t he could 
d i r e c t the way i n which God made Himself known to him, e i t h e r by the 
c l a i m t h a t He must be a s s e s s e d by human reason or t h a t he must f i r e 
the human h e a r t . 
I t i s customary to see i n the P i e t i s m of the Enlightenment period 
a r e a c t i o n to i t s R a t i o n a l i s m , to t a l k about a movement of the h e a r t , 
an 'experienced 1 r e l i g i o n , t h a t moved i n a p r e c i s e l y opposite d i r e c t i o n 
to the 'dry' and. 'formal' r e l i g i o n of the head t h a t developed out of 
the P r o t e s t a n t reformation i n the 'Protestant S c h o l a s t i c i s m ' or 
'P r o t e s t a n t Orthodoxy' of the seventeenth century. In England t h i s i s 
h a b i t u a l l y seen i n terms of the movement towards a purely ' n a t u r a l ' 
r e l i g i o n , i n Deism, which i s commonly taken to have provoked a r e a c t i o n 
towards a more 'emotional', 'experienced' f a i t h i n the Wesleyan movement 
of the ei g h t e e n t h century. B a r t h , however, sees i n Rationalism and 
P i e t i s m two s i d e s of the same coin."* Both movements seek to encompass 
God, the one w i t h the head and the other w i t h the h e a r t . R a t i o n a l i s m 
makes human reason the c r i t e r i o n f o r determining God's e x i s t e n c e and 
nature; P i e t i s m , Barth c l a i m s , tends to make human emotion or r e l i g i o u s 
experience the c r i t e r i o n . I n both c a s e s , r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f f o l l o w s from 
the c a p a c i t y of God to s a t i s f y c e r t a i n demands made of Him by man, i n 
the one case t h a t He be i n t e l l e c t u a l l y i n t e l l i g i b l e and s a t i s f y man's 
n a t u r a l reason, and i n the other t h a t He be emotionally s a t i s f y i n g , and 
s a t i s f y man's n a t u r a l f e e l i n g s . I n e i t h e r c a s e , be i t head or h e a r t , 
man remains the 'measure'. 
K a r l Barth saw i n the theology of the Enlightenment an e r r o r which 
he regarded as fundamental, t h a t of man's b e l i e v i n g t h a t he could ' e x e r c i s e 
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c o n t r o l 1 over God by means of determining the form i n which God may 
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make h i m s e l f known. Barth ' s consciousness of t h i s , to him c r u c i a l , 
f a i l i n g i n man's t h e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g i s the l i n c h p i n of h i s debate 
with Brunner,^ a t the root of h i s h o s t i l i t y to a ' n a t u r a l theology' 
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which he i d e n t i f i e s as the c a r d i n a l e r r o r of Roman C a t h o l i c i s m , and 
a l l o w s him t o defend finselm's o p o l o g e t i c i n the Proslogion i n terms 
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of the d i v i n e l y - g i v e n r a t i o n a l i t y of f a i t h . The space he g i v e s to 
the e i g h t e e n t h century i n the work on Protestant Thought in the 
Nineteenth Century, i l l u s t r a t e s the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the e r r o r s of the 
n i n e t e e n t h and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s d e r i v e from those of the Enlightenment. 
The F i r s t World War might have been the immediate occasion of Barth's 
break w i t h ' l i b e r a l theology', but h i s l a t e r r e f l e c t i o n showed t h a t 
what he wished to oppose had r o o t s , i n h i s view, which l a y f u r t h e r back 
than the l i b e r a l t h e o l o g i a n s of the nineteenth century. 
I t i s beyond the scope of t h i s study to consider how f a r Barth's 
a n a l y s i s of the 'Weltanschauung' of the Enlightenment accords with the 
view of other w r i t e r s of the p e r i o d . However, i n one important r e s p e c t 
we may comment upon Bart h ' s work i n the l i g h t of other h i s t o r i e s of the 
Enlightenment. One development which i s not made e n t i r e l y c l e a r i n 
B a r t h ' s book, i s t h a t the very methodology of i n v e s t i g a t i n g d i f f e r e n t 
a r eas of knowledge, i n each of which Barth b e l i e v e s t h a t a c e r t a i n 
o v e r reaching s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e of man may be d i s c e r n e d , i s i t s e l f a 
product of Enlightenment t h i n k i n g . I n other words, the c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
which B a r t h g i v e s to a r t , n a t u r a l s c i e n c e , p o l i t i c s and so f o r t h , as 
f i e l d s of knowledge separate from theology, i s a c o n s i d e r a t i o n which 
could only be made i n the l i g h t of the Enlightenment, when these other 
d i s c i p l i n e s began to withdraw from the domination and t u t e l a g e of 
t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysics and theology. 
T h i s c r u c i a l development a s s o c i a t e d with the eighteenth century 
i s d e s c r i b e d by E r n s t C a s s i r e r as f o l l o w s : 
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That which formerly had e s t a b l i s h e d other concepts (the 
concept of God) now moves i n t o the p o s i t i o n of t h a t which 
i s t o be e s t a b l i s h e d , and t h a t which h i t h e r t o had j u s t i f i e d 
o t h e r concepts, now f i n d s i t s e l f i n the p o s i t i o n of a 
concept which r e q u i r e s j u s t i f i c a t i o n . (10) 
Bart h c o n s i d e r s an 'absolutism' of confidence i n the power of 
human achievement i n d i f f e r e n t areas of knowledge, i n the e x e r c i s e of 
c o n t r o l over the means of e x p r e s s i o n i n a r t , over n a t u r a l f o r c e s i n 
s c i e n c e , over s o c i a l f o r c e s i n p o l i t i c s , and a determination to f i n d the 
support f o r such c a p a c i t i e s i n r e l i g i o n . He f i n d s t h a t the u t i l i t a r i a n i s m 
of r a t i o n a l i s m does not do r e a l j u s t i c e to human nature, which contains 
elements of sheer r e s i s t a n c e to designs f o r i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l 
improvement; and t h a t the mystery of the transcendent i s l o s t i n an 
a r t determined only t o d i s p l a y i t s a b i l i t y , or a r e l i g i o n determined 
only to make i t s b e l i e f i n God an instrument of progr e s s , and to 
d i s p l a y i n i t s own h e a r t and head the f r u i t s of r e v e l a t i o n . But when 
he examines the 'absolutism' of the Enlightenment i n these terms he 
does not make e x p l i c i t t h a t the very s e p a r a t i o n of d i s c i p l i n e s which 
he assumes "was only achieved by i t . 
B a r t h c i t e s a number of examples, from works of eighteenth century 
theology, which demonstrate the d e s i r e to measure t h e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s 
according to e x t r a - t h e o l o g i c a l principles.'''''" Johannes Franz Buddeus 
(1660-1727) t h i n k s t h a t human reason i s capable of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between 
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true and f a l s e r e v e l a t i o n . C h r i s t o p h Matthias P f a f f (1686-1720) i s 
quoted as say i n g t h a t 'No r e v e l a t i o n i s tr u e u n l e s s i t accords w i t h the 
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l i g h t of nature and extends i t ' . Johann Salomon Semler (1725-1791) i s 
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' r e s o l v e d to u n i t e C h r i s t i a n i t y w i t h h i s own conception of m o r a l i t y ' , 
and i n terms of the ' c r i t e r i o n of moral u s e f u l n e s s ' s e t s out to question 
the a u t h o r i t y of the b i b l i c a l canon. I n these and the other examples 
which B a r t h g i v e s , we see what i n the l i g h t of C a s s i r e r ' s remarks may 
be understood as the n a t u r a l tendency of an age, newly conscious of the 
independence other d i s c i p l i n e s have of theology, to judge t h e o l o g i c a l 
i d e a s according to the p r i n c i p l e s of these other f i e l d s of knowledge. 
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A philosophy whose a c t i o n s do not d e r i v e from theology w i l l n a t u r a l l y 
attempt to judge the C h r i s t i a n r e v e l a t i o n according to the p r i n c i p l e s 
of reason; a system of e t h i c s which does not see i t s e l f as founded 
upon the commandments of God w i l l judge the a u t h o r i t y of the b i b l i c a l 
r e c o r d , which has t r a n s m i t t e d those commandments, according to moral 
p r i n c i p l e s . I n t h i s sense, the theologians of the eighteenth century 
are doing no more than attempt to come to terms w i t h the independence 
of other d i c i p l i n e s from theology: they are not n e c e s s a r i l y t r y i n g to 
'reduce' or 'convert' theology to these other d i s c i p l i n e s . 
When Barth asks the r h e t o r i c a l q u estion: 'what s o r t of a C h r i s t -
i a n i t y was i t t h a t people needed and sought and th e r e f o r e a l s o found 
to f u l f i l t h i s purpose? 1 His answer was t h a t the r e l i g i o u s w r i t e r s 
of the Enlightenment had to p r e s e n t 'a C h r i s t i a n i t y that i s understood 
and a f f i r m e d by man i n accordance w i t h h i s capacity'."*"^ The ' n a t u r a l ' 
or 'reasonable' C h r i s t i a n i t y , which these t h i n k e r s d e s c r i b e d , was a 
C h r i s t i a n i t y t h a t encouraged and supported man's'will f o r Form' i n 
nature and s o c i e t y , h i s new found confidence i n h i s own powers. The 
C h r i s t i a n i t y 'of the bourgeois man" i s one th a t u n d e r l i e s h i s s e l f -
confidence and s e l f - i m p o r t a n c e : the d o c t r i n e s which i t s e t s aside are 
those which cannot p l a y t h i s r o l e . Thus ' i t i s d i f f i c u l t and even 
im p o s s i b l e to r e l a t e the p a t r i s t i c d o c t r i n e of the T r i n i t y to the 
improvement of l i f e t h a t i s to be brought about by man h i m s e l f ... 
That d o c t r i n e c l e a r l y draws a t t e n t i o n , r a t h e r , to a being and a c t i o n 
of God i n h i m s e l f . F or t h a t reason i t i s c o n t e s t a b l e ' . S i m i l a r l y , 
'the d o c t r i n e of the two natures i n C h r i s t .... does not t a l k of C h r i s t 
as one who can be a teacher and .a model and t h e r e f o r e an instrument of 
the improvement of l i f e t h a t we are to br i n g out by ou r s e l v e s .... I t 
i s t h e r e f o r e s u s p e c t ' . The d o c t r i n e of C h r i s t ' s v i c a r i o u s s a t i s f a c t i o n , 
and i n connection with t h i s t h a t of j u s t i f i c a t i o n through f a i t h i n the 
rig h t e o u s n e s s of C h r i s t 'which i s a l i e n to us and merely reckoned to our 
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account', i s seen as a d o c t r i n e which 'makes men r o t t e n and wanton', 
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and i s t h e r e f o r e 'not only suspect but r e p r e h e n s i b l e ' . The doubts and 
opp o s i t i o n of r e l i g i o u s t h i n k e r s i n the eighteenth century, concerning 
d o c t r i n e s such as the T r i n i t y , the Person of C h r i s t , J u s t i f i c a t i o n and 
the Atonement, are i n t e r p r e t e d by Barth i n accordance with h i s c o n v i c t i o n 
t h a t the 'Age of Reason', as an age of human 'power, c a p a c i t y and s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n c y ' , sought t o accept only those t h e o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s capable 
of being harnessed to a r a t i o n a l u t i l i t a r i a n i s m based on b e l i e f i n man's 
power and duty to order h i s r a t i o n a l and s o c i a l environment. There i s 
nothing i n the passage c i t e d from Barth on p o s s i b l e c r i t i c i s m of the 
d o c t r i n e s of the T r i n i t y or the Person of C h r i s t , when viewed from the 
p e r s p e c t i v e of p r i n c i p l e s of reason no longer r e q u i r e d to base t h e i r 
understanding upon given t h e o l o g i c a l t r u t h s . The t h r e a t to c e r t a i n 
orthodox C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f s d e r i v e s , i n Barth's p r e s e n t a t i o n , not from 
t h e i r being open to c r i t i c i s m from d i s c i p l i n e s which have won t h e i r 
autonomy from theology, but from the grandiose assurance of eighteenth 
century man t h a t r e l i g i o n must be the d i v i n e s a n c t i o n i n g of h i s n a t u r a l 
powers. 
There i s undoubtedly t r u t h i n Barth's remarks. The view t h a t the 
h o s t i l i t y of the Enlightenment to orthodox C h r i s t i a n i t y was 'moral' 
r a t h e r than ' i n t e l l e c t u a l ' , f o r i n s t a n c e , and t h a t i t was more concerned 
w i t h purging r e l i g i o n of b e l i e f s t h a t had made i t a s o c i a l l y d i v i s i v e 
f o r c e i n the ' r e l i g i o u s wars' of the p a s t , than with the question of 
i t s i n h e r e n t i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , i s one t h a t i s f r e q u e n t l y made i n works 
on the p e r i o d . But the p o i n t made by C a s s i r e r i s important too. One 
of the reasons why the Enlightenment thought i n terms of making r e l i g i o n 
an instrument of s o c i a l improvement was t h a t i t had experienced the 
f i r s t s t e p s of ' s e c u l a r i s a t i o n ' , through which i t had l e a r n t to a s s e s s 
t h e o l o g i c a l ideas as p a r t of a d i s c i p l i n e which must not consider i t s e l f 
the foundation of a l l o t h e r s . 
Furthermore, i f Barth h i m s e l f had been concerned only with the 
profound complacency and bourgeois s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e of the Enlightenment 
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p e r i o d , he would simply have confirmed the opinions of those t h i n k e r s 
who exposed such complacency and undermine such confidence. This 
p r o c e s s i s w e l l noted i n the case of E n g l i s h Deism, whose arguments 
were e f f e c t i v e l y turned a g a i n s t themselves by David Hume, and a b e l i e f 
i n the reasonableness of man shown to be profoundly unreasonable: 
The more p e n e t r a t i n g our knowledge of the nature of man 
and the more acc u r a t e our d e s c r i p t i o n of t h i s nature, 
the more i t l o s e s the appearance of r a t i o n a l i t y and order. (17) 
Above a l l , d e s p i t e h i s s h a r i n g i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s the outlook of the 
Enlightenment, the b e l i e f t h a t man had d i s c o v e r e d an u n l i m i t e d c a p a c i t y 
to know and to order h i s n a t u r a l and s o c i a l environment was challenged 
by Immanuel Kant. I t was Kant who pointed out t h a t even as 'the measure 
of a l l t h i n g s ' there were s t r i c t self-imposed l i m i t s to man's knowledge 
of r e a l i t y , and who evinced i n many r e s p e c t s a profound s c e p t i c i s m 
concerning man's c a p a c i t y f o r moral and s o c i a l improvement. 
Fo r B a r t h , however, Kant's c r i t i c i s m s of the Enlightenment were 
not r a d i c a l enough. Indeed i n an essay of 1784, 'Was i s t Aifklarung?' 
(What i s Enlightenment?) Kant had d e c l a r e d w i t h approval that the 
Enlightenment represented man's emergence from 'a s e l f - i n f l i c t e d s t a t e 
of m i n o r i t y ' i n which he had been unprepared to use h i s understanding 
without the guidance of other a u t h o r i t i e s . Kant remarked approvingly: 
'Habe Mut, d i c h deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen, i s t a l s o der 
Wahlspruch der Aufklarung. (Have the courage to make use of your own 
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understanding, i s t h e r e f o r e the watchword of the Enlightenment.) 
Kant's c h a l l e n g e to the Enlightenment was not i n any sense a challenge 
to the use of reason, which he e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y supports i n t h i s essay, 
but l a y i n h i s exposure of the l i m i t a t i o n s i n h e r e n t i n t h a t use. Barth 
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n e a t l y c h a r a c t e r i s e s Kant as a f i g u r e i n whom the eighteenth century 
'affirmed i t s e l f i n i t s l i m i t a t i o n s ' : 'affirmed i t s e l f , because he 
j o i n e d w i t h i t i n i t s enthusiasm f o r reason, but ' i n i t s l i m i t a t i o n s ' , 
because Kant drew out the l i m i t e d c a p a c i t y even of an u n f e t t e r e d reason. 
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I n h i s monumental Critique of Pure Reason, Kant demanded t h a t the 
understanding a c t as a judge i n t e r r o g a t i n g nature, r a t h e r than as a 
s p e c t a t o r p a s s i v e l y observing i t . Yet at the same time he demonstrated 
t h a t the v e r y confidence of human understanding was based upon the 
i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y to i t of thi n g s as they e x i s t 'an s i c h ' - i n themselves, 
a p a r t from t h e i r being observed and understood. The understanding a c t e d 
as the determinant of the form i n which r e a l i t y appeared to man, but at 
the same time i t could f o r t h a t reason c l a i m no acc e s s to r e a l i t y as i t 
e x i s t s ' i n i t s e l f . I t was as i f the demand th a t things p r e s e n t them-
s e l v e s to man's understanding had to be accompanied by the concession 
t h a t they could never p r e s e n t themselves i n t h e i r true l i g h t . The 
r e s u l t was a confidence i n the use of the understanding combined with 
a narrowing of i t s range, and an admission of what i t could not, i n 
p r i n c i p l e , know. 
Kant's own philosophy of r e l i g i o n , Barth argues, d e s c r i b e d i n 
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (Religion within .the 
Limits of Reason Alone,) seeks to 'assess r e l i g i o n as a phenomenon of 
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reason, as a c u l t u r a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n ' ; t h i s i s not to imply t h a t 
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' r e l i g i o n e x i s t s s o l e l y w i t h i n the l i m i t s of reason' but i t does imply 
t h a t i t i s s o l e l y w i t h i n ' t h e l i m i t s of reason t h a t r e l i g i o n may be 
understood. The s e l f - e x a m i n a t i o n of reason i n Kant's f i r s t c r i t i q u e 
p rovides the c r i t e r i a by means of which the philosophy of r e l i g i o n 
examines i t s s u b j e c t - m a t t e r . Thus man 'the measure of a l l t h i n g s ' 
becomes 'the measure of r e l i g i o n too: of i t s p r a c t i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l 
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p o s s i b i l i t i e s , and a l s o , i n p a r t i c u l a r , as God's measure'. 
For Barth reason became the measure of a l l things i n Kant, even i f 
he showed a t the same time t h a t not a l l things could be known by i t . 
I t became the measure of a l l things which man could know. The confidence 
of the Enlightenment was undermined by Kant only i n the f u l f i l m e n t of 
the ' s e c u l a r i s a t i o n ' which i t had brought about: uncrowning the 
confidence of the eig h t e e n t h century, Kant had crowned i t s p r i n c i p l e s . 
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Theology no longer s u p p l i e d the p r i n c i p l e s according to which r e a l i t y 
was to be understood, but was i t s e l f s u b j e c t to assessment by c r i t e r i a 
which considered themselves, whether or not they ever could be i n 
r e a l i t y , to be independent of t h e o l o g i c a l reasoning. The r e a l nature 
of 'e'in G e l o s t e s ' , a 'detached 1 man of the Enlightenment with a b e l i e f 
i n the 'absolutism* of human c a p a c i t y , i s now c l e a r . He does not 
n e c e s s a r i l y have f a i t h i n the a b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s or s o c i e t i e s to 
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p e r f e c t themselves, or of reason to know r e a l i t y . What he does, however, 
b e l i e v e , i s t h a t he may know h i m s e l f and h i s world apart from h i s 
knowledge of God. I n h i s knowledge of h i m s e l f as a r t i s t , lawyer, 
s c i e n t i s t , moral being or s o c i a l animal, he i s separated from h i s 
knowledge of h i m s e l f i n r e l a t i o n to-God. He enquires about h i s 
t h e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s from a new-found ' s e c u l a r ' p e r s p e c t i v e , from which 
theology appears to be something which he may d e s c r i b e and c r i t i c i s e 
from p r i n c i p l e s which he d e r i v e s from outside theology i t s e l f . 
As soon as he begins to understand h i m s e l f and h i s environment 
a p a r t from h i s understanding of God, however, man f i n d s h i m s e l f and h i s 
world on the one hand, and God on the other, to be two separate r e a l i t i e s 
c o n f r o n t i n g one another. Here l i e s the r e a l ground of Barth's concern: 
he does not dwell a t length upon the r e l i g i o u s thought of the eighteenth 
century i n order to quest i o n i t s optimism and s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e , but i n 
order to d i s c o v e r t h e r e the beginnings of a process of ' s e c u l a r i s a t i p n ' 
upon which the nineteenth and twentieth c e n t u r i e s were to b u i l d . Indeed 
we f i n d i n Barth's own works a c e r t a i n tone of optimism and s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e 
but i n e r a d i c a b l y b u i l t upon the p r i n c i p l e that a p a r t from h i s knowledge 
of God, a knowledge given by God h i m s e l f , man could have no true under-
standing of h i m s e l f or h i s world. An i n t e l l e c t u a l s c e p t i c i s m , and a 
pessimism about man's moral and s o c i a l p o t e n t i a l , were not enough f o r 
Ba r t h : h i s concern was to r e v e r s e a process of ' s e c u l a r i s a t i o n ' i n 
which s c e p t i c s and p e s s i m i s t s , as w e l l as those confident i n the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral powers of man, a l l a l i k e concurred. 
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The l e c t u r e s on the Enlightenment were d e l i v e r e d by Barth i n 
the l i g h t of the t h e o l o g i c a l methodology o u t l i n e d i n Fides Quaerens 
Intellectum, which we have examined i n chapter four. That work, 
c e r t a i n l y , sought to separate the source of t h e o l o g i c a l understanding 
from t h a t of other forms of human knowledge. Yet Barth sought a t the 
same time to 'include'man's ' s e c u l a r ' knowledge w i t h i n the ambit of 
an a l l - e m b r a c i n g t h e o l o g i c a l given, i n which t h e r e was no understanding 
of man or of the world around him without a p r i o r knowledge of God. 
That the Enlightenment was too ' o p t i m i s t i c ' about man was har d l y K a r l 
B a r t h ' s main complaint a g a i n s t i t , and, as we have seen, he cannot be 
c l a s s e d w i t h those, l i k e Kant and Hume, whose s c e p t i c i s m and l a c k of 
confidence i n human c a p a c i t y was an i n s t r u m e n t a l f o r c e i n c h a l l e n g i n g 
some of the most important assumptions of the p e r i o d . For Barth, the 
r e a l c h a l l e n g e of the Enlightenment was t h a t of a 'world coming of 
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age', l e a r n i n g to understand i t s e l f i n moral, p o l i t i c a l , l e g a l and 
s c i e n t i f i c terms a p a r t from any t h e o l o g i c a l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and 
thereby l e a r n i n g i n t u r n t h a t these 'autonomous' d i s c i p l i n e s s u p p l i e d 
p r i n c i p l e s of t h e i r own from the p e r s p e c t i v e of which t h e o l o g i c a l 
d o c t r i n e s might be c r i t i c i s e d . T h i s 'maturity' the Enlightenment and' 
i t s c r i t i c s both p o s s e s s e d : and a g a i n s t both Barth had to make h i s 
stand, r e s o l v i n g to i n t e g r a t e man and h i s knowledge of h i m s e l f i n t o God 
and the knowledge of Him i n r e v e l a t i o n . To t h i s process of ' i n t e g r a t i o n ' 
we tur n i n the next two ch a p t e r s . 
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The Problem of ' I n t e g r a t i n g Man i n t o God' 
1. The Methodology of Grace 
I t was h i s 'methodology of grace' which enabled Barth t o outflank 
Brunner i n t h e i r debate over ' n a t u r a l theology'."'" T h i s work i s to be 
seen as something of a 'methodological manifesto' f o r the Church 
Dogmatics, although,as we have noted, Barth h i m s e l f i n s i s t e d t h a t i t was 
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h i s book on Anselm which was of primary importance i n t h i s r e s p e c t . 
The arguments between Barth and E m i l Brunner over the nature and 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a ' n a t u r a l theology' determined t h a t t h e i r common commit-
ment t o the 'primacy of r e v e l a t i o n 1 d i d not overcome important d i f f e r e n c e s 
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between them. I t was Brunner's c o n v i c t i o n , t h a t w h i l s t man may not 
' e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l ' over God's s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n , there must n e v e r t h e l e s s 
be w i t h i n him a 'passive c a p a c i t y ' to r e c e i v e i t , an 1 Offenbarungs-
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m a c h t i g k e i t 1 or c a p a c i t y f o r r e v e l a t i o n . Brunner i n s i s t e d upon a p o i n t 
of c o n t a c t i n man w i t h the d i v i n e grace of r e v e l a t i o n i n C h r i s t , a 'purely 
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formal c a p a c i t y of being addressed' (Wortmachtigkeit) by God, which 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d man as the o b j e c t of r e v e l a t i o n from l e s s e r forms of l i f e 
t h a t were incapable of r e c e i v i n g i t . 
B a r t h , however, f i r m l y r e j e c t e d the i d e a of a 'point of contact' 
(Anknupfungspunkt) between man and God. I n h i s view there was i n man no 
'aptitude f o r the r e v e l a t i o n of God'.^ He even denied t h a t man had the 
'negative a p t i t u d e ' of a c a p a c i t y to d e s p a i r of the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
r e v e l a t i o n , which might i n a negative way prepare him to r e c e i v e i t , a 
view i d e n t i f i e d by Barth w i t h h i s own outlook i n the e a r l y commentary on 
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Romans. The r e v e l a t i o n of God i s f o r Barth a 'miracle of grace', 
c r e a t e d i n man i r r e s p e c t i v e of h i s n a t u r a l human c a p a c i t y to r e c e i v e i t . 
B a r t h e x t r a c t s two b i b l i c a l quotations from t h e i r contexts - Mary's 
remark t o the angel G a b r i e l : 'How s h a l l t h i s be, seeing I know not a 
man?', and the d i s c i p l e s ' remark i n the storm on the lake to J e s u s : 
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'Master, knowest thou not t h a t we p e r i s h ? ' - i n order to ' i l l u s t r a t e ' 
j t h a t God's r e v e l a t i o n i s completely unattuned to (Barth would say 
g 
'unconstrained by') any c a p a c i t y of man to r e c e i v e i t . Hence i t s • 
appearance as s h e e r l y 'miraculous' to human beings who can make no sense 
of t h e i r being able to r e c e i v e i t . 
Man's nature, corrupted by s i n , has no 'capacity f o r r e p a i r ' by 
which to be able to r e c e i v e the h e a l i n g work of C h r i s t . There i s , f o r 
Barth, no qu e s t i o n of a 'c a p a c i t y f o r r e p a i r ' on man's p a r t , because 
the ' r e p a i r ' i s a m i r a c l e performed on man by which he becomes - l i t e r a l l y ! 
- a new man. Thus Bart h ' s taunt t h a t Brunner does not understand 2 
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C o r i n t h i a n s 5:17, ' I f any man i s i n C h r i s t , he i s a new c r e a t i o n ' . 
What must be made c l e a r , i s t h a t f o r Bar t h the saving r e v e l a t i o n of 
C h r i s t which h e a l s man's s i n f u l nature and makes him a 'new man', a 'new 
j 
c r e a t i o n ' , i s a work of renewal performed upon him to which he o f f e r s 
no c o n t r i b u t i o n , e i t h e r by a c t i v e c o l l a b o r a t i o n or p a s s i v e r e c e p t i v i t y . 
He i s not even able, by d e s p a i r i n g of h i m s e l f and h i s c a p a c i t y ever to 
r e c e i v e renewal, to prepare h i m s e l f by self-condemnation f o r God's 
h e a l i n g work of s a l v a t i o n upon him. For Barth t h e r e i s i n man, as the 
r e c e i v e r of r e v e l a t i o n , n e i t h e r a n a t u r a l c a p a c i t y to r e c e i v e the Word 
of God, nor a 'supernatural c a p a c i t y ' , as some modern Roman C a t h o l i c 
t h e o l o g i a n s have argued.''"0 God's r e v e l a t i o n i s a 'donum g r a t i a e ' or 
g i f t of grace which encounters no c a p a c i t y i n man to accept i t , but 
r a t h e r i t s e l f ' c r e a t e s ' such a c a p a c i t y . 
T h i s saving r e v e l a t i o n c r e a t e s i t s own 'capacity to be r e c e i v e d ' 
i n man, a c a p a c i t y which i s to be i d e n t i f i e d with the work of the Holy 
S p i r i t i n him: 
The Holy Ghost, who proceeds from the F a t h e r and the Son, 
and i s t h e r e f o r e r e v e a l e d to be God, does not stand i n 
need of any p o i n t of c o n t a c t but t h a t which he hims e l f 
c r e a t e s . (11) 
I t i s notable t h a t the d i s c u s s i o n of man's s i n and l a c k of 
'c a p a c i t y f o r r e p a i r ' i n the l i g h t of the F a l l , i s a s s i m i l a t e d i n Barth's 
argument to the d i s c u s s i o n of man's l a c k of aptitude f o r r e v e l a t i o n . 
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There i s a c l e a r p a r a l l e l between the two, suggesting t h a t Barth's 
theology might be seen i n terms of a reworking of Reformation i s s u e s 
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f o r the t w e n t i e t h century. The burning i s s u e has become, not so much 
whether man may be saved but whether he may know God. The arguments of 
the P r o t e s t a n t Reformers concerning a s a l v a t i o n to be achieved 'beyond' 
the moral c a p a c i t y of man, are transposed i n t o arguments concerning a 
knowledge of God to be achieved beyond the ' i n t e l l e c t u a l ' c a p a c i t y of 
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man. B a r t h transforms the 1 imputed, j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' of c e r t a i n Reformers 
i n t o an 'imputed knowledge of God'. Indeed, the whole of the nineteenth 
century f o r B a r t h p a r t a k e s of an i n t e l l e c t u a l e q u i v a l e n t of the process 
of attempted moral s e l f - j u s t i f i c a t i o n from which Luther e v e n t u a l l y broke 
f r e e . The 'work of C h r i s t ' i n g i v i n g man s a l v a t i o n 'beyond h i m s e l f 
becomes an a l l - e m b r a c i n g i d e a which i n c l u d e s the achievement of a 
knowledge of God beyond the l i m i t s of the human understanding, and the 
s t i c k which Luther used i n order to.beat a mediaeval 'theology of works' 
becomes, i n the hands of Ba r t h , a s t i c k w i t h which to beat Kant and 
Schleiermacher. Barth provides a s o l u t i o n f o r the Nietzschean 'Angst' 
of the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y man d e s p a i r i n g of God's e x i s t e n c e , i n the 
way t h a t the Reformers provided a s o l u t i o n f o r the 'Angst' of the e a r l y 
s i x t e e n t h century before a j u s t God who would condemn man f o r f a i l i n g to 
obey h i s w i l l . ^ 
The argument of B a r t h concerning man's s i n and i t s l i n k to a 
c o r r u p t i o n of h i s nature and of i t s 'capacity f o r r e p a i r ' , then, i s 
connected w i t h h i s p e r c e p t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of knowledge of God. 
I t i s a s s o c i a t e d with h i s o p p o s i t i o n to a ' C a t h o l i c ' d o c t r i n e of the 
'analogia e n t i s ' , and w i t h h i s r e j e c t i o n of a ' n a t u r a l theology'. I n 
-t 
h i s argument he ' o u t f l a n k s ' Brunner, i n the sense t h a t w h i l s t both 
agreed t h a t there could be no knowledge of God save through J e s u s C h r i s t , 
B a r t h i n s i s t e d t h a t t h i s knowledge presumed no p r i o r c a p a c i t y to r e c e i v e 
i t i n man, and t h a t man had no i n n a t e p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r accepting 
r e v e l a t i o n which could 'tune i n ' to the Word of God l i k e a w i r e l e s s 
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r e c e i v i n g airwaves (a metaphor used by Brunner). Rather, f o r Barth 
even the c a p a c i t y to r e c e i v e and understand t h a t Word was cr e a t e d ' i n ' 
man by God. 
I t was on t h i s q u e s t i o n of the c a p a c i t y to r e c e i v e r e v e l a t i o n t h a t 
B a r t h and Brunner c l a s h e d i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Reformers. 
Brunner i n s i s t e d t h a t the Reformers nowhere denied a 'theologia n a t u r a l i s ' . 
They gave i t a l i m i t e d but s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e , i n h i s opinion. Brunner 
quoted C a l v i n to the e f f e c t t h a t from nature we know the 'hands and f e e t 1 
but not the 'heart', of God, t h a t r e v e l a t i o n i n S c r i p t u r e complements 
and c l a r i f i e s God's r e v e l a t i o n i n nature, a c t i n g l i k e an alarm c a l l t o 
waken a s l e e p i n g man who remains undisturbed by the 'n a t u r a l ' n o i s e s 
around him, and t h a t man p o s s e s s e s , even a f t e r the F a l l , a 'remnant' of 
the 'imago Dei' i n which he was c r e a t e d . Man's conscience and i n c l i n a t i o n 
towards t r u t h , Brunner c i t e s C a l v i n as say i n g , i s a 'natural l i g h t ' 
(Lumen N a t u r a l e ) , a n a t u r a l m o r a l i t y , which, l i k e a n a t u r a l theology, 
can be p e r f e c t e d i n C h r i s t a l o n e . ^ For Brunner, C a l v i n i n f a c t 
r e s t o r e d a balance which Luther, l i k e Barth, had threatened, namely the 
r o l e of a n a t u r a l theology i n r e f l e c t i n g a n a t u r a l c a p a c i t y i n man for 
goodness and f o r understanding God, although such a c a p a c i t y was 
i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r s a l v a t i o n , a p o i n t upon which a l l the Reformers were 
i n f u l l agreement. 
For B a r t h , however, Brunner's emphasis upon what Reformation 
h i s t o r i a n s might see as the humanist i n f l u e n c e upon C a l v i n ' s theology, 
was an unacceptable compromising of the tr u e h e r i t a g e of the Reformation. 
Brunner had i n t e r p r e t e d the Reformers i n such a way as to open them up 
to p r e c i s e l y the s o r t of c r i t i c i s m which Barth was l e v e l l i n g a t Roman 
C a t h o l i c t h e o l o g y . ^ Barth's view of the Reformers was th a t they spoke 
of a ' n a t u r a l theology' only i n the l i g h t of the r e v e l a t i o n of God i n 
C h r i s t , and not i n any sense as a 'preparation' or 'capacity' f o r 
r e c e i v i n g t h a t r e v e l a t i o n . That g i v i n g of r e v e l a t i o n was, as we have 
seen, to be 1 understood as a 'miracle' i n which man's n a t u r a l power of 
141. 
r e c e i v i n g was transcended, but t h i s does not, Barth avers, exclude the 
s o r t of d e s c r i p t i o n s o f f e r e d by Calvin of man's n a t u r a l capacity f o r 
goodness and t r u t h , so long as t h i s capacity i s seen t o ar i s e out of 
God's r e v e l a t i o n i n C h r i s t , r a t h e r than e x i s t independently of t h a t 
r e v e l a t i o n as a c r i t e r i o n by which t o judge or accept i t . Brunner found 
i n the Pr o t e s t a n t Reformers evidence t h a t a 'natural theology', w h i l s t 
i t could not give man the means of s a l v a t i o n , d i d give the means of 
a p p r o p r i a t i n g and r e c e i v i n g r e v e l a t i o n . Barth found i n the Protestant 
Reformers evidence t h a t what Brunner read as i n d i c a t i v e of a 'natural 
theology' arose i n the l i g h t o f , and not as preparation f o r , a 'revealed 
theology'. I n t h i s sense the Reformers could be j u s t i f i e d i n t a l k i n g of 
a ' n a t u r a l theology', i n the way t h a t t a l k of analogy was j u s t i f i e d , 
once i t was est a b l i s h e d t h a t t h i s ' natural theology' arose out of and 
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w i t h i n the ambit of God's r e v e l a t i o n . I t could never e x i s t independ-
e n t l y of the l a t t e r as a human standard by which t o measure i t . P r i o r 
t o the acceptance of f a i t h by the C h r i s t i a n , Barth i n s i s t e d , he has no 
capacity f o r the recep t i o n of r e v e l a t i o n , and the d e s c r i p t i o n of t h a t 
capacity i n the Protestant Reformers must be understood as a capacity 
a r i s i n g out o f the acceptance of f a i t h . 
2. The Problem of Analogy i n K a r l Barth's Thought 
I n Natural Theology K a r l Barth, having remarked t h a t the Holy 
Ghost 
does not stand i n need of any p o i n t of contact but t h a t which 
he himself creates (bedarf keines Ankniipf/ngspunktes als 
dessen, den er selber s e t z t ) 
continues: 
Only r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y (nur ruckwartsblickend) i s i t possible 
t o r e f l e c t on the way i n which he "makes contact" (Anknupfen) 
w i t h man, and t h i s r e t r o s p e c t (Rtlckblick) w i l l ever be a 
r e t r o s p e c t upon a miracle (Wunder). (18) 
This comment of Barth p r e c i s e l y i n d i c a t e s the nature of analogy 
w i t h i n h i s 'system', namely as ' r e t r o s p e c t i v e ' , i n other words as 
142. 
d e r i v a t i v e from r e v e l a t i o n r a t h e r than as c o n d i t i o n i n g i t . Once t h i s 
i s accepted, the use of analogy i s j u s t i f i e d . I t i s an 'analogy of 
f a i t h 1 which grows out of r e v e l a t i o n , r a t h e r than an "analogy of being' 
which seeks t o determine i t . 
A discussion of God which bears out t h i s approach t o analogy may 
be found i n the Church Dogmatics, Volume 2, Part 1. Barth i n s i s t s t h a t 
i n speaking of God the use o f analogy i s unavoidable: 
But the o b j e c t i t s e l f - God's t r u t h i n h i s r e v e l a t i o n as the 
basis o f the v e r a c i t y of our knowledge of God - does not leave 
us any opt i o n but t o r e s o r t t o t h i s concept. (My emphasis). (19) 
How, then, may we use concepts of the human understanding w i t h 
respect t o the transcendent God? We must understand, f i r s t o f a l l , 
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t h a t our concepts are r e a l l y His. He p o s i t s Himself as a comprehen-
21 
s i b l e o b j e c t , and i n so doing releases us t o use concepts which we 
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must understand f i r s t l y and p r o p e r l y t o r e f e r t o Him. Hence when we 
use the terms 'Father', 'Son', 'Patience' or 'Love' of God, we use terms 
t h a t God 'places a t our disposal' i n His r e v e l a t i o n , whose o r i g i n a l 
t r u t h l i e s i n t h e i r reference t o Him. We are not attempting t o 'extend' 
the meaning of terms whose primary reference i s t o our experience, but 
r a t h e r , Barth claims, we are being given by God the capacity to use 
those terms i n t h e i r proper and o r i g i n a l sense. 
Barth's f o r m u l a t i o n bears comparison w i t h the concept of an 'analogy 
of a t t r i b u t i o n ' , whereby two objects have a q u a l i t y i n common which makes 
them analogous, but one o b j e c t possesses the q u a l i t y i n dependence upon 
the o t h e r . One o b j e c t i s the cause of the q u a l i t y i n the other. I f God 
and man are both described as 'good', t h a t i s 1 t o say t h a t the goodness 
of man i s caused i n him by God. I n other words, 'goodness' does not 
belong t o the i n t r i n s i c nature of the creature, but t o the creature i n 
i t s r e l a t i o n t o the Creator - the analogy does not belong t o the analogate 
23 
'inwardly', but only i n i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the analogans . To t h i s 
e xtent Barth bears out Quenstedt's fo r m u l a t i o n of the analogia a t t r i b -
• • 24 | u t i o n i s . 
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The obvious d i f f i c u l t y w i t h the 'analogy of a t t r i b u t i o n ' i s t h a t 
apparently i t : 
.... t e l l s us nothing we d i d not know before: i t merely t e l l s 
us t h a t whatever i s capable o f producing an e f f e c t may have 
a p p l i e d t o i t ( " v i r t u a l l y " ) the term p r o p e r l y s i g n i f y i n g t h a t 
e f f e c t thanks s o l e l y t o the f a c t t h a t i t i s able t o produce 
t h a t e f f e c t . I n other words, whatever can produce an e f f e c t 
can produce an e f f e c t ! Such an analogy can t e l l us nothing 
concerning God which t h e i s t s had not accepted beforehand - t h a t 
he i s the cause of f i n i t e phenomena. (25) 
However, Barth 'transcends' t h i s problem of the analogy t e l l i n g us 
'nothing t h a t we d i d not know before' by i n s i s t i n g t h a t our use of 
a n a l o g i c a l language i s the r e s u l t of God's a c t i v e s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e , so 
t h a t on the basis of r e v e l a t i o n we may know t h a t i n using concepts t o 
r e f e r t o Him we are i n f a c t using them i n t h e i r proper sense, r a t h e r 
than ' t a k i n g them where they may not go'. Since, on the basis of His 
r e v e l a t i o n , our surest use of language must be i n reference t o Himself, 
i t i s i n f a c t when we use such words as 'father' and 'son' i n a 
d e r i v a t i v e sense t o r e f e r t o our own experience, t h a t we may have doubts 
concerning the appropriateness of our language! Such an argument r e c a l l s 
t h a t o f Barth against Descartes i n Volume 3, Part 1 of the Church 
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Dogmatics , where Barth argues t h a t Descartes' 'proofs' of the 
existence o f God i n the t h i r d and f i f t h o f h i s Meditations proceed i n 
the wrong d i r e c t i o n by grounding h i s assurance of God"'s existence i n 
j 
h i s assurance of h i s own existence as a t h i n k i n g being - c o g i t o , ergo 
sum - r a t h e r than grounding h i s assurance of h i s own existence i n h i s 
assurance o f the existence of God. The view of analogy i n I I 1, 
clai m i n g t h a t our language about our everyday experience i s e f f e c t i v e l y 
grounded i n the assurance o f the appropriateness of our concepts i n 
r e f e r r i n g i n t h e i r 'proper' sense t o God, o f f e r s a p a r a l l e l argument. 
The view i n I I 1 and I I I 1 of human self-understanding and s e l f -
expression grounded i n the understanding of God, and of 'human' concepts 
as ' d i v i n e ' ideas which p r o p e r l y r e f e r t o d i v i n e , r a t h e r than human, 
being, r e f l e c t s the 'absorption' of man i n t o God which t h i s chapter 
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discusses and c r i t i c i s e s . One obvious d i f f i c u l t y i s t h a t i t might 
appear t o compromise the 'mystery' and 'transcendence' o f God t o claim 
t h a t 'human' language i s perceived by God's grace t o be 'divine' 
language r e f e r r i n g p r o p e r l y t o Himself. I t i s as i f man through God's 
s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e may 'learn the language' by which God understands 
Himself, and thereby see God as God sees Himself! Hence Barth's 
argument i n I I 1 i s ambiguous. On the one hand, words are given what 
by t h e i r nature they cannot have -reference t o God. I n t h i s sense, 
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words are 'raised from the dead', when used t o r e f e r t o God, and no 
d i r e c t comprehension of God by man can be claimed from the use o f such 
concepts, even i n what i s s a i d t o be t h e i r ' o r i g i n a l and proper' sense. 
On the other hand, the claim t h a t we use words improperly w i t h i n the 
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confines o f what i s appropriate t o us , and t h a t t h e i r t r u e reference 
i s t o God, only makes sense i f we understand by t h a t remark t h a t the 
meaning o f those words i s p r i m a r i l y e s t a b l i s h e d when they are used of 
God, and t h a t t h e r e f o r e we f i r s t know what we are saying i n using them 
when we use them o f God. I f we used those words 'properly' only of God, 
and y e t d i d not understand 'how' we used them 'properly 1 of Him, then 
what sense would i t make t o say t h a t we 'used' them? To use a word i n 
i t s proper sense must e n t a i l t o understand i t s meaning: therefore 
Barth cannot argue t h a t we c o r r e c t l y 'use' words t o apply t o God through 
His grace, and not admit t h a t we understand what they mean when used of 
Him. Through God, he must be saying, we understand God. 
This i s borne out i f we look a t what Barth means by the 'hiddenness 
o f God i n I I 1. He argues^ 0 t h a t the 'hiddenness' o f God defines the 
f a c t t h a t we know God not from our own capacity but from God's grace. 
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The confession of God's hiddenness i s t o be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the 
confession of God's r e v e l a t i o n as the beginning o f man's knowledge of 
God. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 'hiddenness', however, merely makes the 
p o i n t t h a t we le a r n of God from God, not t h a t there are l i m i t s t o what 
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we may l e a r n o f Him. Indeed Barth claims t h a t the meaning of the 
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l i m i t imposed upon our terms by the use of analogy i s t h a t we know God 
only through His grace, an argument which i n e f f e c t i mplies no l i m i t 
upon our knowledge o f God a r i s i n g from the concepts themselves. 
The argument, o f t h i s chapter and chapter 7, t h a t i n Barth's 
theology man i s i n t e g r a t e d so c l o s e l y i n t o the being of God t h a t there 
i s a 'reduction' of man t o God, o f anthropology t o theology i n precise 
a n t i t h e s i s t o the reductive tendencies claimed by Barth t o e x i s t i n the 
nineteenth century, i s i l l u s t r a t e d from t h i s s e c t i o n of the Church 
Dogmatics. The l o g i c o f Barth's argument i s t h a t the ' l i m i t a t i o n ' upon 
man's knowledge of God e n t a i l e d by h i s use of analogical language l i e s 
e n t i r e l y i n the f a c t t h a t he i s dependent upon God f o r such knowledge. 
I t i m p l i e s no l i m i t a t i o n upon the knowledge i t s e l f a r i s i n g from the 
l i m i t e d power o f human understanding, expressed through language, t o 
make sense o f God. The c o n s t r a i n t s of the human i n t e l l e c t are e f f e c t i v e l y 
bypassed i n the knowledge o f God t h a t i s based upon r e v e l a t i o n (see 
chapter 5 ) , a knowledge i n which man learns t o use words ' i n t h e i r 
proper sense', t o r e f e r t o t h e i r proper o b j e c t . Man i s admitted t o 
God's knowledge of God, using God's language t o r e f e r t o i t s proper 
o b j e c t , God, r a t h e r than i n an improper, s t r a i n e d manner t o r e f e r t o 
'human' r e a l i t y , which man had taken t o be the proper reference of h i s 
concepts when he had supposed them indeed t o be ' h i s * . I n f a c t , Barth's 
argument makes any need f o r ' i n d i r e c t ' language about God unnecessary; 
the i n d i r e c t n e s s of h i s language arises only when he r e f e r s t o man. 
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Understanding himself through h i s understanding o f » , he uses 
language p r o p e r l y employed i n speaking of God t o apply - i n d i r e c t l y -
t o himself and h i s n a t u r a l experience. He looks out from a d i v i n e 
r e a l i t y i n t o which he has been admitted by God's grace i n order t o make 
sense of the human. 
The form of Barth's argument i s t o appropriate human r e a l i t i e s , 
and present them as d i v i n e - i n other words, h i s i s a 'theology of 
a l i e n a t i o n ' . The concepts of ' f a t h e r ' , 'son' - and even of 'arm' and 
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'mouth' - 'declare t h e i r t r u t h only i n the place .... where the reference 
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i s t o the arm and mouth of God, His deeds and words'. I n r e a l i t y , we 
l e a r n o f arms and mouths by observing them i n fe l l o w - c r e a t u r e s , but 
Barth's P l a t o n i c argument i s t h a t we understand them through understanding 
the nature o f t h e i r d i v i n e ' o r i g i n a l ' . Analogy, r a t h e r than representing 
a s p e c u l a t i o n from human experience t o the nature of God, i s rath e r a 
sp e c u l a t i o n from a God-given 'div i n e ' experience t o the nature of man. 
What i s o r d i n a r i l y conceived of as a movement of thought and language 
from man t o God, i s presented by Barth as a movement of thought and 
language from God t o man. However, the content of t h i s knowledge of God, 
from which the knowledge of man i s derived, appears t o be t h a t of human 
r e a l i t y a l i e n a t e d from i t s proper c o n d i t i o n . An anthropomorphic d e s c r i p t i o n 
of God, b u i l t up out of arms and mouths i n the best t r a d i t i o n of i d o l a t r y , 
i s defended on the grounds t h a t 'arm' and 'mouth' pr o p e r l y belong t o God, 
j 
and only d e r i v a t i v e l y 'and improperly t o man! Barth f a i l s , i n t h i s respect, 
t o s u b s t a n t i a t e the otherness and transcendence o f God. 
A d o c t r i n e of analogy which r e s t s e n t i r e l y upon the claim t h a t God 
i s the source of man's knowledge of Him, f a i l s t o concern i t s e l f w i t h 
what would seem t o be the c e n t r a l p o i n t of the d o c t r i n e , namely the 
l i m i t a t i o n s inherent i n language i t s e l f , and i m p l i c i t l y i n the under-
standing expressed i n language, when t a l k i n g of God. I t i s not cle a r 
t o us t h a t the ' analogia g r a t i a e ' or ' analogia f i d e i ' is_ i n f a c t a 
d o c t r i n e of analogy, since i t s primary concern i s w i t h the source of man's 
understanding o f God, f a t h e r than w i t h the i n d i r e c t nature o f t h a t 
understanding. An e x p l o r a t i o n o f the problems inherent i n the i n d i r e c t 
way i n which man must t r y t o r e f e r t o the nature of a r e a l i t y other t o 
him s e l f requires a commitment t o t h a t otherness. I n Barth's theology 
human language i s 'taken i n t o ' , and re-expressed as, d i v i n e i n such a way 
t h a t the need f o r an a n a l o g i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n of t h a t which remains 
e f f e c t i v e l y opaque t o human understanding i s , we b e l i e v e , denied. Man 
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i s so drawn i n t o the being o f God by God t h a t a use of analogy i s 
redundant: t h i s i s an i m p l i c a t i o n of the ' t h e o l o g i c a l c o n s t r i c t i o n 1 
which we attempt t o o u t l i n e a t the end of t h i s chapter. 
I n the discussion between Barth and Brunner on the nature of 
r e v e l a t i o n and the place o f a 'na t u r a l theology', the f a m i l i a r theme o f 
Fides Quaerens Intellecutm re-emerges, namely the insi s t e n c e t h a t our 
knowledge o f God derives d i r e c t l y from God Himself i n a way t h a t renders 
our n a t u r a l powers of understanding i r r e l e v a n t , whether i n a passive or 
an a c t i v e capacity, t o the attainment of such knowledge. But i n the 
debate w i t h Brunner i t becomes c l e a r e r what we mean by a ' r e b a p t i s i n g 1 
of man's n a t u r a l powers w i t h i n the context of an all-embracing r e v e l a t i o n , 
t o which we a l l u d e d i n chapters three t o f i v e . I n Fides Quaerens 
Intellectum, we argued, an ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' o r i g i n a l l y 
conceived i n o n t o l o g i c a l terms between two d i v i n e and human spheres, i s 
re-expressed i n epistemological terms as a d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
reasoning o f f a i t h and the reasoning of our n a t u r a l powers of under-
standing. But we also saw t h a t Barth couldn't leave these n a t u r a l powers 
out o f account a l t o g e t h e r . He couldn't oppose the 'analogia e n t i s ' , f o r 
instance, by r e f u s i n g t o t a l k about analogy a t a l l . Rather, he sought 
to f i n d a way o f j u s t i f y i n g a n a l o g i c a l language about God with o u t i n any 
way pr e s e n t i n g i t as a means by which man's n a t u r a l powers of reason 
e i t h e r understood God or prepared themselves t o receive h i s s e l f -
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d i s c l o s u r e . The s o l u t i o n was t o t a l k i n terms of an 'analogia f i d e i ' 
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- analogy of f a i t h - r a t h e r than an analogy of being; the 'analogy of 
f a i t h ' represented a use of human ideas about God which may a r i s e only i n 
the l i g h t o f the r e a l i t y o f God's s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n . I t i s n e i t h e r a 
s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h a t r e v e l a t i o n , nor does i t play any p a r t i n i t s welcome. 
I t i s i n f a c t something which t h a t r e v e l a t i o n i t s e l f creates. By 
' r e b a p t i s i n g ' , as i t were, the language of analogy w i t h i n the context of 
the understanding of f a i t h , Barth appears t o be allowing a r o l e f o r 
148. 
n a t u r a l reason a f t e r a l l , b ut one which e x i s t s only ' i n s i d e ' , and not 
as the e x t e r n a l assessor o f , the understanding of f a i t h . 
This development i n Barth's thought i s c l e a r l y shown i n the course 
o f the debate w i t h Brunner. The aspects of a 'nat u r a l theology' which 
p o i n t t o a knowledge of God - inchoate and i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r s a l v a t i o n 
as they may be - apart from r e v e l a t i o n , according t o the view of Brunner, 
are transposed by Barth i n t o aspects which e x i s t only w i t h i n r e v e l a t i o n . 
The c l a i m i s t h a t the ' n a t u r a l knowledge' of God spoken of by the 
Reformers i t s e l f a r i s e s out of the g i f t o f r e v e l a t i o n , r a t h e r than 
p r e p a r i n g man t o receive t h a t g i f t . Indeed, Barth claims t h a t were t h i s 
not the case there would have been no fundamental disagreement between 
the P r o t e s t a n t Reformers and the Roman Catholic Church, since the l a t t e r 
was by no means as 'Pelagian', i n Barth's view, as i t was o f t e n under-
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stood t o have been, and would never have spoken t o man as capable of 
achieving s a l v a t i o n w i t h o u t the prevenient grace of God. The Protestant 
Reformers had a fundamental disagreement w i t h Catholicism, Barth 
maintained, not over whether man could achieve h i s own s a l v a t i o n , but 
over the question of whether the grace of God awoke powers of response 
innate i n man or created those powers from w i t h i n i t s e l f - i n other words, 
had the Reformers argued as Brunner believed they had done, then they 
would not have had any r e a l disagreement w i t h the Roman Catholic Church I 
I n a sense, then, Barth does not, i n h i s debate w i t h Brunner, deny 
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a ' n a t u r a l theology'. What he denies i s a 'nat u r a l theology' t h a t i s 
conceived t o e x i s t independently of God's s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n , whether as a 
s u b s t i t u t e f o r the l a t t e r or as a pr e p a r a t i o n f o r i t and standard by 
which t o adjudge i t . A ' n a t u r a l theology 1 arises out of r e v e l a t i o n 
i t s e l f , as p a r t of the t h e o l o g i c a l grammar about God which r e v e l a t i o n 
creates. I t employs the n a t u r a l powers of human reason, but only as 
ordered i n the l i g h t o f , and on the basis of the r e v e l a t i o n of God i n 
His Word. The exclusion o f n a t u r a l reason from the understanding of 
f a i t h i s i n t h i s argument 'aufgehoben' - t h a t i s t o say, using the word 
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i n i t s t e c h n i c a l Hegelian sense - the two are rec o n c i l e d w i t h the 
n a t u r a l reason a f f i r m e d at a 'higher l e v e l ' w i t h i n the understanding 
of f a i t h . Such a 'rebaptism' of n a t u r a l reason makes i t , of course, 
e n t i r e l y subservient t o the demands of r e v e l a t i o n : i t i s s t i l l q u i t e 
impossible t o argue t h a t man's n a t u r a l reason i s e n t i t l e d t o 'judge' or 
'assess' the claim of r e v e l a t i o n , of what i s created i n man d i r e c t l y by 
God's Word mediated t o him through the Holy S p i r i t . Rather, the n a t u r a l 
reason i s 'recreated' by God's Word t o operate w i t h i n the parameters of 
r e v e l a t i o n set up by t h a t Word i t s e l f : i t i s a f f i r m e d from w i t h i n 
r e v e l a t i o n r a t h e r than excluded from i t . I t i s the p o t e n t i a l ' p o l i t i c a l 
opponent' of r e v e l a t i o n who i s bought by the o f f e r of minor o f f i c e , where 
i t i s accorded honour w i t h o u t power. I t i s not d i v i d e d from the under-
standing of f a i t h , but absorbed w i t h i n i t . I t can never be the under-
standing of f a i t h , but n e i t h e r can i t be sai d t o be r e j e c t e d by i t . 
Perhaps t h i s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n Barth's thought requires 
us t o take s e r i o u s l y the view t h a t despite lack of overt reference t o 
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him i n h i s magnum opus, Barth owes much, i n h i s l a t e r thought, t o Hegel. 
There i s a deeply a t t r a c t i v e Christocentrism i n the mature thought 
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of K a r l Barth. The c r e a t i o n of man i s t r e a t e d as a k i n d of d e r i v a t i v e 
spark from the e t e r n a l process of self-communication through which God 
makes Himself known t o Himself, a process t h a t i s expressed f o r man i n the 
person of C h r i s t . The argument t h a t nature i s derived from r e v e l a t i o n , 
the treatment of r e v e l a t i o n as the prime c r e a t i v e act of God i n which 
the being of man as the bearer of r e v e l a t i o n i s made subsequent t o , and 
derived from, t h a t r e v e l a t i o n i t s e l f , i s p a r t of a deeply a t t r a c t i v e and 
C h r i s t o c e n t r i c v i s i o n o f C h r i s t i a n theology. Barth's v i s i o n i s of the 
o r i g i n a l c r e a t i o n of the wor l d seen through the l i g h t of r e v e l a t i o n t o have 
taken place only i n C h r i s t , through whom a l l things were made. By the 
Word o f God who was man i n the e t e r n i t y of God before he was man f o r us, 
the n a t u r a l order i s gathered i n t o Himself and re-expressed as d e r i v i n g 
from the nature o f His own revealed being. I n the l i g h t of God's r e v e l a t i o n 
150. 
i n His Word, nature appears t o be nature only i n the l i g h t of r e v e l a t i o n ; 
i t i s no longer nature 'against' r e v e l a t i o n , 'beneath' r e v e l a t i o n or 
'prepared t o receive' r e v e l a t i o n . Barth does not so much assimilate 
God's gracious act t o His c r e a t i v e a c t , as B a i l l i e describes i t , as 
a s s i m i l a t e His c r e a t i v e act t o His act of grace i n r e v e l a t i o n , f o r only 
i n the l i g h t of r e v e l a t i o n may the nature of c r e a t i o n be understood. 
There i s , indeed, a deeply important c o r r e c t i v e i n Barth's theology 
t o any f a i l u r e t o recognise the Christocentrism of C h r i s t i a n i t y . Behind 
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the f a i l u r e t o u n i t e 'form' and 'content' perceived by B a i l l i e i n Brunner, 
l i e s a more complex f a i l u r e of C h r i s t i a n theology t o avoid an account of 
C h r i s t i a n i t y which proceeds along the l i n e s of ' f i r s t , the Father creates, 
then, the Son r e c o n c i l e s , and t h i r d l y , the S p i r i t s a n c t i f i e s ' , i n which 
account there i s no fulcrum, no centre or essence of a C h r i s t i a n theology 
about which a l l else must t u r n . Such a view could not have survived 
Barth's profound consideration of t h e T r i n i t y i n the f i r s t volume of the 
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Church Dogmatics (19 32) , and i n p a r t i c u l a r h i s examination of the 
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d o c t r i n e of ' a p p r o p r i a t i o n ' i n the l i g h t of the b e l i e f t h a t 'omnia 
opera t r i n i t a t i s ad e x t r a i n d i v i s a sunt', i n other words t h a t the events 
of s a l v a t i o n - h i s t o r y cannot be p a r c e l l e d out among the various persons 
of the T r i n i t y ( T r i u n i t y - D r e i e i n i g k e i t , i s Barth's p r e f e r r e d expression) 
or made t o be a means of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between the persons i n terms of 
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t h e i r ' p a r t i c u l a r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ' . 
For B a rth, the primary datum of C h r i s t i a n i t y i s t h a t God was i n 
C h r i s t , and His work of c r e a t i o n and redemption i s t o be understood only 
from t h a t datum. God was not i n the Father c r e a t i n g , the Son r e c o n c i l i n g , 
and the S p i r i t s a n c t i f y i n g , but i n His Word, through whom a l l things were 
made and i n whom a l l t h i n g s are brought t o p e r f e c t i o n . Barth i s too 
deeply aware of the Christocentrism of C h r i s t i a n i t y t o f a l l prey t o the 
disguised Sabellianism of much 'process theology', the phrase being used 
not i n the narrow sense o f ass o c i a t i o n w i t h the school of Whitehead, but 
more broadly t o r e f e r t o a p r e v a l e n t tendency t o t h i n k i n terms of a 
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sequence o f dealings, centred i n H i s t o r y , between a resourceful God and 
a r e c a l c i t r a n t humanity, o f which C h r i s t forms but one daring i n i t i a t i v e 
i n the s t o r y r a t h e r than being the b r i e f temporal expression, and even 
r e s o l u t i o n , of the whole ' n a r r a t i v e 1 . Barth s h a t t e r s the p r e v a i l i n g 
heresy ( f a r worse than any o v e r t d e n i a l of a p a r t i c u l a r C h r i s t o l o g i c a l 
t i t l e , or some paraded academic discomfort w i t h a c e r t a i n credal formula) 
of a pre-arranged w o r l d l y stage which awaits the temporary appearance 
of the p r i n c i p a l actor. Such a view manages t o see C h r i s t as a k i n d of 
b r i e f i n t r u d e r upon a l i e n s o i l , an unwelcome guest who 'descends' and 
then 'ascends' back t o the Father. I t c r u c i a l l y misses the p o i n t of 
C h r i s t ' s pre-existence, or ' e t e r n a l existence',- ('Before Abraham was, I 
am'), which i s intended not t o suggest t h a t C h r i s t somehow waited i n the 
wings f o r the r i g h t moment t o 'become incarn a t e ' , but t h a t what i s summed 
up i n the I n c a r n a t i o n i s the e t e r n a l l i f e of God Himself, from which the 
nature o f the temporal world may also be discerned. The l i f e of C h r i s t 
does not represent the b r i e f appearance of one o r d i n a r i l y absent, but 
the h i s t o r i c a l , incarnate existence of one e t e r n a l l y present - and Barth 
confirms t h i s t r u t h i n h i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t a l l C h r i s t i a n doctrines are 
given a C h r i s t o c e n t r i c reference. Since C h r i s t was present at the c r e a t i o n 
of the w o r l d , He does not come i n t o being only at the i n c a r n a t i o n : nor, 
since He i s w i t h His people always, 'even unto the end of the age' 
(Matthew 28:20), does He 'go away' a f t e r h i s death and r e s u r r e c t i o n . 
And y e t , there i s a flaw i n t h i s v i s i o n of Barth's. I t i s located i n 
the f a c t t h a t h i s Christocentrism resolves i t s e l f i n t o a form of 
Chri stomonism. 
I t i s von Balthasar who t a c k l e s Ba'rth's ' r a d i c a l Christocentrism' 
and considers whether there are d i f f i c u l t i e s involved, i n i t . The danger 
i s t h a t C h r i s t the centre o f r e a l i t y w i l l become C h r i s t the whole of 
r e a l i t y . That man understands himself no less as a created being than 
as a redeemed being through C h r i s t , w i l l be made t o e n t a i l t h a t he has 
no conceivable existence apart from C h r i s t . But the r e v e l a t i o n t h a t 
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enables the creature t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the inner r e a l i t y o f God must not 
e n t a i l i t s l o s i n g i t s own nature. Or r a t h e r , since we have argued t h a t 
the creature does not i n f a c t 'lose' i t s n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , but 
r a t h e r receives them back i n a d i f f e r e n t form i n which they are t i g h t l y 
h e l d w i t h i n an all-embracing net of r e v e l a t i o n , the problem i s t h a t the 
creature may lose i t s independence under a theology of ' r a d i c a l 
C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m ' , so long as i t i s understood t h a t t h i s independence i s 
merely ' r e l a t i v e ' , and t h a t i n a sense i t i s a mere t r u i s m t o say t h a t 
no creature e x i s t s independently of God's c r e a t i v e w i l l . I t i s the form 
o f the creature's dependence which i s a t stake here. 
3. The Nature o f Man's Dependence upon God 
An examination of Barth's treatment of the doctrine of man i n 
Volume I I I o f the Church Dogmatics may i l l u s t r a t e the argument of t h i s 
chapter, t h a t man i s so 'absorbed i n t o the being of God' i n Barth's 
theology (as found i n h i s mature years) t h a t he loses t h a t r e l a t i v e 
independence o f h i s Creator which i s a c o n d i t i o n of God's freedom t o 
give or w i t h h o l d His grace from him, and which i s grounded i n a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the 'orders' of grace and c r e a t i o n . A s i m i l a r 
c r i t i c i s m i n terms of the loss of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n may be made of both 
Hegel and Barth: and i f Hegel i s held responsible f o r what was l a t e r t o 
be c a l l e d a Feuerbachian 'reduction o f theology t o anthropology', i t 
makes sense t o t a l k of a Barthian 'reduction of anthropology t o theology' 
The purpose o f t h i s s e c t i o n i s t o i l l u s t r a t e t h i s argument, which i s 
developed i n the main t e x t , from the Church Dogmatics. 
I n I I I 1, Barth considers the s t o r y of the Garden of Eden. I n the 
Garden i s the t r e e of the knowledge of good and e v i l . This t r e e 'reveals 
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the p o s s i b i l i t y of e x a l t a t i o n of the creature'. God does not w i l l t h a t 
man r e a l i s e the p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n d i c a t e d by t h i s t r e e . He p r o h i b i t s man 
from e a t i n g from the t r e e , a p r o h i b i t i o n which i s p a r t of His p r o t e c t i n g 
man from death, the consequence of e a t i n g . The knowledge of good and e v i 
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i n other words, the power o f judgment, p r o p e r l y belongs t o the Creator 
r a t h e r than the cre a t u r e , and God determines t h a t man s h a l l l i v e by His 
w i l l , consenting t o His power of judgment without seeking t o share i n i t , 
and not a s p i r i n g t o a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ( t h a t of judgment) which exceeds 
h i s c a p a c i t y . 
I f man should nevertheless eat of the t r e e of the knowledge o f good' 
and e v i l , he w i l l n o t , according t o Barth's p r e s e n t a t i o n , achieve the 
capacity f o r judgment, f o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between good and e v i l . This 
capacity i s one which God alone possesses, and. i s not t r a n s f e r a b l e . God 
alone 'stands between 1 good and e v i l , able t o pronounce judgment; man 
i s equipped only f o r good, cut o f f from e v i l , and therefore w i t h a 
'freedom' t o obey r a t h e r than t o choose»not t o 'decide' f o r God but t o 
respect and obey God's deci s i o n f o r him. Man i s i n v i t e d by God t o accept 
t h a t judgment and e l e c t i o n belong t o God alone, and t h a t God has elected 
him. 
But man eats of the t r e e . This e a t i n g must imply h i s death: f o r 
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the t r e e of the knowledge of good and e v i l 'says negatively' what the 
tr e e of l i f e 'says p o s i t i v e l y ' . As the l a t t e r a f f i r m s p o s i t i v e l y t h a t 
man i s made f o r l i f e , the t r e e of the knowledge of good and e v i l a f f i r m s 
n e g a t i v e l y t h a t h i s l i f e e n t a i l s a consent of man t o the judgment vested 
i n God alone. 
But man i s not, as Barth presents the s t o r y , subjected t o 'a curse 
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e t e r n a l l y p e r p e t u a t i n g h i s dying' as a r e s u l t o f h i s misdeed. By being 
cast out of Eden he i s preserved from.the f a t e which would have awaited 
him w i t h i n i t . Barth presents man's expulsion from Eden, not as a 
punishment designed t o wreak vengeance on man, but as a m e r c i f u l act 
designed t o p r o t e c t man from death; God appears r a t h e r l i k e the 
c o l l a b o r a t o r i n the e x i l e of a person wanted i n h i s own country f o r some 
un f o r g i v a b l e outrage. 
But what i s the r e s u l t of man's e a t i n g o f the tree? He attempts t o 
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wrest a form o f l i f e which i s 'inwardly impossible' f o r him , t o achieve 
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a power of judgment t h a t i s God's alone. His attempted 'robbery', 
however, has d i r e consequences. Man i s l i k e a c h i l d who s t e a l s sweets 
t h a t t u r n out to be poison, which he e a t s g r e e d i l y and from which he 
w i l l soon d i e (my analogy!). To save him, God does not attempt any 
'surgery' : he sends him out of Eden i n t o a k i n d of suspended animation 
i n which he i s f r o z e n , as i t were, i n h i s moribund condition i n a kind 
of h a l f - l i f e (although the analogy i s mine, the sense i s B a r t h ' s ) . I n 
such a s i t u a t i o n man i s faced w i t h a Hobson's Choice. Should he rega i n 
l i f e , the d i s e a s e w i l l resume i t s course and k i l l him: should he seek 
to avoid t h i s f a t e , however, i t may only be by remaining i n a 'shadow-
e x i s t e n c e ' , c a s t out from Eden. Man f a c e s the choice of a t e r m i n a l l y i l l 
p a t i e n t whose only chance of continued e x i s t e n c e i s to remain i n a coma. 
L e t us c o n s i d e r two as p e c t s of Barth's treatment of the F a l l here. 
F i r s t l y , we may mention the d i s t i n c t i o n of man's freedom from 
'freedom of choice'. I s 'freedom' capable of being considered as a p a r t -
i c u l a r form of a c t i o n , r a t h e r than as a p a r t i c u l a r c a p a c i t y or p o t e n t i a l i t y 
f o r a c t i o n ? I n The Refutation of Determinism, M.R. Ayers draws an analogy 
between 'freedom' i n man and 'horsepower' i n v e h i c l e s . He p o i n t s out 
t h a t a c a r i n a garage may s t i l l be s a i d to have a c e r t a i n horsepower: 
s i m i l a r l y a person i n p r i s o n may s t i l l p ossess h i s freedom (Ayers i s 
attempting t o r e f u t e a form of determinism which i s based on the view 
of freedom as 'absence of c o n s t r a i n t ' ) . Barth's conception of man's 
freedom, however, i d e n t i f i e s i t as a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of a c t i o n s (ones 
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t h a t conform to God's w i l l ) . The que s t i o n must a r i s e , then, as to 
whether B a r t h a l l o w s man 'freedom.' i n any r e c o g n i s a b l e sense. T h i s 
q u e s t i o n w i l l not be pursued i n the t h e s i s : however, i t i s a f u r t h e r 
p o i n t i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of whether man p o s s e s s e s the ' r e l a t i v e independence' 
of God a p p r o p r i a t e to h i s c r e a t u r e l y being. 
Secondly, l e t us c o n s i d e r Barth's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the consequences 
of the ' F a l l ' as a way 'in which God denies man a now dangerous e x i s t e n c e 
i n the Garden of Eden. Man's s t o l e n ' c a p a c i t y ' t o know good and e v i l 
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would have brought death upon him had God allowed i t t o be exercised. 
Man has not taken upon himself a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the expression of 
which he w i l l be t e s t e d and t r i e d , (there i s here none of the 'Irenaean 1 
theodicy centred around man's 'banishment' from the 'milk of h i s mother's 
womb' i n the garden t o a developing m a t u r i t y outside i t , as commended i n 
Professor Hick's Evil and the God of Love) , but has sto l e n a power which 
threatens t o destroy him, t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of e x e r c i s i n g which he 
cannot be r e s t o r e d u n t i l he no longer w i l l s i t f o r himself, and God 
'enforces d e f i n i t i v e l y the j u d i c i a l knowledge i n which He was the Creator 
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o f a l l t h i n g s ' . 
Now the r e s u l t of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h a t Barth i d e n t i f i e s man's 
transgression of the Word of God, i n the h i s t o r y of h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 
God a f t e r h i s banishment, as a doing of e v i l or good a f t e r one's own w i l l , 
r ather, than as a f a i l u r e t o do the w i l l of God. For i t i s God who must 
choose t o do good or e v i l , not man, who has the power of judgment only 
i n a ' s t o l e n ' capacity, and who, p r e c i s e l y because he seeks t o exercise 
h i s judgment, n e c e s s a r i l y does e v i i . We meet here p r e c i s e l y the 'Olympian' 
judgment on e t h i c s encountered i n consideration of Barth's Romans i n 
chapter two, and the same concern t h a t Barth, by appearing t o ' r e l a t i v i s e ' 
e q u a l l y a l l moral judgments of man, f a i l s t o supply a p r i n c i p l e according 
t o which man may d i s c r i m i n a t e between them. The arguments are not 
o r i g i n a l , and demonstrate the in f l u e n c e o f the thought of the Protestant 
Reformers upon Barth. But Barth appears t o give the ' t h e o l o g i c a l e t h i c s ' 
of the Reformers an ' o n t o l o g i c a l 1 foundation which t h e i r thought lacked, 
grounding the idea of man's transgression of God's Word as h i s attempt 
merely t o exercise h i s own judgment of good and e v i l i n an ontology of 
man's 'unreal' existence i n the world apart from God. Although prolonged 
discussion o f Barth's e t h i c s i s not p a r t of t h i s t h e s i s , one might ask a 
s i m i l a r question t o t h a t concerned w i t h h i s view of freedom. I s a view 
o f man's ' s i n ' as the exercise of h i s judgment as h i s i n general, r a t h e r 
than as a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of judgment, s a t i s f a c t o r y ? I t appears t o 
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e c l i p s e any n o t i o n t h a t man should l e a r n , 'apart' from God, t o exercise 
t r u e judgment, since the exercise of any judgment save t h a t of 
'recognising t h a t the only judgment i s God's' would appear t o be 
i d e n t i f i e d by Barth w i t h 'transgression of the Word o f God'. 
Let us move on t o the ' t h e o l o g i c a l anthropology' o u t l i n e d by Barth 
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i n I I I . '"Theological Anthropology" expounds the knowledge of man which 
i s made po s s i b l e and needful by the f a c t t h a t man stands i n the l i g h t 
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o f the Word o f God 1. I t i s more s p e c i f i c a l l y a C h r i s t o l o g i c a l 
anthropology, i n s o f a r as the nature o f the man Jesus alone i s the key 
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t o the problem of human nature. Human nature i n general i s determined 
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from the human nature of C h r i s t i n p a r t i c u l a r , r a t h e r than vice versa, 
and i t i s t h i s determination which l i e s behind the 'ecce Homo' of P i l a t e 
- Behold, the man! 
I n the l i g h t o f h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t we le a r n of human nature i n 
general from the humanity of C h r i s t i n p a r t i c u l a r , we can understand 
Barth's 't h e o c e n t r i c ' understanding of the nature of man as body, soul 
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and S p i r i t . This ' d i v i s i o n ' o f man should not be understood i n terms 
o f 'trichotomism 1 , as i f these formed three separate compartments of 
man's being, but r a t h e r man i s t o be understood as body and so u l , i n s o f a r 
as S p i r i t comes t o him and 'has' him (rat h e r than he 'has' i t ) . S p i r i t 
cannot be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h any p a r t of man, and never 'becomes' a p a r t of 
him. But through i t s determining him 'from without'., i t enables him t o 
e x i s t as body and soul - i t acts on the body 'through' the soul. This 
i s why, Barth argues, some passages of S c r i p t u r e use the word ' S p i r i t ' 
when r e f e r r i n g t o ' s o u l 1 . This should not lead us, however, mistakenly 
t o suppose t h a t S p i r i t does, a f t e r a l l , belong t o man as a 'part' of him 
or an aspect o f h i s being. S p i r i t as a d i v i n e g i f t o f l i f e making him 
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man never becomes a p a r t of him. Anthropologies and philosophies of 
man which have separated man's soul from h i s body, f o r instance Roman 
Ca t h o l i c anthropologies,^° and have viewed man as a 'puzzling d u a l i t y ' 
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of body and soul 'somehow glued together', have made t h e i r mistake 
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through f a i l i n g t o understand t h a t man as' soul and body presupposes man 
as grounded i n S p i r i t . I t i s through a b s t r a c t i n g from S p i r i t t h a t t h i s 
62 f a l s e d u a l i s t conception has a r i s e n ; however, 'man i s as he has S p i r i t ' , 
a u n i t y grounded i n the immediate a c t i o n o f God. 
I t i s apparent from Barth's d e s c r i p t i o n of man as body, soul and 
S p i r i t , t h a t he does not regard him as a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t being, but as 
sustained i n existence only through the continuous a c t i o n of God, i n 
g i v i n g him S p i r i t and thereby making him whole. That t h i s g i f t never 
becomes a 'part' of him only r e i n f o r c e s h i s dependence on God f o r continued 
existence - f o r he never 'takes over' the l i f e - g i v i n g g i f t o f S p i r i t from 
God, but r a t h e r i s cons t a n t l y sustained by i t as something received from 
w i t h o u t . The question t h a t arises here, i s t h a t of whether once again 
the orders of c r e a t i o n and grace have been c o n f l a t e d ; i n other words, 
i s the S p i r i t by which man i s sustained i n being c o n f l a t e d w i t h the grace 
by which man i s redeemed? I s man given t h a t ' r e l a t i v e independence' of 
God i n which he can be an obj e c t o f God's g i v i n g or wi t h h o l d i n g grace, 
or i s he made ne c e s s a r i l y the o b j e c t of God's grace as a c o n d i t i o n of 
h i s being sustained i n being, 'grace' which i n t h i s context i s i d e n t i c a l 
t o ' S p i r i t ' ? 
Barth's work i s ambiguous here. At one p o i n t he presents a 
' t h e o l o g i c a l anthropology' which cannot f a l l v i c t i m t o the above 
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c r i t i c i s m . Here he argues t h a t the knowledge of Chri s t ' s human nature 
enables man t o learn the d i s t i n c t i o n between ' r e a l man' and the man who 
has p e r v e r t e d h i s t r u e ( n a t u r e , and thereby t o recognise i n humanity as 
such 'symptoms' of ' r e a l man'. This argument gives t o man's humanity 
apart from C h r i s t a ' r e a l ontology'. Man has a nature apart from the 
human nature o f C h r i s t , i n which he may recognise 'signs' of the l a t t e r ' s 
t r u e humanity. But elsewhere we have an ontology o f man which i s , we 
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would claim, more recognisably Barthian. Here Barth explains the removal 
of our s i n through C h r i s t ' s atoning s a c r i f i c e i n terms of God's judgment 
of man being determined, not by our s i n f u l , c o r r u p t natures but by Ch r i s t ' s 
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blameless nature. This judgment of God upon C h r i s t ' s nature becomes a 
judgment upon ours, because the c l a r i t y and p u r i t y of h i s human nature 
become ours. Before God there now remains 'only the pure and free 
humanity o f Jesus as our own humanity'. I n t h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n , man has 
no r e a l humanity i n which he may recognise 'symptoms' of the humanity of 
C h r i s t a t a l l , but r a t h e r h i s 'humanity' i s absorbed i n t o , and negated by 
C h r i s t ' s . He does not simply l e a r n of h i s humanity from C h r i s t ' s ; h i s 
humanity becomes C h r i s t ' s . I t i s here t h a t we may see what i n the main 
t e x t of the chapter we have argued i s a 'Christomonism' r a t h e r than a 
'Christocentrism'. I t would be 1 C h r i s t o c e n t r i c ' t o argue t h a t , so f a r 
as the s a l v a t i o n o f man i s concerned, i t i s achieved i n s o f a r as he admitted 
t o C h r i s t ; but t h i s i s c o n f l a t e d w i t h a view t h a t i n s i s t s t h a t the very 
existence o f man as a created being may be understood only i n s o f a r as h i s 
humanity i s t h a t of C h r i s t . Thus we f i n d Barth e a s i l y move from man as 
an o b j e c t o f c r e a t i o n t o man as an object of grace, without any apparent 
regard f o r the change.^ Man i s i n s o f a r as God r e l a t e s Himself t o him i n 
His a c t i o n , Barth declares, going on t o say t h a t i n covenant w i t h God 
he i s maintained i n r e l a t i o n t o God only i n s o f a r as God remains ' f o r him'. 
This c o n f l a t i o n must make us uncertain about Barth's systematic treatment 
of Creation i n Volume I I I of the Church Dogmatics i n terms of Creation 
as 'the e x t e r n a l basis of the Covenant' and the Covenant as 'the i n t e r n a l 
basis of Creation'. W h i l s t Barth d i s t i n g u i s h e s the 'grace of c r e a t i o n ' 
from the 'grace of the covenant', we may f a i r l y wonder a t the r e a l i t y 
o f the d i s t i n c t i o n (see also the remark: 'Creation i s nothing other than 
the i n i t i a t i o n , heading and sum of a l l the d i v i n e disclosures, promises, 
i n t i m a t i o n s and ordinances whose character, so inconceivable t o man, 
serves i n t h i s chapter t o b r i n g out the no less absolutely miraculous 
nature o f f a i t h ' . ) ^ 
We may, then, i d e n t i f y the ' t h e o l o g i c a l c o n s t r i c t i o n 1 of Barth's 
p r e s e n t a t i o n , NOT w i t h a t h e o l o g i c a l anthropology as such, but w i t h the 
view t h a t 'since the c o n s t i t u t i o n of man i s from God, i t i s a saving f a c t ' 
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67 (my emphasis) . Man has no 'independence' of God i n which t o accept 
or r e j e c t God's grace. I n h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n , he i s enabled t o e x i s t as 
body and soul only through S p i r i t , AND YET we read t h a t S p i r i t i s 'the 
element through which man i s introduced as a partn e r i n the covenant of 
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gra c e 1 , and t h a t S p i r i t i s 'the d i v i n e operation of grace i n i t s f u l l 
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scope' . Such an anthropology e n t a i l s t h a t man has no being apart from 
h i s determination by the grace of God, so t h a t man has no p o s s i b i l i t y of 
r e j e c t i n g God's grace, nor God any p o s s i b i l i t y of wi t h h o l d i n g i t (save 
through man's ceasing t o e x i s t ) . Such an ontology i s unacceptable f o r 
i t s c o n f l a t i o n of grace w i t h c r e a t i o n , not f o r i t s being p a r t of a 
' t h e o l o g i c a l anthropology' as such. 
From I I I 3 we discern a consequence of Barth's ontology of man - or 
lack of i t - which i s i m p l i c i t i n I I I 1 and I I I 2, namely an e f f e c t i v e 
undermining o f the r e a l i t y o f s i n . Important f o r our discussion here i s 
one of the most perceptive works on Barth, G.C. Berkouwer's The Triumph 
of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth. For i f man as a created being 
must be determined by the grace of God, i f the S p i r i t which makes him a 
created whole i s at the same time the S p i r i t o f grace and e l e c t i o n , then' 
by h i s very existence man must stand w i t h i n the grace of God as an elected 
being, unable t o divorce himself from 'the triumph o f grace'. Sin i s 
u l t i m a t e l y u n r e a l , because u l t i m a t e l y impossible. 
Man can, of course, s i n , i n Barth's view - but h i s s i n can never 
become a p a r t of h i s humanity^ 0. I n t h i s sense, there i s no o n t o l o g i c a l 
r e a l i t y t o h i s s i n . We may compare t h i s view t o Barth's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of man's expulsion from the Garden of Eden o u t l i n e d i n I I I 1, which we 
described above. There, we argued, Barth e f f e c t i v e l y argues t h a t man's 
banishment i s a p r o t e c t i v e measure by which God denies man the ' r e a l i t y ' 
i n which he would exercise a s t o l e n a u t h o r i t y t o h i s own d e s t r u c t i o n . 
God determines t h a t , since man i s bound t o use h i s newly acquired power 
o f 'judgment' t o i l l e f f e c t , He w i l l deny him the existence i n which t o 
use i t . I t i s p o s s i b l e t o argue from t h i s t h a t man's s i n lacks any 
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71 o n t o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y , as indeed Barth himself w r i t e s ; f o r , knowing 
t h a t having eaten from the t r e e of the knowledge o f good and e v i l man 
w i l l act so as t o b r i n g death upon himself, God prevents the p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f such a c t i o n ! Man s i n s , t h e r e f o r e , i n an o n t o l o g i c a l vacuum i n which 
h i s being remains unaffected. He sins i n a way analogous t o the ' s i n ' 
o f someone who i s encouraged t o sublimate h i s b l o o d l u s t w i t h wargames; 
a ' s u b s t i t u t e ' i s provided through which the s i n f u l i n c l i n a t i o n f i n d s a 
harmless f u l f i l m e n t . There i s , i n Barth, none o f the f r i g h t e n i n g v i s i o n 
o f . t h e impact of s i n upon man's character provided, t o give a simple but 
e f f e c t i v e example, i n C.S. Lewis' The Great Divorce, where the spectacle 
i s p r o v ided of people 'becoming' t h e i r s i n s . I n Barth the s i n i s never 
allowed t o touch the man; f o r the man i s what he i s only through the 
grace and S p i r i t of God, which remain i n e t e r n a l a n t i t h e s i s t o s i n . 
Man i s e f f e c t i v e l y contained, simply as created, w i t h i n the sphere of 
grace wherein s i n cannot penetrate; and h i s ' s i n ' thereby becomes a 
form o f shadow-boxing, i n which he teases himself w i t h an o n t o l o g i c a l 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y . We f i n d here, i n a d i f f e r e n t way t o Romans and the 
argument w i t h Harnack, once more d i s t u r b i n g evidence of a lack of moral 
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seriousness i n Barth. 
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I n chapter IX of h i s work, Berkouwer questions the: 
.... s h i f t i n g which Barth e f f e c t s i n the t r a d i t i o n a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the mystery of s i n t o t h a t of an 
o n t o l o g i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y . . . . (73) 
a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which he regards as 'belonging t o the most decisive and 
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determinative aspects of h i s theology 1 . He t i e s h i s discussion i n w i t h 
t h a t of Barth's u n i v e r s a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the doctrines of e l e c t i o n 
and p r e d e s t i n a t i o n (Church Dogmatics I I , 2 ) . Chapter X ('The U n i v e r s a l i t y 
of the Triumph') makes i t c l e a r t h a t he f e e l s universalism t o be the 
l o g i c a l consequence o f Barth's view of s i n , and h i s conclusion i s f o r t h r i g h t 
The unacceptableness of Barth's c r i t i c i s m of the inadequacy of 
the p a s t o r a l care allowed by the Reformed do c t r i n e of predest-
i n a t i o n i s the reverse side of the vacuum which appears i n 
Barth's own d o c t r i n e o f e l e c t i o n . (75) 
161. 
I n other words, the 'pastoral i m p l i c a t i o n s ' are not cl e a r . I s 
Barth's way round ' p r e d e s t i n a t i o n ' i t s e l f something t h a t lacks the moral 
seriousness of the absence of which t h a t b e l i e f might be accused? 
We may examine t h i s question more c l o s e l y by c i t i n g a very d i f f e r e n t 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o Berkouwer's, t h a t of John Hick i n Evil and the God of 
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Love. I n examining the problem of e v i l i n K a r l Barth's thought, Hick 
concentrates on the n o t i o n of 'das N i c h t i g e ' , a term which summarises 
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a l l 'opposition and resistance t o God's world-dominion'. What i s das 
Nichtige? On the one hand, Hick quotes Barth's d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t 'das 
N i c h t i g e i s t n i c h t das Nic h t s ' t o i l l u s t r a t e t h a t i t i s not 'nothing'. 
At the same time, however, 'das Ni c h t i g e i s t h a t from which God 
separates Himself and i n face of which He asserts Himself and exerts His 
p o s i t i v e w i l l .... God e l e c t s , and t h e r e f o r e r e j e c t s what He does not 
e l e c t ' . Hence ' i n the l i g h t of Jesus C h r i s t there i s no sense i n which 
i t can be a f f i r m e d t h a t das N i c h t i g e has any o b j e c t i v e existence, t h a t 
i t continues except f o r our s t i l l b l i n d e d eyes ...'. I n what sense, 
then does 'das N i c h t i g e ' e x i s t ? ' S u b j e c t i v e l y ' , r a t h e r than ' o b j e c t i v e l y ' , 
i n those who have, not yet perceived through Jesus C h r i s t t h a t e v i l i s an 
i l l u s i o n ? But then, i s not the i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h a t our s i n f u l 
a ctions have no r e a l consequences f o r our u l t i m a t e standing before God, 
because i n the e l e c t i o n of Jesus C h r i s t and ourselves i n him God has 
determined t h a t e v i l or s i n should be an o n t o l o g i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y ? 
The approaches of Berkouwer and Hick are very d i f f e r e n t . Hick wants 
t o show t h a t any theodicy of the 'Augustinian' type, namely one t h a t 
denies the purpose of man's f a l l t o be a process of maturing through the 
experience of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and freedom, and r a t h e r i n t e r p r e t s i t i n 
terms of punishment f o r s i n , i s bound t o view e v i l as something standing 
over against God and l i m i t i n g His power, i n other words a form of gnostic 
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dualism i s bound t o be i m p l i c i t i n 'Augustinian' t h e o d i c i e s . Berkouwer, 
on the other hand, w h i l s t a p p r e c i a t i v e of Barth's Christocentrism,(which 
he r e f e r s t o i n terms of Barth's r e j e c t i o n of what he c a l l s a "step-wise" 
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theology, i n other words one which views s a l v a t i o n - h i s t o r y as a series 
of stages i n a cosmic drama - a r e j e c t i o n we p o i n t t o and appreciate 
i n the main t e x t of the t h e s i s ) - wishes t o suggest t h a t Barth, i n 
r e f u s i n g t o l e t anything stand i n the way of the 'triumph of grace', 
e f f e c t i v e l y denies r e a l i t y t o t h a t power of s i n which stands over against 
i t . Although, however, they reach apparently opposite conclusions, Hick 
seeing the powers t h a t r e s i s t God's grace i n Barth's thought as the 
content of a force which u l t i m a t e l y l i m i t s God's freedom, and Berkouwer 
seeing i n them evidence of an e s s e n t i a l u n r e a l i t y i n Barth's theology, 
which i s thereby u n b i b l i c a l and heterodox, both b r i n g out the ambiguity 
i n Barth's thought. Hick argues t h a t Barth 'conceals the f i n a l 
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a l t e r n a t i v e s f a c i n g any theodicy', by r e f u s i n g t o make clear what 
s o r t of ' r e a l i t y ' e v i l has. Berkouwer shows t h a t Barth conceals the 
r e a l i t y o f a p l a i n l y u n i v e r s a l i s t conception (he c a l l s t h i s the 'way of 
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apokatastasis', a summing up of a l l i n Ch r i s t ) i n h i s e f f e c t i v e 
d e n i a l of the p o s s i b i l i t y of ' s i n ' as a power which may permeate man's 
humanity and remove him from C h r i s t . 
Barth's conception of the nature of the triumph (of grace) 
r a i s e s the problem of the place o f man i n t h i s triumph. (83) 
The problem of the place of man i n s a l v a t i o n - h i s t o r y i s the problem 
v which ar i s e s from consideration of the Church Dogmatics, Volume I I I . We 
may summarise the examples of the problem o u t l i n e d i n t h i s section as 
f o l l o w s : 
I n the f i r s t p lace, does Barth's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the F a l l and i t s 
consequences not deny f a l l e n man r e a l humanity, f o r does i t not imply 
t h a t God 'removes' t h i s humanity from man p r e c i s e l y so t h a t he may not 
exercise i t t o h i s own d e s t r u c t i o n f o l l o w i n g h i s ea t i n g of the t r e e of 
knowledge o f good and e v i l ? 
iecoh^fw j&oe.s not Barth present an anthropology i n which man depends upon 
God's grace not merely f o r s a l v a t i o n but f o r h i s very existence, i n t h a t 
he c r i t i c i s e s anthropologies which separate soul from body i n man 
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because they f a i l t o recognise t h a t man i s held i n being as a body-soul 
u n i t y through the S p i r i t t h a t i s also the grace o f God and the S p i r i t 
of e l e c t i o n ? 
T h i r d l y , does not the second p o i n t , p o i n t t o a c o n f l a t i o n of the 
'orders' o f c r e a t i o n and redemption i n Barth's thought which i s not a 
necessary consequence o f h i s admirable r e f u s a l t o endorse a 'step-wise' 
(Berkouwer's term) theology, but which issues i n a lack o f r e a l i t y f o r 
man as a created being who may respond or not respond t o the o f f e r of 
God's grace? 
F o u r t h l y , do the terms 'freedom' and ' s i n ' have any r e a l i t y i n Barth' 
theology? Can 'freedom' make sense, not as a capacity, but as a 
p a r t i c u l a r form of a c t i o n (one t h a t conforms t o God's w i l l ) ? Can ' s i n ' 
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make sense as something which does not a f f e c t the humanity of man which 
has 'become' t h a t of C h r i s t , but i s r a t h e r a form of shadow-boxing w i t h 
an o n t o l o g i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y ? 
F i n a l l y , i f there i s substance t o these c r i t i c i s m s of Barth,' then 
must we not c r i t i c i s e a ' t h e o l o g i c a l anthropology' such as he presents, 
not f o r wishing t o understand the nature of man from the 'true man' 
revealed by God i n C h r i s t , b u t f o r doing so i n such a way t h a t the r e a l i t y 
of^ f r e e and s i n f u l humanity seeking t o derive an understanding of i t s e l f 
from C h r i s t ' s humanity i s denied? This i s the substance of our argument 
i n t h i s chapter, o f our concern t o endorse the argument of von Balthasar 
w i t h respect t o 'nature' and 'grace', and of our attempt t o suggest t h a t 
Barth evinces an 'i n v e r t e d Hegelianism' w i t h i n which, ra t h e r than 
i n t e g r a t i n g the being o f God i n t o man i n a f a l s e anthropocentrism, Barth 
i n t e g r a t e s the being o f man i n t o God i n a f a l s e theomonism. 
4. Grace and Nature 
Von Balthasar welcomes the Christocentrism of Barth's theology, i t s 
perc e p t i o n t h a t the world was created f o r C h r i s t , r a t h e r than t h a t C h r i s t ' s 
human nature was created f o r the world. He applauds the f a c t t h a t Barth 
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excludes the temptation t o t a l k as i f C h r i s t must be 'reconciled w i t h 
the w o r l d ' , f i t t e d w i t h a human nature i n order t o adapt t o i t s s i n f u l 
c o n d i t i o n , r a t h e r than the world f i t t e d t o C h r i s t who i s the ground of 
i t s existence. But von Balthasar fears t h a t t h i s Christocentrism extends 
t o a p o i n t where God i n h i s s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n no longer confronts an obj e c t 
t o which he has chosen t o ascribe a r e l a t i v e freedom from Himself. That 
man has no 'nature' apart from God's grace i s made t o e n t a i l t h a t he has 
no 'nature' a t a l l , t h a t he e x i s t s only w i t h i n the grace of God: the 
o b j e c t i v i t y of man before God i s e f f e c t i v e l y denied. 
Before coming t o the main p o i n t of our argument concerning the 
c r u c i a l B arthian d e n i a l of man as an 'object of r e v e l a t i o n ' , we must 
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consider the meaning o f the term ' r e v e l a t i o n ' i t s e l f . L i t e r a l l y the 
word means an u n v e i l i n g or di s c l o s u r e of what i s hidden. I t s meaning 
i n general terms i s knowledge achieved passively r a t h e r than a c t i v e l y , 
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by d i s c l o s u r e t o someone r a t h e r than discovery by him. To t a l k of 
knowledge through ' r e v e l a t i o n ' , then, i s t o suggest a knowledge i n which 
the mind passively receives, r a t h e r than a c t i v e l y f i n d s , although i n 
C h r i s t i a n theology i t has had a number o f more s p e c i f i c meanings - a 
d i r e c t communication from God, or an a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y communicated set 
of\ t r u t h s , p a r t i c u l a r l y as encapsulated i n S c r i p t u r e . This i n d i c a t e s an 
understanding of ' r e v e l a t i o n ' as a p a r t i c u l a r body of in f o r m a t i o n supplied 
d i r e c t l y by God. I t has also been i n t e r p r e t e d as a set o f t r u t h s about 
God t h a t could not be a t t a i n e d by man's n a t u r a l reasoning powers: i n 
t h i s sense ' r e v e l a t i o n ' i s set against 'reason',, the former supplying 
t r u t h s u n a t t a i n a b l e by, although uncontradicted by, the l a t t e r . 
The idea of ' r e v e l a t i o n ' as a s p e c i f i c body of in f o r m a t i o n 
communicated by God, which could not be a t t a i n e d by reason a c t i n g unaided 
by d i v i n e help, can be c r i t i c i s e d f o r f a i l i n g t o i n t e r p r e t ' r e v e l a t i o n 1 
as the di s c l o s u r e o f a person r a t h e r than of c e r t a i n d i v i n e ' t r u t h s ' . 
The content of God's s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e i n r e v e l a t i o n i s God, not c e r t a i n 
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otherwise unavailable f a c t s . Such a c r i t i c i s m p o i n t s less t o an 'over-
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i n t e l l e c t u a l i s i n g 1 of ' r e v e l a t i o n ' , however, than t o a f a i l u r e t o 
recognise the importance o f human co-operation w i t h God i n the expression, 
i n p r o p o s i t i o n s or images, of the personal s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e of the d i v i n e . 
The p a s s i v i t y of man i n ' r e v e l a t i o n ' does not exclude the f a c t t h a t he 
must i n t e r p r e t what i s given him. 
This does not req u i r e us t o a f f i r m , w i t h Brunner, a p r i o r 'capacity 
88 
f o r r e v e l a t i o n ' i n man. We agree w i t h B a i l l i e t h a t man acquires the 
capacity t o receive r e v e l a t i o n as he receives i t , and t h i s p o i n t serves 
t o i l l u s t r a t e another important c r i t i c i s m of the view of r e v e l a t i o n out-
l i n e d above, namely i t s presumption t h a t only a s p e c i f i c act or set of 
acts o f God towards man may p r o p e r l y be termed ' r e v e l a t i o n ' . Man has no 
unchanging 'nature': h i s nature i s constantly changing i n the l i g h t o f 
h i s h i s t o r i c a l experience. He i s not w a i t i n g w i t h a f i x e d 'nature' t o 
receive ' r e v e l a t i o n ' , but ra t h e r h i s 'nature' i s constantly changing i n 
the l i g h t o f i t s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f God's conti n u i n g r e v e l a t i o n , or s e l f -
d i s c l o s u r e , i n h i s t o r y . The discussion over a 'natural theology', a 
theology based on the evidence f o r God from the nature of the world and 
the moral nature o f man, ra t h e r than from ' r e v e l a t i o n ' , i s i n t h i s sense 
a pseudo-discussion, f o r ' r e v e l a t i o n ' describes not merely a p a r t , but 
the whole, of man's experience of God, an experience he receives and 
which transforms h i s nature i n the r e c e i v i n g of i t . There may be d i f f e r e n t 
forms of r e v e l a t i o n - i n h i s t o r y , i n the n a t u r a l universe, i n man's moral 
sense - but they are a l l forms of r e v e l a t i o n , o f God's s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e . 
Nor are they a l l forms of r e v e l a t i o n ' t o ' nature, f o r the nature of man 
i s i t s e l f determined by h i s perception of God's r e v e l a t i o n t o him. I n 
t h i s sense Barth i s r i g h t t o repudiate the concept of a 'natural theology', 
or r a t h e r t o subsume i t w i t h i n a theology of r e v e l a t i o n ; a 'natural 
theology' may suggest a c e r t a i n form of r e v e l a t i o n , but not a knowledge 
of God 'apart from' r e v e l a t i o n . 
But t h i s does not e n t i t l e us t o subscribe t o the grounds of Barth's 
r e j e c t i o n of a 'n a t u r a l theology'. For however much the d i s t i n c t i o n \ 
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between 'nature' and ' r e v e l a t i o n ' i s a misconceived one, and however 
much i t i s t r u e t o say t h a t our nature i s 'determined by', rather than 
simply 'waits t o r e c e i v e 1 , r e v e l a t i o n from God, nevertheless ' r e v e l a t i o n ' 
from God presupposes t h a t there i s an obj e c t t o whom t h a t r e v e l a t i o n 
comes, an o b j e c t t h a t , although i n p a r t determined by the nature of t h a t 
r e v e l a t i o n , i s not brought i n t o being by i t . I n other words, God's 
r e v e l a t i o n t o man represents a 'gracious' a c t i v i t y addressed t o him as, 
i t s o b j e c t (although a t the same time determining h i s nature) , ra t h e r 
than a ' c r e a t i v e ' a ct b r i n g i n g him i n t o being. Whilst man's nature 
cannot be conceived apart from i t s experience o f r e v e l a t i o n , nevertheless 
i t does not derive from r e v e l a t i o n . 
We may c l a r i f y t h i s p o i n t by reference t o Professor B a i l l i e ' s 
j u d i c i o u s work Our Knowledge of God, which contains a consideration of 
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the debate between Barth and Brunner. B a i l l i e i s sympathetic towards 
what he perceives t o be Barth's d i s l i k e of any notion t h a t God f i r s t 
created a being capable of 'rec e i v i n g r e v e l a t i o n ' , and then revealed 
h i m s e l f , much as one might f i r s t make a bucket and then f i l l i t w i t h 
water. I f t h i s s o r t of n o t i o n l i e s behind Brunner's ins i s t e n c e upon a 
'formal power o f being addressed' (Wortmachtigkeit) i n man, a capacity 
f o r r e v e l a t i o n , then i t i s r i g h t l y r e j e c t e d , i n B a i l l i e ' s view, by K a r l 
Barth. But the reason f o r B a i l l i e ' s o p p o s i t i o n t o Brunner at t h i s p o i n t 
i s the thoroughly Kantian one, t h a t a l l knowledge arises out of 
experience. Man i s not reasonable ' p r i o r t o ' the apprehension of t r u t h , 
b ut develops h i s r a t i o n a l i t y in_ t h a t apprehension. S i m i l a r l y , any 
capacity f o r r e v e l a t i o n i s developed through the r e c e i v i n g of r e v e l a t i o n 
i t s e l f . B a i l l i e f u l l y agrees w i t h Barth's r e f u s a l t o separate the 
d o c t r i n e o f man as 'imago Dei 1 from t h a t of r e v e l a t i o n , f o r i t i s only 
as he apprehends God's r e v e l a t i o n of Himself t h a t man grows t o perceive 
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and understand h i s createdness. Brunner's theology i s based upon an 
un-Kantian separation of form and content, whereby man maintains the 
'form' o f the image o f God a f t e r the F a l l , but loses i t s 'content', or 
r e t a i n s i n h i s 'nature' the 'form' which may be able t o accept the 
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'content' of r e v e l a t i o n . I n s o f a r as Barth questions any notion of a 
f i x e d 'nature' of man which awaits the coming of ' r e v e l a t i o n ' i n C h r i s t , 
Professor B a i l l i e i s wholly i n agreement w i t h him. 
I n another respect, however, B a i l l i e i d e n t i f i e s a c e n t r a l d i f f i c u l t y 
i n Barth's t h e o l o g i c a l method as o u t l i n e d i n h i s debate w i t h Brunner. 
Revelation, B a i l l i e i n s i s t s , i s a 'miracle of grace', not a 'miracle o f 
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omnipotence'. The c r e a t i v e and the gracious a c t i v i t y of God are not 
the same: B a i l l i e quotes a remark of Canon A.L. L i l l e y : 
God may create a universe ex n i h i l o , but 
He cannot reveal Himself ad n i h i l u m . (92) 
Creation - ex n i h i l o - i s a 'miracle of omnipotence'. God brings 
i n t o being what i n no way c o n t r i b u t e s towards, or c o n d i t i o n s , i t s making. 
I n h i s debate w i t h Brunner Barth assimilates God's saving a c t i v i t y i n 
C h r i s t t o the same model, as an act of 'rec r e a t i o n ' i n which, s i m i l a r l y , 
man as he e x i s t s as an o b j e c t of God's saving r e v e l a t i o n i n His Word i n 
no way c o n t r i b u t e s towards or conditions God's gracious a c t i v i t y . B a i l l i e , 
despite h i s r e j e c t i o n o f Brunner's separation of the 'capacity f o r 
r e v e l a t i o n ' from r e v e l a t i o n i t s e l f , c l e a r l y believes t h a t Barth i s wrong 
t o suggest t h a t r e v e l a t i o n creates i t s own means of a p p r o p r i a t i o n , indeed 
.1 
creates a 'new man' who i s remade through the saving a c t i v i t y of God i n 
C h r i s t . God's saving a c t i v i t y i s d i r e c t e d towards a human object who i s 
addressed by i t even as he i s determined by i t . Revelation i s ' t o ' man, 
even i f not t o a 'nature' e x i s t i n g independently of r e v e l a t i o n , w h i l s t 
c r e a t i o n i s ' o f something out of nothing and 'to' - nothing! By 
suggesting a d i s t i n c t i o n between God's 'c r e a t i v e ' and His 'gracious' 
a c t i v i t y , B a i l l i e distances himself from Barth's view of r e v e l a t i o n : by 
denying the separation of a 'capacity f o r r e v e l a t i o n ' from r e v e l a t i o n 
i t s e l f as the subsequent f u l f i l m e n t of an already e x i s t e n t capacity i n 
man, B a i l l i e distances himself from Brunner's viewpoint. We disagree 
w i t h Brunner i n t a k i n g the view t h a t nature cannot e x i s t independently 
of r e v e l a t i o n ; but we disagree w i t h Barth i n t a k i n g the View t h a t nature 
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does not derive from r e v e l a t i o n . Whilst man's nature i s not separable 
from h i s r e c e i v i n g of r e v e l a t i o n , i t nevertheless e x i s t s i n d i s t i n c t i o n 
from i t i n s o f a r as man, i n h i s created being, remains an ob j e c t 
addressed by God's gracious a c t i o n i n r e v e l a t i o n . 
The c r u c i a l p o i n t i s t h a t r e v e l a t i o n i s always an address of God 
d i r e c t e d towards a r e a l i t y which e x i s t s i n t h a t r e l a t i v e independence 
of God which i s demanded simply by i t s being the r e a l object of God's 
address. This remains t r u e despite the inadequacy of describing t h a t 
which i s addressed as 'nature', since the nature of man i s i t s e l f 
determined by the encounter w i t h the personal r e a l i t y of the s e l f -
r e v e a l i n g God. Revelation i s not a c r e a t i v e a c t i o n , an act by which 
God brings i n t o being something out of nothing, and thereby has no need 
t o take i n t o account any of the c o n s t r a i n t s which are exercised upon His 
actions through His f r e e choice t o address an ob j e c t 'outside' Himself, 
whose capacity t o respond t o Him He must respect. Creation 'ex n i h i l o ' 
means, i n e f f e c t , a c t i o n w i t h o u t c o n s t r a i n t : u n l i k e the s c u l p t o r forced 
t o comply w i t h the l i m i t a t i o n s exercised upon h i s ' c r e a t i v e ' work by the 
m a t e r i a l w i t h which he deals, God, who brings i n t o being even the 
ma t e r i a l s themselves, i s l i m i t e d i n c r e a t i o n by nothing outside Himself -
not even by the 'abstract' p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a l t e r n a t i v e worlds from which 
he chooses the best according t o a L e i b n i z i a n c o n s t r a i n t . Yet t h i s 
freedom from c o n s t r a i n t cannot be a p p l i e d t o God's address t o an e x i s t e n t 
c r e a t u r e : here the r e s u l t of an e s s e n t i a l s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n o f God i n 
c r e a t i n g a being 'outside' Himself comes i n t o p l a y . Barth, however, 
does not recognise t h i s . He continues t o use the language of d i v i n e 
freedom from c o n s t r a i n t , appropriate t o God's c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y , i n 
respect of His gracious a c t i v i t y . 
I f we are t o discover the roots of K a r l Barth's e s s e n t i a l l y reductive 
C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m , then we s h a l l discover them here, i n the a s s i m i l a t i o n o f 
God's gracious a c t i v i t y t o h i s c r e a t i v e . I t i s not simply t h a t Barth 
adopts the language of a 'new c r e a t i o n ' i n speaking of man as the object 
169. 
i 
of God's r e v e l a t o r y a c t i v i t y , f o r there i s a respectable Pauline 
pedigree f o r such a reference. I t i s t h a t , w h i l s t a d m i t t i n g t h a t there 
i s a being who i s the obje c t of God's s e l f - d i s c l o s i n g a c t i v i t y ( t o whom 
He discloses H i m s e l f ) , Barth claims i n a d d i t i o n t h a t t h i s object derives 
i t s e n t i r e being from the r e v e l a t i o n or s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e i t s e l f . That 
God's r e v e l a t i o n i s t o man i s i t s e l f only something t h a t i s made known 
i n the l i g h t o f t h a t r e v e l a t i o n , from which man. .recognises h i s nature as 
a created being: but f o r Barth i t i s possible t o add t o t h a t t h a t man 
i s only brought i n t o being as the o b j e c t of God's r e v e l a t i o n by t h a t 
r e v e l a t i o n . This claim e n t a i l s , we would contend, the omission of a 
c r u c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n . W h i l s t Barth i s r i g h t t o r e j e c t a view of 
s a l v a t i o n - h i s t o r y which sees 'cr e a t i o n ' and ' s a l v a t i o n ' as separate acts 
i n a drama, he cannot go on t o obscure the d i s t i n c t i o n between God's 
a c t i o n i n b r i n g i n g i n t o being an 'object', and h i s r e l a t i o n t o t h a t 
' o b j e c t ' , however much the being of the obje c t i s r i g h t l y seen t o be 
determined through i t s c o n t i n u i n g r e l a t i o n to i t s creator. 
Barth's i n t e n t i o n i s t o claim t h a t the ob j e c t of God's s e l f -
d i s c l o s i n g address ar i s e s out of the s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e and i s conditioned 
by i t : b u t we i n s i s t upon the e s s e n t i a l f a l s i t y of t h i s idea, namely 
t h a t i n r e v e l a t i o n God speaks, and the obje c t of His speech i s b u i l t up 
out of the speech i t s e l f . 'Let there be ...' i s the l o g i c of c r e a t i o n : 
i n r e v e l a t i o n God speaks t o an ob j e c t whom He addresses, however much i t 
may be moulded i n i t s nature through the address. The d i s t i n c t i o n between 
'c r e a t i o n ' and ' r e v e l a t i o n ' , whatever the dangers of i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
such as B a i l l i e h i g h l i g h t s i n Brunner, and however much i t may threaten 
the proper C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m o f C h r i s t i a n theology, i s a c r u c i a l one t o 
main t a i n i n g the r e a l i t y o f man as an ob j e c t of God's address, as a being 
who e x i s t s only through God's s u s t a i n i n g w i l l and i n dependence upon him, 
and y e t a being who, simply as being, possesses the ' r e l a t i v e independence' 
of God t h a t expresses the f a c t t h a t he i s an ob j e c t of God's grace. 
The p o i n t i s made w e l l i n the sub t l e discussion by von Balthasar of 
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the r e l a t i o n between 'grace' and 'nature'. There i s no such t h i n g , von 
Balthasar argues, as 'pure nature' i n t h i s w o r l d , f o r man i n h i s n a t u r a l 
being e x i s t s only i n r e l a t i o n t o h i s supernatural end i n God, whether 
p o s i t i v e l y o r , i f he r e j e c t s God, i n a negative r e l a t i o n s h i p . Man's 
nature i s thus determined through h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o God's grace. Von 
Balthasar may be described as being i n p e r f e c t agreement w i t h B a i l l i e ' s 
reluctance t o t a l k of a 'nature' of man abstracted from God's grace or 
r e v e l a t i o n , even the man who c o n s i s t e n t l y r e j e c t s God. The nature of man 
i s c o n t i n u a l l y formed and reformed through i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the s e l f -
r e v e a l i n g God, and any separation of 'nature' from 'grace' or ' r e v e l a t i o n 
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must break down at t h i s p o i n t . 
Where Barth and von Balthasar d i f f e r , however, i s i n the l a t t e r ' s 
argument t h a t from the premise t h a t nature without grace i s inconceivable 
i 
one must not conclude t h a t grace creates nature. We cannot conceive of 
nature w i t h o u t grace, and y e t , von Balthasar argues, the concept of 'pure 
nature' (das System der reinen Natur ) must remain as a r e s i d u a l 
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concept t h a t cannot be s p e c i f i e d concretely. Without such a r e s i d u a l 
concept, the r e a l i t y o f man as an ob j e c t o f God's grace i s e f f e c t i v e l y 
denied. 
Von Balthasar's concern i s p a r t l y t o p r o t e c t the freedom of God t o 
refuse His grace t o man: 'nature' represents t h a t minimum which must be 
evident and present i n every s i t u a t i o n where God might choose t o reveal 
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Himself t o c r e a t i o n . I f t h i s minimum d i d not e x i s t , then God could 
not w i t h h o l d His grace from c r e a t i o n w i t h o u t e f f e c t i v e l y destroying i t : 
simply as created, the creature would thereby necessarily e x i s t w i t h i n 
God's grace and could not be sustained i n being save i n such a r e l a t i o n . 
I n t h i s sense i t i s von Balthasar r a t h e r than Barth who p r o t e c t s the 
'freedom' of God, f o r he concedes t h a t ' r e l a t i v e independence' t o the 
creature which allows God t o choose the extent of His r e l a t i o n t o i t , 
w i t h o u t f e a r i n g t h a t t o withdraw His presence would be t o destroy i t . 
171. 
This i s but the sense i n which a parent i s 'free' t o choose the nature 
of h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o an adolescent o f f s p r i n g , i n the way t h a t he or 
she i s not f r e e t o choose the nature o f a r e l a t i o n s h i p t o a young c h i l d , 
at l e a s t i n s o f a r as they wish t o guarantee i t s s u r v i v a l . What von 
Balthasar sees, i n f a c t , i s t h a t i n one sense the freedom of God i s 
extended through the r e l a t i v e 'independence' of Him enjoyed by man. 
Unless man i s conceived t o be the obj e c t of God's gracious a c t i v i t y , 
God i s not f r e e t o give or w i t h h o l d His grace from him. I f man i s somehow 
'brought i n t o being' by God's grace i n r e v e l a t i o n , and God's gracious 
a c t i v i t y described i n terms more appropriate t o His cr e a t i v e a c t i v i t y , 
then God has, i n t h i s sense, no choice but t o give man grace: grace, 
r a t h e r than the free g i f t of God, becomes a necessary p a r t of His 
c r e a t i n g him. Once e x i s t e n t , the creature has an absolute claim upon 
God's grace - i n t h a t w i t h o u t i t the creature w i l l cease t o e x i s t . That 
the creature may i n p r i n c i p l e e x i s t without God's grace, i s p r e c i s e l y 
the c o n d i t i o n o f God's being f r e e t o w i t h h o l d i t . 
What we are t r y i n g t o p o i n t out i n Barth's theology, i s a form of 
t h e o l o g i c a l c o n s t r i c t i o n , a Chris t o c e n t r i s m which does not allow, i n i t s 
ontology, f o r the r e a l i t y o f t h a t which i s not C h r i s t . There i s a 
s i m i l a r c o n s t r i c t i o n t o t h a t which, i t has been argued, characterises 
97 Hegel's mature r e f l e c t i o n on C h r i s t i a n i t y , although Barth squeezes 
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theology from the other end, namely by subsuming nature w i t h i n grace 
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r a t h e r than grace w i t h i n nature. For as i n Hegel's argument man, by 
being conceived a necessary p a r t o f God's s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n as God, i s a 
necessary expression o f His being r a t h e r than the object of h i s f r e e l y -
given grace, (a g i f t which could have been w i t h h e l d without God's ceasing 
t o be God), i n Barth the grace o f God i s necessary t o the s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n 
of man as man, and i s t h e r e f o r e a necessary expression of h i s (man's) 
being r a t h e r than a f r e e g i f t which God might choose t o w i t h h o l d from him. 
I n Hegel's d i a l e c t i c , God i s so absorbed i n t o the being of man t h a t God's 
freedom t o determine Himself w i t h o u t man i s compromised. I n Barth's 
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d i a l e c t i c , man i s so absorbed i n t o the being of God t h a t man's freedom 
t o determine himself w i t h o u t God i s denied (and t h e r e f o r e , i n d i r e c t l y , 
God's freedom t o w i t h h o l d His grace from him). The f a i l u r e t o conceive 
o f a r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the order of c r e a t i o n and the order of 
grace, i n other words, i s evident i n both t h i n k e r s . The c r i t i c i s m i n 
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t h i s regard which Professor Taylor l e v e l s a t Hegel might also be 
l e v e l l e d a t K a r l Barth. I n Hegel a t h e o l o g i c a l c o n s t r i c t i o n i n which 
God cannot be God wi t h o u t man i s t o be observed: i n Barth the constr-
i c t i o n l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t man cannot be man with o u t God, not merely 
i n the order of c r e a t i o n but also i n the order of grace, so t h a t i t 
becomes not only the case t h a t as a created being man depends f o r h i s 
existence upon God and could not e x i s t w i t h o u t His sust a i n i n g w i l l , but 
also the case t h a t w i t h o u t God's grace he would cease t o be. Hegel 
presents a theology i n which the being of God i s threatened w i t h absorption 
i n t o the being of man, a c r i t i c i s m which looks knowingly forward through 
Hegel t o Feuerbach and Marx. Barth presents a theology i n which the being 
of man i s threatened w i t h absorption i n t o the being of God. This i s a 
much more d i f f i c u l t p o i n t t o make, perhaps, and y e t i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s have 
been i l l u s t r a t e d i n chapter f i v e , where we have t r i e d t o show how Barth's 
treatment o f the Enlightenment, and indeed the nineteenth century, as 
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i n s u f f i c i e n t l y a p p r e c i a t i v e of the Godness of God, of His transcendence 
and of the t h e o c e n t r i c nature of C h r i s t i a n i t y , i s i n f a c t a programme of 
resistance against a process of ' s e c u l a r i s a t i o n ' , of the removal of 
theology t o a status i n which i t cannot claim t o provide the p r i n c i p l e s 
i n terms o f which other d i s c i p l i n e s may be a r t i c u l a t e d . For these 
d i s c i p l i n e s , i n d e s c r i b i n g man and h i s environment, do not need t o do so 
on the basis of a t h e o l o g i c a l a priori. Such a development i n human 
thought does not n e c e s s a r i l y imply the r e j e c t i o n of t h e o l o g i c a l claims: 
but i t does imply something which D i e t r i c h Bonhoeffer captured so w e l l 
i n h i s Letters and Papers from Prison, namely t h a t man's 'coming of age' 
represents h i s awareness t h a t : 
173. 
God would have us know t h a t we must l i v e as men who manage our 
l i v e s w i t h o u t him ... we cannot be honest unless we recognise 
t h a t we have t o l i v e i n the world e t s i deus non daretur .... 
God as a working hypothesis i n morals, p o l i t i c s or science, 
has been surmounted and abolished; and the same t h i n g has 
happened i n philosophy and r e l i g i o n (Feuerbach!). For the 
sake o f i n t e l l e c t u a l honesty, t h a t working hypothesis should 
be dropped, or as f a r as po s s i b l e e l i m i n a t e d . A s c i e n t i s t or 
p h y s i c i a n who sets out t o e d i f y i s a h y b r i d . (100) 
I f one i s t o understand the i m p l i c a t i o n s of Barth's t h e o l o g i c a l 
e r r o r i n subsuming 'nature' w i t h i n 'grace', then i t l i e s i n h i s r e j e c t i o n 
of the s p i r i t w i t h which Bonhoeffer accepts t h a t ' s e c u l a r i s a t i o n ' may i n 
f a c t r e f l e c t the m a t u r i t y w i t h which man recognises t h a t he has been given 
by God the capacity t o understand himself and h i s environment without Him. 
Where Barth sees i n the s p i r i t of the Enlightenment an 'anthropomorphic' 
desire t o understand the being o f man apart from the being of God, 
Bonhoeffer sees i n the same s p i r i t a 'coming of age' whereby man. a t t a i n s 
the 'independence' of God which God w i l l s f o r him. I f Bonhoeffer's 
conclusions give r i s e i n Barth t o misgivings t h a t he, too, i s s u b t l y 
caught upon an anthropomorphic hook, Barth's conclusions express a note 
of triumphalism, and of the desire once more t o r e - i n t e g r a t e 'secular' 
d i s c i p l i n e s w i t h i n an all-embracing t h e o l o g i c a l scheme, which may appear 
u l t i m a t e l y hollow. To read volume I I I of the Church Dogmatics, i s t o 
perceive the dangers of reducing anthropology t o theology - and the dangers 
are profoundly t h e o l o g i c a l ones. I n the l a s t r e s o r t , they r e f l e c t what 
Bonhoeffer might designate an edging of God back o f f the cross i n t o the 
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world, expressed through a f a i l u r e t o l i v e i n the world without God. 
That our t h e s i s should have begun by questioning an ' i n f i n i t e 
q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' between God and man i n the commentary on Romans 
and now be s t r e s s i n g the importance of an independence of man from God 
as the o b j e c t of His f r e e l y - g i v e n gracious a c t i v i t y , i s explained by the 
development of a methodology by which Barth seeks t o overcome t h i s 
' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' by i n t e g r a t i n g man ' i n t o ' God, h i s 
n a t u r a l being d e r i v i n g from the d i v i n e s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n . Mans power t o 
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'confront' God, o r i g i n a l l y denied i n terms of t h e i r i n h a b i t i n g two 
separate orders o f being, i s now denied i n terms of an 'absorption' of 
man ' i n t o ' God, where he no longer possesses the independence t h a t i s a 
c o n d i t i o n o f such ' c o n f r o n t a t i o n ' . The process by which the being of 
man i s e f f e c t i v e l y 'aufgehoben' w i t h i n the being of God i n Barth's 
thought, not so as t o threaten the Godness of God (as i n Hegel) , but the 
humanity o f man, i s a d i a l e c t i c a l s h i f t which undermines the r e a l 
d i a l e c t i c o f man's r e l a t i o n s h i p t o God i n p r e c i s e l y the way t h a t Hegel's 
d i a l e c t i c does, despite the f a c t t h a t Barth claims t o present an 
a l t e r n a t i v e - even an opposite - system t o t h a t of Hegel. I t i s usual 
t o regard the treatment of God as an 'extension' of man's knowledge of 
himsel f as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c danger of ide a l i s m i n the Hegelian mould: 
our c l a i m i s t h a t the treatment of man as an extension of God's 
knowledge of Himself i s an accurate c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of Barth's 
theology, and t h a t i n a c r u c i a l respect i t works away at a ' t h e o l o g i c a l 
r e alism' as much as Hegel's d i a l e c t i c , eroding i t from the other end. 
This cla i m w i l l be s u b s t a n t i a t e d i n the next chapter. 
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11. Barth, K a r l and Brunner, Emil, op. cit., p. 121. This theme i s taken 
up i n Professor Torrance's essay, 'The Epistemological Relevance of 
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reference of the S p i r i t t h a t we f i n d the answer t o our most 
d i f f i c u l t questions. How i s i t t h a t we t h i n k by means of our 
human t h i n k i n g what u t t e r l y transcends our thought? How i s i t 
human beings, by means of human language, have come t o speak of 
what i s i n e f f a b l e ? How can we through human words which are 
c o r r e l a t e d t o created r e a l i t i e s speak t r u l y o f the Supreme Being 
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This i s what takes place through the operation of the Holy S p i r i t 
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As we s h a l l show i n the next chapter, Torrance i s i n f a c t s t r a i n i n g 
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t o 'jump out o f h i s c o g n i t i v e s k i n ' by means of the Holy S p i r i t . 
For 1 t o t h i n k by means o f our human t h i n k i n g what u t t e r l y transcends 
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12. the d o c t r i n e o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h alone assumes f o r Barth 
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by a theology which hopes t o remain f a i t h f u l t o the Word of God1.. 
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Review, 1969, p.273.) 
13. See Barth and Brunner, Natural Theology, p.97: 
.... there can be as l i t t l e question o f a co-operation of reason 
i n the knowledge o f the t r u e God, as of a co-operation of the 
human w i l l i n the f u l f i l m e n t of the d i v i n e commandments .... 
14. For t h i s view of the Reformation, see the compelling arguments of 
Jean Delumeau, i n Naissance et Affirmation de la Reforme, pp.49-78. 
Delumeau t a l k s of 'une grande angoisse c o l l e c t i v e ' (p.50) t o which 
the Reformation ' f u t d'abord une reponse r e l i g i e u s e ' . However, h i s 
t h e s i s i s h e a v i l y r e l i a n t upon the p o r t r a i t of l a t e mediaeval society 
i n J. Huizinga's The Waning of the Middle Ages. 
15. Barth and Brunner, op. cit., pp. 35f f . 
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t o argue, Brunner's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Reformers does not 
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Brunner, op. cit., pp. 9 5 f f . 
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The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f C h r i s t i a n theology, and somehow also the 
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18. Theologische Existenz Heute, Vol. 14, p.56: E.T. Natural Theology, 
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19. Church Dogmatics, Vol. 2, Part 1, p.225. 
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24. Ibid. 1 
25. Ferre, F. , Language, Logic and God, pp. 73-4. 
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28. Church Dogmatics, Vol. 2, Part 1, p.231. 
29. Ibid. , p.229. 
30. Ibid., p. 182 
31. Ibid., p.192. 
32. Ibid., p.232. 
33. Church Dogmatics, V o l . 3, Part 1, pp. 351ff. 
34. Church Dogmatics, Vol. 2, Part 1, p.230. One here senses t h a t Barth 
c o n f r o n t s s i m i l a r problems t o Plato where considering the question 
o f whether there e x i s t e d an Idea or Form of mud and other common 
substances. 
35. See above f o r c r i t i c i s m o f Barth's use of analogy. 
36. See Church Dogmatics, Vol. 1. Part 1, pp.243-4: . 
Our r e p l y t o the Roman Catho l i c d o c t r i n e of the analogia e n t i s 
i s n o t , then, a d e n i a l of the concept of analogy. We say ra t h e r 
t h a t the analogy i n question i s not an analogia e n t i s but 
according t o Romans 12:6 the ctvaXoyta THS ULCTTEWS , the 
liken e s s of the known i n the knowing, .... of the Word of God 
i n the word t h a t i s thought and spoken by man .... 
37. Barth and Brunner, Natural Theology, p. 95. 
38. I n Barth's own words: 
N a t u r a l theology ( t h e o l o g i a n a t u r a l i s ) i s included and brought 
i n t o c l e a r l i g h t i n the theology of r e v e l a t i o n (theologia 
r e v e l a t a ) ; i n the r e a l i t y o f d i v i n e grace i s included the 
t r u t h o f the d i v i n e Creation. I n t h i s sense i t i s tr u e t h a t 
'Grace does not destroy nature but completes i t ' ( g r a t i a non 
t o l l i t naturam sed p e r f i c i t ) . The meaning of the Word of God 
becomes manifest as i t brings i n t o f u l l l i g h t ... the 
f o r g o t t e n t r u t h of the Creation. 
(Barth, K., Theology and Church, p.342.) 
39. B o u i l l a r d admits t h a t : 
I I e t a i t f a c i l e de s a i s i r une a f f i n i t e entre l a d i a l e c t i q u e 
du Romerbrief e t l a d i a l e c t i q u e hegelienne. 
( B o u i l l a r d , H., Parole de Dieu et Existence Humaine, Vol. 2, 
p.297.) 
I t i s also possible t o extend the a f f i n i t y t o Barth's l a t e r works, 
even t o h i s Church Dogmatics, i n f a c t perhaps p a r t i c u l a r l y t o t h a t 
s y n t h e t i c work. B o u i l l a r d makes the p o i n t t h a t Barth's work i s 
more accurately viewed i n the context of the Protestant Reformation 
than t h a t of German Idealism, but t h i s f o r g e t s t h a t the l a t t e r was 
i t s e l f deeply i n f l u e n c e d by the r e l i g i o u s thought of the Reformation. 
That Hegel sought t o be a Lutheran C h r i s t i a n - even, a t one p o i n t , 
a pastor - as w e l l as a 'modern' philosopher i s a p o i n t made by 
Barth himself i n h i s Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 
which devotes a long and i n t e r e s t i n g chapter t o Hegel. 
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Nevertheless, B o u i l l a r d f e e l s t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s between Barth 
and Hegel are as s i g n i f i c a n t as the s i m i l a r i t i e s , and t h a t i n the 
l a s t r e s o r t : 
Prenons done l a pensee barthienne pour ce q u ' e l l e e s t : 
son o r i g i n a l i t e e s t i r r i d u c t i b l e . (Ibid., p.299.) 
However, we f e e l t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s o u t l i n e d by B o u i l l a r d are 
not i n f a c t as r e a l as he imagines. Above a l l he draws a t t e n t i o n 
t o the d i f f e r e n c e i n terms of the f a c t t h a t Hegel's d i a l e c t i c , 
u n l i k e Barth's, suppresses the freedom o f God i n His r e v e l a t i o n : 
E n f i n , e t e'est l e g r i e f d e c i s i f , 1 ' i d e n t i f i c a t i o n de Dieu 
it l a methode d i a l e c t i q u e de l a logique supprime l a l i b e r t e 
de Dieu dans sa r e v e l a t i o n . (Ibid., p. 298.) 
As we argue i n the course o f t h i s chapter, however, there is_ a 
sense i n which Barth's theology i t s e l f suppresses the freedom of 
God i n h i s r e v e l a t i o n , namely by f a i l i n g t o make the creature a 
d i s t i n c t o b j e c t of the Creator's grace, which may be f r e e l y given 
t o or w i t h h e l d from i t : f o r God t o w i t h h o l d His grace i s e f f e c t -
i v e l y f o r Him t o a n n i h i l a t e the creature w i t h i n the scheme of 
Barth's d i a l e c t i c , a f a c t t h a t denies God's freedom t o r e l a t e 
Himself t o the creature by g i v i n g or w i t h h o l d i n g His grace. Barth, 
we argue, makes p r e c i s e l y the opposite mistake t o Hegel, namely t o 
make man too dependent upon God r a t h e r than God too dependent upon 
man. Of course i n one sense man cannot be too dependent upon God -
he e x i s t s only through the s u s t a i n i n g w i l l o f h i s maker. Neverthe-
l e s s , w i t h i n the ambit of t h a t dependent existence, he possesses a 
r e a l o b j e c t i v i t y before God which allows h i s Creator f r e e l y t o give 
or t o w i t h h o l d His grace from him, a d i v i n e g i f t which i s d i s t i n c t 
from t h a t g i f t by which the creature i s given l i f e and being. This 
we discuss a t length i n the main body of the t e x t . 
Our conclusion i s t h a t Barth and Hegel make a n t i t h e t i c a l e r r o r s , 
but through a common f a i l i n g , which i s one of undermining a r e a l 
o n t o l o g i c a l separateness between God and man which i s the foundation 
of a ' r e a l i s t ' perspective (see chapter 7 ) . I n Hegel the separatene 
i s denied i n a way t h a t a s s i m i l a t e s God.too c l o s e l y t o the r e a l i t y 
of man: i n Barth i t i s denied i n a way t h a t assimilates man too 
c l o s e l y t o the r e a l i t y o f God. 
Von Balthasar also sees an a f f i n i t y between Barth and Hegel: 
Die D a r s t e l l u n g der Hegelschen Philosophie i n Barths Geschichte 
der Protestantischen Theologie .... i s t von solchem Schwung, 
solcher Uberzeugungskraft, dass eine A r t K o n g e n i a l i t a t des 
Denkens gar n i c h t zu tlbersehen i s t . 
(von Balthazar, Karl Barth : Darstellung und Deutung Seiner 
Theologie, pp. 218-9.) 
But von Balthasar also sees the deeper p o i n t of s i m i l a r i t y between . 
Barth and Hegel: 
Doch (Ibersehe man n i c h t , dass die Vereinbarkeit von Gott und 
GeschOpf auch i n der Z e i t der Dogmatik z u l e t z t auf der 
C h r i s t o l o g i e b a s i e r t , dass aber gerade i n Christus die beiden 
naturen, die g t t t t l i c h e und die menschliche, nur i n der 
I d e n t i t S t der einen g O t t l i c h e n Person beieinander sein kOnnen, 
und dass a l l e s , was im geschflpflichen Raum Geist und Person 
h e i s s t , ohne diese ursprungliche I d e n t i t a t wiederum n i c h t 
gedacht werden d a r f . (Ibid., p. 219.) 
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C e r t a i n l y B a r t h ' s C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m appears to s e t himself apart 
from Hegel: y e t the manner of h i s C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m i s one i n which 
the whole c r e a t e d order i s to be understood i n the l i g h t of an 
o r i g i n a l u n i t y of the d i v i n e and human i n the Person of C h r i s t . 
Our contention i s t h a t Barth's C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m i s one t h a t f a i l s 
to a llow f o r a d i s t i n c t i o n between the orders of grace and c r e a t i o n , 
which i s p r e c i s e l y the charge brought a g a i n s t Hegel by P r o f e s s o r 
T a y l o r (Hegel, pp. 489-495). 
40. See the essa y by D.M. Mackinnon i n Essays in Christology for Karl 
Barth, ed. T.H.L. Parker, pp.256-297. Mackinnon comments: 
For Barth t h e r e are no problems i n theology which are not 
i n the end c h r i s t o c e n t r i c . (p. 282) 
Mackinnon draws an i n t e r e s t i n g p a r a l l e l between the concern of the 
l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t to ' s u b s t i t u t e l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n out of the 
observable f o r i n f e r r e d , unobserved e n t i t i e s ' , and what he sees to 
be an analogous ' l o g i c a l economy 1 i n B a r t h : 
We must, he i n s i s t s , s u b s t i t u t e f o r a b s t r a c t , general statements 
concerning the being and purposes of God, and of men, statements 
t h a t show them i n terms of, or s e t them i n r e l a t i o n to, Jesus 
C h r i s t . (p. 284) 
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I n an important essay,"'' Dr R.H. Roberts comments upon Barth's 
theology as f o l l o w s : 
Both (Hegel and Barth are being r e f e r r e d to) t r i e d t o do what 
Kant had c r i t i c i s e d as beyond human p o s s i b i l i t y , namely t o 
regrasp the i n f i n i t e , a pretension precluded by the Kantian 
c r i t i q u e o f human knowledge. (2) 
They went, however, i n d i f f e r e n t and opposite d i r e c t i o n s , Hegel i n 
t h a t of an i n f i n i t e grasped by the f i n i t e , Barth i n t h a t of a f i n i t e 
grasped by the i n f i n i t e . As we i n d i c a t e d a t the end of the l a s t chapter 
the problem f o r Hegel's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f C h r i s t i a n i t y i s t h a t o f whethe 
God remains f r e e from man, able t o give or w i t h h o l d His grace w i t h o u t 
compromising His d i v i n e being, or whether i n f a c t man i s a necessity f o r 
God i n Hegel's system. 'Would God s t i l l be God witho u t man?' i s the 
question which Hegel must answer. 
The problem f o r Barth's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f C h r i s t i a n i t y i s the 
opposite one. Does man remain f r e e from God i n Barth's thought, free 
from God i n the sense t h a t - a t l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e - God may wi t h h o l d 
His grace from him? Or i s the g i v i n g of grace.so as s i m i l a t e d t o the 
b r i n g i n g o f man i n t o being t h a t w i t h o u t God's grace the creature ceases 
t o e x i s t ? I s God a necessity f o r man i n Barth's 'system', not only i n 
the sense t h a t w i t h o u t God's grace man cannot be saved, but also i n the 
sense t h a t w i t h o u t h i s grace he cannot e x i s t , even i n the form of an 
unredeemed sinner? 
I n chapter four we sought t o o u t l i n e Barth's t h e o l o g i c a l method i n 
i 
the l i g h t o f h i s work on Anselm, Fides Quaerens Intellectum• We saw 
t h a t Barth's defence o f Anselm was accompanied by a r e f u t a t i o n o f any 
understanding o f the Proslogion as the r i g h t f u l o b j e c t of Kant's attack 
upon the o n t o l o g i c a l argument f o r the existence of God. For the b e n e f i t 
of our argument i n t h i s chapter, i t would be w e l l t o r e c a l l the nature 
of Kant's a t t a c k , which concentrates upon a f a i l u r e i n Descartes (the 
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o b j e c t o f h i s attack on the o n t o l o g i c a l proof) t o d i s t i n g u i s h the order 
of knowing from the order of being. I n the well-known statement, 
'Existence i s not a p r e d i c a t e 1 , Kant i s arguing t h a t t o say of an ob j e c t , 
t h a t i t e x i s t s , i s not t o describe an a d d i t i o n a l q u a l i t y of the o b j e c t , 
i n a d d i t i o n f o r instance t o saying t h a t i t i s round and yellow. I t i s 
not an a t t r i b u t e of the o b j e c t t h a t i s being described when i t i s sai d 
t o e x i s t , b ut ra t h e r a statement about the whole o b j e c t i s being made, 
namely t h a t i t e x i s t s not only i n thought but i n r e a l i t y . Kant's way of 
i l l u s t r a t i n g t h i s was t o say t h a t a sum of money does not become greater 
by imagining i t t o ' e x i s t ' ; i t i s the same sum, but now claimed t o e x i s t 
i n the order of being and not merely i n the mind. Hence, when Descartes 
t r e a t e s 'existence' as one o f the 'perfections' of God, he i s t r e a t i n g 
existence as a q u a l i t y or pre d i c a t e i n the f a l s e sense described. He 
t h i n k s i t describes an a d d i t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of God, ra t h e r than 
saying o f God as already characterised t h a t He e x i s t s i n r e a l i t y as 
w e l l as i n idea.^ 
For most c r i t i c s o f the o n t o l o g i c a l p roof, Kant's argument applies 
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t o Anselm hi m s e l f . For i t appears t o be e s s e n t i a l t o Anselm's argument 
t h a t i t i s 'greater' f o r a t h i n g t o e x i s t than not t o , and c l e a r l y i m p l i e d 
here i s the idea t h a t existence i s a q u a l i t y of God, one o f the a t t r i b u t e s 
t h a t make Him t h a t than which nothing greater can be conceived. Anselm does 
not recognise, t h a t so f a r as what i s conceived i s concerned, God remains 
e x a c t l y the same and t h e r e f o r e e x a c t l y as 'great' whether He e x i s t s or 
not. He supposes t h a t saying God e x i s t s changes the content of the idea 
of Him, r a t h e r than saying o f the same content, t h a t i t e x i s t s i n r e a l i t y 
and not i n idea'alone. 
I t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t Kant i n s i s t s upon, between 
what e x i s t s i n idea alone, and what i n idea and r e a l i t y , which makes i t 
p o s s i b l e f o r him t o argue, both t h a t r e a l i t y can never be p a r t of our 
idea o f i t , and t h a t our ideas can never be p a r t of the r e a l i t y known 
through them. 
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The Kantian epistemology represented i n t h i s r e f u t a t i o n of the 
' o n t o l o g i c a l p r o o f i s p r e c i s e l y what Barth overcomes i n h i s work on 
Anselm, as indeed Hegel seeks t o overcome i t i n h i s own assertion o f 
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the v a l i d i t y . o f the proof. But where Hegel overcomes i t by a s s i m i l a t i n g 
r e a l i t y t o our ideas of i t , Barth overcomes i t by a s s i m i l a t i n g our ideas 
t o the r e a l i t y known through them. I t i s the purpose of t h i s chapter 
t o make c l e a r t h i s argument i n r e l a t i o n t o Barth. We s h a l l do so by 
examining the p h i l o s o p h i c a l arguments of a modern i n t e r p r e t e r of Barth, 
Professor T.F. Torrance. Our claim i s t h a t i n Torrance, as i n Barth, 
the professed d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge and r e a l i t y , fundamental t o 
any p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e a l i s m which attempts t o d i s t i n g u i s h between the mind 
and the w o r l d which e x i s t s as the object of i t s understanding, and t o 
which i t s concepts r e f e r , is- o b l i t e r a t e d . 
I n 'The Epistemological Relevance of the Holy S p i r i t ' , Torrance 
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professes t o recognise the d i s t i n c t i o n between throught and being: 
We proceed by e s t a b l i s h i n g r e l a t i o n s between throught and being 
but always by r e j e c t i n g any confusion between them .... (7) 
I n a l l our knowledge, even of created t h i n g s , where we are concerned 
w i t h the r e l a t i o n of thought t o being, we are up against what i s 
transcendent t o thought and always reaches beyond what we are able 
t o s p e c i f y . (8) 
I n r e l a t i o n t o knowledge of God, Torrance appears at the s t a r t of h i s 
a r t i c l e t o be committed t o the i n e v i t a b l e r o l e played by human conceptual 
apparatus i n t h e o l o g i c a l understanding: 
Even though God transcends a l l t h a t we can t h i n k and say of Him, 
i t s t i l l holds good t h a t we cannot have experience of Him or 
b e l i e v e i n Him w i t h o u t conceptual forms of understanding .... (9) 
However, i n the same paragraph we f i n d Torrance arguing t h a t the 
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'epistemological' r o l e of the S p i r i t i s t o carry us 'beyond' such 
conceptual forms: 
I t i s only through the S p i r i t t h a t such trans-formal experience 
i s p o s s i b l e , f o r i t i s by His power t h a t we are enabled t o know 
beyond ourselves and t o d i s t i n g u i s h what we know from our 
knowing of i t , so t h a t our knowing of Him f a l l s under the 
c o n t i n u a l i n f o r m i n g and shaping of what He makes known of 
Himself. (10) 
185. 
I n other words, the Holy S p i r i t enables us t o 'know beyond 
ourselves' (p. 185), t o be drawn across the conceptual forms of our 
understanding so t h a t we are no longer knowing 'through' them and 
th e r e f o r e are no longer bound by t h e i r l i m i t a t i o n s , i n t o a s t a t e where 
our knowing i s d i r e c t l y determined by God himself i n h i s S p i r i t . This 
i s the answer t o the question which Torrance asks: 'How i s i t t h a t we 
t h i n k by means of our human t h i n k i n g what u t t e r l y transcends our 
thought? 1 (p. 186). 
Man i n h i s estrangement from, and enmity towards, God, cannot know 
the d i v i n e being through h i s own powers of knowing. But through the 
Holy S p i r i t he may, i n Torrance's view, bypass those powers damaged by 
s i n t o reach a ' d i r e c t ' knowledge of God i n which man i s c a r r i e d 'above 
and beyond h i m s e l f t o ' r e a l knowledge of the d i v i n e being'. There i s a 
merely p e r i p h e r a l r o l e f o r the n a t u r a l human understanding as such, 
namely t h a t o f acknowledging, i n i t s inadequacy f o r d i r e c t knowledge of 
God, t h a t i t has been ' c a r r i e d beyond i t s e l f and given understanding 
through the leading of the S p i r i t : 
Thus theology does not know God by v i r t u e of i t s own ideas and 
concepts .... but only i n response t o God's Word .... and only 
under the leading of His S p i r i t , and t h e r e f o r e only i n humble 
acknowledgement t h a t i t s own thought i s inadequate t o i t s o b j e c t , 
.... and only i n thanksgiving and wonder at the mercy of God who 
i n s p i t e of a l l i s pleased t o .... confer upon our thought, as i t 
f a l l s under the a c t i o n of His S p i r i t and Word, the t r u t h of His 
own Being. (11) 
The problem, f o r Torrance, i s t h a t of how our knowledge can be 
' c a r r i e d beyond i t s e l f and yet remain our knowledge. C e r t a i n l y i t can 
be extended, receive new ideas, encounter new objects - but only as i t 
a s s i m i l a t e s them according t o i t s own r e c e i v i n g capacity can i t have 
knowledge o f them. Torrance's understanding of the no t i o n of 'knowing 
beyond ourselves 1 i s t h a t we 'know beyond our knowledge', so t h a t the 
framework of understanding f o r r e c e i v i n g r e v e l a t i o n i s the Holy S p i r i t 
i t s e l f and not our l i m i t e d c o n c e p t u a l i t y - and t h i s i s the argument of 
Barth against Brunner too (see chapter s i x ) . However, i f the framework 
of our understanding i s the Holy S p i r i t , then t h i s might seem t o mean 
186. 
t h a t the Holy S p i r i t understands God, not t h a t we do. I f we are t o 
understand God, then we must s u r e l y know Him from our own epistemological 
resources; i n order t o accommodate t h i s c r i t i c i s m Torrance has our own 
n a t u r a l powers of understanding i n the background 'acknowledging', i n a 
k i n d o f humble aporia, what the d i r e c t l y conferred knowledge t h a t we 
have 'beyond ourselves!' has received from the Holy S p i r i t . Such 
'acknowledgment' p o i n t s t o the untroublesome, passive r o l e played by the 
n a t u r a l reason 'rebaptised' w i t h i n the ambit of God's r e v e l a t i o n . 
Yet i t may s t i l l be argued t h a t we are i n f a c t determined, i n an 
important sense, merely by t h i s r o l e which our n a t u r a l reason has of 
'acknowledgment'; and t h a t the s o - c a l l e d 'knowledge beyond ourselves 1 
i s a knowledge t o which we cannot be admitted, since our knowledge can 
only f u n c t i o n where the forms of a n a t u r a l human conceptuality are 
maintained. 
The 'acknowledgment' of which Torrance speaks, echoing Barth's 
concept of 'Denken h e i s s t Nachdenken' - l i t e r a l l y t h a t t h e o l o g i c a l 
r e f l e c t i o n i s a t h i n k i n g of God's thought ' a f t e r ' him - does not solve 
the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l paradox a t the r o o t of h i s argument. I f our knowledge 
o f what God reveals i s our knowledge, then i t must be assimilated by us. 
I f , , however, i t i s a s s i m i l a t e d by us, then i t has t o conform t o the nature 
of our understanding. But i n t h a t case, how can i t be knowledge of God? 
E i t h e r , then, i t i s our knowledge, but not our knowledge of God, or i t i s 
knowledge o f God, but not our knowledge. 1 1 a 
Torrance's claim t h a t i t i s our acknowledgment of a knowledge of God 
i n which we are ' c a r r i e d beyond ourselves' to.a capacity f o r r e v e l a t i o n 
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conferred by the Holy S p i r i t , then, raises d i f f i c u l t i e s . He sees i t as 
the acknowledgment of a miracle by which we are enabled t o 'know beyond 
ourselves' - i n Barth's language we become 'new men' altogether i n the 
grace of r e v e l a t i o n (hence the r e f e r r i n g of Brunner t o 2 Corinthians) ^ -
and are given by grace a capacity not p r e v i o u s l y possessed t o understand 
God. We are admitted t o knowledge o f Him through the c o n f e r r i n g of a 
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'donum g r a t i a e ' which provides a supernatural power of cognisance. I n 
the c o n f e r r i n g of t h a t g i f t of grace, however, what r i g h t have we s t i l l 
t o r e f e r t o ourselves as the possessors of t h a t d i v i n e l y created knowledge 
w i t h i n us? As 'new men' i n the grace of r e v e l a t i o n we must remain i n 
c o n t i n u i t y w i t h our former selves. Barth i s concerned t o p r o t e c t t h i s 
c o n t i n u i t y i n s o f a r as he emphasises the r o l e of the n a t u r a l reason 
'rebaptised' w i t h i n the r e v e l a t i o n i n Jesus C h r i s t from whose r e a l i t y 
t h a t reason i s derived. Torrance i s also concerned t o p r o t e c t t h i s 
c o n t i n u i t y i n h i s emphasis upon our 'acknowledgment' of the knowledge 
had from 'beyond ourselves': f o r w i t h o u t such acknowledgment i t could 
be argued t h a t we have ceased t o e x i s t a l t o g e t h e r , or t h a t the beings 
who have knowledge i n the l i g h t of r e v e l a t i o n are not i n f a c t the beings 
who e x i s t e d apart from i t , t o whom t h a t r e v e l a t i o n came. Man cannot 
become a 'new c r e a t i o n ' i n C h r i s t i n the sense t h a t he f i r s t came i n t o 
existence at t h a t moment; f o r the f i r s t c r e a t i o n came out of nothing, 
the second comes out of the o l d Adam. The o l d Adam 'acknowledges' i t s 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t o the new Adam. 
This process of 'acknowledgment' i s an 'Aufhebung' of our n a t u r a l 
reason, through which i t i s denied i n an autonomy set apart from God, 
but r e a f f i r m e d ' w i t h i n ' the d i v i n e being i n the grace of r e v e l a t i o n . 
As 'aufgehoben 1, however, man's nature, even as i t e x i s t s i n the l i g h t 
of God's grace, must continue t o make sense of the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
i t s e l f and God. Even as transformed by the grace of God, man must remain 
man, separate i n h i s knowledge from God as the obj e c t of t h a t knowledge. 
Even when 'taken up i n t o ' the r e a l i t y of the d i v i n e being, and knowing 
God i n h i s 'being known by' Him, man i s not God, nor a p a r t of God, nor 
can he cease t o be d i s t i n c t from God. I f we look more c l o s e l y at 
Torrance's scheme, however, we begin t o discern a f a i l u r e t o mark t h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n : we observe a tendency t o f o r g e t the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
thought and being which i n t u r n ensures a d i s t i n c t i o n between the knower, 
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be i t man or God, and the known, be i t God or man. The fundamental 
sense o f knowledge as knowledge ' o f something, of a r e a l i t y e x t e r n a l 
t o i t s e l f , i s e f f e c t i v e l y l o s t . I n man's knowledge of God, we f i n d the 
knowing sub j e c t made p a r t of the o b j e c t which he knows, as the r e a l i t y 
of God i n His s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n swallows up and devours man as a being set 
apart from h i s c r e a t o r and given grace, i n h i s apartness, t o understand 
Him. We see, i n e f f e c t , the d e s t r u c t i o n of man i n God. Despite the 
assurances i n 'The Epistemological Relevance of the Holy S p i r i t ' , deeper 
e x p l o r a t i o n of Torrance's thought convinces us t h a t the man who knows 
i n s o f a r as he i s known by God e f f e c t i v e l y ceases t o be man at a l l : he 
becomes an absorbed p a r t of God's self-knowledge, no longer able t o be 
seen as a source of knowledge and r e a c t i o n i n ' r e l a t i v e independence' 
of h i s c r e a t o r . The r e a l i t y of man i s denied by the r e a l i t y of God and 
the o n ly r e a l i t y becomes t h a t of God himself, w i t h the c r e a t i o n the 
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u n s u b s t a n t i a l content of a p r o j e c t e d d i v i n e v i s i o n . I n these claims 
concerning Torrance, l i e s our c o n v i c t i o n t h a t an 'acknowledgment' of a 
knowledge which we have 'beyond ourselves' makes no sense, and t h a t what 
we know 'beyond ourselves 1 we cannot acknowledge, since i n no sense can 
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we be the possessors of such knowledge. The idea of 'acknowledgment' 
is 1- merely the means by which Torrance t r i e s somehow t o earth i n humanity 
a knowledge which humanity cannot have. 
I n a h i g h l y suggestive s e c t i o n of h i s book Space, Time and Resurrection 
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the f i n a l chapter on 'The Lord of Space and Time', Professor Torrance 
attempts t o examine the b e n e f i t s t o theology today: 
.... from dialogue w i t h the n a t u r a l sciences, w i t h i n the r a d i c a l l y 
transformed outlook upon the universe which they have brought 
about .... (17) 
He takes up a theme mentioned i n the preface t o h i s book, where he 
discusses the r e l a t i o n between Barth's a t t i t u d e t o 'natural theology' 
and E i n s t e i n ' s account of the r e l a t i o n of geometry t o physics. He put 
the p o i n t , Torrance r e c a l l s , t o Barth i n the f o l l o w i n g way: 
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With r e l a t i v i t y theory E i n s t e i n r e j e c t e d the Newtonian dualism 
between absolute mathematical space and time and bodies i n motion. 
He argued, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i n s t e a d o f i d e a l i s i n g geometry by 
detaching i t from experience, and making i t an independent 
conceptual system which was then used as a r i g i d framework w i t h i n 
which p h y s i c a l knowledge i s t o be pursued and organised, geometry 
must be brought i n t o the midst of physics .... Instead of being 
swallowed up by physics and disappearing, however, geometry becomes 
the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e i n the heart of physics, although i t 
i s incomplete w i t h o u t physics. I t i s i n a s i m i l a r way, I argued, 
t h a t K a r l Barth t r e a t s n a t u r a l theology when he r e j e c t s i t s status 
as a .... preamble of f a i t h , or an independent conceptual system 
antecedent t o a c t u a l knowledge of God .... instead of r e j e c t i n g 
n a t u r a l theology t o u t c o u r t , Barth has transposed i t i n t o the 
m a t e r i a l content of theology where, i n a changed form i t c o n s t i t u t e s 
the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of our knowledge of God .... (18) 
Barth's r e a c t i o n t o t h i s argument of Torrance was apparently t o say: 
I must have been a b l i n d hen not t o see t h a t analogy before. 
(19) 
I n Newtonian science, Torrance claims, i t was possible t o separate or 
a b s t r a c t the t h e o r e t i c a l form i n which r e a l i t y was t o be grasped from 
the f a c t s so understood. I t was t h e r e f o r e possible t o have a 'conceptual 
system' ('epistemological s t r u c t u r e ' ) which prescribed t o the r e a l i t y 
which i t set out t o understand how i t must appear i f i t was t o be under-
stood at a l l . The r e a l i t y of bodies i n motion had t o conform t o the 
t h e o r e t i c a l understanding of 'absolute mathematical space and time'. To 
take another example: 
The o l d e r view of r e a l i t y was one i n which i t s analysed p a r t i c u l a r s 
(atoms, p a r t i c l e s , etc.) were conceived of as being e x t e r n a l l y and 
i n v a r i a b l y connected i n terms of causes. (20) 
I n other words, the conceptual system according t o which r e a l i t y 
must be understood i n terms of a t h e o r e t i c a l framework of cause and e f f e c t 
p r escribes t o r e a l i t y i t s e l f (atoms, p a r t i c l e s , etc.) how i t s h a l l be 
seen t o behave. 
We might wonder whether Torrance's o p p o s i t i o n i s r e a l l y t o the 'older 
view o f Newton or t o t h a t of Kant. He would have t o face.Kant's 
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i n s i s t e n c e t h a t 'objects must conform t o our knowledge 1, i n the sense 
t h a t the only r e a l i t y which we may understand i s one received by, and 
t h e r e f o r e ordered according t o the nature o f , the mind. His r a d i c a l 
argument i s not t o question Kant's emphasis upon the a c t i v e r o l e of the 
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human mind i n understanding, but t o question the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the s t r u c t u r e of the understanding mind and t h a t of the r e a l i t y through 
contact w i t h which the mind embarks upon the process of comprehension. 
Let us examine Torrance 1s claim t h a t n a t u r a l theology has become 
a conceptual system divorced from the r e a l i t y o f God's actu a l s e l f -
r e v e l a t i o n , p r e s c r i b i n g t o t h a t r e v e l a t i o n what i t s nature s h a l l be. 
The n a t u r a l theologian's determination of what may be known of God, 
according t o Torrance's c r i t i c i s m , prescribes what He may a c t u a l l y reveal 
o f Himself. I n t h i s sense, i t attempts t o r u l e God. Barth's 'trans-
p o s i t i o n ' , of n a t u r a l theology i n t o 'the m a t e r i a l content of theology', 
Torrance i s c l a i m i n g , makes i t s r o l e one where i t derives i t s form from 
r e v e l a t i o n r a t h e r than p r e s c r i b i n g a pre-determined form to_ r e v e l a t i o n . 
This was indeed our understanding of Barth's argument against Brunner 
discussed i n chapter s i x . 
However, Torrance seems t o s l i d e from the p o i n t t h a t modern physics, 
u n l i k e i t s Newtonian predecessor, cannot be understood i n terms which 
a b s t r a c t space and time from the 'material content' of both, t o the p o i n t 
t h a t our understanding of r e a l i t y i s not capable of being abstracted 
from r e a l i t y i t s e l f . This l a t t e r p o i n t i s more d o u b t f u l , and must 
th r e a t e n Torrance's i n s i s t e n c e i n God and Rationality upon the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between thought and being. Unless there i s a separation of knowledge 
from r e a l i t y , there cannot be knowledge a t a l l , again f o r the Kantian 
reason t h a t a l l knowledge i s the knowledge of o b j e c t s , presupposing a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between knower and known. And because knowledge i s mental, 
our understanding cannot be divorced from the determining s t r u c t u r e s of 
the mind. 
Our worry i s w i t h Torrance's use of the term 1epistemological 
s t r u c t u r e 1 . Epistemological s t r u c t u r e s are s t r u c t u r e s of knowledge, and 
sometimes Torrance seems t o be suggesting t h a t we must f i n d these 
s t r u c t u r e s ' i n s i d e ' the r e a l i t i e s w i t h which they seek t o deal. I t i s 
t h i s t h a t we are attempting t o question. 
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On the other hand, i t i s c l e a r e r t o see what Torrance i s saying 
when he t a l k s o f a 'dynamic view of the world' as: 
.... a continuous i n t e g r a t e d manifold of f i e l d s of force i n which 
r e l a t i o n s between bodies are j u s t as o n t o l o g i c a l l y r e a l as the 
bodies themselves, f o r i t i s i n t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s and t r a n s -
formations t h a t things are found t o be what and as and when they 
are. (22) 
The p o i n t here seems t o be a d i f f e r e n t one. E i n s t e i n disproves the 
idea t h a t space and time e x i s t independently of the bodies t h a t are ' i n ' 
them. Rather, space and time e x i s t only ' i n r e l a t i o n t o ' bodies i n motion. 
The discovery t h a t o b j e c t s a t very high speeds experience a slower passing 
o f time, f o r instance, shows t h a t time, f a r from being an independent 
bac k c l o t h t o the behaviour of matter, can only be considered i n r e l a t i o n 
t o t h a t behaviour. Time i s not an e n t i r e l y independent context f o r the 
a c t i v i t y of matter, and as Torrance argues i n h i s book, Space, Time and 
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Incarnation i n c r i t i c i s m of a 'receptacle' view of space, nor i s space. 
Space has been s i m i l a r l y viewed as an independent backcloth f o r the 
behaviour of m a t e r i a l p a r t i c l e s , or i n Torrance's analogy as a bowl or 
receptacle may be considered as a vessel containing contents which behave 
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w i t h i n i t s confines i n an e n t i r e l y independent manner. Torrance's 
advocacy o f a ' r e l a t i o n a l ' r a t h e r than 'receptacle' view of space and 
time i n t h i s book p a r a l l e l s h i s treatment i n Space, Time and Resurrection. 
But Torrance wants t o do more than t h i s . I n Space, Time and 
Resurrection, he wants, by i d e n t i f y i n g space and time w i t h a 'conceptual' 
r a t h e r than a ' r e a l ' system, t o argue t h a t modern physics i l l u s t r a t e s 
how our knowledge of r e a l i t y , r a t h e r than p r e s c r i b i n g t o r e a l i t y i t s 
nature, must somehow proceed from ' w i t h i n ' i t and be determined d i r e c t l y 
by i t . At l e a s t , t h i s seems t o be the only possible ground f o r h i s 
f i n d i n g an analogy between such developments i n n a t u r a l science as 
E i n s t e i n has helped t o b r i n g about, and those which Barth has encouraged 
or even i n i t i a t e d i n what Torrance r e f e r s t o as ' t h e o l o g i c a l science 1. 
Torrance commends Barth f o r r e f u s i n g t o t r e a t n a t u r a l theology as 
an independent conceptual system antecedent t o a c t u a l knowledge of God. 
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Instead, Barth t r e a t s a n a t u r a l theology as something which derives from 
what God a c t u a l l y reveals of himsel f : what 'may be known' of him i s 
derived from what is_ known o f , because revealed by, him. R e a l i t y 
precedes p o s s i b i l i t y . N a t u r a l theology thus plays a subordinate r o l e 
t o r e v e l a t i o n , as the attempt t o understand what i s already there as 
given, a process t h a t Barth b e l i e v e d t o be i n essence what Anselm meant 
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by ' f a i t h seeking understanding 1. God does not reveal what man i s 
able t o grasp; r a t h e r , man's a b i l i t y t o grasp what God reveals derives 
from God's a c t u a l r e v e l a t i o n of Himself. The mistake of the n a t u r a l 
the o l o g i a n i s t o demand t h a t the content of r e v e l a t i o n conform t o h i s 
understanding o f what may be revealed, an understanding which i s 
mistakenly b e l i e v e d , i n Barth's view, t o e x i s t independently of the 
a c t u a l content of r e v e l a t i o n . To Torrance t h i s Barthian r e j e c t i o n of 
n a t u r a l theology i s analogous t o the r e j e c t i o n of the Newtonian view t h a t 
bodies i n space and time, r a t h e r than e x i s t i n g i n an e s s e n t i a l r e l a t i o n 
t o t h e i r spatio-temporal context, merely conform t o the prescribed demands 
of t h a t c o n t e x t , which e x i s t s e n t i r e l y independently of them. 
But the analogy i s not a r e a l one. For the p o i n t of Einstein's 
discovery i s surely t o show t h a t several f a c t o r s i n an understanding of 
r e a l i t y which were once thought separate are i n f a c t r e l a t e d . Hence the 
use of terms l i k e ' f i e l d s of forc e ' or 'energy f i e l d s ' t o p o i n t t o areas 
of mutual i n t e r a c t i o n . The idea t h a t a l l p h y s i c a l a c t i v i t y i n the 
universe may i n p r i n c i p l e be reduced t o a mathematical equation i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t the p o s s i b l e i n t e g r a t i o n of forces i n r e l a t i o n t o one another i n any 
p h y s i c a l understanding of the universe i s much greater than was once 
thought p o s s i b l e . 
On the other hand, the p o i n t of the t h e o l o g i c a l remarks of Barth 
concerning n a t u r a l theology i s su r e l y q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . I t i s designed 
to show t h a t what we know of God i s somehow d i r e c t l y conferred upon us 
by God Himself, so t h a t the question of 'how' we know anything of God 
i s made secondary t o our a c t u a l l y knowing. This i s a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t 
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argument, and an a t t r a c t i v e one i f we hope t o free the knowledge of God 
we may claim t o have from our doubts concerning i t s p o s s i b i l i t y , doubts 
which beset any theologian who t r i e s t o come t o g r i p s w i t h Kant (and i n 
the present day w i t h l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m ) . The grounds f o r such a move 
l i e i n the claim t h a t the question of the p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e o l o g i c a l 
knowledge a r i s e s only out of i t s r e a l i t y , i n the way t h a t f o r Barth 
t h e o l o g i c a l understanding can only be woven out of a God-given f a i t h -
as i f theology was a search f o r the questions t o d i f f i c u l t answers 1 
The p o i n t of E i n s t e i n 1 s t r a n s p o s i t i o n i s t o t a l k of 1 space' and 
'time' e x i s t i n g only i n r e l a t i o n t o bodies i n motion. But the p o i n t of 
Barth's t r a n s p o s i t i o n i s sur e l y not t o t a l k of t h e o l o g i c a l equivalents 
which p l a y a r o l e analogous t o t h a t of space and time i n a ph y s i c a l 
understanding of r e a l i t y . Rather, Barth's t r a n s p o s i t i o n i s intended t o 
t a l k of our knowledge o f God as i f t h a t were a p a r t of the complex r e a l i t y 
described by the theologian. I n other words, i f Barth's treatment of 
n a t u r a l theology were t r u l y analogous t o . E i n s t e i n ' s work i n n a t u r a l 
science, then t h i s would be, i f Torrance's argument were c o r r e c t , t o 
see our knowledge o f God as i t s e l f a ' t h e o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n ' t o be 
considered together w i t h other c o n s t i t u e n t s of the r e a l i t y which forms 
the o b j e c t o f t h e o l o g i c a l i n q u i r y . I f the work of b r i n g i n g our knowledge 
of God i n t o r e l a t i o n t o the other c o n s t i t u e n t s of the r e a l i t y known t o 
the t h e o l o g i a n were t o p a r a l l e l the b r i n g i n g i n t o r e l a t i o n of space, 
time and bodies i n motion w i t h i n a s i n g l e f i e l d o f f o r c e , then t h i s would 
be t o question the fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge and r e a l i t y . 
But there i s no r e a l p a r a l l e l , and the developments i n n a t u r a l science 
r e f e r r e d t o by Torrance do not i n t e n d t o question t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . They 
do not re-value the d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge and r e a l i t y , but between 
various c o n s t i t u e n t s o f r e a l i t y i t s e l f which were pr e v i o u s l y considered 
to.have been independent o f one another, namely space and time on the one 
hand, and the moving bodies supposedly taken t o operate independently 
' w i t h i n ' them on the other. By t a l k i n g of space and time as a 'conceptual 
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system' Torrance makes i t seem as i f the p o i n t concerns, not the h i g h l y 
i n t e g r a t e d nature o f r e a l i t y i t s e l f , but the i n t e g r a t i o n of r e a l i t y w i t h 
our knowledge of i t . 
I n the l a s t pages of Space, Time and Resurrection Torrance considers 
'the c o r r e l a t i o n between the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of knowledge and the 
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d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of r e a l i t y ' . He argues t h a t : 
the more i n t e n s i v e l y we probe i n t o the inherent p r o f u n d i t y of the 
universe .... the more we f i n d our epistemic r e l a t i o n t o i t being 
reversed: we are up against a r e a l i t y t h a t towers above our 
i n t e l l i g e n c e , which we cannot know or r e f l e c t about by t r y i n g t o 
occupy some epistemic stance "above" i t . (28) 
The higher the ' l e v e l of r e a l i t y ' , Torrance seems t o be saying, the 
more 'passive' towards i t our minds must become, 'allowing our under-
standing t o f a l l under the power of i t s i n t r i n s i c but transcendent 
u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y 1 - the t h e o l o g i c a l epistemology o f 'Denken als Nach -
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Denken'. I n t r e a t i n g of the highest r e a l i t y , God, we can only show 
'reverent submission o f our minds t o h i s uncreated L i g h t and Majesty', 
so t h a t : 
Only the mind which surrenders i n awe and wonder t o the 
transcendent r e a l i t y of God Himself w i l l be able t o 
approach the r e s u r r e c t i o n i n a way appropriate t o i t s 
i n t r i n s i c s i g n i f i c a n c e . (30). 
Thus the 'higher 1 the l e v e l of r e a l i t y w i t h which we deal, the more 
'passive' our minds i n r e l a t i o n t o i t , u n t i l i n the case of our knowledge 
of God the s t r u c t u r e s of our knowing are not only submissive t o , but 
d e r i v e d from, even are i n t r i n s i c t o , the o b j e c t o f knowledge i t s e l f . We 
are encouraged by Torrance t o b e l i e v e t h a t the r e s u r r e c t i o n , being p a r t 
o f t h i s 'highest r e a l i t y ' as an act of God, draws our a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
submissive minds i n t o i t s own explanation of i t s e l f , and t h a t any 
d i f f i c u l t i e s which we have i n understanding the r e s u r r e c t i o n only appear 
t o be d i f f i c u l t i e s i f we refuse t o be l e d by the r e a l i t y o f the r e s u r r e c t i o n 
i t s e l f i n t o those mysterious n o e t i c ways which are appropriate t o i t s 
i n t r i n s i c nature, w h i l s t being u n i n t e l l i g i b l e t o our m i nds.^ Our i n -
comprehension i s only the sign of our being l i f t e d out of ourselves i n t o 
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the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e which e x i s t s w i t h i n the r e a l i t y being 
understood i t s e l f . Here again the d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge and 
r e a l i t y i s being obscured by Torrance, where knowledge t r e a t s of the 
'higher r e a l i t y 1 of God which somehow contains w i t h i n i t s e l f the means 
by which we understand i t . 
The "highest r e a l i t y ' o f God explains i t s e l f not so much 'to' us as 
' i n ' us, His r e a l i t y c a r r y i n g w i t h i n i t s e l f i t s own explanation, and 
His grace making t h i s our explanation of Him i n a way t h a t n e i t h e r 
conforms t o nor seeks t o extend our understanding. I n appropriate 
p a s s i v i t y (knowledge as acknowledgment) we are drawn i n t o the explanation 
i n t r i n s i c t o the r e a l i t y i t s e l f , which t o our own understanding i s 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
I n Torrance's epi s t e m o l o g i c a l scheme, then, we are drawn i n t o a 
knowledge which both becomes 'ours' and y e t i s beyond our understanding. 
We are enabled to 'jump out of our c o g n i t i v e s k i n s ' , t o r e c a l l Mackinnon 1 s 
phrase, f o r we are absorbed i n t o the epistemological s t r u c t u r e s i n the 
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h e a r t of God him s e l f , knowing God i n His knowledge of Himself. 
But how may we know God i n h i s knowledge o f Himself? How can such 
language make sense w i t h o u t e f f e c t i v e l y destroying us as knowing subjects 
a l t o g e t h e r ? How can we f a i l t o pay the p r i c e of denying the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between knowledge and r e a l i t y , which i s t h a t of ceasing t o know? How 
can the knowledge 'given' t o us by God's grace ever be knowledge 'had' 
by us? Does not the ' i n t e g r a t i o n ' of man w i t h i n God, o u t l i n e d i n the 
l a s t chapter i n terms of the lack of an ontology of man apart from God, 
have i t s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l equivalent i n terms of an e s s e n t i a l l y meaningless 
idea of our 'knowing beyond ourselves'? 
Torrance argues t h a t i n the 'acknowledgment' of such a knowledge 
l i e s our c o n t i n u i n g i d e n t i t y as knowing subjects. But what we acknow-
ledge must be our knowledge. I n the 'hierarchy of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ' which 
Torrance suggests, the r e a l i t y o f man as a knowing subject i s threatened 
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by the process of t h e o l o g i c a l knowledge i t s e l f . Confronted by an object 
whose i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y i s ' w i t h i n ' i t s e l f , man i s required t o 'leap out 
of h i m s e l f i n t o an a l i e n epistemology i n order t o 'receive' the under-
standing which he cannot a t t a i n from the employment of h i s own i n t e l l e c t u a l 
resources. But how can t h i s make sense unless i n the r e c e i v i n g of such 
knowledge man ceases t o have a mind apart from God, ep i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y 
i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the d i v i n e self-understanding i n the way t h a t he has also 
been o n t o l o g i c a l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the d i v i n e being? The claim t h a t no 
more i s being suggested by Torrance than something analogous t o 
developments i n the understanding of r e a l i t y w i t h i n " the n a t u r a l sciences 
i s u n j u s t i f i e d . 
The epistemology of Torrance and Barth may be seen i n the context 
of the sup p o s i t i o n t h a t i n the l i g h t of what Kant had determined concerning 
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the l i m i t s t o knowledge, knowledge of God would be impossible. To 
bypass-the problems r a i s e d by Kant, or t o overcome them, the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between knowledge and r e a l i t y must be overcome, f o r t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n l i e s 
a t the r o o t o f the Kantian d e n i a l of access f o r the mind t o r e a l i t y as i t 
e x i s t s i n i t s e l f . One way of overcoming the problem would be t o deny 
the d i s t i n c t i o n from the side o f r e a l i t y which, i t could be sa i d , e x i s t s 
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only ' i n the mind'. 'Barthian Realism', on the other hand, denies the 
d i s t i n c t i o n from the side of our knowledge. Our knowledge, i t i s said , 
e x i s t s only as the 'epistemological s t r u c t u r e i n the heart of being i t s e l f . 
But i n both cases a questionable step i s being taken. 
The I d e a l i s t has, i n s p i t e of himself, t o t a l k o f a r e a l i t y which i s 
d i s t i n c t from h i s ideas of i t . I n doing so, he r e l i e s upon a c e r t a i n 
ambiguity i n the word 'knowledge'. I t may e i t h e r mean the 'act of knowing' 
or 'what i s known'. Where Berkleian i d e a l i s m i s concerned, i t has been 
s a i d t h a t h i s philosophy r e l i e s upon t h i s ambiguity when i t i s s a i d t h a t 
knowledge must be ' o f - something, and t h a t there must be a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between knowing and what i s known. Since the word 'knowledge' can be 
used o f both, i t may appear t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n does not demand t h a t 
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there 'be' anything t h a t i s known. I n f a c t , however, 'knowledge' i n i t s 
second sense of 'what i s known' only makes sense i n d i s t i n c t i o n from i t s 
f i r s t meaning as the 'act of knowing 1 i f i n f a c t there are objects outside 
the mind. 
The Barthian ' R e a l i s t ' , on the other hand, denies the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between knowledge and r e a l i t y from the side of our knowledge. He too 
r e l i e s upon an ambiguity i n speaking o f the knowledge of God, which may 
mean e i t h e r man's knowledge of God or the knowledge which God Himself 
has. Barth and Torrance attempt t o solve the problematical dichotomy 
between knowledge and r e a l i t y by subsuming man's knowledge w i t h i n the 
r e a l i t y o f God i n His t h i n k i n g and being; knowledge of God, i n t h e i r 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l scheme, can only be knowledge had by God. But the 
ambiguity o f 'knowledge of God' enables them t o maintain the idea t h a t 
t h i s knowledge i s i n f a c t man's knowledge of God. I n f a c t Barth's 
approach t o t h e o l o g i c a l understanding might a p p r o p r i a t e l y be termed an 
'idealism grounded on God', denying the otherness of man t o God r a t h e r 
than t h a t of God t o man, and p r o j e c t i n g a universe i n which there are no 
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beings beside God. 
We have suggested, i n the course of the l a s t two chapters, t h a t 
Barth's t h e o l o g i c a l method contains an i n v e r t e d r e l a t i o n t o aspects of 
nineteenth century Hegelianism. I f we look a t the h i s t o r y of the l a t t e r 
school of thought, we can see t h a t i t has been associated w i t h an 
absorption o f God w i t h i n the s t r u c t u r e s of human existence, a process 
o u t l i n e d indeed by Barth h i m s e l f , as an imaginative p r o j e c t i o n through 
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which i n d i v i d u a l man r e a l i s e d , or man i n soc i e t y was f r u s t r a t e d m 
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r e a l i s i n g , h i s human p o t e n t i a l . But i n Barth's thought we f i n d the 
a n t i t h e t i c a l process of man's absorption w i t h i n the s t r u c t u r e of God as 
He declares Himself i n r e v e l a t i o n . The d i s t i n c t i o n between man and God, 
the s u b t l e t r a c i n g of an order o f grace w i t h i n which, despite h i s 
existence i n absolute dependence upon h i s Maker as a creature, man possesses 
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a ' r e l a t i v e independence 1 of God, i s l o s t i n both systems of thought. 
The one f a i l s t o f i n d God w i t h o u t f i n d i n g man as the r e a l i t y of the 
' d i v i n e ' ; the other f a i l s t o f i n d man without f i n d i n g God as the 
r e a l i t y o f . t h e 'human'. Our e s s e n t i a l c r i t i c i s m of Barth, then, follows 
t h a t of Hans Urs von Balthasar. C h r i s t i a n theology cannot make sense 
w i t h o u t an ontology which recognises a r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n between man 
and God. 
I n a s t r i k i n g metaphor, Professor Taylor c r i t i c i s e s Hegel f o r a 
'theology' according t o which God i s l i k e a flame which passes from mortal 
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candle t o m o r t a l candle, each t o go out but the flame t o be e t e r n a l . 
The i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t the d i v i n e 'flame' i s made t o depend upon the 
human 'candles' f o r i t s existence; man thereby becomes necessary t o the 
being of God - the order o f grace i s a s s i m i l a t e d t o the order of His 
d i v i n e nature. I n Barth's theology i t i s as i f human beings represented 
the flame on a s i n g l e candle l i t e t e r n a l l y by God and sustained by His 
w i l l . They may f l i c k e r w i l f u l l y , but they may never become detached t o 
form subordinate l i g h t s of t h e i r own; the order o f man's nature i s 
a s s i m i l a t e d t o t h a t of God's grace. God and man never endure t h a t 
separation according t o which, i n an o l d e r metaphor, a spark of l i g h t 
generated from w i t h i n the d i v i n e being breaks apart from i t and generates 
i t s own f i r e apart from the o r i g i n a l source of i t s being. Berkouwer i s 
r i g h t - Barth cannot concede the power of e v i l t o disentangle i t s e l f 
from God. There i s no L u c i f e r allowed t o f a l l from Heaven - more 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y f o r our metaphor, there i s no Prometheus permitted t o 
s t e a l f i r e from the gods. 
There i s a note o f triumphalism i n Barth's theology which f o l l o w s 
from the theomonism which we have t r i e d t o describe, and which may i n 
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p a r t e x p l a i n i t . There i s a resistance t o ' s e c u l a r i s a t i o n ' which may 
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be u s e f u l l y grounded i n h i s d e n i a l of an 'ontology o f man. But i n 
t h i s chapter we have emphasised a t h i r d aspect of Barth's thought, namely 
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a response t o the problems r a i s e d by those on whom he cut h i s theo-
.1 
l o g i c a l t e e t h , i n p a r t i c u l a r , Kant. We have sought t o argue t h a t there 
corresponds t o the lack of an 'ontology of man', o u t l i n e d i n chapter 
s i x , an equivalent epistemological vacuum i n making sense of man's 
knowledge of God as knowledge 'had' by man, and t o argue t h a t attempts 
t o e x p l a i n t h i s i n terms of analogies drawn w i t h developments i n modern 
physics are not v a l i d . We argue f o r a fundamental Kantian resistance t o 
a concept of ' r e v e l a t i o n ' according t o which man i s enabled by God t o 
'know beyond h i m s e l f , and t h a t t h i s resistance i s t o be located i n 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge and what i s known t h a t i s fundamental 
t o a l l forms of r e a l i s m , i n c l u d i n g t h a t of Kant. The i n t e g r a t i o n of man 
i n t o God i n Barth's thought, may be seen i n terms o f a loss of being f o r 
man i n d i s t i n c t i o n from God, from which i t f o l l o w s t h a t there i s nowhere 
t o l o c a t e man's knowledge save i n God Himself. A l l t h a t i s apparently 
being s a i d by Barth about man's knowledge of God i s i n f a c t being s a i d 
about God's knowledge of Himself. There i s , i n f a c t , no man t o hear or 
receive or respond t o God's s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e : only an e t e r n a l d i v i n e 
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monologue. I n David Ford's words: 
(Barth's magnum opus i s ) a s p i r a l round and round the 
se l f - e x p r e s s i o n of God i n time. (44) 
Yet there i s more i r o n y i n these words than Ford ever r e a l i s e s . 
For the s p i r a l i s round and round the time of God, and the image t h a t 
45 
of a d i v i n e being who concedes nothing of Himself t o man, and who 
thereby i n seeking His c r e a t i o n merely chases the shadow of His own 
e t e r n a l s e l f . 
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the o b jects are i d e a l i n us. ( I l l , 365). 
Indeed 
the idea t h a t Being may be separated from the Notion 
i s a mere fancy. ( I l l , 364) . 
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important p o i n t t h a t the C h r i s t i a n view of c r e a t i o n , according 
t o which time i s i n c r e a t i o n r a t h e r than c r e a t i o n i n time, i t s e l f 
r u l e s out any treatment of time as an 'independent backcloth' t o , 
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of the r e s u r r e c t i o n . 
32. 'God i s known only by God' {Church Dogmatics, I I , 1, p.179). Again: 
God i s knowable t o Himself; the Son t o the Father, but 
also the Father t o the Son. This i s the f i r s t and l a s t 
t h i n g which i s t o be s a i d about the k n o w a b i l i t y of God 
even from the p o i n t of view of the readiness of man. 
( I I , 1, p.151.) 
How, then, does God become knowable t o man? Through the f a c t t h a t 
1 our viewing and conceiving i s adopted and determined t o p a r t i c i -
p a t i o n i n the t r u t h of God by God Himself i n grace' (p. 179), an 
adoption t h a t i s grounded i n the f a c t t h a t God i s man i n Jesus 
C h r i s t (p. 151). 
God, then i s knowable only t o God, and a t t h i s p o i n t man ' s t i l l 
seems t o stand outside' (Ibid.) the d i v i n e self-knowledge. But 
God i s also man i n Jesus C h r i s t , and t h e r e f o r e through Jesus 
C h r i s t man i s drawn i n t o the d i v i n e self-knowledge, 'adopted .... 
to p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the t r u t h of God by God Himself i n grace'. 
(p. 179) . 
But what s o r t of a ' p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' i n the t r u t h of God does man 
'possess' through grace? I t i s ' p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n God's r e v e l a t i o n 1 , 
and as such can b a s i c a l l y c o n s i s t 'only i n the o f f e r i n g of our 
thanks' ( I I , 1, 216). Now: 
True knowledge of God does not need t o be c a l l e d t o order 
by any c r i t i c a l theory o f knowledge t o remember the 
inadequacy of a l l human views, concepts and words i n 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h i s o b j e c t , because as the work of 
g r a t i t u d e i t cannot t r y t o be r e q u i t a l and the r e f o r e 
a r e p l y i n equal terms t o what has been said t o man 
by God. 
( I I , 1, 217.) 
Knowledge of God, then, transcends man's n a t u r a l capacity f o r 
knowledge. Barth suggests here t h a t the l i m i t a t i o n s of the human 
understanding do not f r u s t r a t e man's knowledge of God because, as 
'an o f f e r i n g of thanks', t h i s knowledge i s merely 'acknowledgment 
of the r e v e l a t i o n of God' (ibid.) and does not require t h a t man 
respond i n the same language w i t h which he has been addressed by 
God. Barth continues t h i s p o i n t by comparing a 'work of g r a t i t u d e ' 
t o a t r a n s a c t i o n , where l i k e i s repaid w i t h l i k e and both p a r t i e s 
have t o obey the economic laws of the market-place. A g i f t , on the 
other hand, does not r e q u i r e repayment i n k i n d . Thus man, who 'knows 
beyond h i m s e l f the t r u t h of God, does not have t o r e p l y i n a language 
which he could not speak. j 
Of course, Barth's argument t h a t the knowledge of God transcends 
any i n h e r e n t l i m i t a t i o n s i n the understanding of man im p l i e s t h a t 
i n p r i n c i p l e any cr e a t u r e , even inanimate o b j e c t s , could be the 
o b j e c t of God's r e v e l a t i o n and understand Him. But the C h r i s t o -
centrism of Barth's theology r u l e s t h i s out, f o r i n Jesus C h r i s t 
God i s man, not a b u l l or a stone. Nevertheless, nothing i n the 
nature of b u l l s and stones would have r u l e d out the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of God's r e v e a l i n g Himself t o them. Barjth r e c a l l s the st o r y of 
Balaam's ass i n order t o make p r e c i s e l y t h i s p o i n t : 
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And we must not f o r g e t Numbers 22.28, where even the 
mouth of Balaam's ass i s opened (as i f i n c i d e n t a l l y 
t o show t h a t the d i v i n e p o s s i b i l i t y i n v o l v e d does not 
have a l i m i t , l e t alone a c o n d i t i o n , i n humanity.) 
( I I , 1, 221) 
The d i f f i c u l t y which we have w i t h Barth's epistemology may be put 
i n the form of two questions: 
F i r s t l y , are no c o n s t r a i n t s exercised by the inadequacy of human 
concepts f o r even the 'rec e i v i n g of a g i f t ' , e.g., man's capacity 
t o ask the usual question which accompanies a g i f t , 'what i s i t ? ' 
Secondly, i f man i s given a capacity t o 'acknowledge' a g i f t from 
God by God Himself i n a manner t h a t transcends h i s n a t u r a l under-
standing, why should he not also thereby acquire the capacity t o 
're p l y ' t o God? 
We suggest t h a t i n one sense Barth concedes too much t o man, and 
i n another too l i t t l e . He concedes too much, i n t h a t he believes 
t h a t man may be given the capacity, beyond h i s understanding, t o 
'acknowledge'a g i f t from God and t o thank Him i n awe, j o y and pr a i s e 
( I I , 1, 222ff.) f o r the knowledge of Himself. He concedes too 
l i t t l e , however, i n t h a t once man has the self-transcending capacity 
t o acknowledge t h a t g i f t , s u rely he may receive the self-transcending 
capacity t o 'rep l y ' t o i t , t o converse w i t h God i n the language of 
God. Barth i s r e a l l y faced w i t h two a l t e r n a t i v e s , t o speak of man 
as unable t o know God, or o f man as able t o know God as God knows 
Himself. He t r i e s , however, t o hold man i n a limbo where he exceeds 
the f i r s t w i t h o u t a t t a i n i n g the second. 
Torrance's c r i t i c i s m of a Kantian view of the mind's 'pre s c r i b i n g ' 
t o r e a l i t y i t s nature, a view which he sees modern science as having 
undermined, r e q u i r e s c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n. 
There would seem t o be grounds f o r the view t h a t i n the 'Trans-
cendental Deduction of Categories' i n the Critique of Pure Reason 
Kant argues, as Jonathan Bennett remarks i n Kant's A n a l y t i c , t h a t 
'there i s causal order i n our experience because the understanding 
p u t i t the r e ' . He quotes Kant's comment: 
The order and r e g u l a r i t y i n the appearances, which we e n t i t l e 
n ature, we ourselves i n t r o d u c e . We could never f i n d them i n 
appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, 
o r i g i n a l l y set them th e r e . 
(Karit, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 125: quoted i n Bennett, 
op. cit.,p. 156.) 
From Kant's commitment t o the view t h a t causal order i s imposed 
upon the phenomenal world by the human mind, i t would seem t o 
f o l l o w t h a t no e m p i r i c a l observations w i t h i n t h a t world could 
p o s s i b l y change h i s commitment t o a causal order. Such a concept, 
proceeds not from the wor l d which demands such a concept f o r i t s 
being understood, and which might t h e r e f o r e i n p r i n c i p l e provide 
such new evidence as would c a l l f o r t h a d i f f e r e n t concept i n the 
s c i e n t i s t seeking t o make sense of i t , but from the nature of the 
human understanding as such, 'the lawgiver of nature', which i n s i s t s 
t h a t any r e a l i t y i n t e l l i g i b l e t o i t s e l f must be causally ordered. 
Since i t i s a c o n d i t i o n of understanding as such t h a t i t determine 
the world t o be causally ordered, any other arrangement of the world 
i s impossible, simply because i t could not be understood. I t i s 
from h i s commitment t o c e r t a i n basic forms of understanding and of 
s e n s i b i l i t y which n e c e s s a r i l y impose themselves upon any r e a l i t y 
which we understand, i f we are t o understand i t at a l l , t h a t Kant 
sees the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of 'synt h e t i c a p r i o r i p r o p o s i t i o n s ' , 
p r o p o s i t i o n s which are u n i v e r s a l and necessary and yet which do not 
merely describe the meaning of words. They describe, r a t h e r the 
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necessary conditions of experience i f there i s t o be experience a t 
a l l . They'begin w i t h ' experience, i n the sense t h a t they are only 
recognised in_ i t , and y e t they do not 'arise out o f i t , since they 
are i n f a c t forms imposed upon i t by the mind. Hence Kant's 
c o n v i c t i o n t h a t he has found the confidence i n causation which Hume 
lacked. By t r i n g t o f i n d grounds f o r a concept of causation i n the 
nature of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , Hume f a i l e d t o f i n d a j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r i t s necessity, and concluded t h a t i t was employed merely out of 
a bad h a b i t of mind which d i d , however, represent a psychological 
t r u t h about human nature. Kant argues t h a t the ground f o r using 
the concept i s not t o be sought f o r i n the e x t e r n a l world a t a l l , 
but i n the nature o f the mind which perceives and understands the 
wo r l d , and which 'imposes' upon i t c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s prescribed 
by i t s own c o n s t i t u t i o n as the conditions of possible experience. 
I n t h i s sense i t i s c l e a r t o see how Torrance sees i n Kant a 'pre-
s c r i p t i v e ' a t t i t u d e towards r e a l i t y , an a t t i t u d e t h a t i s independent 
of any evidence supplied by r e a l i t y as such t o the observer concerning 
the appropriateness of h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i v e t o o l s . I t i s also c l e a r 
t h a t Kant's i n s i s t e n c e upon the use of c e r t a i n concepts derives from 
the b e l i e f t h a t these are the only ones which the understanding may 
use. There i s obviously a question o f whether modern science i n i t s 
impatience w i t h the idea of 'causation' as a necessary concept, or 
w i t h the conclusions of a Euclidean geometry, i s impatient w i t h 
Kant's assessment of which are the necessary, concepts t h a t the 
understanding must use, or w i t h the not i o n of such concepts, 'imposed' 
by the mind upon r e a l i t y , as such. 
I n h i s book ThejLogic of Scientific Discovery, 'Sir K a r l Popper 
makes i t c l e a r t h a t h i s own theory of 1 f a l s i f i a b i l i t y ' as a c r i t e r i o n 
' f o r deciding whether or not a t h e o r e t i c a l system belongs t o 
e m p i r i c a l science' i s threatened by a Kantian outlook: 
According t o t h i s c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t p o i n t of view laws of 
nature are not f a l s i f i a b l e by observation; f o r they are 
needed t o determine what an observation and, more e s p e c i a l l y , 
what a s c i e n t i f i c measurement i s . 
The ' c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t ' view sees t h e o r e t i c a l n a t u r a l science as a 
l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n r a t h e r than a p i c t u r e of nature; the laws of 
nature are simple because they are imposed on nature by the mind. 
We a r b i t r a r i l y i n v e n t these laws, and by t h i s i n v e n t i o n determine 
the p r o p e r t i e s of an ' a r t i f i c i a l world' of our i n v e n t i o n . Science 
speaks of a world o f concepts - and thus a l l 'observation' i s 
i r r e l e v a n t t o what science may determine as 'laws of nature' (see 
Popper, op.cit., pp. 49-56: 'On the Problem of a Theory of S c i e n t i f i c 
Method'). 
Popper sees such 'conventionalism' as an extension of Kantian 
i d e a l i s m ; but where Kant saw the i n t e l l e c t from i t s own c o n s t i t u t i o n 
as such imposing laws upon nature, the 'c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t ' sees t h i s 
i m p o s i t i o n as a 'conventional' one, a product of chosen human 
convention, s o c i e t a l l y i n f l u e n c e d . Yet i n both cases a c o n t r i b u t i o n 
of nature as such t o the understanding o f i t appears t o be proscribed, 
and hence also negated i s the responsiveness of the s c i e n t i f i c mind 
to 'how. thi n g s a c t u a l l y are' which the Popperian no t i o n of 
' f a l s i f i a b i l i t y ' e n t a i l s . Kant appears, i n t h i s sense, t o be the 
precursor of a form o f i d e a l i s m which, on the grounds of an unavoidable 
tyranny exercised by the mind over nature, e f f e c t i v e l y e liminates the 
responsiveness of knowledge t o r e a l i t y . 
This i s d i s c e r n i b l e i n the i n f l u e n c e of Kant upon Hegel. I n the 
I n t r o d u c t i o n t o h i s Phenomenology of Mind ( t r . J.B. B a i l l i e ) , Hegel 
examines the Kantian view t h a t knowledge i s a medium through which 
we receive the t r u t h not as i t i s i n i t s e l f , but 'as i t i s i n and 
through t h i s medium' [ibid., p. 74). He considers the paradox t h a t 
I 
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knowledge never y i e l d s us r e a l i t y as i t i s i n i t s e l f ( u n l i k e 1 a b i r d 
caught i n a l i m e s t i c k ' ) , but t h a t on the other hand with o u t the use 
of the understanding as a medium through which t o know what i s , 
nothing would be known at a l l - ' i f t h i s be removed, the bare 
d i r e c t i o n or the empty place would alone be i n d i c a t e d 1 (p. 75). 
Hegel's s o l u t i o n of the problem i s t h a t since the understanding 
only needs the d i s t i n c t i o n between the object of consciousness, the 
'phenomenon' i n Kantian terms, and consciousness i t s e l f , then the 
' t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f ' may e f f e c t i v e l y drop out of consideration. We 
are l e f t w i t h a d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t constantly resolves i t s e l f w i t h i n 
consciousness: 
For consciousness i s , on the one hand, consciousness of the 
o b j e c t , on the other, consciousness o f i t s e l f ; consciousness 
of what t o i t i s t r u e , and consciousness of i t s knowledge of 
t h a t t r u t h . 
(Ibid., p. 85) 
Hence Hegel's Pheomenology conceives i t s e l f t o be a development 
through a sequence of forms of consciousness u n t i l knowledge i s 
'no longer compelled t o go beyond i t s e l f , a conception p r e c i s e l y 
made p o s s i b l e by Kant's ' p r e s c r i p t i v e ' a t t i t u d e towards the forms 
of understanding, which are not t o be thought of as responsive t o 
the nature of an e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y . I n t h i s sense Kant makes 
po s s i b l e the id e a l i s m of Hegel,since ' r e a l i t y ' i s contained w i t h i n 
the concept of 'things-in-themselves 1 which, because they do not 
modify the nature of the understanding, are a l l too e a s i l y excluded 
from c o n s i d e r a t i o n by i t (see Norman,Richard, Hegel's Phenomenology: 
A Philosophical Introduction, Chapter 1. 'The Dilemma of Epistem-
ology, esp. p.17). 
I n s h o r t , Hegel may subsume r e a l i t y w i t h i n man's knowledge of i t , 
because Kant has determined man's knowledge, i n the form of i t s 
understanding, t o be unaffected by r e a l i t y . 
S i m i l a r l y , i t may be because of a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the nature of 
man's knowledge i s unaffected by r e a l i t y i n t h i s sense i n Kant's 
conception, t h a t i n Barth's epistemology i t i s man's knowledge t h a t 
drops out of con s i d e r a t i o n , and man i s 'assumed i n t o ' the r e a l i t y 
of God where he i s given t o 'know beyond h i m s e l f the nature of the 
d i v i n e (see note 32). 
The d i f f i c u l t y i n Kant's thought appears t o be, t h a t w h i l s t he 
maintains the d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge and r e a l i t y , i t i s a 
d i s t i n c t i o n made too absolute f o r a d i a l e c t i c o f understanding t o 
emerge i n which i t i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between knowledge on the 
one hand, and r e a l i t y on the other, t h a t forms the components of 
the d i a l e c t i c . I t leads e i t h e r t o an ' i d e a l i s t ' d i a l e c t i c w i t h i n 
knowledge i t s e l f , as i n Hegel, or a ' r e a l i s t ' d i a l e c t i c w i t h i n the 
r e a l i t y of God i n His r e v e l a t i o n , as i n Barth. 
The problem w i t h Torrance and Barth i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
Kant, then, i s t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge and r e a l i t y , 
which i s the e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n of a r e a l i s t philosophy, i s made 
too sharply f o r i t s own good i n Kant's philosophy. But they r a t h e r 
f a l l v i c t i m of the sharpness, than overcome i t . They absorb 
knowledge w i t h i n r e a l i t y r a t h e r than r e a l i t y w i t h i n knowledge, an 
argument which we attempt t o draw out i n the main body of the t e x t . 
F i n a l l y , i t i s not c l e a r t h a t Kant's thought i s as ' p r e s c r i p t i v e ' 
as Torrance and Popper i n s i s t t h a t i t i s . Bennett quotes the f i r s t 
Critique a t the p o i n t where Kant i n s i s t s t h a t reason ... 'must not 
allow i t s e l f t o be kept, as i t were, i n nature's leading s t r i n g s , 
(but must i t s e l f constrain) nature t o give answer t o questions of 
reason's own determining'. Bennett (Kant's Analytic, p. 159) poi n t s 
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out t h a t t h i s remark might be understood as much i n Popperian terms 
of t e s t i n g s p e c i f i c hypotheses i n the world, as i n terms of the 
view t h a t causal order i s imposed by the understanding, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
where Kant continues: 
Reason, holding i n one hand i t s p r i n c i p l e s , according t o which 
alone concordant appearances can be admitted as equivalent t o 
laws, and i n the other hand the experiment which i t has devised 
i n conformity w i t h these p r i n c i p l e s , must approach nature i n 
order t o be taught by i t . 
(Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd ed., 
p. x i i i . ) 
Bennett's conclusion i s t h a t there i s an ambiguity i n Kant. Never-
t h e l e s s , we would hold t o the view t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
knowledge and r e a l i t y i s made so sharp i n Kant's philosophy, i n the 
way i n d i c a t e d , t h a t i t has subsequently broken apart i n the form i n 
which Kant drew i t and been redrawn w i t h i n knowledge (Hegel), or w i t h i n 
r e a l i t y ('the epistemological s t r u c t u r e a t the heart of being' -
Torrance - and the admission of man t o the knowledge which God has 
of Himself w i t h i n the r e a l i t y o f the d i v i n e being - B a r t h ) . 
34. Arguably i d e a l i s t philosophies always play upon the ambiguity of 
t h i s s o r t o f phrase. 
35. Reference must be made here t o an unpublished Ph.D. th e s i s by Dr 
Alan M i l l a r : Realism and Understanding: Some Problems in the 
Philosophy of Religion, (Cambridge, September, 1973). M i l l a r argues 
t h a t Barth has a genuinely ' r e a l i s t ' a t t i t u d e t o t r u t h , since he 
refuses t o characterise the obj e c t of h i s f a i t h i n terms of the way 
i n which i t can be known (p. 4 ) . Throughout the Church Dogmatics, 
M i l l a r p o i n t s out, a d i s t i n c t i o n i s maintained between the obj e c t 
of f a i t h , God, i n His r e v e l a t i o n , and man's e x p e r i e n t i a l and 
conceptual response t o t h a t o b j e c t , while Schleiermacher and others 
appear t o be dangerously 'closing the gap' between t r u t h and 
a c c e p t a b i l i t y by c h a r a c t e r i s i n g God i n terms of the manner o f 
knowing Him. C l e a r l y opposed t o t h i s , Barth i n s i s t s t h a t : 
We thus understand the a s s e r t i o n of the hiddenness of God as 
the confession of the t r u t h and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the sentence 
of judgment which i n the r e v e l a t i o n of God i n Jesus C h r i s t i s 
pronounced upon man and t h e r e f o r e also upon h i s viewing and 
conceiving, dispossessing him of h i s own p o s s i b i l i t y of 
r e a l i s i n g the knowledge of the God who encounters him, and 
le a v i n g him only the knowledge of f a i t h granted t o him and 
demanded of him by the grace of God and th e r e f o r e only the 
viewing and conceiving of f a i t h . 
(Church Dogmatics, I I , 1, 191.) 
M i l l a r seeks t o designate Barth a ' r e a l i s t ' i n s o f a r as he refuses 
t o determine the nature of God according t o the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
human conceiving, but does not i n v e s t i g a t e the a l t e r n a t i v e 'knowledge 
of f a i t h ' o f which Barth speaks i n t h i s passage (and which does not 
i n f a c t form p a r t of M i l l a r ' s own q u o t a t i o n ) . I t i s our contention 
t h a t t h i s 'knowledge of f a i t h 1 so absorbs man w i t h i n the d i v i n e 
being t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge and r e a l i t y i s denied 
'from the other end', t h a t i s t o say from the p o i n t of view of man 
set apart from God. This r e f l e c t s the opposite tendency t o one 
which f a i l e d t o set God apart from man and so absorbed Him i n t o 
the s t r u c t u r e s of human existence. The 'knowledge of f a i t h ' i s an 
'idealism grounded on God', which f a i l s t o d i s t i n g u i s h God's 
consciousness of Himself from His consciousness of man. This i s 
p r e c i s e l y opposite t o the accusation l e v e l l e d a t Schleiermacher and 
o t h e r s , t h a t they f a i l t o d i s t i n g u i s h between man's consciousness 
of God and h i s consciousness of himself. 
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36. See the i n t r o d u c t i o n by K a r l Barth t o Feuerbach's The Essence of 
Christianity, t r a n s l a t e d by George E l i o t , pp. x - x x x i i . 
37. See Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, t r . George E l i o t . 
38. See Engels, F., Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German 
Philosophy, and Marx, K., Theses on Feuerbach, i n Marx and Engels, 
On Religion, pp. 187-235 and 62-65 r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
39. T a y l o r , C, Hegel, CUP, 1975, p. 495. 
41. What has been argued i n the l a s t two chapters might be compared t o 
remarks found i n W i l l i a m Temple's Nature, tan and Cod: 
.... t h a t only by r e v e l a t i o n and by h i s surrender t o i t s 
s p i r i t u a l power can man be 'saved', i s a profound and 
i r r e f r a g a b l e t r u t h ; t h a t even-when man's s a l v a t i o n i s 
complete there i s s t i l l the impassable d i s t i n c t i o n between 
Creator and creature, Redeemer and redeemed, S a n c t i f i e r and 
s a n c t i f i e d , i s the heart of metaphysical and r e l i g i o u s 
s a n i t y . I n so f a r as God and man are s p i r i t u a l they are 
of one k i n d ; i n so f a r as God and man are r a t i o n a l they 
are o f one k i n d . But i n so f a r as God creates, redeems and 
s a n c t i f i e s w h i l e man i s created, redeemed and s a n c t i f i e d , they 
are of two kinds. God i s not creature; man i s not creator. 
God i s not redeemed sinner; man i s not redeemer from s i n . 
At t h i s p o i n t the Otherness i s complete. 
(p. 396.) 
42. See chapter f i v e . 
43. I n The Question of God, Heinz Zahrnt reaches s i m i l a r conclusions 
t o ours i n h i s treatment of Barth (pp. 112-122, 'Monologue i n 
Heaven 1). He comments (p. 112) t h a t i n Barth's l a t e r theology: 
The process of r e v e l a t i o n i s reduced t o a monologue conducted 
by God w i t h himself as three persons, as Father, Son and Holy 
S p i r i t . 
44.' I n Sykes, S.W., ed. , Karl Barth : Studies of his Theological Method, 
p. 201. 
45. See chapter nine, where I e x p l a i n the sense of God 'conceding nothing 
of Himself t o man' i n Barth's thought, i n the context of a discussion 




By discussing Barth's treatment of the Resurrection/ we in t e n d t o 
show how the development of h i s t h e o l o g i c a l method may be applied t o 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r d o c t r i n e . Our f i n d i n g s may be 
compared w i t h those o f chapter three concerning the development of 
Barth's view o f S c r i p t u r e , and we s h a l l f i n d c e r t a i n p a r a l l e l s i n h i s 
treatment of each. 
That Barth's treatment of the r e s u r r e c t i o n 'changed' during the 
course of h i s career i s a f a m i l i a r charge. We f i n d i t , f o r instance, 
i n Dr Peter Selby's Look for the Living : The Corporate Nature of the 
Resurrection Faith. Here we are t o l d t h a t : 
I n h i s e a r l y w r i t i n g s , K a r l Barth took a p o s i t i o n s i m i l a r t o 
t h a t taken more r e c e n t l y by Rudolf Bultman. (1) 
Selby bel i e v e s t h a t i n Der Auferstehung der Toten (ET The Resur-
2 
r e c t i o n of the Dead), w r i t t e n by Barth i n 1924 four years a f t e r the 
second commentary on Romans, and which examines the concept of resur-
r e c t i o n w i t h s p e c i a l reference t o Paul's f i r s t l e t t e r t o the 
3 
Co r i n t h i a n s , Barth: 
.... s t a t e s t h a t the r e s u r r e c t i o n of Jesus i s hot a f a c t open t o 
h i s t o r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , but r a t h e r a d i v i n e f a c t which could 
only be grasped by r e v e l a t i o n . (4) 
This approach of the 'early Barth' t o the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s associated 
by Selby w i t h the views of Bultmann. I t must be remembered, however, 
t h a t Bultmann's primary concern i s not so much t o deny t h a t the resur-
r e c t i o n 'happened', as t o argue t h a t any attempt t o i n v e s t i g a t e i t s 
nature from the perspective of an h i s t o r i a n i n q u i r i n g i n t o i t s h i s t o r i c i t y 
misconceives i t s nature. Bultmann w r i t e s : . 
.... the h i s t o r i c a l problem i s not of i n t e r e s t t o C h r i s t i a n 
b e l i e f i n the r e s u r r e c t i o n (my emphasis). (5) 
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I t would be wrong .... t o r a i s e again the problem of how t h i s 
preaching arose h i s t o r i c a l l y , as though t h a t could v i n d i c a t e 
i t s t r u t h . That would be t o t i e our f a i t h i n the word of God 
t o the r e s u l t s o f h i s t o r i c a l research. (6) 
Bultmann does not so much deny t h a t the r e s u r r e c t i o n was an h i s t o r i c a l 
event, as t h r u s t the question aside, seeing i t as symptomatic of a 
f a i l u r e t o understand what the r e s u r r e c t i o n means. To i n v e s t i g a t e the 
h i s t o r i c i t y of the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s f o r Bultmann t o f a l l prey t o an 
' o b j e c t i f y i n g ' approach which f a i l s t o recognise the c r u c i a l r o l e of 
f a i t h i n the r e s u r r e c t i o n t o an understanding of i t . 
B a r t h , l i k e Bultmann, denies t h a t the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s a ' f a c t open 
t o h i s t o r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n ' : unlike'Bultmann, however, h i s p o i n t i s not 
so much t h a t t h e ' r e s u r r e c t i o n may only be an o b j e c t of f a i t h r a t h e r than 
h i s t o r i c a l l y - m e d i a t e d knowledge, as t h a t i t i s , i n Selby's words, 'a 
d i v i n e f a c t which could only be grasped by r e v e l a t i o n ' . The grace of God 
i n r e v e l a t i o n , r a t h e r than the nature of h i s t o r i c a l i n q u i r y , i s the 
methodological source f o r understanding the r e s u r r e c t i o n of C h r i s t . I n 
Bultmann, the source of understanding f o r the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s man's 
f a i t h r a t h e r than man's h i s t o r i c a l knowledge: i n Barth i t i s God's grace 
g i v i n g understanding r a t h e r than man's h i s t o r i c a l reason or man's f a i t h . 
I n h i s l a t e r theology, however, Selby sees a change i n Barth's 
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thought. He comes t o distance himself more c l e a r l y from Bultmann's 
view, i n Selby's o p i n i o n , on the ground t h a t Bultmann 'removes the 
o b j e c t i v i t y o f the r e s u r r e c t i o n , making i t a p u r e l y s u b j e c t i v e matter 
....'. . This r e c a l l s Barth's arguments against Harnack on the question 
o f b i b l i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (see chapter t h r e e ) . Any s u b s t i t u t i o n of 
man's f a i t h f o r man's h i s t o r i c a l knowledge as a source of understanding 
w i l l be a recourse t o 'subjectivism' i n Barth's view; what Barth wished 
t o s u b s t i t u t e was God's f a i t h given t o man, and guaranteed as ' o b j e c t i v e ' , 
f o r man's 'autonomous' powers of understanding. I n the t h i r d chapter we 
saw t h a t Barth argues knowledge based on 'o b j e c t i v e ' h i s t o r i c a l methods 
t o be i n danger of 'su b j e c t i v i s m ' , and he c i t e s the e f f e c t i v e disagree-
ments between h i s t o r i a n s on the nature of Ch r i s t ' s teaching as an example 
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of the d i f f i c u l t i e s experienced by the h i s t o r i c a l method i n being 
' o b j e c t i v e ' . The only ' o b j e c t i v e ' knowledge, i n Barth's view, i s 
knowledge grounded upon God's d i r e c t s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e - t h a t i s t o say, 
i n Selby's words, 'a d i v i n e f a c t which could only be grasped by 
r e v e l a t i o n ' . Opposition t o Bultmann's 'subjectivism' i s the c r u c i a l 
f a c t o r i n Barth's disagreement w i t h him. 
The d i f f e r e n c e i n Barth's l a t e r , as opposed t o h i s e a r l i e r , thought 
on the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s u s u a l l y seen t o be t h a t of a s t r i c t i n s i s t e n c e , 
i n the l a t e r w r i t i n g s , upon the r e s u r r e c t i o n as an event i n the p h y s i c a l , 
h i s t o r i c a l w o r l d , and w i t h t h i s an emphasis upon the r e s u r r e c t i o n as a 
p h y s i c a l event. I n the Preface t o Space, Time and Resurrection, Prof-
essor Torrance r e c a l l s a v i s i t t o Barth made a few weeks before the 
l a t t e r ' s death: 
.... Barth leaned over t o me and said w i t h considerable f o r c e , 
which I s h a l l never f o r g e t , 'Wohlverstanden, l e i b l i c h e 
Auferstehung' - 'Mark w e l l , b o d i l y r e s u r r e c t i o n ' . (8) 
Barth's view i n the l a t e r volumes of the Church Dogmatics, i t i s 
claimed, i s t h a t the r e s u r r e c t i o n was an event i n the p h y s i c a l , 
h i s t o r i c a l w o r l d , although he refuses t o .accept t h a t i t i s open t o 
h i s t o r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n . An analysis of t h i s ' l a t e r ' Barthian p o s i t i o n 
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i s provided by Van A. Harvey i n The Historian and the Believer. Van 
Harvey bel i e v e s t h a t Barth i s seeking t o have h i s cake and eat i t i n h i s 
l a t e r w r i t i n g s on the r e s u r r e c t i o n , i n the sense t h a t he wants the 
advantages of cla i m i n g t h a t Jesus's r e s u r r e c t i o n was an h i s t o r i c a l event, 
i n terms of i t s being accorded a d e f i n i t e e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y , w h i l s t 
i n c u r r i n g none o f the disadvantages i n terms of i t s being open t o 
c r i t i c a l h i s t o r i c a l s c r u t i n y : 
On the one hand, he i n s i s t s t h a t the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s a p h y s i c a l 
and b o d i l y f a c t w h i l e , on the other hand, he claims t h a t the 
h i s t o r i a n can determine nothing about i t . (10) 
I f we examine Barth's view of the r e s u r r e c t i o n i n h i s e a r l y theology, 
we see t h a t i t i s not s u f f i c i e n t simply t o say t h a t Barth 'denies i t s 
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h i s t o r i c i t y ' i n h i s e a r l y work. I n h i s second commentary on Romans we 
f i n d Barth saying, indeed, t h a t from one p o i n t of view the r e s u r r e c t i o n 
i s an h i s t o r i c a l event: 
So i s t d i e Auferstehung das Er e i g n i s von den Toren Jerusalem im 
Jahre 30, sofern s i e d o r t ' e i n t r a t ' , entdeckt und erkannt wurde. 
(11) 
As something t h a t entered our world, was discovered and was 
recognised by us, the r e s u r r e c t i o n cannot but be event - 'Ereignis'. 
The desire t o r e t a i n the f a c t o f encounter between two separate worlds 
as a r e a l f a c t of encounter d i s c e r n i b l e by man, ensures the ' h i s t o r i c i t y 
of the r e s u r r e c t i o n ' , although only 'from the p o i n t of view o f man's 
di s c e r n i n g . The 'sofern' i s a l l - i m p o r t a n t . .For, a t the same time: 
Und Sie i s t es auch wieder gar n i c h t , sofern i h r e Notwendigkeit, 
Erscheinung und Offenbarung n i c h t durch jenes E i n t r e t e n , 
Entdecken und Erkennen bedingt, sondern s e l b s t i h r Bedingendes 
i s t . (12) 
I n other words the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s not .an event i n h i s t o r y , and the 
h i s t o r i c i t y o f the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s denied, i n s o f a r as i t s appearance, 
r e v e l a t i o n and necessity are not and cannot ( f o r God i s free) be con d i t -
ioned by the nature of i t s e n t r y i n t o , and discovery by, the world of 
man, i n other words i n so f a r as t o assent t o the ' h i s t o r i c i t y ' of the 
r e s u r r e c t i o n might imply a c o n s t r a i n i n g of God through the requirements 
l a i d upon Him i n d i r e c t l y through man's l i m i t e d powers of discovery and 
r e c o g n i t i o n . 
Barth's argument i s t h a t the r e s u r r e c t i o n of C h r i s t i s perceived by 
man t o be w i t h i n h i s t o r y , , but t h a t i n s o f a r as God's actions are not 
constrained by the l i m i t a t i o n s o f human experience we cannot say t h a t 
the r e s u r r e c t i o n as an act of God i s i n i t s e l f an h i s t o r i c a l a c t i o n . 
The 'change' i n Barth's l a t e r theology l i e s i n h i s p e r c e i v i n g t h a t t h i s 
d e n i a l of innate h i s t o r i c i t y t o the r e s u r r e c t i o n might open him up t o 
p r e c i s e l y the charge t h a t he was t o l e v e l against Bultmann, namely t h a t 
of ' s u b j e c t i v i s m ' - i n other words, t o the charge t h a t the r e s u r r e c t i o n 
'seemed' h i s t o r i c a l when assessed by man but ' i n i t s e l f , uninfluenced 
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by the ' s u b j e c t i v e ' view of man, t h a t i t was not an o b j e c t i v e , 
i 
h i s t o r i c a l event. The need i n h i s l a t e r theoljogy, then, was t o assent 
t o the o b j e c t i v i t y of the r e s u r r e c t i o n as a r e a l h i s t o r i c a l event i n 
i t s e l f , w h i l s t f i n d i n g a way t o answer the o b j e c t i o n t h a t l e d him t o shy 
away from t h i s p o i n t of view i n h i s commentary on Romans, namely t h a t 
such an admission would 'constrain' God t o act w i t h i n the confines of 
the w o r l d as ordered and d i r e c t e d by man. 
The most well-known Barthian q u o t a t i o n concerning the r e s u r r e c t i o n 
i s the f a m i l i a r analogy of tangent and c i r c l e from the commentary on 
Romans: ! 
I n die Auferstehung b e r u h r t die neue Welt des h e i l i g e n Geistes 
die a l t e Welt des Fleisches. Aber si e b e r t l h r t s i e wie die 
Tangente einer K r e i s , ohne s i e zu beruhren, und gerade indem 
s i e s i e n i c h t b e r u h r t , b e r u h r t s i e s i e als i h r e Begrenzung, 
a l s neue Welt. (13) 
I n the language of paradox which seeks t o r e t a i n both the encounter 
of two worlds and t h e i r otherness from one another, the mathematical 
analogy of tangent and c i r c l e i s brought i n . But w i t h an a d d i t i o n a l 
p o i n t - f o r i n the touch t h a t does not touch l i e s the t r u e r e l a t i o n of 
i 
the new wor l d t o the o l d as i t s 'Begrenzung', i t s l i m i t or f r o n t i e r . 
What dis c l o s e s the new encloses the o l d . The tangent meets and draws 
away from the c i r c l e which i t encounters: a t the same time i t defines 
i t s outermost p o i n t and r u l e s i t s f r o n t i e r . I t does not open up new 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r man, so much as define and declare the l i m i t of h i s 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . This r o l e i t possesses as the 'impossible p o s s i b i l i t y ' , 
pronouncing: 'thus f a r , and no f u r t h e r ' . The r e s u r r e c t i o n declares the 
r e s t r i c t e d scope of the o l d world and, r a t h e r ithan e x a l t i n g i t t o , and 
c a r r y i n g i t over i n t o , the new, bounds and l i m i t s i t , establishes i t 
w i t h i n i t s f i n i t e sphere and, from the p o i n t of view of i t s own e t e r n a l 
d e c l a r a t i o n , d i s s o l v e s i t . I t i s not a p o i n t of u n i t y between God and 
man, a p o i n t where man i s ex a l t e d t o become d i v i n e , or of God w i l l i n g l y 
g i v i n g himself t o be human, but an occasion on which t h e i r separation i s 
maintained and the enclosure, r a t h e r than the permeation, of the temporal 
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by the e t e r n a l declared through the r e s u r r e c t i o n of Jesus C h r i s t from 
the dead. 
Barth's language leads us t o ask the question addressed t o h i s 
treatment both of I n c a r n a t i o n and Resurrection i n chapter two, namely 
t h a t of whether h i s 'system' of ' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' can 
bear any r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a u n i t y of God and man played out i n h i s t o r y , 
e i t h e r through the condescension o f the d i v i n e t o become human i n the 
I n c a r n a t i o n or the e x a l t a t i o n of the human t o become d i v i n e i n the 
r e s u r r e c t i o n . Barth's p r e s e n t a t i o n i s , r a t h e r , t h a t both 'enclose' the 
human w i t h i n the d i v i n e , r a t h e r than u n i t e them: rat h e r than being 
i t s e l f an h i s t o r i c a l event, the r e s u r r e c t i o n declares the l i m i t s of 
h i s t o r y . As the ' l i n e of i n t e r s e c t i o n ' ( S c h n i t t l i n i e ) marked by the 
I n c a r n a t i o n does not r e s u l t i n an extension (Ausdehnung) of the h i s t o r -
i c a l plane known to us (der uns bekahnten Ebene), so also the resur-
r e c t i o n does not 'touch' (beruhrt) the h i s t o r i c a l world i n any r e a l 
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sense, however much it-may be perceived by us t o do so. The 
h i s t o r i c i t y o f the r e s u r r e c t i o n i n t h i s e a r l y thought of Barth i s a 
s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of man, not c o n s t i t u t i v e of the o b j e c t i v e 
r e a l i t y o f the event of God's r a i s i n g h i s son. 
I n the 1920s Barth's thought develops from the ' o n t o l o g i c a l dualism' 
shown i n Romans t o an 1 e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l dualism' which separates 
knowledge based on reason a c t i n g w i t h i n f a i t h from knowledge based upon 
' n a t u r a l ' reason. We f i n d an a n t i c i p a t i o n of t h i s s h i f t i n Die Aufer-
stehung der Toten, w r i t t e n i n the form of a commentary upon Paul's f i r s t 
l e t t e r t o the Corinthians i n 1924. I n commenting on the famous f i f t e e n t h 
chapter o f the e p i s t l e , Barth r e f e r s t o the Pauline claim t h a t the 
r e s u r r e c t i o n o f Jesus stands or f a l l s w i t h the r e s u r r e c t i o n of the dead 
g e n e r a l l y . How, i n t h i s context, he asks, can the r e s u r r e c t i o n be an 
h i s t o r i c a l f a c t , when the percep t i o n of i t i s bound up expressly w i t h 
the p e r c e p t i o n of a general t r u t h ? Barth's p o i n t i s t o say t h a t i f the 
dead are not r a i s e d , then C h r i s t i s not r a i s e d , i s t o attempt t o deduce 
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an h i s t o r i c a l f a c t from a general t r u t h . 
I n what sense, furthermore, Barth asks, are the r e s u r r e c t i o n 
appearances h i s t o r i c a l ? H i s t o r y , he declares, w i l l only take us as 
f a r as the empty tomb. Beyond t h a t , a l l ideas as t o the way i n which 
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He appeared t o the d i s c i p l e s are incapable of being completed. Indeed, 
i n s o f a r as t o pronounce them ' h i s t o r i c a l ' i s t o reduce what took place 
before the d i s c i p l e s and women a t t h a t time, i t i s necessary t o argue 
t h a t the appearances are 'only comprehensible as r e v e l a t i o n ; otherwise 
they are incomprehensible'."*"^ For 'th a t r e v e l a t i o n i s r e v e l a t i o n can 
17 
only be proved from r e v e l a t i o n i t s e l f . And when we say t h a t the 
r e s u r r e c t i o n was 'according t o the S c r i p t u r e s ' , we thereby r e g i s t e r t h a t 
we cannot e x p l a i n how i t i s t r u e , but only t h a t there i s a 'consensus of 
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voices announcing a t r u t h t h a t proves i t s e l f . I t i s cle a r t h a t Barth 
believes the r e s u r r e c t i o n appearances t o c o n s t i t u t e a t r u t h t h a t 'proves 
i t s e l f , t h a t provides, as i t were, the very means by which i t can be 
understood. 
The argument here i s not q u i t e the same as i n Romans. The emphasis 
i s upon how we know the r e s u r r e c t i o n , r a t h e r than the r e s u r r e c t i o n i t s e l f . 
The c l a i m i s t h a t knowledge of the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s based upon r e v e l a t i o n , 
a s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i n g source of understanding which does not require the 
n a t u r a l - i n c l u d i n g the h i s t o r i c a l - resources of human reason t o determine 
i t s t r u t h from t h e i r own powers. The stress i s not upon the r e s u r r e c t i o n 
as i t s e l f a d i v i n e r e a l i t y which 'encloses' the human, but upon a l l ideas 
as t o the way i n which 'his appearance was seen' as 'incapable of being 
completed', and upon the comprehensibility of the r e s u r r e c t i o n 'as 
r e v e l a t i o n ; otherwise i t i s incomprehensible'. I n Romans the r e s u r r e c t i o n 
was a r e a l i t y t h a t touched t h i s w o r l d 'without touching i t ' : i n 'The 
Resurrection o f the Dead' knowledge of the r e s u r r e c t i o n does not 'touch' 
the o r d i n a r y knowledge,of reason a c t i n g from i t s own resources. The 
Resurrection of the Dead thereby shows the inf l u e n c e of an epistemological 
debate w i t h Harnack i n which Barth's hermeneutics sharpened i t s e l f . 
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There i s a f u r t h e r respect i n which Barth's view shows evidence 
of change i n 1924. I n the 1924 work the perception of the r e s u r r e c t i o n 
by God's d i r e c t a c t i v i t y i n man i s not made t o exclude the h i s t o r i c i t y 
of the r e s u r r e c t i o n . The r e s u r r e c t i o n , Barth w r i t e s , i s 
a h i s t o r i c a l d i v i n e f a c t ( g e s c h i c h t l i c h e Gottestatsache), which 
as such i s only t o be grasped i n the category of r e v e l a t i o n and 
i n none other. (19) 
Although i t i s t o be grasped i n the category of r e v e l a t i o n and none 
other, the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s s t i l l a ' h i s t o r i c a l d i v i n e f a c t ' . 
The n a t u r a l powers of human understanding, i n c l u d i n g the h i s t o r i c a l 
reason, which i n understanding r e v e l a t i o n can only work w i t h i n a God-
given f a i t h , nevertheless work w i t h i n t h a t f a i t h : they are i n t e g r a t e d 
i n t o i t (we discuss t h i s i n d e t a i l i n chapter s i x and seven) as the 
're-baptised' instruments of a s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i n g r e v e l a t i o n . Thus 
the h i s t o r i c i t y of the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s not so much denied as 'taken i n t o ' 
the order o f God's s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e . I t i s ' h i s t o r i c a l ' , but only w i t h i n 
the ambit of ' f a i t h seeking understanding 1. I n the Church Dogmatics we 
f i n d t h i s 'Aufhebung' of the n a t u r a l knowledge of God f u l l y catalogued 
i n terms of concepts such as 'Primal H i s t o r y ' , 'Saga' and 'God's time', 
i n which h i s t o r i c a l and temporal concepts are re-expressed from ' w i t h i n ' 
r e v e l a t i o n i t s e l f , and i n which context the o b j e c t i v i t y of the r e s u r r e c t i o n 
as an h i s t o r i c a l event ( w i t h i n God's r e v e l a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e , as Van 
Harvey points o u t , not open t o h i s t o r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n ) i s af f i r m e d . 
I n the second commentary on Romans, the most accurate assessment of 
Barth's view of the r e s u r r e c t i o n would be t h a t i t s h i s t o r i c i t y was denied, 
w h i l s t the h i s t o r i c a l nature of man's perception of i t was aff i r m e d . I n 
the commentary on 1 C o r i n t h i a n s , the perception of the r e s u r r e c t i o n as 
h i s t o r i c a l , r a t h e r than being a s u b j e c t i v e assessment of i t s nature by 
man i n h i s merely r e l a t i v e being, becomes an 'ob j e c t i v e ' i n s i g h t i n t o 
i t s nature based on God's g i f t o f grace i n r e v e l a t i o n . The h i s t o r i c a l 
and temporal s t r u c t u r e of human understanding are made t o conform t o the 
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' o b j e c t i v e ' r e a l i t y o f God i n h i s s e l f - m a n i f e s t a t i o n by the act i o n of 
God hi m s e l f , and t h e r e f o r e become vehicles of 'o b j e c t i v e ' statements 
about him. The Church Dogmatics, i n i t s references t o the r e s u r r e c t i o n , 
continues t h i s approach. We s h a l l concentrate t o begin w i t h upon the 
con s i d e r a t i o n of the r e s u r r e c t i o n i n I I I 2. 
Barth here provides one of h i s longest treatments of the subject i n 
the Church Dogmatics, i n a sec t i o n e n t i t l e d 'Jesus, Lord of time'.^° We 
also f i n d here a discussion by Barth of h i s d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h Bultmann. 
I n Barth's understanding of time, our temporal existence can only 
be understood i n terms of our r e l a t i o n t o 'God's time' ( f o r God does not 
l i v e w i t h o u t time,according t o Barth, but i n the 'uncreated time' i n 
which p a s t , present and f u t u r e are simultaneous r a t h e r than successive). 
This r e l a t i o n t o God can only be understood through C h r i s t , who as Lord 
of time enables the time of h i s existence i n h i s t o r y t o acquire the 
character o f God's time. 
This a c q u i s i t i o n i s s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e d t o the 'Easter time', the 
f o r t y days between r e s u r r e c t i o n and ascension. Barth c a l l s t h i s a 
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' f u r t h e r h i s t o r y ' of Jesus, f o l l o w i n g the end of h i s ' f i r s t h i s t o r y ' . 
I t i s t h i s p e r i o d t h a t : 
shows us, as nothing else can, according t o the New Testament, 
t h a t even as a man i n His time Jesus i s the Lord of a l l time. (22) 
I t does not, however, 'make' Jesus Lord of time: i t reveals a l o r d -
ship t h a t has e x i s t e d throughout h i s l i f e . However, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o 
see how these f o r t y days 'reveal' t h i s l o r d s h i p of time more than the 
previous thousand of h i s m i n i s t r y . According t o Barth, 'the man Jesus 
23 
was manifested among them i n the mode of God' during the p e r i o d between 
r e s u r r e c t i o n and ascension, and a d e i t y h i t h e r t o v e i l e d was revealed. 
God, who has a d i f f e r e n t time than men, ' w i l l e d t o give man a share i n 
24 
t h i s time o f His' , and the f o r t y , days reveal t h i s . Yet they remain, 
f o r a l l t h a t , s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r t y days; Barth's argument i s t h a t men 
25 
experience an 'assumption o f t h e i r time i n t o His ( C h r i s t ' s ) ' , made 
manifest during the 'Easter h i s t o r y ' . This 'assumption' enables man t o 
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p a r t i c i p a t e i n the s i m u l t a n e i t y of time t o God's time, and enables the 
time of Jesus's l i f e t o become 'present' t o men of every age i n t h e i r 
own times, since a l l times are present t o i t (as 'eternal t i m e ' ) . 
Because men i n t h e i r own times are assumed i n t o the e t e r n a l time f o r 
which a l l times are simultaneous, they p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h i s perspective 
of s i m u l t a n e i t y , and t h e r e f o r e the l i f e o f Jesus becomes present t o them 
- t o the prophets i t i s present i n t h e i r prophecy, and t o the apostles 
i n t h e i r r e c o l l e c t i o n . 
God's a c t i o n i n g i v i n g man a share i n His 'time', then, i s mediated 
through the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the time of Jesus i n h i s 'time', a p a r t i c i -
p a t i o n which i s revealed through the f o r t y days which display Jesus's 
Lordship of time. 
Barth's treatment of time i s , however, ambiguous. His argument 
makes, i t c l e a r t h a t Jesus' Lordship of time enables His time t o acquire 
the character o f God's time - t o which a l l times are simultaneously 
present - i n a way t h a t o r d i n a r y human time cannot hope t o do, being 
i t s e l f always successive time. On the other hand, from the perspective 
of man, the Easter time i s f o r t y days, as Jesus's m i n i s t r y was three years. 
I n t h i s sense man's time cannot become God's. Yet the 'assumption' of 
human time ' i n t o ' God's time through Jesus's Lordship of time implies 
t h a t the two become one, and t h a t through C h r i s t ' s simultaneous presence 
t o a l l times they are l i f t e d i n t o the time of God. The process appears 
to be one i n which Barth c o n s t a n t l y seeks t o 'admit' human time, through 
C h r i s t , ' i n t o ' the time of God, w h i l s t at the same time ensuring a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the two. From one per s p e c t i v e , then, the f o r t y days 
i 
are a s p e c i f i c l ength of 'human' time of l i m i t e d d u r a t i o n : from another 
p e r s p e c t i v e , however, they are the moment of en t r y of man's time i n t o 
i 
God's. On the one hand, i t appears t h a t C h r i s t ' s 'taking of time' upon 
himse l f b r i n g s time and e t e r n i t y together: as Lord of time, Jesus admits 
man's successive time t o the s i m u l t a n e i t y of God's time. On the other 
hand, the f o r t y days rev e a l the time of God which i s other than t h a t of man. 
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The d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Barth's treatment of time are brought out i n 
Dr R. H. Roberts's a r t i c l e , 'Barth's Doctrine of Time : I t s Nature and 
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I m p l i c a t i o n s ' : 
Can Jesus' being i n time mean what i t means f o r us a l l ? Barth's 
ambiguity i s here q u i n t e s s e n t i a l l y expressed, f o r h i s answer i s 
a f f i r m a t i v e , y e t immediately q u a l i f i e d by the ' i n c l u s i o n ' of such 
time by the d i v i n e time. (28) 
I t was Dr Roberts who i n i t i a l l y emphasised t o us the suggestion of 
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an unsung Hegelianism i n the Church Dogmatics, and the word i n i n v e r t e d 
commas - i n c l u s i o n - suggests the process by which, we have argued, Barth 
'rebaptises' the constants of the n a t u r a l world, such as time, w i t h i n a 
supervening d i v i n e r e a l i t y . ^ a Roberts believes t h a t Barth cannot, i n 
the end, escape the charge t h a t h i s treatment of 'the r e s u r r e c t i o n time' 
i s d o c e t i c , f o r although Barth agrees t h a t 'only a docetic a t t i t u d e t o 
Jesus can deny t h a t His being i n time also means what being i n time means 
f o r us all',^° he also a f f i r m s t h a t the 'time of r e v e l a t i o n as consummated 
i n the r e s u r r e c t i o n becomes the ac t u a l p r o t o t y p i c a l basis of human time', 
a p r o t o t y p e which by i t s t a k i n g up of ordinary human time i n t o i t s e l f 
must n e c e s s a r i l y rob i t of i t s n a t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s (although Barth would 
claim t h a t i t a f f i r m s them). I f Roberts nevertheless f e e l s t h a t Barth's 
treatment i s ' d o c e t i c 1 , i t i s because he denies t h a t 'ordinary' time 
r e d e f i n e d from ' w i t h i n ' i t s d i v i n e prototype remains ordinary time, i n 
other words t h a t such an 'Aufhebung' of ordinary time i s anything other 
than i t s e f f e c t i v e d i s s o l u t i o n . 
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'The d i a l e c t i c i s resolved upwards i n every context ....', Roberts 
comments. The terms of n a t u r a l human experience - time, h i s t o r y , n a r r a t i v e , 
and so on, are explained i n terms of a 'divi n e ' time, a 'Primal' h i s t o r y 
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(Urgeschichte), and the concept o f 'saga', d i v i n e r e a l i t i e s which 
o r i g i n a t e and 'include' t h e i r human equiv a l e n t s , determining t h a t whatever 
the r e a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n of God through C h r i s t i n the n a t u r a l order, t h a t 
order w i l l always be f i n a l l y explained i n terms of these p u t a t i v e d i v i n e 
o r i g i n a l s . 
Thus we f i n d i n I I I 1 t h a t the aim of c r e a t i o n i s ' h i s t o r y ' , q u a l i f i e d 
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as ' s a l v a t i o n - h i s t o r y ' , which i s not 'one h i s t o r y among others', but 
the h i s t o r y : 
.... the t r u e h i s t o r y which encloses a l l other h i s t o r y and t o 
which i n some way a l l other h i s t o r y belongs t o the extent t h a t 
i t r e f l e c t s and i l l u s t r a t e s the h i s t o r y of s a l v a t i o n . (34) 
The p u t a t i v e d i v i n e o r i g i n a l 'explains' the n a t u r a l h i s t o r y which 
i t 'encloses', despite the f a c t t h a t , i n using the word ' h i s t o r y ' , 
s a l v a t i o n - h i s t o r y has i t s e l f borrowed from the n a t u r a l order. 'True' 
h i s t o r y i s not h i s t o r y as i t i s l i v e d and experienced by man i n the 
n a t u r a l order, but the h i s t o r y of s a l v a t i o n which encloses t h a t order: 
s i m i l a r l y i t i s God's time, revealed i n the Lordship of time enjoyed 
by C h r i s t , which encloses the human time of temporal succession. 
Like some cancerous Doppelganger, t h e o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y appears 
t o i n f l a t e i t s e l f , drawing l i f e from the r e a l i t y i t condemns, 
p e r f e c t i n g i n e x q u i s i t e form what could be seen as the most 
profound and s y s t e m a t i c a l l y consistent t h e o l o g i c a l a l i e n a t i o n 
of the n a t u r a l order ever achieved. (35) 
For t h e o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y 'draws l i f e ' from the n a t u r a l understanding 
of time, h i s t o r y and n a r r a t i v e i n order t o give substance t o those d i v i n e 
'prototypes' which enable theology t o claim t h a t i t deals w i t h 'another 
order' than they, an order i n which t h a t n a t u r a l understanding i s said 
t o be 'enclosed' i n order t o avoid the charge of docetism - the most 
obvious form of ' t h e o l o g i c a l a l i e n a t i o n ' . Such a process of 'enclosing' 
maintains the ambiguity of a time at once ' n a t u r a l ' and assumed i n t o 
another order of 'God's time', a h i s t o r y t h a t i s ' p r e - h i s t o r i c a l 1 and 
yet encloses a l l other h i s t o r y , recounted i n 'saga' which i s immune t o 
the canons of ordi n a r y human c r i t i c i s m which, however, i t embraces. The 
'di v i n e ' r e a l i t i e s receive t h e i r substance i n f a c t from t h e i r human 
eq u i v a l e n t s , w h i l e e f f e c t i v e l y anaesthetising them i n s o f a r as t h e i r 
c r i t i c a l capacity i s concerned: hence the p o s s i b i l i t y of arguing, as 
van Harvey p o i n t s out, t h a t the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s ' h i s t o r i c a l ' w h i l s t f r e e 
of c r i t i c i s m from the perspective of the i n v e s t i g a t i v e h i s t o r i a n . The 
r e s u r r e c t i o n p a r t i c i p a t e s i n t h i s ambiguity i n the s i g n i f i c a n c e which 
Barth accords t o the f o r t y days which, w h i l s t r e t a i n i n g t h e i r n a t u r a l 
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temporal sense, a t the same time r e p r e s e n t the d i s c l o s u r e of an 
assumption of n a t u r a l time i n t o the time of God. 
When we examine Bart h ' s treatment of Bultmann i n t h i s s e c t i o n , we 
f i n d the c l a i m t h a t w h i l s t Bultmann, u n l i k e Cullmann, r e c o g n i s e s the 
c e n t r a l i t y of the r e s u r r e c t i o n , he i d e n t i f i e s i t with no p a r t i c u l a r 
'event'. Bultmann understands the p o s s i b l e scope of words l i k e 'event' 
i n terms of t h e i r ' s e c u l a r ' usage. To t h i s any ' r e l i g i o u s ' usage must 
be a p p l i c a b l e . I f the r e s u r r e c t i o n was not an h i s t o r i c a l event, i t was 
not an event, s i n c e we only use the word 'event' of what i s h i s t o r i c a l . 
B a r t h r e j e c t s t h i s approach e n t i r e l y . J u s t as Cullmann made the 
mistake of understanding the event of C h r i s t w i t h i n the p r e v a i l i n g 
understanding of an 'event' (and thereby r e j e c t s i t as 'event'); 
Bultmann, l i k e Herrmann, R i t s c h l and Schleiermacher, thereby f o r c e s 
s y s t e m a t i c theology, i n Barth's opinion, i n t o an a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l 
s t r a i t j a c k e t , i n which- i n the case of Bultmann - an event i s h i s t o r i c a l 
only i f open to v e r i f i c a t i o n by the methods of h i s t o r i c a l s c h o l a r s h i p . 
However, the r e s u r r e c t i o n , Barth argues, i s a ' f a c t ' beyond the scope 
of h i s t o r i c a l methods, because u n l i k e other f a c t s . I t i s an event 
beyond the reach of the h i s t o r i a n , to which f a c t the d i s j o i n t e d , even 
in c o m p a t i b l e , E a s t e r n a r r a t i v e s pay a s u b t l e homage by t h e i r apparent 
i n a d e q u a c y . ^ 
However, d e s p i t e the apparent opposition between them, there i s i n 
f a c t a s i m i l a r i t y between Barth and Bultmann i n t h e i r treatments of the 
r e s u r r e c t i o n . The l a t t e r seeks to bypass the thorny problem of i t s 
h i s t o r i c i t y , and to i d e n t i f y the s e l f - m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the Risen Lord 
w i t h an a c t of f a i t h on the p a r t of the d i s c i p l e s (the s i g n i f i c a n c e of 
the c r o s s ) , f o r which the qu e s t i o n of the h i s t o r i c i t y of the r e s u r r e c t i o n 
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i s i r r e l e v a n t - or even a faith-endangering q u e s t i o n to ask. The , 
former (Barth) a l s o seeks to bypass the question of h i s t o r i c i t y , and to 
speak of an ' o b j e c t i v e ' r e a l i t y of the r e s u r r e c t i o n , but one removed 
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from, and independent o f , those f e a t u r e s of the e x t e r n a l world which 
r e q u i r e t o be analysed by the h i s t o r i a n : 
E v e r y t h i n g had to happen as i t a c t u a l l y d i d according to the 
E a s t e r S t o r y i n i t s simple, l i t e r a l sense. There was no 
other way. (37) 
Thus B a r t h . Yet h i s emphasis i s upon i t s l i t e r a l sense (ihrem 
s c h l i c h t e n , n i c h t umgedeuteten Wortlaut) which i s not to be thought of 
as e q u i v a l e n t to the l i t e r a l sense of events reported i n the everyday 
world of h i s t o r i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e events. Otherwise we could not recognise 
what Ba r t h means when he r e f e r s to the empty tomb as a 'sign' i n the 
sense of 'presupposition' and a s k s : 
I s i t j u s t a 'legend'? What matter? I t s t i l l r e f e r s to the 
phenomenon ensuring the r e s u r r e c t i o n , to the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n 
of the appearance of J e s u s ... 
Indeed: 
I t i s the s i g n which o b v i a t e s a l l p o s s i b l e misunderstanding. 
I t cannot t h e r e f o r e but demand our a s s e n t , even as a legend. (38) 
I t i s almost as i f the terms i n which the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s expressed 
have become independent of the q u e s t i o n of whether i t a c t u a l l y - l i t e r a l l y . ' 
- happened. 
Behind B a r t h ' s approach l i e s a d i f f i c u l t y . He argues t h a t the 
' s t r a i t j a c k e t ' which judges the o b j e c t i v i t y of the r e s u r r e c t i o n according 
to the c r i t e r i a by which other events are judged to be o b j e c t i v e i s to 
be c a s t o f f . Yet h i s own i n s i s t e n c e upon the ' o b j e c t i v i t y ' of the 
r e s u r r e c t i o n i s n e c e s s a r i l y p a r a s i t i c upon what i s o r d i n a r i l y conceived 
of as ' f a c t ' or 'event', capable of being brought w i t h i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
grasp of the h i s t o r i a n . On the one hand, the commitment to an e x t e r n a l 
r e a l i t y a p p r e c i a b l e by man makes of the r e s u r r e c t i o n , i n Barth's view, 
very much what the h i s t o r i a n might i n p r i n c i p l e i n v e s t i g a t e . On the other 
hand, the emphasis upon a f a c t beyond h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m , something 
t h a t happened i n a 'higher h i s t o r y ' and i s . no o r d i n a r y event, makes not 
only the event of r e s u r r e c t i o n i t s e l f , on which a l l the e v a n g e l i s t s are 
s i l e n t , but the whole f o r t y days and the events t h a t took p l a c e w i t h i n 
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them, something to which Barth grants ' o b j e c t i v i t y ' only as a s e r i e s of 
events u n r e l a t e d to o t h e r s i n which the h i s t o r i a n i s r i g h t f u l l y i n t e r -
e s t e d . 
Both B a r t h and Bultmann seek to bypass the problems surrounding 
h i s t o r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the r e s u r r e c t i o n n a r r a t i v e s : but while f o r 
Bultmann the emphasis i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may be p l a c e d upon 
s u b j e c t i v e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of J e s u s ' s death by the 
b e l i e v e r , B a r t h ' s emphasis i s upon an o b j e c t i v i t y l o c a t e d 'beyond' the 
range of h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m w h i l s t 'enclosing' the h i s t o r i c a l w i t h i n 
i t s e l f . 
B a r t h ' s understanding of the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
from t h a t of Wolfhart Pannenberg. The l a t t e r c o n s i d e r s understanding 
of the r e s u r r e c t i o n to be hindered by the tendency to regard a l l 
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h i s t o r i c a l events as p o s s e s s i n g the same form. He argues t h a t the 
r e s u r r e c t i o n must be understood i n terms of a concept of h i s t o r y t h a t 
emphasises the contingency of h i s t o r i c a l events. Pannenberg's argument, 
u n l i k e B a r t h ' s , a f f i r m s the h i s t o r i c i t y of the r e s u r r e c t i o n while 
broadening the conception of what i s h i s t o r i c a l , whereas Barth a f f i r m s 
t h a t the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s only ' h i s t o r i c a l ' from the p e r s p e c t i v e of a 
s a l v a t i o n - h i s t o r y which i s to be separated from the n a t u r a l h i s t o r i c a l 
order t h a t i t ' e n c l o s e s ' , however broadly the l a t t e r i s conceived. 
Pannenberg emphasises the 'uniqueness' of the r e s u r r e c t i o n i n the sense 
i n which a l l h i s t o r i c a l events are unique: B a r t h emphasises i t s unique-
ness i n terms of an event whose expla n a t i o n i s contained 'within' i t s e l f . 
40 
B e r t h o l d K l a p p e r t supports the view t h a t we have taken of the 
p r o b l e m a t i c a l nature of the r e s u r r e c t i o n as an 'event' i n Barth's l a t e r 
w r i t i n g s . K l a p p e r t argues t h a t B a r t h d i s t i n g u i s h e s between the 'Nicht-
H i s t o r i z i t a t ' of the r e s u r r e c t i o n i n terms of i t s being 'ausserhalb 
m e n s c h l i c h e r Pragmatik und K a u s a l i t a t ' , and i t s ' H i s t o r i z i t a t ' 'im Sinn 
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der R a u m z e i t l i c h k e i t , D a t i e r b a r k e i t und L o k a l i s i e r b a r k e i t ' , but makes 
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i t c l e a r t h a t t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s i t s e l f p r o b l e m a t i c a l . However, 
K l a p p e r t t s n d s to i d e n t i f y Barth's view with Pannenberg's, i n t h a t : 
Die Auferstehung i s t e i n die h i s t o r i s c h e Ebene i m p l i z i e r e n d e s 
z u g l e i c h aber tranzendierendes E r e i g n i s und i n s o f e r n e i n 
' p r a h i s t o r i s c h e s ' Geschehen. (42) 
Y e t f o r Pannenberg the r e s u r r e c t i o n transcends the h i s t o r i c a l plane 
i n s o f a r as t h a t plane i s not a 'closed continuum' of predetermined events, 
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i n other words i n s o f a r as the h i s t o r i c a l plane transcends i t s e l f : 
whereas B a r t h i s concerned w i t h a plane which transcends the ' h i s t o r i c a l 
p l a n e ' of the n a t u r a l order a l t o g e t h e r . Barth's view of the event of 
r e s u r r e c t i o n ' a l s e i n p r a h i s t o r i s c h e s Geschehen mit h i s t o r i s c h e m 
I m p l i k a t ' d i s t i n g u i s h e s the r e s u r r e c t i o n from the h i s t o r i c a l plane 
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on which, however, i t has an ' i m p l i c a t i o n ' , w h i l s t Pannenberg cons i d e r s 
the h i s t o r i c a l plane i t s e l f t o i n c l u d e the p o s s i b i l i t y of the r e s u r r e c t i o n 
as a contingent event w i t h i n h i s t o r y . 
K l a p p e r t d i s c u s s e s at some length Barth's treatment of the r e s u r -
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r e c t i o n i n Church Dogmatics, I V , 1 , and once again the question of the 
nature of the 'event' of God's r a i s i n g His Son i s r e v e a l e d to be ambiguous 
i n h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n . I t i s , B a r t h s a y s , not to be understood as a 
' s u p e r n a t u r a l event' ( u b e r w e l t l i c h e s E r e i g n i s ) . I t s c h a r a c t e r as a r e a l 
event in_ h i s t o r y i s i m p l i e d by i t s c h a r a c t e r as judgment and r e v e l a t i o n 
and u n d e r l i n e s t h i s c h a r a c t e r , e n s u r i n g t h a t the judgment i s ' t o t a l 
d i e s s e i t i g erkennbar'. I n K l a p p e r t ' s words: 
Der r a u m z e i t l i c h e Geschehenscharakter der Auferweckung a l s 
I m p l i k a t i h r e s U r t e i l s c h a r a k t e r s ermoglicht nach Barth die 
menschliche E r k e n n b a r k e i t des im Kreuz unter dem Nein 
verborgenen J a . (46) 
The r e s u r r e c t i o n , then, was not a s u p e r n a t u r a l event, was i n space 
and time, and had the c h a r a c t e r of an 'occurrence'. Yet, as we have 
noted, i t was a ' p r a h i s t o r i s c h e s ' Geschehen. I t was not an h i s t o r i c a l 
event which c o u l d be t r e a t e d as other .events were t r e a t e d : 
.... a l s ' H i s t o r i e ' kann a l l e n f a l l s der Tod, a l s ' H i s t o r i e ' 
kann aber d i e Auferstehung n i c h t e r f a s s t werden. (47) 
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Although an occurrence i n space and time, the r e s u r r e c t i o n i s not 
' f a s s b a r ' h i s t o r i c a l l y . T h i s i s the p o i n t made by van Harvey, t h a t 
Barth appears to want the advantages of c l a i m i n g t h a t the r e s u r r e c t i o n 
was an event, without the disadvantages of i t s thereby being open to 
c r i t i c a l s c r u t i n y by the h i s t o r i a n . A ' r a u m z e i t l i c h e Geschehen' which 
i s , however, not ' f a s s b a r 1 by the h i s t o r i a n , seems to possess p r e c i s e l y 
the q u e s t i o n a b l e s t a t u s t h a t van Harvey p o i n t s out, and t h i s must be 
borne i n mind whenever i t i s simply claimed t h a t i n Barth's l a t e r 
theology he a f f i r m e d t h a t the r e s u r r e c t i o n was an event. As Kl a p p e r t 
remarks-: 
Aber nun erhebt s i c h die Frage v e r s c h a r f t : I n w i e f e r n kann Barth 
von einem im Raum und i n der Z e i t gegenstandlichen, nur eben 
' h i s t o r i s c h ' n i c h t f a s s b a r e n , aber w i r k l i c h e n Geschehen sprechen? 
(48) 
T h i s i s a l s o the q u e s t i o n van Harvey wishes to ask. How can Barth 
continue to p r o t e c t the r e s u r r e c t i o n n a r r a t i v e s from h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m 
and a t the same time i n s i s t upon the ' r a u m z e i t l i c h e Geschehenscharakter' 
of what they record? 
B a r t h ' s approach to the problem of the c h a r a c t e r of the r e s u r r e c t i o n 
as an 'event' must be understood i n the context of the 'system' by which, 
i n h i s l a t e r thought, concepts a p p l i c a b l e to the human order are 
' r e b a p t i s e d ' w i t h i n an order of grace or r e v e l a t i o n . H i s t o r y i s under-
stood i n terms of s a l v a t i o n - h i s t o r y , the 'true' h i s t o r y which i n c l u d e s 
a l l other h i s t o r y : s i m i l a r l y , man's time i s 'enclosed' w i t h i n 'God's 
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time'. Roberts t r a c e s , i n h i s a r t i c l e , the development of Barth's 
treatment of time and e t e r n i t y i n h i s w r i t i n g s , from t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n 
i n 'Romans' to the 'aufhebung' of man's time w i t h i n God's time i n the 
Church Dogmatics,. I l l , 2 . From the ' i n f i n i t e , q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' 
between time and e t e r n i t y which forms Barth's system i n 'Romans', h i s 
thought proceeds to the 'enclosing' of time w i t h i n e t e r n i t y - the time 
of God - made manifest i n J e s u s ' s Lordship of time during the f o r t y days 
of h i s p o s t - r e s u r r e c t i o n appearances. The nature of the 'enclosing' of 
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man's time w i t h i n God's time i s , however, ambiguous. I t both appears 
t h a t man's time r e t a i n s i t s n a t u r a l q u a l i t i e s , and t h a t i t p a r t i c i p a t e s 
i n the time of God to which a l l other times are simultaneously p r e s e n t . 
The same ambiguity c h a r a c t e r i s e s the r e s u r r e c t i o n of J e s u s , t r e a t e d by 
Bar t h both as an event i n h i s t o r y and - as a ' p r e - h i s t o r i c a l ' event -
as an occurrence w i t h i n t h a t ' s a l v a t i o n - h i s t o r y ' which, as the true h i s t o r y 
which ' e n c l o s e s ' a l l other h i s t o r i e s , i s n e v e r t h e l e s s not open to h i s t o r i c a l 
s c r u t i n y , but r a t h e r i s d e s c r i b e d i n terms of the p e c u l i a r l i t e r a r y from 
of 'saga'. 
The p r o c e s s , then, by which Barth attempts, i n van Harvey's words, 
to 'have h i s cake and e a t i t ' , i s one by which the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of God 
i n time and h i s t o r y i s only i n f a c t a p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n God's time and 
s a l v a t i o n - h i s t o r y : but because these are s a i d to be the prototypes of 
t h e i r n a t u r a l c o u n t e r p a r t s , B a r t h r e f u t e s the charge of docetism by 
c l a i m i n g t h a t he i s r e f e r r i n g to a ' r e a l ' temporal and h i s t o r i c a l 
involvement of God when he speaks of 'God's time' and ' s a l v a t i o n - h i s t o r y ' 
or ' p r e - h i s t o r y ' . Because ' n a t u r a l ' time and h i s t o r y are 'enclosed' 
w i t h i n the time of God and the h i s t o r y of s a l v a t i o n , God's p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
through C h r i s t i n His own time and h i s t o r y i s a l s o s a i d to be a p a r t i c i -
p a t i o n i n our time and h i s t o r y ; although, because the p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s 
i n H i s time and His h i s t o r y , i t i s not open to i n v e s t i g a t i o n by the 
h i s t o r i a n s of our time and our h i s t o r y ! Roberts i s s u r e l y r i g h t to f i n d 
i n t h i s the ploy of a d i s g u i s e d docetism, and a l s o , i n the p r e s e n t a t i o n 
of human time and h i s t o r y as 'enclosed' w i t h i n God's as 'true' time and 
'tru e ' h i s t o r y , a p a r a l l e l to the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c as c r i t i c i s e d by 
K a r l Marx. The c r i t i c i s m of Barth t h a t i t i s i n f a c t our time and our 
h i s t o r y which are 'true',and the ' d i v i n e ' counterparts to them mere 
a b s t r a c t i o n d e r i v e d from t h e i r n a t u r a l usage, r a t h e r than v i c e v e r s a as 
Bar t h would have i t , bears a r e l a t i o n s h i p to the i n v e r s i o n of the 
49 Hegelian d i a l e c t i c p r a c t i s e d by Feuerbach and Marx. 
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I n the l i g h t of these remarks, the con c l u s i o n t h a t Barth 'changed 
h i s view' of the r e s u r r e c t i o n must be t r e a t e d very c a r e f u l l y . I n i t i a l l y , 
under the i n f l u e n c e of the ' o n t o l o g i c a l dualism' of Romans, the 
h i s t o r i c i t y of the r e s u r r e c t i o n was a matter of man's s u b j e c t i v e 
p e r c e p t i o n only i n Ba r t h ' s thought; t h i s view Barth does change, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y as he comes t o c r i t i c i s e the ' s u b j e c t i v i s m ' of Bultmann's 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r e s u r r e c t i o n i n terms of the f a i t h of the d i s c i p l e s . 
Yet B a r t h ' s l a t e r thought r e t a i n s a dualism, s u b t l y d i s g u i s e d , between 
God's time and man's, between the h i s t o r y of s a l v a t i o n i n which the 
'event' of r e s u r r e c t i o n t a k e s p l a c e and 'ordinary' h i s t o r y which i t 
' e n c l o s e s ' . I t i s a dualism i n which the d i v i n e world 'reproduces' f o r 
i t s e l f the language of the human, w h i l s t c l a i m i n g t h a t i t i s the proto-
type of the human. The d i v i n e world i s not an 'unknown other' which 
forms the i n v i s i b l e boundary of the v i s i b l e world, (Romans), but makes 
i t s e l f known i n terms of the v i s i b l e world w h i l s t claiming to be the 
o r i g i n and foundation of the v i s i b l e world, the time of God to which a l l 
human times are p r e s e n t , the h i s t o r y of s a l v a t i o n which 'encloses' a l l 
other h i s t o r i e s . T h i s p r o c e s s Roberts d e s c r i b e s as ' t h e o l o g i c a l a l i e n -
a t i o n ' , whereby t h e o l o g i c a l language r e p r e s e n t s an ' a l i e n a t e d ' form of 
s e c u l a r language. 
I n t h i s l a t e r thought of Barth, h i s 'dualism' i s not always 
r e c o g n i s e d , ^ 0 and the s u p p o s i t i o n i s made t h a t he has i n f a c t 'reversed' 
the outlook of Romans. I n f a c t he has made i t much more s u b t l e . He 
has convinced many of h i s readers t h a t he has become committed to the 
r e s u r r e c t i o n as an ' o b j e c t i v e ' , ' h i s t o r i c a l ' 'event', thus d i s c a r d i n g 
the ' r a d i c a l s u b j e c t i v i s m ' of h i s e a r l i e r y e a r s . The f a c t t h a t t h i s 
' h i s t o r i c a l event' i s unable to be i n v e s t i g a t e d by the h i s t o r i a n should 
make c l e a r , however, t h a t the r e s u r r e c t i o n as a ' p r a h i s t o r i s c h e s Geschehen' 
remains an 'event' w i t h i n the h i s t o r y , and i n the time, which are God's 
and not man's, and which only appear t o be man's because Ba r t h has used 
the concepts of o r d i n a r y language i n order to ' f i l l out' the nature of 
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the d i v i n e world which he e a r l i e r p r o f e s s e d to be unknown, and i n order 
to maintain a c e r t a i n ambiguity as to whether he i s r e f e r r i n g to events 
i n ' t h i s ' world or not. 
Our treatment of the r e s u r r e c t i o n i n t h i s chapter may be compared 
wi t h our treatment of hermeneutics i n chapter t h r e e . I n the t h i r d chapter 
we n o t i c e d a ' c r i t i c a l ambiguity i n Barth's p r e s e n t a t i o n of the 'content' 
of s c r i p t u r e , as something both separate from, and y e t l o c a t e d w i t h i n , 
the words themselves (chapter 3, p. 69 ) . We argued t h a t the 'content' 
of the t e x t f unctioned as a 'ps e u d o - r e a l i t y ' which, w h i l e c l a i m i n g to be 
sepa r a t e from the words themselves, words t h a t might be c r i t i c a l l y 
examined and t h e i r a u t h e n t i c i t y questioned, was n e v e r t h e l e s s , p a r a s i t i c 
upon them f o r any meaning t h a t i t might have as t h e i r 'content'. We 
observe something s i m i l a r w i t h r e s p e c t to the r e s u r r e c t i o n , a n event w i t h i n 
a time t h a t i s God's, and p a r t of a ' p r e - h i s t o r y ' t h a t i s immune to 
h i s t o r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , w h i l s t dependent upon the ordinary 'human' 
sense of time and h i s t o r y f o r any meaning which i t might c l a i m as a r e a l 
' E r e i g n i s 1 - event. The R e s u r r e c t i o n , l i k e the Word or content of 
s c r i p t u r e , i s beyond c r i t i c a l , h i s t o r i c a l assessment i n Barth's p r e s e n t -
a t i o n : and y e t both are apparently i d e n t i f i e d w i t h 'human1 r e a l i t i e s -
a c o l l e c t i o n of t e x t s and a r e a l event i n space and time.- which must 
s u r e l y be open to such c r i t i c i s m . B a r t h ' s r e l e n t l e s s p u r s u i t of the 
b e n e f i t s of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the known world, w h i l s t e q u a l l y concerned 
to p r o t e c t f o r the B i b l e and the understanding of the r e s u r r e c t i o n the 
b e n e f i t s of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h what i s beyond human c r i t i c i s m , renders 
h i s theology u l t i m a t e l y ambiguous, as these two examples have sought to 
i l l u s t r a t e . 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Barth and C h r i s t o l o g y 
1. C h r i s t the source of the knowledge of God 
I n chapters s i x and seven we argued t h a t Barth's theology 'kicks 
man u p s t a i r s ' . I t so promotes him to p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the being of God 
t h a t h i s e f f e c t i v e 'independence' of God, an 'independence' which we 
def i n e i n the context of man's being an o b j e c t of grace r a t h e r than an 
o b j e c t of c r e a t i o n , i s removed. We concluded t h a t Barth's ' t h e o l o g i c a l 
anthropology' was a t f a u l t , not f o r seeking to understand the nature of 
man from t h a t of God r e v e a l e d i n C h r i s t , but f o r f a i l i n g to d e s c r i b e an 
ontology of man i n h i s humanity apart from C h r i s t . I n chapter seven we 
sought to argue, t h a t corresponding to t h i s l a c k of an ontology of man i s 
a f a i l u r e t o take i n t o account the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t a t u s of man's 
knowledge i n the a p p r o p r i a t i o n of r e v e l a t i o n . Barth e f f e c t i v e l y argues 
t h a t man's knowledge of God bypasses h i s n a t u r a l understanding, which 
'acknowledges' the knowledge which man has from beyond h i m s e l f . Man's 
knowledge of God e x i s t s w i t h i n God's knowledge of Himself, j u s t as man's 
humanity e x i s t s w i t h i n the humanity of'God r e v e a l e d i n C h r i s t . Man i s , 
i n other words, a p a r t of God, not to the detriment of God's absolute 
independence of man (as i n Hegel) , but to the detriment of man's r e l a t i v e 
independence of God. 
I n the notion t h a t the I n c a r n a t i o n of the Son of God i n v o l v e s a ' s e l f -
emptying' or 'Kenosis' i n the t a k i n g of human form, there may l i e 
i m p l i c i t l y the i d e a t h a t human and d i v i n e stand apart from one another 
as a l i e n worlds. I n IV 1 1 B a r t h w r i t e s of 'The Way of the Son of God i n t o 
the f a r country'"'" and the image i s of a d i s t a n t , i n h o s p i t a b l e land to which 
the Son must venture on a mi s s i o n to save i t s i n h a b i t a n t s . He must t r a v e l 
l i g h t l y and i n c o g n i t o (He must 'empty H i m s e l f ) . Indeed i t may not be 
t h a t He does so simply out of a d e s i r e to d i s g u i s e Himself f o r the sake 
of a c h i e v i n g a c e r t a i n moral purpose, as i n Kierkegaard's famous image 
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of the p r i n c e and the maiden, but r a t h e r t h a t such a self-emptying i s 
forc e d upon Him by the c o n s t r a i n t s of the 'journey' which He must under-
take. He cannot be i n the ' f a r country'"^ as a p r i n c e , not because He 
would be thereby unable to make His message c l e a r , but because He would 
not then be among them a t a l l . He must be among them as one who grows 
to c o nsciousness as a human being, who i s ordi n a r y enough to be l o s t i n 
a crowd, who may l o s e His temper, His confidence, perhaps even His f a i t h , 
who may s u f f e r and who may d i e . Kierkegaard's p r i n c e does not r e q u i r e 
the surroundings of h i s humbled e x i s t e n c e i n order t o d i s c o v e r h i s r o y a l 
persona: he i s always the r i c h man p l a y i n g a t being poor. He does not 
need the f a r country i n order to d i s c o v e r who he i s , but only i n order 
to f u l f i l a purpose. Whereas the Son of God who went h i s way d i d not a t 
a c e r t a i n p o i n t 'descend' from one region to another, from heavenly 
s e c u r i t y t o e a r t h l y v u l n e r a b i l i t y , c a r r y i n g w i t h Him the memory of a 
p a s t home and the assurance of an i d e n t i t y a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d i n His 
p r e - e x i s t e n c e . 
The e x p l o r e r who t r a v e l s to an i n h o s p i t a b l e f a r country may s u f f e r 
acute p h y s i c a l discomfort. The ' a l i e n c u l t u r e ' he encounters may le a d 
him t o q u e s t i o n h i s v a l u e s and even h i s b a s i c sense of who he i s . Yet 
he w i l l always be able to understand h i m s e l f , from the moment of h i s 
ve n t u r i n g abroad, as the one who 'came from' another land, h i s selfhood 
determined i n advance of h i s l a t e r experience. What we w i l l c onsider i n 
t h i s chapter i s the aptness of t h i s image f o r the i n c a r n a t e Word. We 
w i l l suggest t h a t C h r i s t o l o g y must take account of the f a c t t h a t J e s u s 
of Nazareth had to l e a r n of His ' d i v i n i t y ' through experience which was 
e n t i r e l y determined by His human surroundings, from which He had no 
escape by way of the memory of a former h a b i t a t i o n , or the consciousness 
t h a t He had 'once been e l s e w h e r e 1 . 
B a r t h ' s treatment of the 'way of the Son of God i n t o the f a r country' 
i s t o be understood i n terms of a key p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s e t f o r t h i n h i s 
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C h r i s t o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n s i n I 2. T h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i s t h a t the 
4 
manhood of C h r i s t i s only the 'pr e d i c a t e ' of the Godhead, and t h e r e f o r e 
t h a t whatever the 'condescension' r e q u i r e d of the Son or Logos i n h i s 
'journey' i n t o the world. His s e l f - g i v i n g w i l l not extend to a f a i l u r e 
to r e c o g n i s e His e a r t h l y l i f e as a s e r i e s of experiences which happen 
to 'Him', t h e i r enduring d i v i n e s u b j e c t . The Word i s the s u b j e c t of the 
i n c a r n a t e being of C h r i s t . ~* 
The u n i t y of God and man i n J e s u s C h r i s t , Barth i n s i s t s , i s p r i m a r i l y 
a p e r s o n a l or h y p o s t a t i c union, and only s e c o n d a r i l y a un i t y of nat u r e s . ^ 
The Greek t r a d i t i o n of the e a r l y church, and Lutheran s c h o l a s t i c t r a d i t i o n 
a f t e r the Reformation, had introduced a dangerous d i s r e g a r d f o r the primacy 
of the p e r s o n a l union, i n Barth ' s view, t a k i n g an 'independent i n t e r e s t ' 
7 
i n the unio naturarum, but Reformed C h r i s t o l o g y had r e s t o r e d the balance. 
To say t h a t t h i s u n i t y i s p r i m a r i l y a p e r s o n a l union, i s to say t h a t the 
i n c a r n a t e C h r i s t i s not composed of two separate 'things' or 'substances', 
but t h a t , although He has two n a t u r e s , the human nature a c q u i r e s s u b s i s t e n c e 
only w i t h i n the being of the Word. Hence Barth's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
p a t r i s t i c i d e a s of 'enhypostatic' and 'anhypostatic' union, which to him 
re p r e s e n t two d i f f e r e n t ways of formulating the same p o i n t : the union 
i s \ 'enhypostatic', i n t h a t the human nature a c q u i r e s s u b s i s t e n c e i n the 
mode of being of the Word, and ' a n h y p o s t a t i c 1 , i n t h a t i t a c q u i r e s sub-
Q 
s i s t e n c e only i n the mode of being of the Word, and not i n and f o r i t s e l f . 
Hence a l s o B a r t h ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the p a t r i s t i c debate concerning an 
'impersonal' humanity i n C h r i s t ; the notion of C h r i s t ' s human nature as 
'impersonal', B a r t h argues, makes the p o i n t , not t h a t i t l a c k s p e r s o n a l i t y , 
but t h a t i t l a c k s a separate h y p o s t a s i s , i n other words, i t s t r e s s e s once 
again t h a t C h r i s t ' s human nature has e x i s t e n c e only through and i n the Word.' 
Not only i s the Word always s u b j e c t of the i n c a r n a t e being of C h r i s t , 
and the human nature have s u b s i s t e n c e only w i t h i n the Word, but Barth 
a l s o i n s i s t s t h a t t h e r e i s an e s s e n t i a l i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y i n the process 
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by which the Word became f l e s h . I t i s never the case t h a t , j u s t as 
humanity only has r e a l i t y through the Word, so a l s o the Word only has 
r e a l i t y through humanity, even i n i t s i n c a r n a t e e x i s t e n c e . T h i s i s a 
'heresy' which Barth i d e n t i f i e s w i t h the i d e a of ' p e r i c h o r e s i s ' , and with 
the Lutheran use of the notion of a ' communicatio idiomatum 1 . The man-
hood i s a ' p r e d i c a t e ' of the Godhead, but the Godhead may never become a 
' p r e d i c a t e ' of the manhood. The process i s always i r r e v e r s i b l e i n the 
sense t h a t i t i s always the d i v i n i t y of C h r i s t which s u s t a i n s and g i v e s 
to His humanity, and never the humanity which s u s t a i n s and g i v e s to His 
d i v i n i t y . 
The i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y of the 'exchange of p r o p e r t i e s ' between the two 
n a t u r e s i n B a r t h ' s C h r i s t o l o g y , and h i s argument t h a t the human nature 
i s i n any case not a separate ' s u b j e c t ' which might r e c e i v e p r o p e r t i e s 
from the d i v i n i t y as p r e d i c a t e s of i t s e l f , i s i n Barth's view a guarantee 
a g a i n s t the a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c tendency which he regards as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of n i n e t e e n t h century theology. Thus one f i n d s him r e t u r n to the a t t a c k 
a g a i n s t Lutheran t h e o l o g i a n s , who have i n t e r p r e t e d the communicatio 
idiomatum i n terms of r e c i p r o c i t y between the humanity and the d i v i n i t y 
of C h r i s t , i n h i s treatment of Ludwig Feuerbach i n an essay on the h i s t o r y 
of modern t h e o l o g y . ^ 
Barth-argues t h a t the l i n e of thought which had been ' c r y s t a l l i s e d 
i n the orthodox Lutheran d o c t r i n e of the "communication of idioms" .... 
according to which the p r e d i c a t e s of the d i v i n e majesty r e a l l y belong to 
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the humanity of Je s u s as such and i n a b s t r a c t o ' found i t s f u l f i l m e n t 
i n Feuerbach's r e d u c t i o n of theology to anthropology, a reduction which 
Barth ventures to d e s c r i b e as 'more t h e o l o g i c a l than t h a t of many 
t h e o l o g i a n s ' ! Denying the p r i n c i p l e of the Reformed church, t h a t 'finitum 
non capax i n f i n i t i ' , the Lutheran t h e o l o g i a n s had allowed f o r 'the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of an i n v e r s i o n of above and below, of heaven and e a r t h , of 
God and man - the p o s s i b i l i t y of f o r g e t t i n g the e s c h a t o l o g i c a l l i m i t ' . ^ 
236 . 
Feuerbach's argument t h a t the a t t r i b u t e s of God were i n f a c t human 
a t t r i b u t e s ' p r o jected' to an i n f i n i t e degree as p a r t of a process by 
which man r e a l i s e d h i s own ' d i v i n e ' p o s s i b i l i t i e s , represented for Barth 
a u n i v e r s a l i s i n g of the Lutheran view t h a t the q u a l i t i e s of C h r i s t ' s 
14 
d i v i n e nature might be p r e d i c a t e d of h i s human nature. Feuerbach simply 
extended what was t r u e of C h r i s t ' s human nature to a l l humanity. The same 
i n f l u e n c e l a y behind Hegel, Barth continues, who had indeed i n h i s e a r l y 
l i f e s t u d i e d theology with the i n t e n t i o n of becoming a Lutheran p a s t o r . 
U n l e s s , then, the manner i n which God becomes and is'man i n C h r i s t 
i s an i r r e v e r s i b l e one, according to which the humanity i s s u s t a i n e d i n 
being through the d i v i n i t y but not v i c e v e r s a , then the p r o c e s s by which 
God g i v e s h i m s e l f to man i n the I n c a r n a t i o n w i l l become one i n which man 
s e i z e s c o n t r o l of God and t u r n s Him i n t o an image of h i m s e l f . Divine 
condescension w i l l become human p o s s e s s i o n . The i n c a r n a t i o n , Barth 
i n s i s t s , must be understood as an assunption of humanity by God, not an 
assumption of d i v i n i t y by man. Lutheran notions of a 'communicatio 
idiomatum' and a ' p e r i c h o r e s i s ' or exchange of p r o p e r t i e s between the 
n a t u r e s threatened t o t u r n God's I n c a r n a t i o n i n t o man's d i v i n i s a t i o n . 
Feuerbach and Hegel, i n t h i s r e s p e c t , represented a German Lutheran 
t r a d i t i o n extending a f a l s e C h r i s t o l o g y to a f a l s e anthropology. 
' • I t i s , then, only as committed to the view t h a t the Word remains 
s u b j e c t of the i n c a r n a t e being of C h r i s t , and t h a t there i s no r e c i p r o c i t y 
between the n a t u r e s of C h r i s t i n His i n c a r n a t e l i f e , t h a t Barth s e t s out, 
i n Volume I V of h i s Church Dogmaticsto give an account of C h r i s t ' s 
work of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . 
I n j o u r n e y i n g to the ' f a r country', Barth i n s i s t s , i n being a Good 
Samaritan to man r a t h e r than abandon him l i k e the p r i e s t and the L e v i t e , 
God does not, although what he performs i s an 'act of extravagance', r i s k 
His b eing: 
He does not f o r f e i t anything by doing t h i s . I n being neighbour to 
man, i n order to d e a l w i t h him and a c t towards him as such, He does 
not need to f e a r f o r His godhead. (16) 
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Although, then, other gods, i n Barth's view, r e f l e c t 'the human 
p r i d e which w i l l not bend', and God alone ' i n His high majesty .... i s 
humble', t h i s humbling of Himself does not extend to a r i s k i n g of 
Himself - a ' f e a r i n g f o r His godhead'. L i k e the p r i n c e i n Kierkegaard's 
t a l e , 'The Lord as S e r v a n t 1 does not f o r f e i t His Lordship but suppresses 
i t . He stoops to conquer. 
Y e t B a r t h ' s language a t times approaches a g r e a t e r sense of 'Kenosis' 
than t h i s . I n t a l k i n g of a ' s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n ' and ' s e l f - h u m i l i a t i o n 1 on 
the p a r t of God, he r e f e r s to 'the grace i n which God compromises 
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H i m s e l f ; and l a t e r Barth remarks-: 
He i s s i l e n t where Job too had to be s i l e n t before God. But, again, 
there takes p l a c e here something q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from what took 
p l a c e t h e r e . I n Him God has entered i n , breaking i n t o t h a t c i r c u l u s 
v i t i o s u s of the human p l i g h t , making His own not only the g u i l t of 
man but a l s o h i s r e j e c t i o n and condemnation, g i v i n g Himself to bear 
the d i v i n e l y r ighteous consequences of human s i n .... He, the 
e l e c t i n g , e t e r n a l God, w i l l e d h i m s e l f to be r e j e c t e d and t h e r e f o r e 
p e r i s h i n g man. T h i s i s something which never happened i n a l l the 
d r e a d f u l t h i n g s a t t e s t e d i n the Old Testament concerning the wrath 
of God and the p l i g h t of man. I n the Old Testament there i s always 
the a n t i t h e s i s between the righteous God and the b i t t e r t h i n g s which 
man has to accept from Him without murmuring. I n the pa s s i o n s t o r y 
of the New Testament t h i s a n t i t h e s i s i s done away. I t i s God Himself 
who takes the p l a c e of the former s u f f e r e r s and allows the b i t t e r n e s s 
of t h e i r s u f f e r i n g to f a l l upon Himself .... There i s s u f f e r i n g 
and death i n the Old Testament, but i t i s only i n the New t h a t we 
see what s u f f e r i n g and death r e a l l y means, as i t becomes the work 
of God Himself, as God g i v e s Himself to t h i s most dre a d f u l of a l l 
f o r e i g n spheres. (18) 
I n what sense, however, does God 'compromise H i m s e l f ( s i c h s e l b e r 
kompromittiert) ? I n what sense does He 'give H i m s e l f , i n His journey 
to the f a r country, 'to t h i s most dre a d f u l of a l l f o r e i g n spheres'? 
Barth c o n t i n u e s : 
But a t t h i s p o i n t what i s meant to be supreme p r a i s e of God can i n 
f a c t become supreme blasphemy. God g i v e s Himself, but He does not 
give Himself away. He does not give up being God i n becoming a 
c r e a t u r e , i n becoming man. He does not cease to be God. He does 
not come i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h Himself. (19) (my emphasis) 
Not only does He not cease to be God i n becoming man, but He has 
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His human nature only i n the being of the Word, the continuing s u b j e c t 
of H i s i n c a r n a t e being. 
i 
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C e r t a i n l y , Barth t a l k s of God denying the immutability of His being 
fo r the sake of the redemption of the world, and of His allowing His 
d i v i n e nature to be i n d i s c o n t i n u i t y with Himself - indeed He w i l l e d to 
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be ' a g a i n s t H i m s e l f , to s e t Himself i n s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n ' - f o r 
.... I n Himself He was s t i l l the omnipresent, almighty, e t e r n a l and 
g l o r i o u s One, the A l l - H o l y and All - R i g h t e o u s who could not be 
tempted. (21) 
I n other words, B a r t h p r e s e n t s us w i t h a p a r a d o x i c a l a n t i t h e s i s 
between God's being and essence i n Himself, and His a c t i v i t y as the 
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r e c o n c i l e r of the world c r e a t e d by Him. The being of God i n His work 
seems to challenge the being of God i n Himself; T h i s i s the determination 
of God i n His i n c a r n a t i o n to be a 'God a g a i n s t God', and the i m p l i c a t i o n 
i s t h a t i n becoming man God puts His 'Goodness' at r i s k and comes i n t o 
c o n f l i c t w i t h Himself. At times Barth seems to make the dangerous 
suggestion t h a t , w h i l s t there i s a ' c o n t r a d i c t i o n ' between God i n Himself, 
immutable, omnipotent and almighty, and God as He appears to man i n C h r i s t , 
the ' c o n t r a d i c t i o n ' i s somehow transcended a t a 'higher l e v e l ' . God i s 
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Lord o f the very c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h i n Himself. T h i s view i s bound i n 
the end to l e a d to a p o s i t i o n i n which the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of God i n 
Himself w i t h His being i n C h r i s t i s u l t i m a t e l y denied. I t would be i n 
e f f e c t t o deny the d i v i n i t y of C h r i s t . Elsewhere Barth adopts a p o s i t i o n 
comparable to t h a t most notably o u t l i n e d i n Moltmann's The Crucified God. 
T h i s a c c e p t s t h a t i n the l i g h t of the i n c a r n a t i o n i t must re-examine the 
concept of God, f o r i t may be t h a t the ' i r r e c o n c i l a b l e t e n s i o n s ' s e t up 
w i t h i n the being of God by His presence i n C h r i s t appear to be i r r e c o n c i l -
able only because the the o l o g i a n i s approaching God's presence i n C h r i s t 
w i t h p r e c o n c e i v e d notions of the nature of God, notions which ought, r a t h e r , 
to be d e r i v e d from His s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n i n J e s u s of Nazareth. One of the 
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most b e a u t i f u l passages i n the Church Dogmatics very c l e a r l y shows t h i s 
understanding: 
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What He i s and does He i s and does i n f u l l u n i t y with Himself. 
I t i s i n f u l l u n i t y with Himself t h a t He i s a l s o - and e s p e c i a l l y 
and above a l l - i n C h r i s t , t h a t He becomes a c r e a t u r e , man, f l e s h , 
t h a t He e n t e r s i n t o our being i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n , t h a t He takes upon 
Himself i t s consequences. I f we t h i n k t h a t t h i s i s impossible i t 
i s because our concept of God i s too narrow, too a r b i t r a r y , too 
human - f a r too human. Who God i s and what i t i s to be d i v i n e i s 
something we have to l e a r n where God has r e v e a l e d Himself and His 
n a t u r e , the essence of the d i v i n e . And i f He has r e v e a l e d Himself 
i n J e s u s C h r i s t as the God Who does t h i s , i t i s not f o r us to be 
w i s e r than He and to say t h a t i t i s i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n with the 
d i v i n e essence. We have to be ready to be taught by Him t h a t we 
have been too s m a l l and p e r v e r t e d i n our t h i n k i n g about Him w i t h i n 
the framework of a f a l s e i d e a of God. I t i s not for us to speak 
of a c o n t r a d i c t i o n and r i f t i n the being of God, but to l e a r n to 
c o r r e c t our notions of the being of God, to r e c o n s t i t u t e them i n 
the l i g h t of the f a c t t h a t He does t h i s . We-may b e l i e v e t h a t God 
can and must only be absolute i n c o n t r a s t to a l l t h a t i s r e l a t i v e , 
e x a l t e d i n c o n t r a s t to a l l t h a t i s lowly, a c t i v e i n c o n t r a s t to 
a l l s u f f e r i n g , i n v i o l a b l e i n c o n t r a s t to a l l temptation, t r a n s -
cendent i n c o n t r a s t to a l l immanence, and t h e r e f o r e d i v i n e i n 
c o n t r a s t t o e v e r y t h i n g human, i n shor t t h a t He can and must be 
only the 'Wholly O t h e r 1 . But such b e l i e f s are shown to be q u i t e 
untenable, and corrupt and pagan, by the f a c t t h a t God does i n 
f a c t be and do t h i s i n J e s u s C h r i s t . We cannot make them the 
standard by which to measure what God can or cannot do, or the 
b a s i s of the judgment t h a t i n doing t h i s He b r i n g s Himself i n t o 
s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n . By doing t h i s God proves to us t h a t He can 
do i t , t h a t to do i t i s w i t h i n His nature. And He shows Himself 
to be more great and r i c h and sovereign than we had ever imagined. 
And our i d e a s of His nature must be guided by t h i s , and not v i c e 
v e r s a . (25) (my emphasis) 
I t i s , we b e l i e v e , the f a i l i n g of modern ' r a d i c a l ' c r i t i q u e s of 
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C h r i s t o l o g y l i k e The Myth of God Incarnate, t h a t they are profoundly 
c o n s e r v a t i v e i n t h e i r i d e a of God. They b e l i e v e i t impossible f o r the 
'transcendent, e x a l t e d , omnipotent God' to have been i n C h r i s t , because 
they have approached the nature of C h r i s t with a s t o r e of preconceived 
i d e a s concerning the nature of God which they r e f u s e to allow to be 
c r i t i c i s e d by the i d e a of i n c a r n a t i o n i t s e l f . ^ a They do not ask: 
'What s o r t of a God might become i n c a r n a t e i n J e s u s of Nazareth?' but 
'This notion of God becoming man does not f i t our conception of God. 
I t must t h e r e f o r e be wrong'. Such ' r a d i c a l ' C h r i s t o l o g i e s are b u i l t upon 
c o n s e r v a t i v e ' t h e o l o g i e s ' . 
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B a r t h , however, as we have remarked e a r l i e r , emphasises, i n h i s 
mature theology, the C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m of theology. His d o c t r i n e of God d e r i v e s fr m the s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n of God i n His Word. The Doctrine of the 
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Word of God thus precedes the Doctrine of God i n the Church Dogmatics. 
The s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t God must be the 'Wholly Other' (and Barth may have 
been t h i n k i n g of h i s own Romans), i s modified, i n t h i s passage we quote, 
by the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the nature of God i s l e a r n e d from His s e l f -
r e v e l a t i o n i n C h r i s t , and not from preconceived notions of transcendence. 
We t h i n k i t i m p o s s i b l e , Barth argues, to b e l i e v e t h a t i n u n i t y with 
Himself, God i n C h r i s t becomes man, because our concept of God i s 'too 
narrow' - because i t i s not d e r i v e d from the nature of God's s e l f -
r e v e l a t i o n i n His Word. The i n c a r n a t i o n c h a l l e n g e s us, not to think 
t h a t God's presence i n C h r i s t must somehow be a ki n d of u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
d e v i a t i o n from His t r u e being, a r a s h plunge i n t o humanity, but the 
a c t i o n from which His t r u e being may be learned. Thus: 
We have to t h i n k something a f t e r the f o l l o w i n g f a s h i o n . As God 
was i n C h r i s t , f a r from being a g a i n s t Himself, or at d i s u n i t y 
w i t h Himself, He has put i n t o e f f e c t the freedom of His d i v i n e 
l o v e , the love i n which He i s d i v i n e l y f r e e . (28) 
We see Barth c a r r y through h i s i n s i s t e n c e upon the dentation of the 
concept of God from the r e v e l a t i o n of His being i n C h r i s t , where he 
Lutheran 'Kenotic' t h e o l o g i a n s of the nin e t e e n t h century, S a r t o r i u s i n 
h i s Lehre von der heiligen Liebe, W.F. Gess i n h i s Das Dogma von Christi 
Person und Werk, and Thomasius i n h i s Christi Person und Werk, thought 
not i n terms of a b s t e n t i o n from, or even r e n u n c i a t i o n of, d i v i n e 
' a t t r i b u t e s ' by the i n c a r n a t e C h r i s t , as the seventeenth century 1 K e n o t i c ' 
c o n t r o v e r s y between the theol o g i a n s of Giessen and of Tubingen had, but of 
an a b s t e n t i o n or r e n u n c i a t i o n on the p a r t of the p r e - e x i s t e n t Logos i t s e l f . 
B a r t h ' s counter-argument to a 'Kenotic 1 C h r i s t o l o g y was to s t r e s s t h a t 
s p e c u l a t i o n about the nature of the Logos 'before' the i n c a r n a t i o n was 
i m p o s s i b l e , and i m p l i e d the importation of p r e c i s e l y the s o r t of assumptions 
concerning the nature of God which we have been c r i t i c i s i n g . Since the 
being of God i s made known i n C h r i s t the i n c a r n a t e Word, one cannot wonder 
at what 'must have happened' to the Word i n becoming i n c a r n a t e . The 
t r e a t s of the 'Kenotic' theology of the nineteenth century. 29 The 
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'Kenotic' theologians are open to the c r i t i c i s m t h a t they, too, have 
preconc e i v e d notions of the nature of God apart from His r e v e l a t i o n 
i n C h r i s t , such t h a t He must 'renounce' His former s e l f i n order to 
become i n c a r n a t e . 
We have, however, suggested t h a t Barth i s uncomfortable with 
t h i s a s p e c t of h i s C h r i s t o l o g y . What we have to consider, i s whether 
there i s anything i n B a r t h ' s thought which might undermine h i s own 
p r i n c i p l e of d e r i v i n g the concept of God from the r e v e l a t i o n of His 
t r u e being i n J e s u s C h r i s t . I s t h e r e anything i n Barth's own theo-
l o g i c a l 'system', which might tend to work a g a i n s t h i s idea t h a t 
merely to assume t h a t God i s 'absolute i n c o n t r a s t to a l l s u f f e r i n g , 
i n v i o l a b l e i n c o n t r a s t to a l l temptation, transcendent i n c o n t r a s t to 
a l l immanence, and t h e r e f o r e d i v i n e i n c o n t r a s t to e v e r y t h i n g human' 
i s to indulge i n 'corrupt and pagan' b e l i e f s , when God has shown 
Himself to be otherwise i n J e s u s C h r i s t ? We b e l i e v e t h a t there i s . 
I t l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t Barth cannot i d e n t i f y the s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n 
of the Word of God as d i v i n e s u b j e c t i n the i n c a r n a t e C h r i s t , with the 
gradual s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n of the man J e s u s as a human s u b j e c t . And 
t h i s i m p o s s i b i l i t y , w h i l s t expressed i n terms of mere preference f o r 
a Reformed over a Lutheran C h r i s t o l o g y and i n terms of a p a r t i c u l a r 
form of t r i n i t a r i a n theology, as we s h a l l consider i n the next two 
s e c t i o n s of t h i s chapter, d e r i v e s fundamentally from the o u t l i n e of 
a dualism i n Barth's thought which remains a p e r v a s i v e i n f l u e n c e even 
upon the l a t e r s e c t i o n s of the Church Dogmatics. 
T h i s p e r v a s i v e dualism, o r i g i n a l l y between the human and the 
d i v i n e as such, i s i n Barth's C h r i s t o c e n t r i c l a t e r thought re d e f i n e d 
between the human and the d i v i n e natures of C h r i s t . I t i s a dualism 
h e a v i l y d i s g u i s e d by the 'absorption' of the human nature w i t h i n the 
d i v i n e , and by the h e a v i l y 'Kenotic' f l a v o u r (but no more) of Barth's 
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i 
j p o e t i c d e s c r i p t i o n s of the e x t e n t of d i v i n e s e l f - g i v i n g i n the i n c a r n a t e 
! 
r e a l i t y of J e s u s C h r i s t . But i t remains evident i n the enduring Lordship 
of the c o n t r o l l i n g d i v i n e s u b j e c t of t h a t i n c a r n a t e r e a l i t y . I f Barth 
cannot achieve a tr u e 'Kenosis' i n h i s C h r i s t o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n , i t i s 
because he cannot l o c a t e the mystery of C h r i s t i n a mysterious i d e n t i t y 
of a human s u b j e c t and a d i v i n e s u b j e c t , of a man s t r u g g l i n g to understand 
h i s humanity as a Jew i n an occupied land on the one hand, and the d i v i n e 
Word s t r u g g l i n g to come t o a s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n of His nature as a d i v i n e 
s u b j e c t , of the nature of His omnipotence and His omnipresence, of the 
very nature of God Himself i n the r e l a t i o n of Son to Fath e r , on the other. 
B a r t h can bend the d i v i n e p r o c e s s to the human, and can r e c e i v e the human 
proc e s s . i n t o the divine'. What he cannot do, as we b r i n g out i n the f i n a l 
s e c t i o n of t h i s chapter', i s i d e n t i f y the two. He can only warn a g a i n s t 
C h r i s t as 'God i n man', and s e t i n oppos i t i o n to t h a t h i s own view of 
C h r i s t as 'man i n God'. He i s committed to a form of C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m i n 
h i s theology which c o n t i n u e s , as h i s commentary on Romans d i d , to separate 
God i n Heaven from man on e a r t h . 
i 
We s h a l l attempt to draw out these claims i n the r e s t of the chapter. 
We s h a l l c o n s i d e r i n i t i a l l y B a r t h ' s Reformed C h r i s t o l o g y and h i s t r i n i t -
a r i a n i s m , and then the b a s i c form of h i s C h r i s t o l o g y . 
2. The ' E x t r a C a l v i n i s t i c u m ' 
F i r s t l y , we may co n s i d e r B a r t h ' s p r e f e r e n c e f o r a Reformed over a 
Lutheran C h r i s t o l o g y . C a l v i n i s t o b j e c t i o n to the i d e a of the ' i n c l u s i o n ' 
of the Logos i n the man J e s u s , as i f the Word of God was to be 'confined' 
and 'trapped' i n human form, l e d t o the view dubbed by Lutherans the 'extra 
c a l v i n i s t i c u m ' , namely t h a t the Logos was a t one and.the same time i n a 
v i r g i n ' s womb, or a man hanging upon a c r o s s , and i n heaven as the e t e r n a l 
Word. B a r t h a s s o c i a t e s Lutheran r e j e c t i o n of t h i s notion w i t h a f e a r of 
Nes t o r i a n i s m , and w i t h a b e l i e f t h a t s i n c e the d i v i n e a t t r i b u t e s could be 
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p r e d i c a t e d of the humanity of C h r i s t the Logos was not 'confined' 
w i t h i n a human form, but r a t h e r C h r i s t ' s humanity r e c e i v e d - a t l e a s t i n 
i t s g l o r i f i e d s t a t e a f t e r the r e s u r r e c t i o n - the d i v i n e a t t r i b u t e of 
omnipotence, a view which enabled Lutherans to a f f i r m b e l i e f i n the r e a l 
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presence. But there i s a l s o , i n the l i g h t of what we have s a i d , a very 
B a r t h i a n o b j e c t i o n to the i d e a of the 'extra c a l v i n i s t i c u m ' - an o b j e c t i o n 
h i n t e d a t by B a r t h h i m s e l f : 
We may concede t h a t t h e r e i s something u n s a t i s f a c t o r y about the theory, 
i n t h a t r i g h t up t o our own d a y ^ i t . has .led to f a t a l s p e c u l a t i o n about 
the being and work of the Xoyos acrapxos or a God whom we t h i n k we 
can know elsewhere, and whose d i v i n e being we can define from e l s e -
where than i n and from the contemplation of His presence and a c t i v i t y 
as the Word made f l e s h . (32) 
And y e t B a r t h defends C a l v i n on the grounds t h a t " i t was h i s aim i n 
t h a t theory to h o l d to the f a c t t h a t the Son of God who i s wholly t h i s 
man (t o t u s i n t r a carnem as i t was formulated by a l a t e r C a l v i n i s t ) i s 
a l s o wholly God and t h e r e f o r e omnipotent and omnipresent (and to t h a t 
33 
e x t e n t e x t r a carnem, not bound or a l t e r e d by i t s l i m i t a t i o n s ) ' . Now 
s u r e l y t h i s i s to assume t h a t there do indeed e x i s t q u a l i t i e s of 
'omnipotence' and 'omnipresence' which must.be expected to c r y out a g a i n s t 
t h e i r confinement i n human form. Thus, when Barth continues: 
He i s the Lord and C r e a t o r who because He becomes a c r e a t u r e and 
x e x i s t s i n t h a t forma s e r v i does not cease t o be Lord and Creator 
and t h e r e f o r e to e x i s t i n the forma Dei (34) 
he i s presupposing an a n t i t h e s i s between the 'forma s e r v i ' and the 'forma 
Dei' , r a t h e r than a p p r e c i a t i n g t h a t the forma Dei i s r e v e a l e d i n i t s t r u e 
being i n the 'forma s e r v i ' , and t h a t One who i s among h i s d i s c i p l e s as 
one who s e r v e s i s not i n doing so d i s g u i s i n g His t r u e being but p e r f e c t l y 
r e v e a l i n g i t . Here we may r e c a l l the dangerous i n f l u e n c e upon C h r i s t o l o g y 
of the p e r v a s i v e K i e r k e g a a r d i a n image of the p r i n c e and the maiden, 
accor d i n g t o which the e a r t h l y s e r v i t u d e of the Son of God i s i n t e r p r e t e d 
as a mask of His t r u e being r a t h e r than a demonstration of i t . For 
K i e r k e g a a r d ' s p a r a b l e to be considered apt, the c o n d i t i o n of poverty from 
which the p r i n c e woos the maiden would be a r e v e l a t i o n of what ^ t> meant 
I 
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to be_ a p r i n c e . His rags would not be a device to win a s u s c e p t i b l e -
h e a r t , l a t e r t o be thrown o f f when he resumes h i s wealth, but the manif-
e s t a t i o n of h i s tr u e nature. T h i s i m p l i c a t i o n l i e s i n the s t o r y i n p a r t , 
i n t h a t the p r i n c e wishes to be loved 'for h i m s e l f , and not f o r h i s 
wealth or s t a t u s ; y e t the i m p l i c a t i o n of the I n c a r n a t i o n i s t h a t i n the 
very weakness and v u l n e r a b i l i t y of C h r i s t there l i e s , not a means to make 
known the t r u e being of God, but t h a t very d i v i n e nature i t s e l f . The 
'forma servi'makes known the 'forma Dei'. I f we b e l i e v e t h a t such weakness 
and v u l n e r a b i l i t y cannot c h a r a c t e r i s e God, then perhaps we should follow 
K a r l B a r t h i n c o n s i d e r i n g our i d e a of God to be too narrow! We should 
cease to f i n d God's presence i n C h r i s t incompatible w i t h our pre-determined 
i d e a of God, and d e r i v e our i d e a of God from His presence i n C h r i s t . We 
should, indeed, understand the r e l a t i o n between the T r i n i t y and the 
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I n c a r n a t i o n , such t h a t a c o n s e r v a t i v e C h r i s t o l o g y can only be s u s t a i n e d 
by a r a d i c a l 'theology', by a 'theology' which sees i n the C h r i s t i a n 
understanding of the person of C h r i s t the grounds f o r a d i s t i n c t i v e 
C h r i s t i a n view of God. " / 
i 
3. The 'Inner Being' of God 
We have suggested t h a t i n Barth's Church Dogmatics there i s a c e r t a i n 
r e s i s t a n c e to h i s own s t a t e d p r i n c i p l e t h a t God may be understood not p r i o r 
to, nor as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n f o r understanding, but from His s e l f - m a n i f e s t -
a t i o n i n the i n c a r n a t e Son. v 
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Moltmann suggests i n The Crucified God t h a t B a r t h e v i n c e s a d e s i r e 
to p r o t e c t the 'inner being' of God from His s e l f - g i v i n g presence i n the 
i n c a r n a t e C h r i s t . He submits t h a t , w h i l s t Barth p o s s e s s e s a f u l l y 
1 t h e o p a s c h i t i c ' awareness of God's involvement i n the c r o s s of C h r i s t , he 
i s unable t o exp r e s s t h i s involvement adequately because of a f a i l u r e to 
a p p r e c i a t e the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the t r i n i t a r i a n nature of God. I n other 
words, the problem i s not t h a t B a r t h f a i l s to see t h a t God s u f f e r s the 
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death of the Son w i t h i n Himself, but how He s u f f e r s the death of the Son 
w i t h i n Himself. According to MOltmann, Barth i s d r i v e n to have recourse 
- i m p l i c i t l y - t o the Lutheran d i s t i n c t i o n between the 'Deus r e v e l a t u s ' 
and the 'Deus absconditus', i n order to p r o t e c t both God's transcendence 
| and His presence i n the c r o s s of C h r i s t . Despite h i s avowed h o s t i l i t y 
•1 ' 
to t h i s Lutheran d i s t i n c t i o n , Barth has no a l t e r n a t i v e but to use i t i f 
he f a i l s p r o p e r l y to r e c o g n i s e the d i s t i n c t i o n between the Father and the 
Son, Moltmann argues. Moltmann argues h i s p o i n t i n the l i g h t of Church 
Dogmatics I I 2 , where -Barth w r i t e s of the '.eternal w i l l of God i n the 
e l e c t i o n of J e s u s C h r i s t ' , whereby God, n e i t h e r b e l i t t l i n g nor i g n o r i n g 
s i n s , ' d e c l a r e s His s o l i d a r i t y w i t h t h e i r author, t a k i n g h i s p l a c e i n 
r e s p e c t of t h e i r n e c e s s a r y consequence, s u f f e r i n g i n Himself what man 
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ought to have s u f f e r e d ' . 
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B a r t h ' s argument i s as f o l l o w s . Man has shown hims e l f to be 
unworthy as God's covenant p a r t n e r . God might have w i l l e d man's d e s t r -
u c t i o n as a consequence, but He does not. 'From a l l e t e r n i t y God could 
have excluded man from His covenant .... but He d i d not do so. He 
e l e c t e d man as a covenant-partner. I n His Son He e l e c t e d Himself as the 
covenant p a r t n e r of man 1. Yet t h i s cannot mean t h a t God e i t h e r overlooks 
or f i n d s a c c e p t a b l e the e v i l f o r which man i s r e s p o n s i b l e . Rather, the 
' a f f r o n t t o H i s majesty' which has been made by human s i n must be made 
good. I t i s redeemed, however, not by God's avenging Himself on man, 
but r a t h e r by Himself b e a r i n g the i n e v i t a b l e wrath and p e r d i t i o n , by 
'Himself mediating on b e h a l f of the one who must n e c e s s a r i l y be r e j e c t e d , 
who had n e c e s s a r i l y f a l l e n v i c t i m t o damnation and death, by allowing His 
own h e a r t to be wounded by the wrath which, i f i t had f a l l e n on man, could 
only have o b l i t e r a t e d and destroyed him'. 
Now the q u e s t i o n i s : How can t h i s 'mediation' be conceived? What 
i s t h i s 'heart-wounding' b e a r i n g of (presumably God's) wrath by God 
H i m s e l f ? ' I n God's e t e r n a l purpose i t i s God Himself who i s r e j e c t e d i n 
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His Son'. But how do we understand God's r e j e c t i o n by God i n His Son? 
Only, Moltmann wants to argue, by a p p r e c i a t i n g the t r i n i t a r i a n nature 
of God. 
I n a passage quoted by Moltmann, Barth w r i t e s : 
I n o r d e r i n g the ove r f l o w i n g of His g l o r y God a l s o and n e c e s s a r i l y 
o r d a i n s t h a t t h i s g l o r y , which i n Himself, ( i n ihm s e l b e r .... ) 
i n H i s i n n e r l i f e (seinem inneren Leben) as F a t h e r , Son and Holy 
S p i r i t cannot be s u b j e c t e d to a t t a c k or d i s t u r b a n c e , which i n 
Himself cannot be opposed, should e n t e r i n t o the sphere of 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n .... (39) 
I t i s the f a c t t h a t B a r t h i d e n t i f i e s here only what he c a l l s the 
'inner l i f e ' (innerem Leben) of God alone as F a t h e r , Son and S p i r i t , 
which suggests to Moltmann t h a t Barth f a i l s to a p p r e c i a t e how c r u c i a l 
the d i s t i n c t i o n of persons w i t h i n the Godhead i s f o r understanding the 
economy of s a l v a t i o n . The d i s t i n c t i o n cannot be r e s e r v e d f o r the 'inner 
being' of God. Moltmann i m p l i e s t h a t by f a i l i n g t o understand how the 
death of J e s u s may be expressed i n t h i s way as a death w i t h i n God, Ba r t h 
must i n e v i t a b l y introduce a d i s t i n c t i o n between the God who 1 s u f f e r s ' 
and the God whose 'inner l i f e ' remains un a f f e c t e d by J e s u s ' s death. Such 
a s e p a r a t i o n w i l l smack of the d i t h e i s m and l a c k of commitment to God's 
presence as God i n His r e v e l a t i o n , t h a t Barth h i m s e l f suspects i n the 
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Lutheran d i s t i n c t i o n between a 'Deus a b s c o n d i t u s 1 and a 'Deus r e v e l a t u s ' . 
Moltmann's assessment of B a r t h , then, i s t h a t he draws back from 
i d e n t i f y i n g the t r u e being of God w i t h the 'one who must n e c e s s a r i l y be 
r e j e c t e d , who had n e c e s s a r i l y f a l l e n v i c t i m t o damnation and death'. 
He withdraws t o a d i s t i n c t i o n which allows the 'inner being' of God to 
tr a n s c e n d the being of God i n His r e v e l a t i o n . Moltmann f u r t h e r suggests 
t h a t B a r t h ' s i n c l i n a t i o n towards t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s a s s o c i a t e d with an 
i n s u f f i c i e n t l y t r i n i t a r i a n conception of God. Barth l a c k s , i n h i s view, 
an understanding which would allow the experience of d i v i n e s e l f - g i v i n g 
e x p r e s s e d i n the l i f e of J e s u s to be a r e a l i t y p l a y e d out w i t h i n the 
t r i n i t a r i a n h e a r t of God. 
I n The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, Moltmann suggests t h a t Barth's 
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thought i n Volume IV of the Church Dogmatics does not, u n l i k e t h a t i n 
Volume I I , withdraw to the d i s t i n c t i o n between God's 'inner being' and 
His 'being i n r e v e l a t i o n ' . C e r t a i n l y Barth i s aware i n the l a t e r 
volumes of the c l o s e connection between the d o c t r i n e s of the T r i n i t y 
and the I n c a r n a t i o n . I n I V 1 he w r i t e s : 
We can now see the e r r o r which i s common to the s u b o r d i n a t i o n i s t 
and the modalist p r e s e n t a t i o n and s o l u t i o n of the problem. Both 
s u f f e r from the f a c t t h a t they t r y t o evade the cr o s s of J e s u s 
C h r i s t , i . e . , the t r u t h of the h u m i l i a t i o n , the l o w l i n e s s and 
the obedience of the one t r u e God Himself as i t became an event 
amongst us i n J e s u s C h r i s t as the s u b j e c t of the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
of the world w i t h God. They evade i t because they s t a r t from 
the assumption t h a t i t cannot be accepted as t r u e . And then 
they e r r i n t h e i r d i f f e r e n t ways as they t r y t o escape the 
dilemma which they themselves have c r e a t e d , i n t e r p r e t i n g the 
obedient C h r i s t e i t h e r as some heavenly or e a r t h l y being 
d i s t i n c t from God, or as a mere mode of appearance of the one 
t r u e God. Both damage and indeed destroy the nerve of the New 
Testament knowledge o f C h r i s t . Both solve the C h r i s t o l o g i c a l 
mystery by j u g g l i n g i t away, and f o r t h a t reason both show 
themselves to be q u i t e u s e l e s s . (40) 
Subordinationism s e p a r a t e s the Son from the being of God, and thereby 
' p r o t e c t s ' the d i v i n e nature from involvement i n the s u f f e r i n g of C h r i s t . 
Modalism t r e a t s the i n c a r n a t e being of God as a mere 'show', one of a 
s u c c e s s i o n of 'appearances' of God i n which His tr u e being i s not involved. 
B a r t h e f f e c t i v e l y t r e a t s modalism as a form of docetism. Only a pro p e r l y 
t r i n i t a r i a n theology can do j u s t i c e , i n Barth's view, to the presence of 
God i n the i n c a r n a t e being of the Son. 
However, Moltmann remains c r i t i c a l even of Barth's l a t e r thought. 
He does so out of the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t Barth's T r i n i t a r i a n i s m i s i t s e l f 
a form of modalism. Indeed from examining Moltmann's c r i t i c i s m s we come 
to see an i n t e r e s t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between our concern with, the form of 
Bar t h ' s T r i n i t a r i a n i s m , and our concern w i t h the form of h i s C h r i s t o l o g y . 
Moltmann's fundamental c r i t i c i s m of Barth i s t h a t , i n v a l u i n g the 
d o c t r i n e o f the T r i n i t y as an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the ' s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n of 
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God as Lord', i n other words i n beginning from the Lordship of God 
and thence moving on to His ' t h r e e f o l d nature', Barth i s i n e v i t a b l y 
caught up i n the i d e a of God as a s i n g l e s u b j e c t e x i s t i n g i n three 'modes 
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of being' ( S e i n s w e i s e ) , and thereby produces an e s s e n t i a l l y m o d a l i s t i c 
understanding of God. Moltmann suggests, furthermore, t h a t Barth's 
model r e v e a l s another a s p e c t o f h i s dependence upon German I d e a l i s m , 
a s s e s s i n g the d i v i n e nature i n terms of the image of an absolute s u b j e c t 
who, through s e l f - d i s t i n c t i o n and s e l f - r e c o l l e c t i o n , r e v e a l s Himself as 
F a t h e r , Son and S p i r i t . Moltmann's co n c l u s i o n i s t h a t t h i s model of God 
as s u b j e c t no more escapes modalism than the model of God as a s i n g l e 
substance i n e a r l i e r t r i n i t a r i a n t h e o l o g i e s . I t i s notable t h a t Moltmann 
here echoes the o b j e c t i o n s of P r o f e s s o r Leonard Hodgson to Barth's 
t r i n i t a r i a n theology expressed i n The Doctrine of the Trinity, i n which 
he f i n d s the advocacy of 'modes of being' as a n - i n t e r p r e t a t i v e model 
f o r the persons of the T r i n i t y ' s u r p r i s i n g ' and 'i n f l a t c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
to the b i b l i c a l evidence'. Hodgson a n t i c i p a t e s the t h e s i s of Moltmann's 
c r i t i c i s m where he w r i t e s : 
I n s t e a d of a l l o w i n g the e m p i r i c a l evidence of the b i b l i c a l 
r e v e l a t i o n to r e v i s e h i s i d e a of u n i t y , he (Barth) i n s i s t s 
on making t h a t evidence conform to the requirements of h i s 
a p r i o r i conception of u n i t y . (43) 
P r o f e s s o r D.M. B a i l l i e s i m i l a r l y f i n d s K a r l Barth's views on the 
i 
T r i n i t y 'the outstanding r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 1 of a mode of thought 'which i n 
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i t s extreme form might be accused of m o d a l i s t i c heresy'. B a i l l i e 
p o i n t s . o u t t h a t f o r B a r t h the modern conception of 'person 1 as a centre 
of s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s has r u l e d the conception of God as three persons 
out of c o u r t , i f t r i t h e i s m i s to be avoided. I n t h i s r e s p e c t he i s 
sympathetic to B a r t h , denies t h a t B a r t h i s a p t l y d e s c r i b e d as 'modalist' 
s i n c e h i s d e s i g n a t i o n of God as three 'modes of being' i s intended to 
p o i n t to r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n s w i t h i n the Godhead, and emphasises that'the 
term 'modes of being' was i t s e l f used o r i g i n a l l y by a p a t r i s t i c school 
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of thought a c t u a l l y accused of t r i t h e i s m - the Cappadocian f a t h e r s . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the ch a l l e n g e may be made a g a i n s t Barth, t h a t w i t h i n the 
scope o f an understanding which i n s i s t s t h a t God i s spoken of more 
a p t l y as one person than as t h r e e , the ' r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n s ' w i t h i n the 
Godhead r e p r e s e n t e d by the F a t h e r , Son and S p i r i t cannot amount to a 
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t r u l y t r i n i t a r i a n theology. Rather than being f o r c e d away from the 
n o t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y i n the l i g h t of i t s modern 'p s y c h o l o g i c a l ' 
meaning i n terms of 'centre of consciousness', Barth i s more approp-
r i a t e l y d e s c r i b e d as having embraced t h a t modern meaning and a p p l i e d 
i t to the u n i t y of God as a f r e e s u b j e c t , r a t h e r than to the d i s t i n c t i o n s 
w i t h i n the Godhead to which the i d e a of 'person' i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y a p p l i e d . 
A c o r r e l a t i o n between Bart h ' s view of the T r i n i t y and of the Person 
of C h r i s t , l i e s i n the comparison which may be drawn between, on the 
one hand, B a r t h ' s C h r i s t o l o g i c a l i n s i s t e n c e upon the d i v i n e Word as the 
enduring s u b j e c t of the i n c a r n a t e being of C h r i s t , and, on the other 
hand, h i s t r i n i t a r i a n s t a r t i n g - p o i n t i n the Lordship of God. A c r i t i c i s m 
of B a r t h ' s C h r i s t o l o g y as u l t i m a t e l y ' d o c e t i c ' , i n t h a t the q u a l i t i e s of 
a p u r e l y human e x i s t e n c e are somehow to be understood as attached to and 
l o c a t e d w i t h i n a d i v i n e s u b j e c t , may be connected to a c r i t i c i s m of 
B a r t h ' s T r i n i t a r i a n i s m as u l t i m a t e l y ' m o d a l i s t i c ' , i n t h a t the t r i -
p e r s o n a l being of God i s somehow l o c a t e d w i t h i n the s i n g l e d i v i n e 
p e r s o n a l i t y , the f r e e s u b j e c t i v i t y of the s e l f - d i s t i n g u i s h i n g and s e l f -
i 
r e c o l l e c t i n g God. 
I n B a r t h ' s C h r i s t o l o g y , the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the i n c a r n a t e l i f e 
o f \ C h r i s t are determined according t o the c o n t r o l l i n g i d e a of t h e i r 
inherence i n a s i n g l e d i v i n e s u b j e c t . I n Barth's d o c t r i n e of God, the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of His being are determined according to the c o n t r o l l i n g 
i d e a of His e x i s t e n c e , again, as a s i n g l e d i v i n e s u b j e c t . The e s s e n t -
i a l l y I d e a l i s t concept of a s i n g l e d i v i n e s e l f w i t h i n which d i f f e r e n t 
modes of a c t i v i t y and experience may be contained, but which remains 
always the Lord and S u b j e c t of those a c t i v i t i e s , i s the dominating image 
46 of B a r t h ' s theology, c h a r a c t e r i s e d by Moltmann as ' T r i n i t a r i a n Monarchy 1. 
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4. The Form of Barth's C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m 
I t i s appropriate t h a t John Hick, e d i t o r of The Myth of God 
Incarnate, should elsewhere have suggested a 'Copernican Revolution' 
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i n theology, i n the l i g h t of which a l l r e l i g i o n s are t o be understood 
as p r e s e n t i n g d i f f e r e n t ways to 'the one God', r a t h e r than being a s s e s s e d 
i n terms of t h e i r s p e c i f i c correspondence to the r e v e l a t i o n of God i n 
C h r i s t . F o r Hick's d e v a l u a t i o n of C h r i s t o l o g y i s bound to leave God 
e s s e n t i a l l y untouched by the I n c a r n a t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e capable of being 
approached e q u a l l y w e l l from the p e r s p e c t i v e of other r e l i g i o n s . On the 
other hand, a theologian f a i t h f u l to a C h r i s t o c e n t r i c theology must take 
i n t o account the f a c t t h a t God i s only to be understood from the perspec-
t i v e of His s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n i n C h r i s t . 
T h i s l a t t e r i s the view of K a r l B a r t h . I n no sense, f o r Barth, 
may the nature of God be presumed ' i n advance o f or 'apart from' t h a t 
r e v e l a t i o n . At the same time, however, we f i n d evidence i n Barth of a 
c e r t a i n r e s i s t a n c e to h i s own thoroughly C h r i s t o c e n t r i c approach to the 
problem of God. 
F i r s t l y , i n h i s c o n s i s t e n t p r e f e r e n c e f o r a Reformed over a Lutheran 
C h r i s t o l o g y , B a r t h i s l e d to emphasise the being of the Logos apart from 
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s His ' l i m i t i n g ' , ' c o n s t r a i n i n g ' presence on e a r t h i n c a r n a t e . 
\ Secondly, Barth i s uncomfortable when using language t h a t i m p l i e s 
a s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h i n the Godhead, |a 'God a g a i n s t God'. We may 
l i n k t h i s d i s comfort to Barth's f a i l u r e to f i n d the appropriate form of 
T r i n i t a r i a n i s m to express t h a t s e l f - d i r e m p t i o n which l i e s a t the h e a r t 
of God's being i n C h r i s t . 
These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s must l e a d us to recognise t h a t there are 
i 
d i f f e r e n t forms of C h r i s t o c e n t r i c theology, arid t h a t Barth cannot escape 
c r i t i c i s m merely by p o i n t i n g t o h i s C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m as such. 
B a r t h has matured, between Romans and the Church Dogmatics, from an 




h i s theology, to a theology based on God's s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n i n C h r i s t . 
However, as we have t r i e d to show i n the course of t h i s t h e s i s , t h a t 
s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n i n C h r i s t which forms the b a s i s of h i s l a t e r theology 
i s i t s e l f i n t e r p r e t e d according to p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s concerning the form 
of r e v e l a t i o n and i t s r e l a t i o n to n a t u r a l reason, and the corresponding 
form of man's new humanity i n C h r i s t i n r e l a t i o n to h i s ' n a t u r a l humanity'. 
Therefore when Barth c l a i m s to d e r i v e h i s theology from a C h r i s t o c e n t r i c 
core, we have t o remember t h a t the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s which were a t work 
i n determining h i s theology i n Romans are a l s o a t work i n determining 
h i s C h r i s t o l o g y i n the Church Dogmatics. The ' r e s i s t a n c e ' of Barth to 
a s p e c t s of h i s own C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m becomes apparent where he has to 
p r o t e c t those p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s from being challenged by the very concen-
t r a t i o n upon C h r i s t which they are designed to i n t e r p r e t . Thus, where 
Bar t h t r e a t s of the ' e x t r a c a l v i n i s t i c u m ' , we f i n d t h a t he i s torn 
between the a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t the Son of God was 'totus i n t r a carnem', 
and the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t as 'wholly God, and t h e r e f o r e omnipotent and 
omnipresent' His e x i s t e n c e i n human form must be a l i m i t a t i o n of, i f not 
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a t h r e a t t o , His t r u e being, and t h a t to t h i s e x t ent He must a l s o be 
' e x t r a carnem'. Barth i s embarrassed p r e c i s e l y because the p o s s i b i l i t y 
t h a t the e x i s t e n c e of the Logos 'totus i n t r a carnem' was a l i m i t a t i o n 
w i l l e d by God f o r Himself appears to c o n t r a d i c t the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of 
B a r t h ' s C h r i s t o l o g y , namely t h a t the I n c a r n a t i o n must always be under-
stood i n terms of a s u b j e c t i n g of man to God r a t h e r than a s u b j e c t i n g 
of God to man. Barth f e a r s the p o s s i b i l i t y of a d i v i n e w i l l to s u b j e c t 
Himself to man, a d i v i n e w i l l t o give i t s e l f to the very s e c u l a r 
r e a l i t i e s o f human l i f e from which Barth wished to see God p r o t e c t e d . 
I n o t h e r words, the p o s s i b i l i t y opens up t h a t what Barth claims i t 
would be i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the nature of God as God to do, God has i n 
f a c t done i n C h r i s t . I t i s t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y which leads Barth to 
h e s i t a t e before committing h i m s e l f to the view t h a t our understanding 
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of God's nature i s d e r i v e d from His s e l f - m a n i f e s t a t i o n i n C h r i s t , and 
which l e a d s him to the suggestion t h a t the 'inner b e i n g 1 of God remains 
apart from such d i s c l o s u r e . 
We have observed t h a t B a r t h ' s C h r i s t o l o g y i s determined by the 
p r i n c i p l e t h a t the Word remains s u b j e c t of the i n c a r n a t e being of C h r i s t . 
We wish t o examine t h i s c l a i m f u r t h e r i n the l i g h t of a p a r t i c u l a r 
assessment of a Lutheran C h r i s t o l o g y . 
I n h i s l e c t u r e s on Christology, D i e t r i c h Bonhoeffer d e c l a r e d t h a t 
the statement ' t h i s man i s God', a p p l i e d to J e s u s , ' q u a l i f i e s the whole 
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man J e s u s as God'. Bonhoeffer f o l l o w s Barth i n c r i t i c i s i n g the 
Lutheran i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the communicatio idiomatum i n terms of an 
'exchange of p r o p e r t i e s ' between the two n a t u r e s , p r e d i c a t i n g q u a l i t i e s 
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of the human nature of the d i v i n e nature and v i c e v e r s a , but h i s 
answer to the problem i s to r e c a l l the theologian away from any treatment 
of the n a t u r e s of C h r i s t i n i s o l a t i o n as a s t a r t i n g - p o i n t f o r C h r i s t o l o g y , 
to the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t t h a t 'the man J e s u s i s the C h r i s t , i s God', an ' i s ' 
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which, he s a y s , 'cannot be deduced'. T h i s p o s i t i o n he regards as 
q u i n t e s s e n t i a l l y Lutheran, a f f i r m i n g the mystery t h a t the c h i l d i n the 
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c r a d l e i s the whole God (he r e f e r s the reader to L u t h e r ' s hymns) as 
the beginning of a l l C h r i s t o l o g y , not the consequence of having estab-' 
l i s h e d the r e l a t i o n s h i p of h i s two natures i n advance. I n t h i s context 
Bonhoeffer rules, out the i d e a of 'enhypostasia' as an attempt to under-
stand the person of C h r i s t i n terms of what was conceivable i n terms of 
h i s n a t u r e s . 
Arguably, Bonhoeffer i s more l o y a l to a C h r i s t o l o g y without p r e -
s u p p o s i t i o n i n t h i s r e s p e c t than K a r l Barth. He d e r i v e s h i s knowledge 
of God e n t i r e l y from the p a r a d o x i c a l r e a l i t y of C h r i s t c h i l d i n the 
c r a d l e , weak on the c r o s s and y e t the whole God, as presented i n the 
b i b l i c a l n a r r a t i v e and p r e s e r v e d , without any attempt to r a t i o n a l i s e 
'how' i t might be so, i n the w r i t i n g s t h e o l o g i c a l and l i t u r g i c a l of 
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Martin Luther. The b e a u t i f u l i n t r o d u c t i o n t o Bonhoeffer's l e c t u r e s , 
beginning w i t h the reminder t h a t 'teaching about C h r i s t begins i n 
s i l e n c e ' and going on t o d i s t i n g u i s h the question 'how?', asked of 
C h r i s t , from the 'question of f a i t h ' , the question 'who?', i s arguably 
more Bar t h i a n than Barth. For Bonhoeffer does not presuppose i n h i s 
C h r i s t o l o g y what Barth presupposes i n h i s , namely t h a t the Word remains 
the s u b j e c t of the incarnate being of C h r i s t . Rather, he recognises 
t h a t such i s the mystery o f C h r i s t ' s being as the man Jesus who was God 
t h a t no assumptions concerning the i d e n t i t y of the Word as subject can 
be brought t o bear as conditions of the person of C h r i s t . I t may, 
indeed, be t h a t from the perspective of the incarnate Logos we must 
look more c l o s e l y at Barth's understanding of the Word as subject of 
the i n carnate being of C h r i s t : and the form of Barth's perception here • 
may be l i n k e d t o Bonhoeffer's i m p l i e d c r i t i c i s m of Barth i n the statement 
Gott i s t f r e i n i c h t vom Menschen, sondern f u r den Menschen.^ 
I s i t p o s s i b l e t h a t i n being fre e ' f o r ' r a t h e r than 'from' man 
the Word y i e l d s up the p r i n c i p l e t h a t preserves i t from human ' c o n t r o l ' , 
the p r i n c i p l e t h a t i t i s always 'subject' arid not 'object' before man? 
Barth claims t h a t humanity i s made p e r f e c t i n C h r i s t , not by 
r e c e i v i n g such p e r f e c t i o n ' i n t o ' i t s e l f , as i f there e x i s t e d i n Him a 
human s u b j e c t , but by being i t s e l f received i n t o the Word which remains 
e t e r n a l l y s u b j e c t , even i n the incarnate being of C h r i s t . Because f o r 
Barth there i s a d i v i n e subject i n the incarnate C h r i s t but not a human 
su b j e c t , humanity i s p e r f e c t e d by Him through being taken up i n t o the 
d i v i n e Word. 'Finitum capax i n f i n i t i ' , i n a c e r t a i n sense, f o r Barth, but 
'non i n se sed i n i n f i n i t u m ' ; the f i n i t e receives the i n f i n i t e only as 
i t i s received by i t ; , the i n f i n i t e does not p e r f e c t the f i n i t e through 
being i t s e l f r e a l i s e d i n a human s u b j e c t , but through t a k i n g the 
f i n i t e i n t o i t s e l f as a d i v i n e subject and p e r f e c t i n g i t . Yet we 
are suggesting t h a t the i n s i s t e n c e upon a s i n g l e d i v i n e subject of the 
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incarnate C h r i s t i s an assumption which may not e a s i l y be maintained 
i n the face o f the r e a l i t y o f the incarnate C h r i s t Himself. 
The apparent lack of a 'centre' i n C h r i s t ' s person, of an enduring 
d i v i n e s u b j e c t , f o r which a Reformed Christology c r i t i c i s e s a Lutheran, 
and which Barth f o l l o w s , f a i l s t o recognise t h a t t h i s c r u c i a l ambiguity 
as t o the subject o f the incarnate C h r i s t r e f l e c t s the s e l f - g i v i n g of 
the I n c a r n a t i o n i t s e l f . I t i s necessary t o derive a Christology from 
the r e a l i t y of C h r i s t , t o make the 'how' of His being f o l l o w the 
uniqueness o f 'who' He i s (Bonhoeffer). 
To see the I n c a r n a t i o n i n the manner of a Reformed Christology as 
i n t e r p r e t e d by Barth, i n terms of a drawing o f humanity i n t o an 
enduring d i v i n e subject which embraces human q u a l i t i e s w i t h i n i t s e l f , 
i s c r u c i a l l y t o deny one aspect of the I n c a r n a t i o n , and of the form of 
the Word's s e l f - g i v i n g t o man. This i s c r u c i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from the 
' d i v i n i s a t i o n of man' which Barth fears i n the u n i v e r s a l i s i n g of a 
Lutheran C h r i s t o l o g y . We are not t a l k i n g of the a t t r i b u t i n g o f 'divine 
p r o p e r t i e s ' t o a human subject. We are t a l k i n g of the process by which 
a d i v i n e subject learns o f i t s d i v i n i t y through a human subject. We 
are t a l k i n g of a greater 1 self-emptying' o f the Logos than can be 
associated w i t h any 'decision of the p r e - e x i s t e n t ' Logos t o shed or 
make i n e f f e c t u a l any of i t s 'divine p r o p e r t i e s ' , or w i t h the w i l l e d 
disguise o f the Kierkegaardian parable. We are t a l k i n g of the Son of 
God as man, who does not recognise the 'journey' which He has made i n t o 
the f a r country save i n s o f a r as he comes t o terms w i t h Himself as a 
human being, Jesus the carpenter's son, the Jew from despised G a l i l e e , 
o f whom the s t o r i e s were t o l d t h a t He kept bad company and drank too 
much, who could t e l l His own s t o r i e s of escaping the a u t h o r i t i e s i n a 
crowd, who ended up loo k i n g a f o o l and who was allowed t o asphyxiate or 
bleed t o death as one among many, as p a r t of the normal j u d i c i a l 
procedures o f the day. As a l l these t h i n g s , He entered upon l i f e , ' 
unconscious t h a t a l l He d i d was p a r t of a grand scheme of Kenotic 
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r e n u n c i a t i o n or t h a t He was d e l i b e r a t e l y concealing His t r u e nature 
f o r the sake of some romantic i d e a l , but only conscious of Himself 
as a man, w i t h the f e e l i n g s t h a t none of the gospel w r i t e r s , f o r a l l 
t h e i r r e f u s a l t o be biographers, deny Him. 
I s i t possible t o respond t o the r e a l i t y o f the incarnate C h r i s t 
i n the way t h a t Barth does, as i f the experiences so described were 
simply t o be seen as a drawing of the q u a l i t i e s of human l i f e i n t o the 
Word o f God which stands - how else can one describe i t ? - d o c e t i c a l l y 
above them as t h e i r d i v i n e s u b j e c t . This subject was a man. And t h i s 
man i s the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t o f any Chr i s t o l o g y . The Son of God about t o 
embark on a journey i s not the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t - t h a t i s t o begin not 
from God i n C h r i s t revealed t o man,.but God i n His 'inner l i f e ' 
p r e p a r i n g t o reve a l Himself. We s t a r t - we must s t a r t - w i t h Jesus of 
Nazareth, as. the e a r l y C h r i s t i a n s s t a r t e d w i t h ' t h i s Jesus whom ye 
c r u c i f i e d 1 . We s t a r t w i t h the concrete, the p a r t i c u l a r , w i t h f a c t s . 
From t h i s s t a r t i n g - p o i n t we may a f f i r m t h a t Jesus of Nazareth came 
t o know Himself as God the Son, but only i n s o f a r as He knew Himself as 
a G a l i l e a n . Nothing t h a t He knew of Himself as a d i v i n e subject d i d He 
know of Himself save i n s o f a r as he knew Himself as t h i s man, as t h i s 
human s u b j e c t . He d i d not 'remember' t h a t He was once the e t e r n a l 
Logos who had s a c r i f i c e d His omnipotent q u a l i t y as God. Rather, i n His 
consciousness o f Himself as a Gali l e a n He became conscious of Himself 
also as the omnipotent and e t e r n a l Logos - and doubtless the experience 
drove Him out i n t o the wilderness t o meditate upon the t r u e nature of 
His omnipotence so understood. He was not l o s i n g s i g h t o f who He was 
as a man born o f a woman when He r e f l e c t e d upon the dawning consciousness 
of Himself as the Son of the Father. This d i d not come t o Him i n the 
form of some 'anamnesis' of a d i f f e r e n t l i f e i n e t e r n i t y before He 
engaged upon some dangerous plan t o redeem the world. No. I t came t o 
Him p r e c i s e l y i n s o f a r as He knew Himself as a human being. This f r a i l 
human s u b j e c t , t h i s was the e t e r n a l Logos, t h i s was the omnipotent Son 
- and as t h i s dawned upon Him what drove Him i n t o His mission was the 
consciousness t h a t e t e r n i t y and omnipotence must be revealed f o r what 
they are, an omnipotence of s e l f - s a c r i f i c i n g l o v e , " ^ as revealed i n 
the f a c t t h a t the Son recognised and r e a l i s e d Himself i n t h i s human 
being, the d i v i n e s u b j e c t and the human subject as one being i n C h r i s t , 
w i t h o u t confusion of the two.-
Our c l a i m i s t h a t the incarnate being of C h r i s t has a d i v i n e 
s u b j e c t only i n s o f a r as i t becomes conscious of i t s e l f as a human 
sub j e c t . We r e j e c t any suggestion t h a t t h i s ' d i v i n i s e s ' a human 
sub j e c t . We do not claim t h a t the human subject comes t o recognise 
i t s e l f as d i v i n e , but t h a t as i t comes t o recognise i t s e l f as human, 
so i n t h a t very process a d i v i n e subject becomes conscious of i t s 
d i v i n i t y . C h r i s t recognises Himself as a d i v i n e subject i n s o f a r as 
He recognises Himself as an i n d i v i d u a l human su b j e c t , w i t h o u t any 
escape from t h a t humanity i n t o the consciousness o f a separate existence 
as the Son of God t o which i n i t s t r u e nature these e a r t h l y c o n s t r a i n t s 
do not apply. 
We would claim t h a t t h i s view is_ a 'Kenotic' one, but not i n the 
sense o f Kierkegaard's Prince who consciously abandons c e r t a i n d i v i n e 
'advantages', or even Barth's Son of God who consciously sets out f o r 
the f a r country and remains the one enduring subject of h i s experiences 
i n t h a t a l i e n land. Our 'Kenoticism' begins w i t h the incarnate being 
of C h r i s t , where a l l theology i n a C h r i s t o c e n t r i c mould begins, and 
sees the 'self-emptying' of the Son of God i n terms, not of a conscious 
I 
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d i v i n e r e n u n c i a t i o n of power, but i n terms of the discovery made by 
a human being t h a t i n His deepening self-awareness the love which God 
had f o r Himself recognised i t s e l f . I n other words, the 'Kenosis' of 
r e n u n c i a t i o n i s always u l t i m a t e l y docetic - the humanity i s merely the 
h a i r s h i r t of the d i v i n i t y . But the 'Kenosis 1 of the d i v i n e Logos 
discovered i n the consciousness which a man has o f himself as a Nazarene 
i n an occupied country i s a t r u e 'Kenosis', f o r i t excludes any s e l f -
understanding which the Logos might have of i t s e l f , even i n i t s 
omnipotence and e t e r n i t y , apart from the knowledge which t h i s man Jesus 
has o f h i m s e l f . 
5. Conclusion 
We have seen i n chapters s i x and seven the argument t h a t , where 
human nature i n general i s concerned, Barth's i n s i s t e n c e upon under-
standing both human being and human knowledge i n terms of a d i v i n e 
' o r i g i n a l ' , which represents ' t r u e ' humanity and 't r u e ' knowledge 
e f f e c t i v e l y removes the o n t o l o g i c a l and epistemological grounds of 
human existence. But t h i s Barthian treatment of human nature i n general 
i s the u n i v e r s a l i s i n g of h i s treatment of the humanity of C h r i s t i n 
p a r t i c u l a r . I n h i s treatment of the humanity of C h r i s t i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
we have fastened our att a c k upon the claim t h a t the Word remains 
s u b j e c t o f the incarnate person of C h r i s t . This may seem unwise, i n 
t h a t Barth's i n s i s t e n c e here may be seen as no 'Alexandrian' heresy 
but as the foundation of Chalcedonian orthodoxy. However, we see a 
cl e a r connection between Barth's i n s i s t e n c e upon the d i v i n e Word as 
the s i n g l e enduring subject of the incarnate C h r i s t , and h i s (we have 
argued) undermining of the o n t o l o g i c a l and epistemological conditions 
of human existence. 
Barth's Ch r i s t o l o g y i s open t o c r i t i c i s m f o r denying t o Jesus's 
humanity a d i r e c t r e v e l a t o r y power. This i s the p o i n t of c r i t i c i s m 
258. 
aimed a t Barth's 'Docetism', c r i t i c i s m which has t o be judged very 
c a r e f u l l y since Barth very c l e a r l y does not deny e i t h e r the humanity 
of Jesus or the f a c t t h a t Jesus C h r i s t was an i n d i v i d u a l man. 
Consider the f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n from Thompson's Christ in 
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Perspective in the Theology of Karl Barth: 
Barth r e j e c t s the 'Jesus of h i s t o r y ' movement since i t deals 
w i t h a Jesus who never e x i s t e d ; the only Jesus we know i s 
One not apart from the Word but i n and w i t h the Word. 
Barth does not deny, as Thompson makes c l e a r , the h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y 
o f Jesus, of Nazareth or h i s t r u e humanity. What Barth argues i s t h a t 
Jesus's humanity cannot be considered ' i n a b s t r a c t i o n ' . Thus Barth 
r e j e c t s C a t h o l i c teaching on the sacred heart of Jesus, f o r instance, 
on the grounds t h a t such teaching t r e a t s the 1human-ness' of Jesus as 
1 ' 5 8 something separable from His being as the Word. 
Barth's p o s i t i o n , summed up by Thompson, i s as f o l l o w s : 
F i r s t l y , only the d i v i n e can re v e a l . No a t t r i b u t e of the humanity 
of Jesus considered ' i n abstracto' and apart from i t s being i n d w e l t by 
the Word, has the power t o r e v e a l . f 
Secondly, however, the d i v i n e reveals through the human. This i s 
Barth's ground f o r denying t h a t h i s Christology i s e i t h e r docetic or 
monophysite. He i s not denying the t r u e humanity of Jesus, but r a t h e r 
the idea t h a t the being of C h r i s t ' s f l e s h had an existence of i t s own 
apart from the Word or Son. 
Now i t should be c l e a r from t h i s t h a t our d i f f i c u l t y w i t h Barth's 
C h r i s t o l o g y i s p r e c i s e l y akin t o our d i f f i c u l t y w i t h h i s ' t h e o l o g i c a l 
anthropology' or what we might c a l l h i s " t h e o l o g i c a l epistemology', as 
we have sought to o u t l i n e them i n chapters s i x and seven of t h i s t h e s i s . 
Barth has a s i m i l a r l y problematic ' t h e o l o g i c a l C hristology'. The 'Jesus 
of h i s t o r y ' , the f l e s h and bood r e a l i t y of Jesus of Nazareth, l i k e the 
f l e s h and blood r e a l i t y of human nature as such, may only be understood, 
according t o Barth, on the basis of a 'divine o r i g i n a l ' , the Word of God. 
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Yet i t i s the f l e s h and blood r e a l i t y o f Jesus of Nazareth which allows 
us t o make sense of the idea of the 'Word of God'. The same apparently 
c i r c u l a r argument a r i s e s w i t h respect t o Barth's Christology as arises 
w i t h respect t o h i s anthropology. The Word which i s the d i v i n e r e a l i t y 
i n terms of which alone the humanity o f C h r i s t makes sense, i t s e l f only 
makes sense through t h a t humanity. Barth again f a l l s open t o the charge 
of ' t h e o l o g i c a l a l i e n a t i o n ' , whereby the human r e a l i t y which i n f a c t 
provides the content of a p u t a t i v e d i v i n e counterpart, i s i t s e l f s a i d 
t o be based upon the content of i t s ' d i v i n e ' o r i g i n a l ' . 
1 i 
I n h i s book Theological Science, Professor Torrance remarks: 
I n Docetic C h r i s t o l o g i e s we see t h a t we cannot take the way of 
deduction, beginning w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r idea o f God and then 
f i n d i n g t h a t f u l f i l l e d or confirmed i n Jesus C h r i s t , only then 
t o r e l e g a t e the a c t u a l humanity of Jesus t o a place of u l t i m a t e 
unimportance compared t o the idea of C h r i s t or God brought t o 
l i g h t through him. (59) > 
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Yet such Docetisra must surely be the consequence of Barth's 
presumption t h a t the humanity o f Jesus has no d i r e c t r e v e l a t o r y power. 
That i s s u r e l y already t o relegate i t 'to a place of u l t i m a t e unimport-
ance compared t o the idea of C h r i s t or God brought t o l i g h t through him. ' 
Barth's very i n s i s t e n c e upon the f a c t t h a t i t i s not the humanity of 
C h r i s t which determines His d i v i n i t y , but the d i v i n i t y which determines 
! 
His humanity, i t s e l f relegates the humanity t o unimportance, as a mere 
channel o f the d i v i n e s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n . The jjower of the humanity of 
C h r i s t e f f e c t i v e l y t o challenge the presuppositions of the theologian 
concerning what c o n s t i t u t e s d i v i n i t y i s e f f e c t i v e l y cut o f f by Barth, 
since only through t h a t d i v i n i t y may the humanity be allowed t o speak. 
i 
C r i t i c i s m of Barth's C h r i s t o l o g y must take a d i f f e r e n t form t o 
t h a t which challenges h i s commitment t o the humanity of C h r i s t as such. 
C r i t i c i s m must focus, r a t h e r , on Barth's conception of the r e l a t i o n of 
humanity t o d i v i n i t y i n the incarnate person of C h r i s t . I t may seem 
a p o i n t of C h r i s t o l o g i c a l orthodoxy t h a t the jvery notion of 'assumption' 
! 6 means t h a t 'God Himself i s the subject of a r e a l human being and a c t i o n ' . 
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Yet does such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 'assumption' render the f u l l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of the d i v i n e s e l f - g i v i n g i n the incarnate Christ? 
When Barth comments t h a t 'even i n the form which he assumes by 
r e v e a l i n g h i m s e l f , God i s f r e e t o r e v e a l himself or not t o reveal 
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h i m s e l f , i s there not detectable a f a i l u r e t o recognise the nature 
of the d i v i n e commitment i n Christ? I s the humanity of Jesus merely a 
channel o f r e v e l a t i o n which may be maintained or w i t h h e l d by the 
d i v i n e Word, as Barth suggests when he comments: 
.... the power and the c o n t i n u i t y i n which the man Jesus of 
Nazareth .... was i n f a c t the revealed word, consisted here 
also i n the power and c o n t i n u i t y o f the d i v i n e a c t i o n i n 
t h i s form and not i n the c o n t i n u i t y of t h i s form as such. (62) 
Or i s i t not, r a t h e r , t h a t when the Word chose t h i s form i n which 
t o become f l e s h , i t s a c r i f i c e d a c e r t a i n power t o give or w i t h h o l d 
i t s e l f a t w i l l i n human form? I n t h a t case, would i t not be inaccurate 
t o speak o f the humanity as having power ' i n and through the Word', 
j u s t as. i t would be inaccurate t o speak of the Word having power only 
i n and through the humanity? I s i t not r a t h e r t h a t there i s an 
i d e n t i t y between the power of the Word which i s i n f i n i t e and e t e r n a l 
and the power o f a human being which i s f i n i t e and temporary? To speak 
of one power as e x i s t i n g 'through' the other, or as f r e e t o give i t s e l f 
t o , or w i t h h o l d i t s e l f from, the other, i s t o miss the p o i n t of t h i s 
i d e n t i t y , i n which the C h r i s t o l o g i c a l mystery c o n s i s t s . 
From t h i s excursus i t w i l l , we hope, be possible t o s t a t e our 
conclusion c l e a r l y . Our argument i s t h a t the search f o r a Christology 
must not be seen t o d r i v e .us i n t o b e l i e v i n g t h a t we must choose between 
a human and a d i v i n e subject of the incarnate C h r i s t . We believe t h a t 
Barth has f e l t himself compelled t o make such a choice, and t h a t the 
form o f C h r i s t o l o g y which has r e s u l t e d from h i s decision possesses 
weaknesses. Others reach the opposite conclusion, namely t h a t respect 
f o r h i s t o r y demands a merely human subject of the incarnate C h r i s t . 
Our argument i s t h a t only the dogmatic e v a l u a t i o n o f the man Jesus of 
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Nazareth as the e t e r n a l Son of the Father enables the h i s t o r y which 
gives concrete expression t o t h a t Sonship t o be understood. To i d e n t i f y 
a human subj e c t w i t h a d i v i n e subject as the person of C h r i s t i s the 
only C h r i s t o l o g y which can serve as' the C h r i s t o c e n t r i c core of a theology 
which does j u s t i c e t o the r e l a t i o n s of God and man which receive a one-
sided p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the theology of K a r l Barth. Barth does not deny 
t h a t i n the I n c a r n a t i o n the Word became a man: 
'The Word became f l e s h ' means p r i m a r i l y and of i t s e l f , then, t h a t 
the Word became p a r t i c i p a n t i n human nature and existence. Human 
essence and existence became His. Now since t h i s cannot be r e a l 
except i n the concrete r e a l i t y o f one man, i t must a t once be sai d 
t h a t He became a man. (63) 
But Barth evades the i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s statement, namely t h a t the 
subject o f the incarnate being of C h r i s t i s at one and the same time the 
e t e r n a l Logos and the man Jesus, and t h a t there e x i s t e d i n the condes-
cension o f God t o man i n C h r i s t a process of s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n which 
a man from G a l i l e e came t o understand h i s own human, f i n i t e s e l f -
consciousness as i t s e l f the process of e t e r n a l s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n of God 
i n the obedience o f Son t o Father. 
Any f o r m u l a t i o n of a Chri s t o l o g y must seek t o do j u s t i c e t o the 
Chalcedonian p r e s e n t a t i o n of the person of C h r i s t as 'of one nature 
w i t h the Father i n respect of h i s Godhead, and o f one nature w i t h our-
selves i n respect of h i s manhood .... the d i f f e r e n c e i n nature being 
i n no way removed as a r e s u l t of the.union, but r a t h e r ' t h e property of 
each nature being preserved and concurring i n one person and h y p o s t a s i s 1 . 
McKinney, f o r instance, e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t s the formula of Chalcedon as 
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a p r e s e n t a t i o n of the nature of C h r i s t . He embraces the 'Christology 
from below' o f Pannenberg, b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h i s does not i n s u l a t e f a i t h 
from 'the aids of h i s t o r i c a l s cholarship'. He makes the fundamental 
e r r o r of b e l i e v i n g t h a t dogmatic theology i s somehow j u s t i f i e d only as 
a conclusion of o b j e c t i v e h i s t o r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , r a t h e r than being 
i t s e l f a means by which the h i s t o r i a n of C h r i s t i a n o r i g i n s can make 
sense of h i s subject-matter. Where Barth i s accused i n the t h e s i s of 
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wishing t o bypass h i s t o r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , McKinney himself sees i t 
as a preparatio fidei, t h a t which determines what statements concerning 
the person of C h r i s t may reasonably be made. He f a i l s t o see t h a t the 
dogmatic e n t e r p r i s e is. p r o p e r l y t o be conceived as a way of making sense 
of the h i s t o r i c a l l i f e o f Jesus. 
McKinney's t h e s i s provides an i n t e r e s t i n g p o i n t of comparison f o r 
co n s i d e r a t i o n of Barth's own C h r i s t o l o g i c a l presuppositions. Barth 
wants t o argue t h a t the person of C h r i s t can only be the d i v i n e Word. 
McKinney wants t o argue t h a t the person of C h r i s t can only be Jesus of 
Nazareth. I n f a c t , both thereby f a i l t o fathom the mystery of Ch r i s t ' s 
^ i n c a r n a t e being which i s t h a t the d i v i n e Word and 1Jesus of Nazareth are 
one and the same person. I t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s which makes any h i s t o r i c a l 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n of Jesus of Nazareth impossible w i t h o u t dogmatic e x p l o r a t i o n 
of the nature of God. 
McKinney cannot understand Barth's claim t h a t the Inc a r n a t i o n 
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'precedes' Creation. He cannot understand how the pre-existence of 
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C h r i s t i s r e l a t e d t o the 'events' of Bethlehem and Golgotha. What 
McKinney f a i l s t o see, i s t h a t i f a man and the d i v i n e Word are one and 
the same person, then the human form of Jesus of Nazareth presented on 
e a r t h God the Son i n His e t e r n a l being, not what He had temp o r a r i l y become 
but what He e t e r n a l l y i s . For Barth the In c a r n a t i o n 'precedes' Creation 
i n t h a t i t i s the p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the e t e r n a l being of the Word i n Jesus 
of Nazareth which, i n Barth's view, Iboth explains and determines the 
Creation. McKinney seems t o b e l i e v e t h a t Barth i s making a p l a i n l y i l l o g i c a l 
statement when he remarks t h a t the In c a r n a t i o n 'precedes' the Creation, 
as i f he were t o be saying t h a t May precedes A p r i l i n the calendar. 
What Barth i s su r e l y recognising i s t h a t t h e ; e t e r n a l Son precedes 
Creation - indeed Creation was 'through' the Son - and t h a t the Incarna t i o n 
represents not a new becoming i n the Son but a r e v e l a t i o n of what He 
e t e r n a l l y i s , and t h e r e f o r e o f what He indeed i s at the Creation 
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i t s e l f . The 'precedence' of the In c a r n a t i o n over the Creation l i e s 
i n the a s s e r t i o n t h a t i n Jesus of Nazareth i s disclosed the e t e r n a l being 
of the Son, i n the l i g h t o f which a l l a c t i v i t y of the Son, i n c l u d i n g 
His r o l e i n Creation, i s t o be understood. McKinney i s f a l l i n g v i c t i m 
t o the idea of the I n c a r n a t i o n as a 'stage i n the h i s t o r y 1 of the Son, 
a f u r t h e r development i n the saga of God's r e l a t i o n t o man. He does 
not see the p o i n t t h a t Jesus of Nazareth, a man, i s the e t e r n a l Son 
of the Father, t h a t they are one person. He represents, i n t h i s manner, 
the dangers of an approach t o the gospels 1 c e n t r a l character which 
intends t o a r r i v e a t dogmatic conclusions a t the end of a road along 
which i t i s conducted by apparently undogmatic considerations alone. 
Like Pannenberg, McKinney w i l l be l e f t a t the end of the day w i t h 
n othing but what the former c a l l s the ' r e t r o a c t i v e ' power of Jesus' 
h i s t o r i c a l l y a t t e s t e d Resurrection i n order t o t r y t o construct dogma 
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out o f h i s t o r y . Pannenberg's ' r e t r o a c t i v e power 1 of the Resurrection 
i s a p u r e l y mythological expression. I t i s a yerctgaots etS aXXo Y e v°S 
by which he attempts t o guide himself from an h i s t o r i c a l event t o 
dogmatic consequences which i t cannot, i n f a c t , y i e l d . The Resurrection 
becomes an h i s t o r i c a l f a c t which a t the same time provides the hermen-
e u t i c a l key t o open up the mysteries of the C h r i s t i a n f a i t h . I t becomes 
an almost romantic v i n d i c a t i o n of Jesus's teaching about Himself and 
allows theology t o expand upon His uniqueness. The sense of God's 
presence i n s u f f e r i n g , weakness and helplessness during C h r i s t ' s l i f e , 
the s e l f - g i v i n g and love of God revealed i n the dogmatic equation of 
the e t e r n a l Son w i t h the man o f Nazareth which must, i n our view, be 
the p r e c o n d i t i o n of any understanding of the h i s t o r y of Jesus, i s l o s t 
i n the triumphant demonstration of Easter. Now, suddenly, a l l the 
s t u d i o u s l y avoided dogmatic presuppositions are t o be produced l i k e 
r a b b i t s out o f a conjuror's hat. But i t was not only i n the l i g h t of 
the r e s u r r e c t i o n t h a t C h r i s t ' s claims were understood; nor could they 
merely be e s t a b l i s h e d by the r e s u r r e c t i o n . Without understanding how 
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God had revealed Himself t o the p o i n t of self-compromising outreach 
i n the l i f e of C h r i s t , what could be known of the d i v i n e love i n the 
l i g h t o f the Resurrection? ' I f they do not l i s t e n t o Moses and the 
prophets, they w i l l pay no heed even i f someone should r i s e from the 
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dead'. 
McKinney asks how the pre-existence of C h r i s t i s r e l a t e d t o the 
events of Bethlehem and Golgotha. The answer i s t h a t the e t e r n a l 
existence of C h r i s t i s made known by, i s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h , the man who 
s u f f e r e d a t Golgotha and was born i n Bethlehem. McKinney i s c o r r e c t 
i n c r i t i c i s i n g Barth, as we have c r i t i c i s e d him i n t h i s t h e s i s , f o r 
i d e n t i f y i n g the subject o f the. incarnate C h r i s t w i t h the d i v i n e Word 
alone. McKinney, however, i d e n t i f i e s him only as the man Jesus of 
Nazareth. He r e j e c t s the dogmatic i n f i l t r a t i o n i n t o events which 
presumes t o a r r i v e at. the e t e r n a l Son before i t has f i n i s h e d w i t h the 
man Jesus. He wishes t o f o l l o w the 'pure h i s t o r i c a l ' method which he 
i d e n t i f i e s w i t h Pannenberg, and according t o which he w i l l f i r s t 
v i n d i c a t e the l a t t e r a t the Resurrection, and then w i l l somehow f i n d 
' r e t r o a c t i v e ' power t o discover the former, and t o clothe i n dogmatic 
shades of grey Jesus's b r i e f moment of triumph on the t h i r d day. Does 
MeKinney suppose t h a t he thereby does j u s t i c e t o h i s t o r y ? I s i t not the 
dogma o f C h r i s t ' s e t e r n a l existence which provides the key t o under-
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standing the l i f e of Jesus, as i t i s the l i f e of Jesus which reveals 
the e t e r n a l existence of C h r i s t ? And i f he throws away t h a t key, and 
any i n s i s t e n c e t h a t the l i f e of C h r i s t must always be understood i n 
the l i g h t of the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the man Jesus and the e t e r n a l Son 
were one and the same person, w i l l not the r e s u l t be a b e l i t t l i n g of 
the h i s t o r i c i t y of C h r i s t ' s l i f e ? W i l l we not be constantly looking 
beyond the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus t o the triumph of h i s resurrection? For 
what i s the ' r e t r o a c t i v e ' force o f the Resurrection t o 'explain' the 
t r u t h o f C h r i s t , but a systematic purging of t h a t i r o n y , i n s i s t e n c e and 
a u t h o r i t y through which Jesus i d e n t i f i e d himself during h i s l i f e t i m e 
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as the e t e r n a l Son, not only t o others but i n an agony of s e l f -
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n also? We do not , i n t h i s approach, f i n d the r e -
instatement of the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus. We f i n d only one form of h i s t o r y , 
which by i t s recourse t o what might appear the one remaining fashionable 
miracle attempts t o provide an acceptable ladder away from h i s t o r y i n t o 
dogma and, i n so doing, d i r e c t ^ a t t e n t i o n away from the h i s t o r i c a l events 
which dogma i n v e s t s w i t h t h e i r t r u e h i s t o r i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . To f i n d 
dogma by way o f h i s t o r y may be less h i s t o r i c a l than t o f i n d i n dogma 
the key t o h i s t o r y . 
McKinney's question concerning the connection between the pre-
e x i s t e n t Son and the events of Bethlehem and Golgotha gives the game 
away. I t i s the very equation of the t r a g i c event of Golgotha w i t h 
the e t e r n a l l i f e o f the Word of God which gives t h a t event i t s 
h i s t o r i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , which f i x e s forever the image of a man 
bleeding on a cross i n 30 A.D. by i d e n t i f y i n g i t w i t h the e t e r n a l l i f e 
of God the Son i n the s e l f - g i v i n g o f d i v i n e love. Without t h i s event, 
what would the ' s e l f - g i v i n g of d i v i n e love' mean? What would i t be 
but an abs t r a c t i o n ? What r e a l i t y could i t have as a mere u n i v e r s a l 
w i t h o u t p a r t i c u l a r expression?"^ 0 The c r i t i c i s m which McKinney l e v e l s 
a t what he considers t o be Barth's treatment of the humanity assumed 
by the Word but not i n s t a n t i a t e d i n a human being applies also t o the 
d i v i n i t y o f C h r i s t , r e a l i s e d i n the one person who i s both God the Son 
incarnate and Jesus of Nazareth. The subject of the Incarnate Word i s 
God the Son, who i s also Jesus of Nazareth, and i t i s i n t h i s meeting 
of the temporal and the e t e r n a l , t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the e t e r n a l 
being of the Son w i t h the course of a temporally r e a l i s e d l i f e , which 
c o n s t i t u t e s t h a t centre, of C h r i s t i a n i t y i n terms of which a l l else i s 
to be understood, and which makes of both Barth and Pannenberg opposite 
forms of reductionism. 
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by God o f His ' a u t h o r i s a t i o n ' t o Jesus i l l u s t r a t e s . Pannenberg 
c l a i m s t h a t : 
.... t h e r e s u r r e c t e d Lord's e s s e n t i a l u n i t y w i t h God le a d s t o 
t h e i d e a o f p r e e x i s t e n c e t h r o u g h i t s own i n t r i n s i c l o g i c . 
(pp. 153-4.) 
Bu t i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h e n a t u r e o f t h i s ' l o g i c a l d e d u c t i o n 1 i n 
Pannenberg's argument w h i c h we f a i l t o see, and which i s t h e ground 
o f o u r c l a i m c o n c e r n i n g Pannenberg's u n s u c c e s s f u l a t t e m p t t o l e a d 
t h e r e a d e r p a i n l e s s l y t h r o u g h h i s t o r y i n t o dogma. 
69. Luke 16:31. 
70. See t h e essay by' D.M. Mackinnon, '"Substance" i n C h r i s t o l o g y - a 
Cross-Bench View', i n Sykes, S.W., and C l a y t o n , J.P. eds., Christ, 
Faith and History. 
7 1 . An u n r e a s o n a b l e c h a r g e , s i n c e B a r t h q u i t e c l e a r l y a s s e n ts t o t h e 
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t Jesus o f N a z a r e t h was an i n d i v i d u a l human b e i n g , 
and h i s t r e a t m e n t o f t h e ' a n h y p o s t a s i a ' and 'enh y p o s t a s i a ' i s i n 




Our t h e s i s began w i t h an e x a m i n a t i o n o f B a r t h ' s e a r l y t h e o l o g y , 
w h i c h we v i e w e d i n t h e l i g h t o f h i s r e l a t i o n t o t h e t h o u g h t o f Kant. 
P r i o r t o t h e second commentary on Romans, we a r gued, a K a n t i a n m o r a l 
t h e o l o g y c o u l d be o b s e r v e d i n B a r t h : i n t h e second commentary, however, 
t h i s i s r e j e c t e d and Kant's c r u c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e l i e s i n s t e a d i n t h e 
o u t l i n e o f a d u a l i s m w h i c h p r o v i d e s t h e b a s i s f o r m a i n t a i n i n g an 
' i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n ' between God and man. T r a n s c e n d e n t a l 
i d e a l i s m formed t h e ground o f a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e s c h a t o l o g y i n t h e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f P a u l ' s e p i s t l e . 
The second commentary on Romans was n o t a ' t h e o l o g y o f r e v e l a t i o n ' . 
We have a r g u e d t h a t i t was a ' n e g a t i v e n a t u r a l t h e o l o g y ' , whose ' p r o o f 
o f God l a y i n t h e e x i s t e n t i a l c o n v i c t i o n o f a f a l l e n w o r l d f r o m w h i c h 
t h e h e a v e n l y l e g i o n s had d e p a r t e d . The p o e t i c appeal o f t h i s m a g n i f i c e n t 
work l i e s i n t h e c o n s t a n t l y r e i t e r a t e d theme o f a w o r l d w h i c h God i n His 
d i s p l e a s u r e has l e f t w i t h no s i g n s o f H i s presence b u t w i t h some s i g n s 
! 
o f H i s absence - hence t h e c r u c i a l r o l e f o r those P a u l i n e passages w h i c h 
s u g g e s t a knowledge o f God ' from t h e t h i n g s w h i c h are made'. Reading 
Romans i s l i k e r e a d i n g t h e account o f a v a n i s h e d c i v i l i s a t i o n : be i t 
t h e p o e t r y o f d r i e d - u p c a n a l s w h i c h were once f i l l e d w i t h t h e l i v i n g 
s treams o f e t e r n a l l i f e , o r t h e more a b s t r a c t . c o n c e p t o f a ' r e l a t i v e ' 
w h i c h i n i t s r e l a t i v i t y p r o c l a i m s a 'vanished a b s o l u t e ' , Bar.th suggests 
t o e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y man, n o t t h a t a l l t h e o l o g y i s based upon 
r e v e l a t i o n , b u t t h a t God has condemned t h e w o r l d t o l i v e w i t h o u t Him. 
T h i s was t h e p o w e r f u l message t h a t spoke i n t h e a f t e r m a t h o f t h e f i r s t 
w o r l d war. B a r t h a d o p t s , i n h i s commentary, an a l m o s t S t o i c t o n e : God 
has l e f t t h e w o r l d , w h i c h must l e a r n t o l i v e i n s e p a r a t i o n f r o m Him and 
i n H i s d i s f a v o u r ( t h e a m b i g u i t y o f ' k r i s i s ' as s e p a r a t i o n and judgment) 
u n t i l an e s c h a t o l o g i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n w h i c h i t w i l l cease t o be. 
I t must a c c e p t , as Jesus encouraged i t t o a c c e p t , t h e r e a l i t y o f t h e 
d i v i n e absence. I t must n o t s t r i v e t o deny t h i s and t o b u i l d some e r s a t z 
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r e p l a c e m e n t i n o r d e r t o p r e t e n d t o i t s e l f t h a t God has, i n f a c t , 
r e t u r n e d . I t s hope l i e s o n l y i n i t s p e r c e p t i o n o f i t s own f i n i t u d e : 
so t h a t . r e s i g n a t i o n a t i t s own abandonment by God may be c o n t a i n e d 
w i t h i n t h e e x p e c t a t i o n o f r e u n i f i c a t i o n w i t h Him t h r o u g h i t s d i s s o l u t i o n . 
Sorrow a t a ' p a s t ' t h a t can never be r e - l i v e d e x i s t s w i t h i n a r e c o g n i t i o n 
o f t h e u l t i m a t e u n r e a l i t y o f t i m e i t s e l f and a l l t h a t t a k e s p l a c e w i t h i n 
i t : t h e c o n d i t i o n o f man i s n o t f i n a l l y h o p e less because n o t f i n a l l y 
r e a l . The f i n a l t r a g e d y i s l i g h t e n e d by a f i n a l i r o n y . The ' c o n d i t i o n 
o f man w i t h o u t God can be b r o k e n , however, o n l y by His e s c h a t o l o g i c a l . 
' e s t a b l i s h m e n t ' o f t h e w o r l d t h r o u g h i t s d i s s o l u t i o n , an e s t a b l i s h m e n t 
o f w h i c h t h e hope i t s e l f i s t h e o n l y p r e s e n t r e a l i t y , and o f w h i c h t h e 
f i n i t u d e o f t h e p r e s e n t w o r l d - o r d e r i s t h e o n l y p r e s e n t s i g n . 
A l t h o u g h B a r t h ' s f i n e s t w o r k, Romans has more o f t h e s p i r i t o f 
Greek t r a g e d y t h a n o f C h r i s t i a n i t y . I t has no C h r i s t o c e n t r i c p r o c l a m a t i o n 
o f good news a t t h e j o i n i n g o f God and man i n C h r i s t . I t has no t h e o l o g y 
o f r e v e l a t i o n b i n d i n g t h e w o r l d t o i t s C r e a t o r . L i n k e d t o t h i s f a i l i n g , 
i s a l a c k o f p o l i t i c a l and m o r a l s e r i o u s n e s s i n a t h e o l o g y w h i c h , h a v i n g 
j e t t i s o n e d t h e e t h i c a l i d e a l i s m o f Kant, f i n d s n o t h i n g i n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l 
i d e a l i s m a l o n e t o j u s t i f y a p o s i t i v e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n on b e h a l f o f c e r t a i n 
values.^" I n some ways t h e S t o i c i s m o f Romans, w h i l s t a ground f o r t h e 
r e j e c t i o n o f any t h i s - w o r l d l y i d e o l o g y such as t h a t o f Nazism, opened 
up a vacuum w h i c h a N a z i i d e o l o g y m i g h t f i l l , perhaps as p r e c i s e l y t h e 
k i n d o f ' H e r o s t a t e a n deed' t h a t Harnack f e a r e d i n t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f 
what he saw as B a r t h ' s d i s m i s s a l o f s c i e n t i f i c h i s t o r i c a l - c r i t i c a l s t u d y 
o f t h e B i b l e (see c h a p t e r t h r e e ) . 
I n l a t e r y e a r s B a r t h s t r o v e t o c o n s t r u c t a more o r t h o d o x and p o s i t i v e 
t h e o l o g y based upon t h e C h r i s t o c e n t r i s m o f C h r i s t i a n i t y . H i s e n d u r i n g 
commitment'to t h e c e n t r a l i t y o f C h r i s t i n any dogmatic f o r m u l a t i o n o f 
t h e C h r i s t i a n f a i t h i s h i s g r e a t e s t achievement i n t h e s e y e a r s , b u t t h e 
f o r m o f h i s commitment p r o d u c e d d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
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I n c h a p t e r s t h r e e t o n i n e we t r i e d t o b r i n g o u t these d i f f i c u l t i e s 
by a r g u i n g t h a t B a r t h remained committed t o an e s s e n t i a l l y d u a l i s t 
t h e o l o g y , d e s p i t e t h e d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w h i c h he l a t e r e xpressed w i t h t h e 
2 
views o f Romans. H i s d u a l i s m becomes 1 e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l 1 r a t h e r t h a n 
' o n t o l o g i c a l ' , t h a t i s t o say i t s e p a r a t e s t h e knowledge o f God based 
upon r e v e l a t i o n f r o m o t h e r forms o f knowledge. I t i s t h i s e p i s t e m o l -
o g i c a l d u a l i s m t h a t i s e s t a b l i s h e d , we argued i n c h a p t e r f o u r , by Fides 
Quaerens Intellectual, t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l m a n i f e s t o o f t h e Church 
Dogmatics, a work w h i c h d e s p i t e i t s o v e r t r e j e c t i o n o f Kant's arguments 
a g a i n s t 'Anselm' ( B a r t h concedes t h a t Kant s p e c i f i c a l l y d i r e c t e d them 
a g a i n s t E e s c a r t e s ) , and i t s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t Kant's t h e o l o g y i s a n t h r o p -
o c e n t r i c i n t h a t i t d e t e r m i n e s knowledge o f God a c c o r d i n g t o t h e 
c o n s t r a i n i n g l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e human u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i s v e r y happy t o 
c o n t i n u e t o espouse a K a n t i a n d u a l i s m i n terms o f t h e s e p a r a t i o n between 
t h e o l o g y and o t h e r forms o f knowledge. A l t h o u g h i t i s t r u e t h a t B a r t h 
c o n t i n u e s t o make use o f t h e concept o f a n a l o g y , and c o n t i n u e s t o use -
as i n d e e d he must - t h e terms o f o r d i n a r y d i s c o u r s e ' r e b a p t i s e d ' w i t h i n 
t h e language o f f a i t h , he does so i n t h e c o n t e x t o f an i n h e r e n t and 
i n e s c a p a b l e a m b i g u i t y c o n c e r n i n g t h e s t a t u s o f t h o s e t e r m s , w h i c h are 
b o t h t o be u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e i r ' o r d i n a r y ' sense and i n a fo r m w h i c h , 
because i t i s t h e i r ' o r i g i n a l , d i v i n e c o n t e n t ' t h a t i s b e i n g r e f e r r e d 
t o , r e n d e r s them immune t o c r i t i c i s m by t h e human u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Chapters 
t h r e e and e i g h t t r y t o e s t a b l i s h t h i s w i t h r e s p e c t t o s p e c i f i c examples, 
t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e B i b l e ( t h e a m b i g u i t y o f i t s ' d i v i n e ' ' c o n t e n t ' ) , 
and t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e R e s u r r e c t i o n (an 'ev e n t ' , b u t immune t o t h e 
c r i t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n b r o u g h t t o e v e n t s by t h e h i s t o r i a n ) . 
The purpose o f t h i s c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r i s t o a t t e m p t t o show t h a t 
our c r i t i c i s m s o f B a r t h i n t h e course o f t h i s t h e s i s may be b r o u g h t 
t o g e t h e r around t h e i s s u e o f C h r i s t o l o g y . We applaud t h e C h r i s t o c e n t r i c 
a pproach t o C h r i s t i a n t h e o l o g y w h i c h B a r t h o f f e r s ; b u t we f e e l t h a t 
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because o f a C h r i s t o l o g i c a l f l a w i n B a r t h ' s thought,, t h e o t h e r aspects 
o f h i s t h e o l o g y w h i c h a re d e t e r m i n e d by h i s fu n d a m e n t a l C h r i s t o l o g i c a l 
commitment are s i m i l a r l y f l a w e d . A C h r i s t i a n t h e o l o g y i s r i g h t l y , i n 
our v i e w , t h e ' u n i v e r s a l i s i n g ' o f a C h r i s t o l o g y ; b u t what C h r i s t o l o g y 
i s b e i n g ' u n i v e r s a l i s e d ' ? The d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h have been b r o u g h t 
o u t i n c h a p t e r s f i v e , s i x and seven o f t h i s t h e s i s are a l l t r a c e a b l e , 
we b e l i e v e , t o a d e f e c t i v e C h r i s t o l o g i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n terms o f 
w h i c h t h e o t h e r a s p e c t s o f C h r i s t i a n t h e o l o g y a re t o be u n d e r s t o o d . 
We may now l i s t under a number o f headings t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p as we see 
i t : 
\ 
a. B a r t h r i g h t l y a r g u e s , i n h i s c r i t i c i s m o f a L u t h e r a n C h r i s t o l o g y 
and h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between a L u t h e r a n C h r i s t o l o g y 
and n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y German I d e a l i s m , t h a t a C h r i s t o l o g y may be t h e 
f o u n d a t i o n . o f an a n t h r o p o l o g y . B a r t h ' s own C h r i s t o l o g y , we have argued 
i n c h a p t e r n i n e , i s based upon t h e c o n v i c t i o n o f a s i n g l e e n d u r i n g 
d i v i n e s u b j e c t o f t h e i n c a r n a t e b e i n g o f C h r i s t . The e x p e r i e n c e s o f 
C h r i s t a r e known, n o t t o a human s u b j e c t b u t t o t h e e t e r n a l Word. T h i s 
C h r i s t o l o g y may be l i n k e d t o B a r t h ' s a n t h r o p o l o g y as we t r i e d t o 
d e s c r i b e i t i n c h a p t e r s i x . There we sought t o q u e s t i o n whether B a r t h ' s 
t h o u g h t a l l o w e d f o r a r e a l ' o n t o l o g y o f man' i n h i s n a t u r a l b e i n g a p a r t 
f r o m C h r i s t . I n c h a p t e r seven we a t t e m p t e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e 'epistem-
o l o g i c a l c o r r e l a t i v e ' j o f t h i s , namely whether B a r t h ' s t h o u g h t a l l o w e d 
f o r a r e a l knowledge o f God l o c a t e d i n man, t h e b e a r e r o f t h a t knowledge. 
The d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h we have o u t l i n e d i n a B a r t h i a n t h e o l o g y i n 
c h a p t e r s s i x and seven r e p r e s e n t , we w o u l d c l a i m , t h e o u t w o r k i n g o f a 
C h r i s t o l o g y w h i c h a s s o c i a t e s human e x p e r i e n c e i n C h r i s t w i t h a ' d i v i n e ' 
r a t h e r t h a n a 'human' s u b j e c t , and t h e n extends t h i s t o human e x p e r i e n c e 
i n g e n e r a l . The a t t e m p t t o ' r e b a p t i s e ' t h e elements o f a human under-
s t a n d i n g ' w i t h i n ' t h e d i v i n e may be u n d e r s t o o d as t h e e x t e n s i o n t o 
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h u m a n i t y i n g e n e r a l o f t h e a t t e m p t t o g i v e substance t o t h e i n c a r n a t e 
e x i s t e n c e o f a s i n g l e d i v i n e s u b j e c t w i t h o u t a t any p o i n t conceding 
t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n c e s o f C h r i s t i n H i s e a r t h l y l i f e may be under-
s t o o d t o be e x p e r i e n c e s o f a human s u b j e c t . 
b. B a r t h a t t a c k s a L u t h e r a n ' d i v i n i s i n g ' o f man t h r o u g h t h e a n t h r o p -
o l o g i c a l e x t e n s i o n o f t h e a t t r i b u t i o n o f d i v i n e q u a l i t i e s t o t h e human 
n a t u r e o f C h r i s t . Extended t o human n a t u r e as such, t h i s becomes i n 
B a r t h ' s v i e w a d i v i n i s i n g o f man. L u t h e r b e g e t s Feuerbach. B a r t h ' s 
c r i t i c i s m o f movements i n t h e o l o g y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h S c h l e i e r m a c h e r and 
Bultmann i s s i m i l a r , namely t h a t t h e y i n t e r p r e t God a c c o r d i n g t o 
e s s e n t i a l l y human c r i t e r i a and t h e r e b y 'reduce' God t o man. I n f a c t 
such a ' d i v i n i s i n g ' o f man i s n o t t h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e t o B a r t h ' s 
C h r i s t o l o g i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n . A C h r i s t o l o g y c o u l d be suggested which 
sees t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e human as human i n C h r i s t , . a n d t h e 
s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e e t e r n a l Logos, as t a k i n g p l a c e i n one b e i n g . 
Extended t o an a n t h r o p o l o g y , t h i s f o r m o f C h r i s t o l o g i c a l argument 
e n t a i l s , n o t t h a t man comes t o u n d e r s t a n d h i m s e l f as God, b u t t h a t he 
un d e r s t a n d s h i m s e l f i n h i s r e l a t i o n t o God i n s o f a r as he understands 
h i m s e l f as man. I n d e e d an a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l s t a r t i n g - p o i n t need n o t 
e n t a i l a n t h r o p o c e n t r i s m . 
We may p r e s e n t t h e a l t e r n a t i v e forms o f C h r i s t o l o g y w h i c h may be 
' u n i v e r s a l i s e d ' i n terms o f a ' t h e o l o g i c a l a n t h r o p o l o g y 1 as f o l l o w s : 
i . A C h r i s t o l o g y w h i c h p o s i t s a s i n g l e d i v i n e s u b j e c t o f t h e 
i n c a r n a t e C h r i s t . We r e g a r d t h i s as. B a r t h ' s C h r i s t o l o g y . ' U n i v e r s a l -
i s e d ' , t h i s l e a d s t o t h e view w h i c h we have c r i t i c i s e d i n c h a p t e r s s i x 
and seven o f t h i s t h e s i s . I t l e a d s t o an a n t h r o p o l o g y i n w h i c h t h e 
b e i n g o f man l a c k s r e a l i t y as t h e o b j e c t o f God's r e v e l a t i o n , as t h a t 
t o w h i c h God's r e v e l a t i o n i s addressed. I n e f f e c t , man i s absorbed 
w i t h i n God, h i s knowledge o f God i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h e knowledge 
God has o f H i m s e l f . The s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f man t o God i n t h e d i a l o g u e 
between them i s de v e l o p e d t o an e x t e n t t h a t i n f a c t t a k e s t h e 
o n t o l o g i c a l ground f r o m under i t s f e e t , p r o d u c i n g a d i v i n e monologue 
i n w h i c h t h e C r e a t o r addresses a phantom. As t h e o n t o l o g i c a l ground 
i s t a k e n f r o m under t h e f e e t o f C h r i s t ' s humanity i n B a r t h ' s C h r i s t -
o l o g y , /Q0 i t i s t a k e n f r o m under our f e e t i n h i s ' t h e o l o g i c a l a n t h r o p -
o l o g y ' . C e r t a i n l y , f o r B a r t h , C h r i s t was t r u l y man and t r u l y a_ man. 
But such a r e t h e c o n d i t i o n s s e t by B a r t h t o t h e r e a l i t y o f H i s hum a n i t y , 
whose q u a l i t i e s may never i n h e r e i n a human s u b j e c t o f H i s i n c a r n a t e 
e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t i t can never be more t h a n a phantom humanity. S i m i l a r l y , 
B a r t h nowhere f a i l s t o t a l k o f human b e i n g s as f l e s h and b l o o d b e i n g s 
c a p a b l e o f d e n y i n g t h e i r C r e a t o r . But he so c o n f l a t e s t h e o r d e r o f . 
n a t u r e w i t h t h e o r d e r o f grace t h a t such 'independence' o f God as a 
human c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s f i n a l l y u n r e a l . 
i i . The second f o r m o f C h r i s t o l o g y i s t h a t w h i c h B a r t h a t t a c k s i n 
terms o f a l i n e o f t h o u g h t f r o m L u t h e r t h r o u g h Feuerbach and German 
I d e a l i s m t o t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y 'humanism'. The I n c a r n a t i o n i s here 
u n d e r s t o o d i n terms o f a s i n g l e human s u b j e c t w h i c h g l o r i f i e s i t s e l f 
t h r o u g h t h e r e c e p t i o n o f d i v i n e q u a l i t i e s i n t o i t s e l f . I t becomes t h e 
d i v i n i s a t i o n o f man r a t h e r t h a n t h e h u m a n i s a t i o n o f God. Through what 
B a r t h sees as a L u t h e r a n a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e communicatio idiomatum, t h e 
w a y . i s opened f o r p r e d i c a t i n g d i v i n e , q u a l i t i e s o f t h e human n a t u r e i n 
C h r i s t , a p r o c e s s w h i c h i s t h e n ' u n i v e r s a l i s e d ' i n t o an a n t h r o p o l o g y 
w h i c h p r e d i c a t e s d i v i n e q u a l i t i e s o f man as such. There i s no 
' C a l v i n i s t c o r r e c t i v e ' t o e n s u r e . t h a t t h e p r o c e s s by w h i c h i n C h r i s t God 
t h e Son t a k e s t o H i m s e l f human f o r m i s never a p r o c e s s by w h i c h human 
n a t u r e r e c e i v e s d i v i n e q u a l i t i e s as a t t r i b u t e s o f i t s e l f , and t o ensure 
t h a t t h e I n c a r n a t i o n i s always a r e c e i v i n g o f t h e human i n t o t h e d i v i n e 
and never a r e c e i v i n g o f t h e d i v i n e i n t o t h e human. 
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i i i . I n t h e t h i r d f o r m o f C h r i s t o l o g y w h i c h we have p u t f o r w a r d , 
C h r i s t i s n e i t h e r t o be c o n c e i v e d o f as a s i n g l e e n d u r i n g d i v i n e s u b j e c t 
o f human q u a l i t i e s n o r as a s i n g l e e n d u r i n g human s u b j e c t o f d i v i n e 
q u a l i t i e s . We have, h e r e , n e i t h e r t h e a b s o r p t i o n o f human e x p e r i e n c e 
and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n t o a d e t e r m i n i n g d i v i n e s u b j e c t , n o r t h e p r o g r e s -
s i v e d i v i n i s a t i o n o f a human s u b j e c t t h r o u g h t h e r e c e i v i n g o f d i v i n e 
i 
powers and a t t r i b u t e s i n t o i t s e l f . The my s t e r y o f C h r i s t ' s b e i n g i s 
t h e m y s t e r y o f a human s u b j e c t r e c o g n i s i n g H i m s e l f i n His humanity as 
a man o f N a z a r e t h i n s o f a r as t h e e t e r n a l Logos understands i t s e l f i n 
i t s e t e r n i t y as God t h e Son, as a d i v i n e s u b j e c t . The s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n 
o f t h e man Jesus i s p r e c i s e l y i d e n t i c a l t o , i s t h e v e r y o c c a s i o n o f , t h e 
s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e Logos i n i t s d i v i n i t y . ' U n i v e r s a l i s e d ' t h i s 
e n t a i l s , n e i t h e r t h a t man i s absorbed i n t o God n o r t h a t man absorbs God 
i n t o h i m s e l f , b u t t h a t man's own s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g (examined r i g h t l y 
by S c h l e i e r m a c h e r i n terms o f h i s sense o f dependence, o r by Kant i n 
terms o f h i s sense o f m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n ) i s t h e l o c u s o f man's under-
s t a n d i n g o f h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o God. T h i s C h r i s t o l o g y i d e n t i f i e s t h e 
m y s t e r y o f C h r i s t ' s b e i n g w i t h t h a t o f t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f a human 
s u b j e c t i n H i s humanity w i t h a d i v i n e s u b j e c t i n H i s d i v i n i t y . Does 
t h i s e n t a i l a N e s t o r i a n d i v i s i o n o f t h e Person o f C h r i s t i n t o two 
s u b j e c t s ? No - because t h e m y s t e r y o f C h r i s t l i e s p r e c i s e l y i n t h e 
f a c t t h a t t h e s e two s u b j e c t s a r e one, t h a t t h e s e l f - e x i s t e n t human 
b e i n g Jesus o f N a z a r e t h i s _ t h e Word o f God i n i t s e t e r n a l s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n . 
S i m i l a r l y , i n a r g u i n g t h a t a ' t h e o l o g i c a l a n t h r o p o l o g y ' must accord man 
i n r e l a t i o n t o God a ' r e l a t i v e independence 1 o f h i s C r e a t o r , and g i v e 
o n t o l o g i c a l ground t o h i s a p a r t n e s s f r o m God i n t h i s r e s p e c t , we are 
u n i v e r s a l i s i n g t h e demand f o r a r e a l human s u b j e c t o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e s 
o f t h e i n c a r n a t e C h r i s t . But we do n o t i n d o i n g so seek t o d i v i n i s e 
t h e human. We seek o n l y t o humanise t h e human, t o g i v e t o t h e human 
t h e r e a l grounds o f i t s h u m a n i t y . We are s a y i n g no more t h a n t h a t i t 
i s o n l y i n h i s humanity t h a t man knows and e x p e r i e n c e s God, as i n C h r i s t 
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i t was o n l y i n t h e e x p e r i e n c e a man had o f H i m s e l f as a human b e i n g 
t h a t t h e Word o f God e t e r n a l l y r e c o g n i s e s i t s e l f . 
c. We may now c o n s i d e r t h e argument i n c h a p t e r f i v e o f our t h e s i s , i n 
w h i c h we argued t h a t i n h i s l e c t u r e s on t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e o l o g y B a r t h ' s 
r e a l o b j e c t o f a t t a c k was a.process by w h i c h t h e o l o g i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
p r o v i d e s t h e p r e c o n d i t i o n o f t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f r e a l i t y w h i c h o t h e r 
i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s c i p l i n e s seek. We may r e c a l l t h e p o i n t i n our s i x t h 
c h a p t e r c o n c e r n i n g an o r d e r o f n a t u r e w h i c h cannot be absorbed w i t h i n 
an o r d e r o f g r a c e . As i n C h r i s t t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a man 
c o a l e s c e s w i t h , b u t does n o t i n t e r r u p t , t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e 
Word o f God, so t h e a t t e m p t t o make sense o f t h e w o r l d w i t h o u t t h e i s t i c 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , t h e response o f man s i n c e t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t t o 1 coming 
o f age', i n B o n h o e f f e r ' s phrase,"^ does n o t f r u s t r a t e , b u t coalesces w i t h 
man's a t t e m p t t o u n d e r s t a n d h i m s e l f i n r e l a t i o n t o God. Corres p o n d i n g 
t o t h e completeness o f t h e humanity o f C h r i s t , t o t h e completeness o f 
C h r i s t as a man, i s t h e completeness o f t h e w o r l d as i n t e r p r e t e d 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y , e t h i c a l l y , p o l i t i c a l l y and i n d e e d r e l i g i o u s l y . As t h e 
e t e r n a l Logos i n t h e i n c a r n a t e b e i n g o f C h r i s t d i d n o t undermine t h e 
completeness o f t h e human s u b j e c t , so t h e c r e a t i v e power o f God does 
n o t undermine our a t t e m p t t o make sense o f o u r s e l v e s and o u r w o r l d 
w i t h o u t t h e i s t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . The C h r i s t i a n knows God i n t h e 
completeness o f Jesus C h r i s t as a human b e i n g , n o t i n some ' s u p e r n a t u r a l 
power o r p r o p e r t y 1 o f t h a t b e i n g ; s i m i l a r l y he knows God as t h e C r e a t o r 
o f t h e w o r l d i n t h e e f f o r t t o make sense o f t h a t w o r l d i n i t s own te r m s . 
Theology i s r i g h t l y c e n t r e d upon C h r i s t , and C h r i s t i s r i g h t l y 
p r e s e n t e d as a paradox. But B a r t h c r u c i a l l y l o s e s s i g h t o f t h e paradox, 
n o t o f God i n man n o r o f man i n God, b u t o f God and man. 
There i s a c o n n n e c t i o n between t h e two fundamental d o c t r i n e s o f 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , t h o s e o f t h e Person o f C h r i s t and o f t h e T r i n i t y . I n 
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b o t h t h e t h e o l o g i c a l p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a m y s t e r y e n t a i l s a concern t h a t 
'the c e n t r e cannot h o l d 1 . I n t h e view o f t h e p e r s o n o f C h r i s t as a t 
once a human s u b j e c t and a d i v i n e s u b j e c t , t h e doubt may be expressed 
t h a t t h e y may remain i d e n t i c a l w i t h o u t b e i n g b r o k e n a p a r t i n t o s e p a r a t e 
c o n s t i t u e n t s , whereas i n f a c t what m a i n t a i n s t h e sense o f C h r i s t o l o g y 
i 
i s t h e i r i d e n t i t y . S i m i l a r l y , t h e sense o f t h r e e c o i n h e r i n g persons 
analogous t o t h r e e c e n t r e s o f consciousness w i t h i n t h e b e i n g o f God 
4 
t h r e a t e n s t r i t h e i s m , a l t h o u g h as P r o f e s s o r Hodgson p o i n t s o u t i n a 
most i l l u m i n a t i n g passage, i t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f h i g h e r o r d e r s o f 
b e i n g t o combine u n i t y and i n c r e a s i n g i n n e r c o m p l e x i t y . Such d o c t r i n e s 
a t t e m p t t o r e v e a l i n p o o r and i n a d e q u a t e metaphors t h e c o s t t o God o f 
t h a t a c t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h He remains God even as He reaches t o c o n t a i n 
w i t h i n H i m s e l f t h e b e i n g o f man, n o t e n h y p o s t a t i c a l l y t r a n q u i l l i s e d 
i n t o c o n f o r m i t y w i t h H i m s e l f , b u t s t i l l r a g i n g l i k e Prometheus a t h i s 
f a t e , and t h r e a t e n i n g t o t e a r a God o f l o v e a p a r t . I n s e c t i o n t h r e e 
o f c h a p t e r n i n e , we t r i e d t o r e v i e w t h e r e l a t i o n between t h e d o c t r i n e s 
o f t h e I n c a r n a t i o n and t h e T r i n i t y i n B a r t h ' s t h o u g h t p r e c i s e l y because 
we b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g e l u d e s him. He s e t s o u t f r o m t h e 
v i e w t h a t God i n C h r i s t e x p r e s s e d H i s e t e r n a l b e i n g as 'the One who 
l o v e s i n freedom', and t h e n he draws back f r o m t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s 
r e v e l a t i o n i n terms o f t h e f r e e l y w i l l e d s u b j e c t i o n o f God t o c o n s t r a i n t s 
and l i m i t a t i o n s , w h i c h must, B a r t h presupposes, p r o v i d e Him w i t h an 
' u n g o d l i k e ' e x p e r i e n c e , and w h i c h i n d e e d b e g i n t o t h r e a t e n t h e f o r m 
o f B a r t h ' s own commitment t o t h e s o v e r e i g n t y o f God. I n s t e a d o f 
a c k n o w l e d g i n g God's a c t i o n s i n C h r i s t , B a r t h t i e s t h e C h r i s t o l o g i c a l 
k n o t t o o t i g h t l y , and f a i l s t o r e v e r e n c e God t h e more f o r r e v e r e n c i n g 
t h e freedom and d i g n i t y o f man w i t h w h i c h God s t r u g g l e s t o u n i t e H i m s e l f . 
I n t h e Humanity of Goer* B a r t h c o n s i d e r e d t h a t i n h i s commentary on 
Romans he had o m i t t e d t h e humanity o f God and c o n c e n t r a t e d upon H i s 
d i v i n i t y . Y et i t i s t h e d i v i n i t y o f God, i n a l l i t s f r i g h t e n i n g and 
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t r a g i c weakness, t h a t i s e t e r n a l l y t h e br o k e n man o f N a z a r e t h . I t i s 
t h e i d e n t i t y o f God's e t e r n a l s e l v i n g and a man's s u f f e r i n g t h a t f o r m s , 
i n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e essence o f t h e g o s p e l , and w h i c h d i r e c t s t h e o l o g y , 
i n i t s s e a r c h f o r God, t o a s t u d y o f t h e n a t u r e o f man. We b e l i e v e 
t h a t t h e l a t e r t h o u g h t o f K a r l B a r t h was l e s s t h e r e t r a c t i o n o f e a r l i e r 
c l a i m s t h a n t h e i n c r e a s i n g l y p a i n f u l r e c o g n i t i o n o f an a m b i g u i t y , as 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y p r e s e n t e d i t s e l f t h a t what B a r t h d e t e r m i n e d t o be t h e 
n a t u r e o f God as C r e a t o r and R e c o n c i l e r o f man was a n a t u r e t h a t He 
d e n i e d t o be H i s i n C h r i s t . I n c r e a s i n g l y , t h e c r y which K a r l B a r t h 
echoed, 'Let God be God!' , appeared unable t o match t h e c r y 'God was 
i n C h r i s t ' . v 
For t h e f i n a l q u e s t i o n we w o u l d ask i s t h i s : I s t h e God Who was 
i n C h r i s t b r o k e n and weak upon t h e Cross e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e God Whose 
s o v e r e i g n t y and e l e c t i v e w i l l s t a n d o u t so s t r o n g l y i n t h e volumes o f 
t h e Church Dogmatics? I s t h i s God, who conceded so much o f H i m s e l f t o 
man i n C h r i s t , t h e same God who concedes so l i t t l e t o man's d i g n i t y as 
a f r e e and s i n f u l c r e a t u r e , as we have t r i e d t o argue i n c h a p t e r s i x ? 
B a r t h ' s commentary on Romans made much o f t h e i n s e c u r i t y o f man, 
and h i s s e a r c h f o r 'secure' a l t e r n a t i v e s t o God. But i s t h e r e n o t a 
c e r t a i n ' f a l s e s e c u r i t y ' f o r man i n t h e awareness o f h i s own b e l i t t l e d 
i m potence b e f o r e an a l l - p o w e r f u l God? Man t a k e s much c o m f o r t f r o m t h e 
easy assurance t h a t s i n c e God can save him, He w i l l . But perhaps t h e 
p o i n t about an omnipotence o f l o v e i s t h a t i t c a n n o t , r a t h e r t h a n w i l l 
n o t , save t h o s e who r e j e c t i t . Man's i n s e c u r i t y b e f o r e God l i e s i n t h e 
par a d o x o f an omnipotence o f l o v e w h i c h must be weak, w h i c h f r e e l y 
chooses t o w i t h d r a w f r o m t h a t power over human d e s t i n i e s w h i c h c o u l d , 
a t t h e mere m e r c i f u l whim o f an a l l - p o w e r f u l judgement, f o r g i v e t h e 
o p p r e s s o r a l o n g s i d e t h e oppressed. S u r e l y t h e h a r s h m o r a l terms o f t h e 
g o s p e l a re grounded i n u n c o m f o r t a b l e words o f d i v i n e weakness - ' I never 
knew y o u ' , and t h e t h r e a t e n i n g p r o s p e c t o f t h e ' o u t e r darkness' i n t o 
w h i c h t h e l i g h t q u i t e s i m p l y cannot, go. 
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B a r t h ' s r e v e a l i n g comment i n The Humanity of God suggests t h a t 
i n h i s l a t e r t h o u g h t he d i d n o t q u e s t i o n h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f God's 
d i v i n i t y , b u t r a t h e r added t o i t a s e p a r a t e d i v i n e 'humanity' w h i c h 
must o n l y p e r p e t u a t e t h e d u a l i s m o f h i s t h o u g h t . The p o i n t o f a 
C h r i s t o c e n t r i c t h e o l o g y i s s u r e l y t h a t t h e humanity o f man i s a l l o w e d 
t o c a l l i n t o q u e s t i o n , and even t o d e t e r m i n e , t h e d i v i n i t y o f God, and 
t h a t t h e honour p a i d t o God i n H i s transcendence and s o v e r e i g n t y must 
be d e t e r m i n e d t h r o u g h t h i s C h r i s t o c e n t r i c p e r s p e c t i v e . For t h i s reason 
t h e r e i s , perhaps p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e l a t e r work o f B a r t h , a n o t e o f 
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h o l l o w t r i u m p h a l i s m . Berkouwer i n p a r t i c u l a r has n o t e d t h a t t h e 
' t r i u m p h o f g r a c e ' t h e r e o u t l i n e d l a c k s a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e d e p t h and 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f human s i n ; y e t Berkouwer's r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h i s weakness 
i n B a r t h ' s t h o u g h t needs t o be grounded i n t h e awareness o f a p r o p e r l y 
C h r i s t o c e n t r i c t h e o l o g y , a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h e h a r s h and perhaps 
! 
u n r e m i t t i n g consequences o f human s i n are u n d e r s t o o d i n terms o f t h e 
w i l l i n g n e s s o f God, n o t s i m p l y t o share them b u t t o be d e t e r m i n e d by 
them. The source o f t h e weakness i n B a r t h ' s ' t r i u m p h o f gra c e ' i s h i s 
view o f t h e t r i u m p h o f God, and i t i s t o t h e f o r m o f t h a t t r i u m p h as 
d i s c l o s e d i n Jesus C h r i s t t h a t t h e t h e o l o g i a n must d i r e c t h i s o r her 
t h o u g h t s . 
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Notes on Chapter Ten 
1. We w o u l d agree w i t h N i e b u h r ' s remark t h a t 'Barth's t h e o l o g y i s t o o 
t r a n s c e n d e n t t o o f f e r any guidance f o r t h e d i s c r i m i n a t i n g c h o i c e s 
t h a t p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y c h a l l e n g e s us t o ' . Quoted i n 
H e b b l e t h w a i t e , B., The Adequacy of Christian Ethics, p. 69. 
2. A d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w h i c h s h o u l d n o t be ex a g g e r a t e d . I t was r e g r e t 
o v e r a p a r t i c u l a r emphasis r a t h e r t h a n a r e p u d i a t i o n o f e a r l i e r 
v i e w s , as B a r t h makes c l e a r i n The Humanity of God. B a r t h here 
c o n f e s s e s t h a t i n Romans he had f a i l e d t o t a k e t h e d e i t y o f God 
s e r i o u s l y enough t o see t h a t i t ' i n c l u d e d ' H i s humanity. Yet he 
does n o t a l t e r h i s view o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f humanity and d i v i n i t y , 
and he r e a f f i r m s t h e C h r i s t o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n w h i c h we o u t l i n e d i n 
c h a p t e r n i n e , a t t a c k i n g 'the f a t a l L u t h e r a n d o c t r i n e o f t h e two 
n a t u r e s and t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s ' (p. 5 0 ) . 
3. See h i s Letters and Papers from Prison. The i n f l u e n c e o f C a s s i r e r ' s 
s t u d i e s o f t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t upon B o n h o e f f e r a r e w i d e l y n o t e d ; see 
e.g., J u n g e l , E., Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, p. 2 1 . 
4. I n The Doctrine of the Trinity. The h i s t o r y o f e v o l u t i o n y i e l d s 
t h e o b s e r v a t i o n , he remarks, t h a t t h e h i g h e r t h e form b e i n g observed, 
t h e more i t s u n i t y i s combined w i t h a c o i n h e r i n g c o m p l e x i t y . Thus 
a s t o n e has v e r y l i t t l e i n n e r c o m p l e x i t y ; a p r i m i t i v e l i f e - f o r m 
more, f o r i t may b r e a t h e and r e p r o d u c e ; a h i g h e r form s t i l l may 
have t h e power o f movement, and t h e r e b y i t s c o m p l e x i t y o f f u n c t i o n 
i n c r e a s e w h i l s t i t r e m a i n s , as an i n d i v i d u a l o f a s p e c i e s , a u n i t y . 
I n t h e case o f man, t h e power o f t h o u g h t and memory makes t h e 
c o m p l e x i t y o f each i n d i v i d u a l b e i n g , i t s v a r i e t y o f f u n c t i o n and 
a c t i v i t y a l l l o c a t e d w i t h i n a s i n g l e ' s e l f , even g r e a t e r . I n t h e 
case o f God, we may suppose an even g r e a t e r ' i n n e r c o m p l e x i t y ' 
w i t h i n t h e b e i n g o f t h e godhead, and i t may be t h a t by sp e a k i n g o f 
t h r e e s u b j e c t s o r even c e n t r e s o f consciousness w i t h i n God we do 
g r e a t e s t j u s t i c e i n i m a g i n a t i o n t o t h e complex u n i t y o f t h e D e i t y , 
and do n o t suppose t h a t what i s a c o n d i t i o n o f u n i t y i n man must 
n e c e s s a r i l y be a c o n d i t i o n o f u n i t y i n God. The c o m p l a i n t t h a t 
\ t h r e e p e r s o n s o r s u b j e c t s , even c o n c e i v e d a c c o r d i n g t o 'modern' 
i d e a s o f ' p e r s o n a l i t y 1 i n terms o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , cannot be 
c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n t h e u n i t y o f t h e Godhead, may be an anthropomorphic 
v i e w . The s u g g e s t i o n i n some t h e o l o g i c a l works t h a t a ' l o n e l y ' God 
w o u l d 'need' a w o r l d f o r 'company' suggests t h a t i t i s v e r y easy 
f o r such anthropomorphism t o t a k e h o l d . W h i l e God i s supremely 
p e r s o n a l , He i s n o t a p e r s o n , and t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f u n i t y i n t h e 
p e r s o n a l b e i n g o f God cannot be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f 
u n i t y i n t h e p e r s o n a l b e i n g o f man. 
5. See n o t e 2. 
6. An i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n t o c o n s i d e r i s t h a t o f whether B a r t h ' s 
d o c t r i n e o f e l e c t i o n and h i s ap p a r e n t u n i v e r s a l i s m . d o j u s t i c e t o 
t h i s ' d i g n i t y ' o f I man. I n an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d ' I s K a r l B a r t h a 
u n i v e r s a l i s t ? * (Scottish Journal of Theology, 1967) Rev P r o f e s s o r 
J.D. B e t t i s d e n i e s t h a t B a r t h ' s t h e o l o g y e n t a i l s u n i v e r s a l i s m , f o r 
God i n . n o way 'has' t o save man: 
The p r o b l e m i s n o t t h a t u n i v e r ' s a l i s m t i e s God t o a l l men b u t t h a t 
i t t i e s God t o men a t a l l ( p. 4 2 9 ) . 
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However, B e t t i s ' s a r t i c l e r a i s e s t h e p r o b l e m c o n s i d e r e d i n 
c h a p t e r s i x o f t h i s t h e s i s , namely t h e a p p a r e n t l a c k o f o n t o l o g i c a l 
r e a l i t y t o man's d i s o b e d i e n c e . B e t t i s argues t h a t man's d i s -
o b edience i s ' r e a l b u t i n e f f e c t i v e ' ( p . 4 3 0 ) . Man may d i s o b e y , b u t 
God f r u s t r a t e s t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e u n f a i t h f u l man t o a c t as an 
i n d e p e n d e n t a g e n t : t h e d i s o b e d i e n t man ' i s l i k e a man w a l k i n g down 
t h e u p - e s c a l a t o r . H i s a c t i v i t y c o n t i n u e s , b u t i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s i s 
n u l l i f i e d ' . (p. 4 3 0 ) . The q u e s t i o n c l e a r l y a r i s e s as t o whether 
B e t t i s ' s d i s t i n c t i o n rescues man's d i s o b e d i e n c e f r o m o n t o l o g i c a l 
u n r e a l i t y : i n d e e d what sense does t h e d i s t i n c t i o n make a t a l l ? 
B e t t i s does, however, c l a r i f y e x a c t l y what our o b j e c t i o n i s t o 
B a r t h ' s d o c t r i n e o f e l e c t i o n . I t i s n o t d e n i e d by us t h a t B a r t h 
i s no u n i v e r s a l i s t i n t h e sense t h a t he nowhere argues t h a t God 
'cannot' w i t h h o l d s a l v a t i o n f r o m man: r a t h e r , i t appears t h a t 
w h e t h e r o r n o t God has mercy on a l l , He e f f e c t i v e l y removes f r o m 
man t h e power t o f r u s t r a t e H i s e l e c t i o n . Whether o r n o t God w i l l 
e l e c t a l l i s a secondary q u e s t i o n : o u r o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t man's 
power o f acceptance o r r e j e c t i o n o f God's w i l l appears t o p l a y no 
p a r t i n t h a t f r e e d i v i n e d e c i s i o n . I n d e e d i t c o u l d be argued t h a t 
t h e l a c k o f grounds i n B a r t h ' s t h e o l o g y f o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between 
m o r a l v a l u e s by man, co r r e s p o n d s t o a l a c k o f grounds f o r d i s -
c r i m i n a t i o n by God, i n H i s e l e c t i o n o f man, between v a r i o u s human 
responses t o H i s g r a c e . 
7. See The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth. 
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